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Abstract 
This research explores the management of risk in operations. It explores the different 
structures influencing the treatment of risk and the influence on managerial risk taking 
behaviours. There is limited understanding within the extant literature of the different 
treatment strategies for risk in operations and what influences selection of treatment 
strategy. This research employs an abductive approach iterating between the theoretical and 
empirical. There are four levels of analysis: the firm, the function, the group and the 
individual. The research was conducted in two European Energy companies. The research 
found that there is a complex interaction between organizational structures and individual 
perceptions in managing risk. Corporate risk structures have limited influence on the 
selection of risk treatments. The specification of business function (service or asset focus) 
informs the process of risk management and use of systems. Use of systems and valuation 
techniques underpin the risk prioritization process and specifically the assessment of risk. 
There is an order of decision influences that reflects the Levers of Control (Simons, 1995; 
1998): Risk treatments are prohibited by boundary systems. Secondly, individual’s beliefs 
influence positive selection of treatment, and third where a treatment has not been selected 
through beliefs, the performance system is consulted. The performance system is most likely 
to influence selection of risk acceptance or risk mitigation. It is found that classification of 
risk has more than a semantic influence on perception and risk treatment; it can prohibit 
uses of certain treatments and inform priority. Understanding of the decision process 
matures and increases in complexity in senior managers. It is found that the performance 
system has influences on manager’s beliefs and in the long term, reflecting vision and 
mission the implementation of boundary conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
This research is concerned with the management of risk in operations. Mikes identifies the 
gap in understanding (2009:19) as: 
What do risk managers do and what function and structural arrangements organize their 
activities? … How are control systems used by decision makers? 
This research extends this understanding from an Operations Management standpoint. 
1.1 Research Rationale  
The idea for this research began as I worked as a general manager in an energy company. I 
had operated across a number of functions, roles and variety of levels in management. As I 
became more senior, and exposed to increasingly strategic considerations, it became 
apparent that my management of resources in operations and through change was 
underpinned by an overarching requirement to manage risk. For example, I was managing 
my resources against a conflicting set of demands from different clients, trying to minimise 
the potential for defaulting against well-established contracts, choosing a path that would 
expose the operation to a minimal level of financial or reputational loss.  
I found it difficult to reconcile the actions of my colleagues, who seemed to be taking risks, 
where I felt constrained by the requirements on me from the firm. As I changed from retail 
(sales and service), to asset (power generation) and finally to trading I sought reference 
points to what was successful risk management. Understanding of this was poorly defined. 
On seeking promising practice from practitioner and academic sources I found that risk 
management was understood within the finance discipline, and less well defined in 
operations management. Understanding from financial disciplines aligned to my role in 
trading, but did not explain the risks I was managing in retail and asset management. The 
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primary tool available to me in steering the operation was the company’s performance 
management system. 
The performance management system, and specifically the Balanced Scorecard, appeared as 
a tool for aligning operational objectives with strategic requirements. But there was a gap in 
understanding as to how a performance management system is used to manage risk, risk 
taking or even the perception of risk. As my responsibility for employees increased from a 
handful to a few hundred, and across multiple locations I became increasingly reliant on the 
performance management system as a tool to direct the operation functions. The risks I was 
managing were increasing in magnitude (i.e. value) and complexity (i.e. integration of risks). 
With this increased responsibility, the aggregation of risks being reported and managed had 
changed from transactional (cost-benefit) to complex priority and risk-bearing decisions. 
My concerns were discussed with the company’s executive management team. It appeared 
that I was not the only manager interested in developing an understanding on how to 
manage risk through the organization with more precision. My enquiry led me to 
understand a hidden process of risk management, driven by the corporate functions, laden 
with reporting requirements and with limited operational engagement. 
I returned to the executive team with a developed understanding of the process, but felt this 
was still poorly understood. Risk management was becoming an increasingly important 
discipline within the sector, and the complexity was increasing because of growing political 
and public interest in the energy sector. The executive team felt that the practitioner 
literature was limited and shallow in its understanding of risk management levers. That 
understanding was based on a simplified and mechanistic process of data collection and 
stakeholder management. They felt it missed the complexity of the energy sector’s 
environment, where there are many different stakeholder demands and many different 
types of risk being faced. The Chief Finance Officer (CFO) supported this concern, and 
articulated the business imperative behind developing an improved understanding of 
performance managing risk:  
3 
 
“I want to understand the mechanisms available to me to change our risk management 
process, whether we can operate like financial institutions in our assessment of risk, or 
whether we are fundamentally different. I wish to be able to desensitise certain aspects 
of our organisation and turn-on others.”  CFO, UK Energy Company. 
During early analysis, it was apparent that although trading activities existed as part of some 
energy companies, the greatest complexities arose where organizations were reconciling the 
different issues in pure risk (the risk of loss). There were issues in running parallel pure and 
speculative risk (the potential for loss and gain) management processes. It was this 
reconciliation that was not effective.  
Looking beyond my company, it was apparent that energy companies showed an intent to 
develop their risk management process, wishing to make this a function for competitive 
advantage and not just a process ‘of hygiene’ (i.e. a task required of them by regulators and 
auditors). There was a common question, whether financial institutions should be a model 
for risk management, and replicated in energy. This was a reflection on the Basel Accord 
(2006; 2009), which defines banking supervision requirements through a set of voluntary 
standards and risk classifications, therefore the question was asked: 
“Should the energy sector adopt the classification defined by the Basel Accord as a 
suitable standard for their risk management process?” CFO, UK Energy Company. 
Scanning the environment that was accessible to me, there seemed a large variety of 
different performance systems in use; some were used to record performance and others to 
direct activity and priority.  
This is where the interest developed for developing a deeper understanding of the 
performance management of risk in the energy sector. This research clearly has managerial 
implications, but as the next section shows it has the potential to make a theoretical 
contribution. 
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1.2 Theoretical Background 
Understanding of management of risk in operations is covered across several bodies of 
work: Performance measurement (Bourne et al., 2000; Neely & Austin, 2002; Otley, 2008) 
and performance management (Franco-Santos et al., 2007 Neely, 2005; Otley, 1999), risk 
management (Chapman, 2006; Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007; Kleindorfer & Saad., 2005) and 
behavioural science (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Pennington & Tuttle, 2007; Peterson & 
Beach, 1967; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
The performance measurement and management literature is well established. It has a 
long lineage both in Operations and Performance Management (e.g. Bourne et al., 2000; 
Neely & Adams, 2002; Otley, 1999) and Management Accounting (Anthony, 1965; Mikes, 
2011; Power, 2005; 2009). There is a difference in focus between the Operations 
Management and Management Accounting communities. Management Accounting has been 
developed with a financial focus (cf. Mikes, 2009). Operations Management has been more 
holistic in its understanding, it has developed an interest in both the breadth of stakeholders 
and the mapping of strategy into objectives (cf. Kaplan & Norton, 2008). Over the last 
decade these two communities (i.e. performance management and measurement) have 
converged on a discussion that is now harder to separate (cf. Otley, 1999). 
The literature on control systems (Anthony, 1965), performance management systems 
(Kaplan & Norton, 2008) and performance measurement systems (Bourne et al., 2000; Neely, 
2005) overlaps (cf. Franco-Santos et al., 2007). It may appear to be a semantic issue 
between the different terms management and measurement. However the literature does 
clarify that the performance measurement system is a wholly encompassed aspect of the 
performance management system (Otley, 2008). Reconciliation of these classifications is not 
well defined with management control system literature, so leaves ambiguity in the 
literature. 
The risk literature is less well defined. It is diverse and the boundaries of the subject are 
fuzzy. As a topic that has interest across all disciplines, discussion of risk is heavily 
5 
 
intertwined in a breadth of subjects. There are a number of approaches to describing this 
body of work: community specific discussions of risk (i.e. the banking sector), discipline 
based perspectives (e.g. supply chain, Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007), project management (Raz 
& Michael, 2001), and theoretical discussions of risk (e.g. inherent and residual risks and the 
meaning of probability, cf. Zwikael & Sadeh, 2007). There are research themes on different 
aspects of the risk cycle (e.g. valuation techniques, Chapman, 2006). Finally, there are 
defined risk management frameworks (e.g. Enterprise Risk Management) and risk 
standards (e.g. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 2004). 
All of these bodies of work provide an understanding of risk and how it may be managed. 
The literature on risk appears to be dominated by discussion of different classifications of 
risk (cf. Power, 2005), and defining appropriate risk management cycles (COSO, 2004; 
2004b). This again is more than a semantic issue (Power, 2005). Operational risk is a 
description of risk from the Basel Accord (Basel Committee, 2005; 2006), and banking 
sector explicitly. It is a risk originating from people, processes and systems (Basel 
Committee, 2004). This is different to risk in operations (Lewis, 2003). Risk in operations is 
broader in understanding; it includes a multiplicity of risk types (cf. Dey 2004), and a 
description of risks occurring in the transformation process. However, understanding of 
Operational risk is important in the body of risk literature. It is often confused as a term, and 
used extensively by practitioners. It is well defined in its relationship with Credit and 
Market risk and the associated valuation approaches. In practice there was confusion in the 
term, as either a specific and technical classification or a more general catch-all term 
(Power, 2009). 
Besides the sector-specific definitions of risk, there is a body of work discussing industrial 
approaches to risk management. These are the risk standards or frameworks. Current 
thinking is that risk management should be an iterative process (BSI, 2009; Chapman, 
2006). It should cycle through: identification, assessment, analysis, treatment and control.  
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The best known of the risk management frameworks is ERM (Enterprise Risk Management). 
ERM provides definitions, process and structure for managing risk (Beasley et al., 2010). 
However it is understood that implementation is often imperfect. There are a number of 
standards that pertain to an ERM approach; these have different focuses and definitions 
embedded within each (e.g. COSO ERM). 
Referring to practice, risk management effectiveness is viewed as a product of its decisions. 
These decisions are discrete, with limited choices to be made, for example mitigation (cf. 
Slack et al., 2010), risk transfer (Sharpe, 1997) and termination (Hopkin, 2012). This 
simplicity is surprisingly limited in coverage as a complete discussion in extant literature. 
There is empirical and theoretical discussion of risk treatments (i.e. outsource, Teng et al., 
1995), but this is conducted either as individual treatments or at an abstract level that has 
limited insight into how these different choices are influenced. 
The third body of work reviewed is from the behavioural sciences. This is a large body of 
knowledge, which has many features and sub-topics. The sub-topic of interest is decisions 
under uncertainty. This literature (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Peterson & Beach, 1967; 
Pennington & Tuttle, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) provides an explanation to many of 
the human factors seen in risk management. Prospect Theory is highly cited and critically 
reviewed, as a theory to understand the influence on risk decisions. Prospect theory 
provides a link to many of the different concepts underpinning an understanding of 
decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). They define the different decision-making 
strategies that people use (Payne et al., 1988), how time pressure affects these decisions 
(Pennington & Tuttle, 2007), and further how weighting (Wedell & Senter, 1997), bias (Hsee 
& Hastie, 2006) and aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998) can be of influence. This 
knowledge provides an understanding that risk is a subjective phenomenon, which has 
direct impact on the organization and the individual.  
In bringing these different bodies of work together, four theoretical frameworks are 
discussed: Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005), ERM Ideal Types (Mikes, 2009 & 2011), The 
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Levers of Control (Simons, 1994; 1995) and Principle Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
rationale behind using these frameworks is explained in sections: 2.3.3, 2.3.4, 2.8.7 and 
2.6.13.  
So, although there are a few well-established frameworks and theories to understand the 
management of risk, there is a gap in understanding as to how organizations and managers 
control risk decisions. Risk treatments (e.g. mitigation), are the strategies organizations can 
deploy (Hopkin, 2012). The influence of different controls, performance systems and 
behaviour are not understood as to their effect on selecting these risk treatments. Is this a 
matter of individual beliefs and frames of reference or is this a rational and consistent 
process of treatment selection? Where there is an environment presenting a multiplicity of 
risk types (e.g. safety and reputational risk), there is a lack of understanding as to the 
different perspectives these risk types engender.  
1.3 The Purpose of this Research 
The purpose of this research is to understand the treatment strategies for risk in 
operations and what influences selection of treatment strategy; therefore contributing 
to the knowledge of managing risk in operations. As this research is situated as a study in 
operations, this research distinguishes between managing risk as the potential for risk and 
reward, and risk as the management of loss, arising from operational activities (e.g. power 
generation). 
Inherent in these questions, the different levels of the firm need to be understood as to their 
influence on risk management and evidence the inputs and outputs of the process. Each 
level of the organization, starting at the firm (representing the central and corporate 
perspective) provides an understanding of how the next level is being managed. 
Performance system literature (e.g. Bourne et al., 2000) suggests that mature and integrated 
approaches support an iterative development and check on strategy. The performance 
system (or control system) can be understood as a mechanism to develop and communicate 
objectives and measure activities against objectives. In large corporations (as seen in the 
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energy sector) the use of performance systems are desired to be a framework that 
disseminates these objectives and measures across a distributed (both technically and 
geographically) organization. This research takes a top-down approach (in order of: firm, 
function, managerial group and finally individual) to reflect one view of the performance 
system. 
The Business-Units (BU) report into the corporate functions, they are the next level of the 
organization. These are semi-autonomous organizations delivering to a specific market, 
often independent of other BUs. There are several cases available for comparison, but the 
greatest polar examples are the retail functions (selling power and gas to the market) and 
the generation functions (the production of Power).  
It was observed during the design of the research that different management communities 
existed within these functions, relating to levels of authority in the organization. These 
communities have access to different types and degrees of resource (i.e. employees and 
capital). There was a presumption that different management communities have different 
levels of strategic and operational demands and therefore access to knowledge (cf. Yang et 
al., 2009), this forms the third level of analysis: the group-level.  
The most granular unit of analysis is the individual. The organization is made up of a 
structured collection of individuals, each which bring with them different experience, 
judgement and personal contingencies (e.g. risk aversion).  
These four levels of analysis provide the structure of this research; each level informing the 
next on how to operate and potentially how to manage risk. The research method also has to 
reflect this evolution of the frame of reference; this is the use of the abductive approach.  
1.4 Contribution of the Research 
This research makes contribution to both theory and practice. The analysis found that 
replicating Operational risk practices (from the financial community) is not appropriate for 
the energy sector. Its purpose is different and does not reflect the multiplicity of risk types 
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in the energy sector. Further, there were differences in the desired and observed influences, 
for example ERM adoption was meant to influence the design of the risk management 
process, whereas this influence was limited as it did not permeate into the BUs; where local 
culture and market influences dominated. Academically there is ambiguity in the literature, 
there is limited understanding of how different levels of the firm interplay. 
It was found that the corporate functions focus on standards and communication. The 
business units operate in specific disciplines, and define the system and micro-processes in 
their organizations. In moving to a study of managerial groups, the focus becomes the 
mental models existing within these communities. Finally, individuals reflect their own 
beliefs, sensitivities to measures and personal experience in decision-making. This is clearly 
a multi-level phenomenon. 
The research extended understanding of Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control. It found the 
levers have order of influence. Further, that managerial belief was affected by the 
classification of risk. The research showed different decision models existed between senior 
and middle managers. Fundamentally, the influence of function has great bearing on the risk 
management process, risk perceptions and behaviours. 
A framework identified for risk classification offers the practitioner a standardised 
approach to integrate different risk types. Academically it exposes the challenges in 
managing an environment which has a multiplicity of risk types. 
For practice, this research responds to the question of what structures and influences are in 
force to manage risk in operations, this is seen as a process of selecting risk treatments. This 
research exposes the influences on the different paths to treatment selection; where each 
treatment (or absence of) infers different levels of risk taking or aversion. 
This research highlights a number of further research opportunities, which through 
extension would provide a greater understanding of the phenomena of risk management in 
10 
 
operations. From the results there are opportunities to extend this understanding into other 
sectors that demonstrate similar multiplicity of risk types.  
1.5 Research Structure 
This research uses an abductive method. Abductive methods cycle between observations of 
the environment and explanations. At each phase the research reviews the findings, leading 
to a set of observations, which the next phase of research then seeks to develop. The 
adoption of an abductive approach is an iterative approach to extend theory or offer new 
theory. It is a cycle of theory matching, observation and suggestion (cf. Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). Figure 1.1 summarises the structure of this research. 
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Following the introduction, a literature review is presented (Chapter 2); this is broken into 
three main sections: Risk, Decisions Under Uncertainty and Performance Systems. 
Chapter 3 is the research strategy; it provides a structure and philosophical stance relevant 
to the whole thesis.  
Chapters 4 to 7 report the four levels of analysis. Each chapter contains a description and 
justification of method. Next, results and analysis are presented, and finally a discussion 
(first within the level, secondly between levels). The levels of analysis are as follows: 
 Chapter 4, Firm-level: Exploratory Case Study, thematically analysed; 
 Chapter 5, Function-level: Exploratory Case Study, thematically analysed; 
 Chapter 6, Group-level: Exploratory Case Study, thematically analysed and casually 
mapped; 
 Chapter 7, Individual-level: Statistical Analysis of perceptions and risk treatment use. 
Chapter 8 synthesises the different points of understanding and develops a new model of 
cause-consequence, and extensions to the levers of control and treatment selection. It 
concludes with a discussion of the impact to practice, and a sponsor summary (responding 
to practitioner questions). 
Chapter 9 is the conclusion, summarising the contributions to theory and practice, 
limitations and extensions to the research.  
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Chapter 2 
2. Foundational Literature 
There are three main bodies of work reviewed in this chapter:  
- Risk (including ontology of risk, risk management standards, risk in operations, 
Operational risk and risk treatments); 
- Decisions under Uncertainty; and  
- Performance Systems.  
The literature on risk spans many disciplines and its boundaries are imprecise. Risk is 
discussed as a product of risk and reward in the finance community (Damodaran, 2002), as 
a focus of control of imprecision in the accounting community (Zebda, 2011), as a source of 
loss in Operations Management (Slack et al., 2010), Supply Chain (Kliendorfer et al., 2003) 
and Project Management (Huchzermeier & Loch, 2001). In Performance Management 
literature the focus is on risk as a strategic concern (Kaplan & Norton, 2008), as well as a 
representation of the organization’s culture (Mikes, 2009; Power, 2005), it is seen as a 
highly practical discipline with precise valuation methods (i.e. Value at Risk [VaR]) (Tang, 
2006) but yet can be subjective in nature (Kapteyn & Teppa, 2002).  
The management of risk is the main theme of this research. The first section covers the 
academic perspective of risk: The Ontology of Risk (section 2.1). Next, practitioner risk 
management standards (section 2.2), and following, two main bodies of risk management 
literature are reviewed:  
a) The financial perspective of risk, this is a review of Operational risk (section 2.3). 
Operational risk (Basel Committee, 2005; 2006) is the first point of reference both as a 
term in industry and as a community that the energy industry wish to emulate; 
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b) Risk in operations and Supply chain risk (2.4), is reviewed as a rich body of risk 
literature. Kleindorfer & Saad (2005) are a valuable point of reference in this domain. 
The final risk section (section 2.5) covers risk treatments (e.g. Insurance). Each treatment is 
analysed in turn. 
The second section (section 2.6) reviews a number of concepts from the psychology 
literature and specifically Decisions Under Uncertainty. This is a broad field of work, it 
begins with the understanding of Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1984). This 
provides an entry point for discussion of a number of sub-themes in this literature: a) 
Intuition and reasoning, b) Framing, c) Decision strategies, d) Time pressure, e) Information 
load, f) Rationality, g) Informational attributes, h) Weighting and i) Biases. These are chosen 
in context of the relationship between the risk management and performance management 
processes. 
The third section (section 2.7), reviews the performance management literature. The 
boundaries of the performance management and control system literature are better 
defined than the risk literature. This is a field dominated by a number of clearly defined 
approaches: The Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and the Performance Prism (i.e. “Contemporary 
Performance Measurement Systems” Franco-Santos et al., 2012), and from the management 
accounting literature, the discussion of Management Control Systems (MCS). To develop 
beyond specific implementations (i.e. BSC), and in line with the philosophy adopted, the 
performance system is deconstructed into a number of functions.  
Figure 2.1 summarises the relationships between domains of knowledge.  
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When defining risk there are ontological disputes1, not apparent in common usage. The term 
can be understood in either an objective or a subjective sense. The objective view exhibits a 
positivist’s standpoint, as it assumes uniform access to knowledge and that quantitative 
representation of risk is reality, regardless of individual context. The subjective view of risk 
is aligned to a Realist or Constructivist philosophy, where risk is a socially mediated 
construct, based on the perception of the individual. 
Knight (1921:233) defines risk as “measureable uncertainty”. This differentiates the term 
from chance or luck. It is a definition cited in social sciences (e.g. Shane & Venkataraman, 
2000), decision sciences (e.g. Slovic, 2000), and organisational behaviour (e.g. Teece et al., 
1994). Knight narrows his definition that uncertainty has two potential offspring: 
measurable uncertainty and unmeasurable uncertainty. Measureable uncertainty is risk, the 
other uncertainty.  
Risk defined as measureable uncertainty infers probability in the definition of risk, and 
whether measurability is considered as subjective or objective. Knight (1921) is able to 
balance this dichotomy by viewing the two sources of measurability as a priori or statistical. 
A priori is a calculation based on deductive reasoning, and statistical is based on past 
experience (to calculate the future). Although now dated, Knight’s view is still considered 
“the principle source for our understanding of uncertainty” (Spender, 1998:240).  
Knight (1921) suggests that an a priori approach is dominant in business almost to the point 
of exclusion of the statistical approach. It is a view disputed by financial and insurance 
communities; because of their prolific use of statistical techniques, for example VaR (Allen & 
Bali, 2007; Basu et al., 2011; Chavez-Demoulin et al., 2006; Jarrow & Yu, 2001; Palomba & 
Riccetti, 2012; Santos et al., 2013; Tang, 2006). His concept may be best summarised 
through his comment that “unmeasurability” is “unknowability”.  
                                                             
1 The study of ontology is the study of what is being. Understanding whether objective probability exists is an issue in 
defining risk (Finetti, 1970). 
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Finite intelligence prevents absolute outcomes from being predicted (Knight, 1921). This 
supports the subjective position, as intelligence is specific to the individual or group. Knight 
therefore takes the view that measurability is subjective to the individual it concerns.  
De Finetti (translation by Machi & Smith, 1970) emotively proposes a thesis that “Probability 
does not exist”; this is contradictory, that in calculating objective probability, an assumption 
of perfect knowledge forms the basis of facts from which to calculate risk. If knowledge were 
perfect, it follows that there are no unknowns. Therefore there are no random events; every 
action is to have a causal mechanism. It becomes our subjective understanding of them that 
differs. Where all the nuances of events and triggers that affect outcome are understood, 
objective probability becomes certainty, (e.g. a man jumping from a plane without a 
parachute, Holton, 2004). Here, there is no risk, only certainty (of death). All the events and 
triggers are understood to conclusion. To apply this across all potential situations requires 
an extension of existing beliefs, and assumes that our understanding of the world and 
society is complete. Knowledge of the world and society is incomplete, but “probabilities are 
subject to change as our information improves” (North, 1968:13). The value of De Finetti’s 
emotive proposition is an erosion of the term objective probability and moves to reinforce 
subjective probability as the convincing interpretation. North (1968:13) supports this: “We 
must conclude that the probability assignment depends on our present state of knowledge”. 
De Finetti’s and Knight’s perspectives are linked by Holton (2004). The definition of risk 
requires exposure (Holton, 2004). Holton sees Knight’s separation of objective and subjective 
probability less as a discussion of knowledge rather as the division between human beliefs 
and whether probabilities can be real. Holton’s contribution is the consideration for 
exposure, or relationship with a Being. The risk of an event occurring where there is no 
subject, to have exposure without subject makes risk materially irrelevant (Holton, 2004). 
Because risk is latent, exposure must be extended to exposure to the proposition of the event, 
this is supported by Harland et al. (2003: 53) where “extent of exposure to a risk” is a 
requirement. This supports Knight’s view of unknowability, as a consequence where the 
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impact is owned. It seems difficult to reproduce a grammatically and logically valid 
conversation that doesn’t establish exposure in risk. By the nature of language, risk is 
uncertainty of outcome to something or someone.  
Risk is therefore comprised of uncertainty (Knight, 1921), subjective probability (Finetti, 
1970) and ownership; what Holton (2004) describes as exposure. This provides a grounding 
to review the specific and practitioner discussions of risk. In management science (e.g. Gan 
et al., 2004) and psychology (e.g. Slovic, 2000) there is an assumption of these 
considerations; although they are largely consistent with this understanding. The next 
section changes perspective from a theoretical discussion of risk to practitioner descriptions 
of risk, as loss or imprecision.  
2.1.1 Risk as Loss or Imprecision 
Having deconstructed the ontological description of risk, recent literature segments the 
term risk, often within specific contexts. Different communities describe risks by different 
terms, for example: financial loss (Basel Committee, 2006), reputational damage (Eccles et 
al., 2007) and reward (Al-Binali, 1999). Although there is commonality between disciplines, 
there is a difference between the financial definitions of risk as variability (the possibility 
and impact of inaccuracy or imprecision), and in operations as incident or accident (loss of 
availability) (cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). The difference between finance and operations 
perspectives is discussed in section 2.3. Operation’s perspectives have greater focus on 
negative outcomes (cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 2012), described as downside risk. But downside risk 
is inseparable from opportunity for financial gain (Law, 2009:485). This infers that risk is 
imperfection in output of an event. Thus both positive and negative outcome is included 
within the term. Risk in finance, is more broadly situated as: 
“The likelihood that we will receive a return on an investment that is different from 
the return we expected to make” (Damodaran, 2002:32)  
or:  
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“Variance from the mean” (March & Shapira, 1987) 
The interpretation of risk as downside risk maps to Knight’s perspective of risk as 
probability of loss or unfavourable contingency. This is seen in examples from the 
Operations Management and Supply Chain communities. For Harland et al. (2003:52), risk is 
“a chance of danger, damage, loss, injury or any other undesired consequences.”, or as 
“…probability of loss” (Gillet, 1997; Mitchell, 1995). 
 The difference between Knight’s unfavourable contingency and March and Shapira’s 
variance from the mean, is the contention between distinct disciplines (i.e. the Financial and 
Strategic communities). Variance from the mean indicates the potential for impact as loss or 
gain, and highlights probability.  
These definitions support both upside and downside outcomes of risk. Banks (2004) 
provides a language for these differences. Together upside and downside consequences are 
termed speculative risk (Banks, 2004:4; Williams, 1966:577). Where only the negative 
consequence (i.e. risk of loss) of an event is described, this is pure risk (Banks, 2004:4). Both 
of these definitions are largely undisputed. In an industrial context risk is considered more 
of an issue of loss than of potential reward: “Risk today connotes less opportunity for gain and 
more possibility of loss. Risk is broadly thought of as involving a threat, hazard, danger or some 
form of harm” (Gephart et al., 2009:147). 
Therefore risk may be a statement of imprecision resulting in loss (pure) or as loss or gain 
(speculative). The next section reviews a description of the risk as pre-treatment (inherent) 
or post-treatment (residual). 
2.1.2 Residual and Inherent Risk 
The terms residual risk and inherent risk are another lens to describe risk (cf. Zwikael & 
Sadeh, 2007). In definition it has association to the management of downside risk, as it is 
reflects on the treatment of negative outcome. Residual risk is the risk left in an environment 
post-treatment (Bell et al., 2001). Inherent risk is the risk that exists in the environment 
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prior to treatment (Bettman, 1973). The relationship between the two terms is the 
treatment being employed, and the reduction of perceived exposure to risk. 
Inherent risk is described in a number of different communities but dominated by analysis 
of auditor’s judgements, for example Bell et al. (2001) and Taylor (2000). Inherent risk is 
not restricted to auditing and medical communities; it is used to understand activities such 
as product and service design (Shariff & Leong, 2009). A definition of Inherent Risk is “the 
latent risk a product class holds for a consumer…” (Bettman, 1973:184). Removed from the 
context of marketing research, the definition of inherent risk may be better understood as: 
The pre-treatment level of risk, (i.e. the latent risk that exists in an environment or process). 
The valuation may be based on either qualitative or quantitative appraisal (Mikes, 2009; 
2011). 
Residual risk is the post-treatment level of risk, the relationship between inherent risk and 
residual risk described as: “to reduce inherent risk to an acceptable level. In contrast business 
risk is by definition, a residual risk that, in principle, cannot be eliminated or reduced below a 
certain level.” (Bell et al., 2001:36). This definition assumes that treatment is effective and 
complete in its application. Figure 2.2 provides a visual representation of residual and 
inherent risk as understood from these descriptions. 
 
Figure 2.2 Relationship between Inherent and Residual Risk 
Bettman’s (1973) and Bell et al.’s (2001) definitions of residual and inherent risks are 
specific to an individual risk. They do not describe the relationship it has with the 
 
Level of risk 
Inherent Risk (pre-treatment); risk 
that exists in the system 
Residual Risk (post-treatment); risk 
that cannot be eliminated 
Effect of risk treatment, 
decreasing the level of risk 
21 
 
environment or the causal influence of the risk. A description of this relationship is 
provided, as specific, systematic or systemic risk. 
2.1.3 Defining the Relations of Risks  
Specific, Systematic and Systemic are descriptions of the source of risk. It is unusual in the 
literature to see these different classifications discussed in parallel with the technical 
classification. There is a focus on either the type of risk (e.g. financial risk) or a discussion of 
the context (e.g. a systematic risk). These different relationships are irrespective of 
speculative or pure definition. Instead they specify the inter-relationships of risks between 
organisational and industrial boundaries. Specific, systematic and systemic risk, are terms of 
process, organizational and market relationship.  
 Specific risk is a risk that affects an individual or individual company; its existence is 
brought about though history, culture, and position. (cf. Kasperson et al. 1988:184). 
 Systematic risk is a risk that affects all players in the market; regardless of history, 
culture, market position the risk exists in the marketplace itself (cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 
2012; Pfohl et al., 2010).  
 Systemic risk (Ackermann et al., 2007; Kaplan et al., 2009), is “the risk or probability of 
breakdown in an entire system” (Kaufman & Scott, 2003:371) a macroeconomic “chain-
reaction or domino effect of sequential failures” (Bliss & Kaufman, 2006:59). These are 
large-scale breakdowns, caused by highly correlated exposures result in a domino effect 
on the system (Elsinger et al., 2006). Systemic Operational Risk (Patrick, 2012) or 
Operational risk as a cause of systemic risk (Andreas, 2010) is a more fundamental risk, 
which may span multiple sectors and industries. Examples can be seen in the 2007/9 
financial crisis, where banking failures led to realisation of risks within the insurance 
sector. This ecology of risk, as a series of inter-related system failures is specifically 
identified by the Basel accord (Basel Committee, 2006:s.49 xvi). Although with 
hindsight, Basel’s omission to regulate against this risk category may attract significant 
criticism.  
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The definitions discussed in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, show that beyond the description of 
risk as variance from the mean, or in a practitioner focus the discussion of a cause or type 
(i.e. reputational risk), risk has a number of different relationships used to describe it: 
 Risk as a statement of untreated or treated state (inherent or residual); 
 Risk as a statement of relationship (specific, systematic or systemic). 
These classifications are not mutually exclusive; therefore a risk in operations may be 
described both in terms of its state (a residual risk) or the relationship it holds (a systematic 
risk). These terms permeate into the language and expressions of risk within the 
organizations and risk management standards; they have a specific meaning in their usage.  
At a practitioner level, moving beyond the detailed classifications and descriptions of risk, 
risk management standards are considered, providing a framework for risk management 
and risk management activities. The risk management standards are a set of codified 
approaches. Their development is driven by a desire to standardise approaches.  
2.2 Risk Management Standards 
This section of the literature review outlines what is meant by a risk management standard 
and its purpose. It highlights that the standards are contextually benign and designed to be a 
framework that may be applied across a variety of industries. There is a similarity of process 
order advocated by the different standards; it provides a structure by which to understand 
the risk management process. 
A Risk Management Standard is understood to be a definition of the strategic process of risk 
management including setting of objectives, routines for identification, analysis and the 
approach to treatment and control of risks (Federation of European Risk Management 
Associations, 2013; Hopkin, 2004:57). Risk Management Standards provide consistency in 
terminology, process, structure and adoption of best practice in managing risk (AIRMIC, 
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2002). There are six risk management standards occurring across sectors with regular 
usage2: 
a. A Risk Management Standard AIRMIC/ ALARM/ IRM (2002); 
b. Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360 (2004); 
c. Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework COSO (ERM COSO) (2004); 
d. ISO31000 International Standard (2009); 
e. BSI British Standard BS ISO31000 (2008, 2011); 
f. Criteria of Control (CoCo), Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (1995). 
There is an increasing number of sector specific standards being developed, e.g. NHSLA Risk 
Management Standard (2013), this is the National Health services Litigation Authority Risk 
Management Standards. There is no such standard identified in the Energy sector. 
From the standards identified above, three are of importance in the context of this research: 
1) BS31000 (British Standard 311000: 2011 as basis of analysis); 
2) ERM Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO, 
2004); 
3) AIRMIC/ALARM/IRM, A Risk Management Standard (2002). 
AIRMIC and BS310000 are standards known to be in use in the European Energy sector 
(2009). Use of The Australian Standard (AS4360) could not be evidenced in the energy 
sector (2009), probably because ISO31000 replaced AS4360 between 2003-2006. Prior to 
this AS4360 was the most widely recognised approach to risk management (Hopkin, 
2004:57). ISO31000 is an applied standard for certification of good practice, recognised by 
the British government, and a trusted standard for specialist risk management practitioners 
(Chapman, 2006).  
                                                             
2 Two pieces of legislation, not considered risk management standards, but understood to have an 
impact on the discipline (Chapman, 2006), because they legislate on the practice of risk management, 
are: 1) Sarbanex Oxley Act in the USA (2002); 2) Financial services and Markets Act in the UK (2000), 
and the earlier Hampel Committee (1998). 
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COSO is supported by: the American Accounting Association (AAA), the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and Financial Executives International (FEI). 
Organizations in the energy sector, e.g. Électricité de France (2009) could be found that 
explicitly used this standard.  
The energy companies refer internally to their use of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as 
a methodology for risk management, for example RWE (2009) and E.ON (2009). In their 
definitions it was not clear whether ERM was an adoption of a prescribed standard or a 
philosophy toward risk management. However, Chapman (2006) describes ERM as:  
“a systematic process embedded in a company’s system of internal control 
(spanning all business activity), to satisfy policies effected by its board of directors, 
aimed at fulfilling its business objectives and safeguarding both the shareholder’s 
investment and the company’s assets… this process is to manage and effectively 
control risk appropriately.” (Chapman, 2006:8).  
It is found that ERM approaches are embedded within a number of different standards (e.g. 
COSO). Instead of ERM specifying a precise process, it indicates an approach toward risk 
management, a move from silo to integrated approach (Chapman, 2006). It is understood 
that ERM is an overlapping term or even a risk management methodology; sometimes used 
in conjunction with COSO (i.e. COSO ERM).  
Chapman’s (2006) description is arguably a description aimed at the private sector 
and with an Anglo-American influence (because shareholders, not stakeholders are 
represented). However it is a description highlighting the integrated and strategic 
nature of ERM. ERM adoption is driven by a desire to manage risk more holistically 
(Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003), and is associated with internal control and audit. Both 
COSO and the British Standard refer to the practice of ERM: 
“Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of 
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directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” (COSO, 2004b:2) 
“Risk management is not a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main 
activities and processes of the organization. Risk management is part of the 
responsibilities of management and an integral part of all organizational 
processes, including strategic planning and all project and change management 
processes.” (British Standards Institution, 2009:4) 
ERM is therefore an integrated risk management framework; it expands the focus of risk 
management from traditional risk practices (i.e. financial) towards a breadth of risks 
(O’Donnell, 2005). It is a standardised process, usually managed from a central team within 
the organization. ERM adoption promises mistakes of the past will be mitigated (Power, 
2009), and that all risks are owned (Nocco & Stulz, 2006). The appointment of Chief Risk 
Officers (CRO) is closely associated to the development of an ERM approach (Kaplan et al., 
2009). A CRO is required to communicate the management of risks to external stakeholders 
(Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Appointment of a CRO is just one of a number of requirements of 
an ERM implementation. This journey of implementation may be lengthy (Beasley et al., 
2010). Beasley et al. (2010) suggest that an organization’s adoption of ERM will be a 
progressive journey, and that both a decision to implement and the implementation itself 
are as much concerns for practice as the theoretical basis of holistic risk management, and 
the classification of risk itself. 
In direct contrast to the earlier ontological discussion, the review of risk management 
standards reflects the practical nature of risk management: What is the terminology being 
promoted? What components form the prescribed standard? What is the overall objective of 
the standard? Three of these different standards (the three most commonly observed 
standards in use within the European Energy Industry, (cf. Beasley et al., 2008; Voronca, 
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2012) are reviewed in turn, in order to expose the similarities and differences. Although 
showing commonality, there are subtle differences in the focus and order of the process, and 
the language used. 
2.2.1 British Standard (BS ISO31000) 
BS ISO31000 (BSI, 2009) is the British Standard of the ISO31000 implementation; this 
document is used as basis of review. The British Standard emphasises that it intends to 
provide principles and guidelines, rather than advocating a set of specific processes. It is, and 
states to be, a generic approach to risk management. The emphasis is on providing a 
common language, a set of terms and objectives in effective risk management processes. 
Purdy (2010) summarises the objectives of ISO31000 as providing: one vocabulary, a set of 
performance criteria, standardised process and integrated decision-making. There are 
several features of BS ISO31000:  
 The standard separates risk management into principles, framework and processes.  
 Principles are applicable regardless of context. These principles include creation and 
protection of value, integrating with organisational processes, that it is part of decision-
making (this infers taking reasoned decision strategies).  
 The process should be systematic, structured, timely and requires a consistent and 
reliable approach.  
 Decisions are founded on the best information available and tailored to the 
environment, taking into account human and cultural factors, transparency and 
inclusivity and that it is dynamic and responsive to change (BS ISO31000, 2009:7-8).  
These are generic principles that could be applied to any organisational context, and would 
serve to be logically good principles for any risk management implementation. 
The standard requires that the risk management process is continuously improved and 
checked for organizational alignment, so that it will evolve and maintain relevance to the 
organization. The management sub-processes (figure 2.3) indicate a continuous loop of 
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design, implement, review and improvement; whilst referring back to the principles. 
Seemingly the framework acts as a continual check, balance and iteration of the principles 
with the risk processes.  
 
Figure 2.3 ISO 31000 Processes (adapted from BS ISO31000) 
The outline of the different terms in ISO31000 is extensive, including:  
“2.15 risk identification, process of finding, recognizing and describing risks (2.1)” 
(BSI, 2009:4); 
 “2.14 risk assessment, overall process of risk identification (2.15), risk analysis 
(2.21) and risk evaluation (2.24)” (BSI, 2009:4); 
 “2.21 risk analysis, process to comprehend the nature of risk (2.1) and to 
determine the level of risk (2.23)” (BSI, 2009:5); 
 “2.25 risk treatment, process to modify risk (2.1…) Note 2 Risk treatments that 
deal with negative consequences are sometimes referred to as risk mitigation, risk 
elimination, risk prevention and risk reduction” (BSI, 2009:6). 
Within the standard these definitions provide a common language. They are linked in 
hierarchy and order, (e.g. risk identification precedes risk analysis). The description of risk 
treatment identifies possible approaches to managing risk: avoidance, taking risk, removing 
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source, changing likelihood, changing consequence, sharing, contracting and retaining (BSI, 
2009:6). This is an outline of potential treatments available to practitioners. 
There are two supporting functions:  
 Communication and consultation;  
 Monitoring and review.  
These are intended to be applicable at all stages of the risk management process. For 
communication and consultation, the standard makes reference to internal and external 
stakeholders (BSI, 2009:14). This reflects an underlying theme that risks may have a variety 
of stakeholders and each might have different subjective appreciation of the causes and 
consequences. Monitoring and review, suggests that treatment plans provide performance 
measures for risk management and that they are accommodated back into the framework 
enabling improvement. 
The standard may appear bureaucratic and labour intensive. It suggests a creation of a 
“comprehensive list of risks based on those events that might create, enhance, prevent, 
degrade, accelerate or delay the achievement of objectives” (BSI, 2009:17). This aim limits the 
lower threshold for risks being managed under the framework, and in contradiction to the 
principle of “risk management being an integral part of all organizational processes” (BSI, 
2009:7), as it would not be practical to manage all organizational risks in this manner.  
However ISO31000 is not without its limitations. Although seen as a pragmatic approach to 
designing risk process (Purdy, 2010), it is criticised for its vagueness in terminology (Leitch, 
2010). So in pursuit of being generalizable has taken some of the potency and preciseness 
away from the definition. Further that the aggregation of risks advocated by the standard, is 
dependent on the perspective being taken. There are many ways of categorising risk (Leitch, 
2010) and ISO31000 leaves this poorly defined. This leads to imprecision and illogical 
decisions being made (Leitch, 2010).  
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In risk treatment, although the standard is clear about the need for a continual process of 
monitoring and review (BS ISO31000, 2009), it is not stated at which point treatment is 
terminated, (i.e. where a criteria is reached or a cost/benefit breakpoint is breached, Purdy, 
2010).  
ISO31000 is therefore seen as a generalizable standard, independent of sector or industry. It 
provides a clear series of iterative steps in managing and controlling risk, although criticised 
for its lack of precision; its use is widespread, and referred to by other standards, for 
example: AIRMIC/ALARM (section 2.2.3).  
2.2.2 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
The COSO framework was sponsored by the Treadway Commission for purposes of 
evaluating internal control systems in a unified manner. COSO (2004) is a requirement of 
companies listed on the French stock exchange and recognised by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act3. 
COSO is described as “world level template for best practice” (Power, 2009:849). It identifies 
risk assessment and risk response as risk management phases. Event identification is similar 
to early assessment stages in other standards. Lam (2003), breaks these stages into 
awareness, measure and control. Lam’s awareness and measure fall into the assessment 
phase, and control into the analysis phase. These two contributors demonstrate the limited 
consistency in the terms being applied. 
COSO does not differentiate in the same way as ISO31000 between the framework being 
applied and the risk management process. ISO31000 is clearer in distinction between the 
two. COSO provides a cube model (figure 2.4), inferring that rather than a serial process of 
risk management it is an iterative and multidirectional process (Chapman, 2006). The 
activities of identification, assessment, response and control are consistent with other ERM 
definitions. In the COSO cube, different phases of risk management do not transfer between 
different levels within the organization (i.e. treatment of strategic risk at the business unit 
level and control of this risk at the entity level). Instead each process phase occurs at all 
                                                             
3 1992 version rather than 2004 for purposes of the New York Stock Exchange 
30 
 
levels of the organization. The third dimension incorporated in the COSO cube provides 
different risk categories (strategic, operations, reporting, compliance). These risk categories 
exist both at different organizational levels, and at every stage of the risk management 
process. This is a comprehensive appraisal of risk categories, risk management stages and 
mapping of organizational responsibility. 
 
Figure 2.4 The COSO Cube for Risk Management (COSO, 2004) 
COSO requires that in identifying of risk a firm should seek an exhaustive list of potential 
events and causes of risk to and in the firm, and that event interdependencies should be 
recognised and that events should be grouped into categories (O’Donnell, 2005). This 
approach should develop an integrated and portfolio view. 
In literature the criticisms of COSO appear more distinct than ISO31000. The production of 
exhaustive risk lists, is a major drawback of the guidance provided, as it is clearly a 
substantial undertaking (Barton et al., 2002; Samad-Khan, 2005). This issue is pronounced 
as although felt to be useful guidance at a macro level, it is flawed because of the 
inconsistency in definition at the risk assessment phase (Samad-Khan, 2005). The issues are 
not contained to the onerous requirements for identification and the inconsistency in 
assessment, as the definitions for risk appetite and risk tolerance are confused (Purdy, 
2010). 
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Therefore, COSO ERM is a well-known ERM framework, it is seen as theoretically strong 
(reflecting on the positive views in macro-level application), and is positively reflected on as 
using common language (Beasley et al., 2010). But similar to ISO31000, the inherent issues 
in COSO are deemed to lead to weaknesses in assessment, an onerous organizational 
overhead.  
2.2.3 AIRMIC (2002), A Risk Management Standard 
A three-way consortium, comprising The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers 
(AIRMIC), The Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and The National Forum for Risk 
Management in the Public Sector (ALARM) formed a team to define a standard for risk 
management. This is the AIRMIC/ALARM standard. 
The standard states that where possible it is consistent with the international risk 
management standard (ISO31000) to the extent that it defers its whole section of Risk 
Assessment to the ISO standard (AIRMIC, 2002:5). It recognises risk has conditions of both 
upside and downside, and that risk management is the management of imprecision. 
The risk management process has similarity to ISO31000, however there are differences: 
a. Risk Analysis is seen as a sub-process to Risk Assessment; 
b. Risk Reporting occurs before Treatment; 
c. Reaching a decision on treatment is explicit and not assumed as an inherent part of the 
treatment phase; 
d. The definition of residual risk is explicit and it creates a trigger for reporting; 
e. Review of the process is done through formal audit, rather than just monitoring and 
control. 
Figure 2.5 is the risk management process from AIRMIC (2002). 
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Figure 2.5 The Risk Management Process (AIRMIC, 2002:4) 
The task of risk estimation is prescriptive (AIRMIC, 2002:6-7), recognising it will be formed 
from both quantitative and qualitative measures. The standard advocates the use of simple 
matrices to document risks based on an evaluation of probability by consequence. It provides 
examples of qualitative descriptions for these different components of risk. 
This standard appears efficient in its statement and objectives. It is highly practical, with 
very little discussion of how the standard is formed. It attempts to be consistent with other 
standards, to the extreme point of deferring the discussion and outlining of specific sub-
processes to ISO31000. In this way it avoids potential conflict. These three standards are 
contrasted in the next section. 
2.2.4 Comparison of Risk Management Standards 
Risk management standards appear to be either prescribed approaches (i.e. COSO, 2004), 
ISO31000 (2009) or frameworks for risk management (i.e. ERM).  
Risk management may be considered as the end-to-end process of handling risk, from 
identification through to the review of actions and controls. In ISO31000, AIRMIC and COSO 
ERM there are different risk management phases. They are largely consistent in their main 
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stages (see table 2.1). ISO31000 emphasises the iterative nature of the process more 
explicitly than COSO, whereas COSO reflects the different organizational levels the process 
operates across. Where an organization adheres to ISO31000 it promotes an iterative 
function of reviewing the risks and returning to the start of the cycle. Incident response is a 
separate function and not included in the ISO31000 model. This is because where a risk is 
realized, this becomes incident or accident management. In incident response, the 
probability of risk is removed (it becomes certainty as probability is removed and the 
impact remains), with the risk becoming realised it becomes a matter of controlling the 
impact (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997). 
ISO31000 provides a language for risk management; it provides a generic consistency 
across a wide range of potential uses (i.e. Health or Energy sectors). It is seen that ISO31000 
terminology is used outside of adherence to the ISO certification, it is a common language in 
risk management. Provision of a precise language in ISO31000 is arguably greater than in 
COSO, although there are criticisms of both (Leitch, 2010; Samad-Khan, 2005). The focus for 
COSO is different, with a greater genealogy in finance, and increased focus on control 
frameworks (Chapman, 2006). Table 2.1 compares the focus and stages of the three 
standards reviewed: 
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Table 2.1 Summary of Risk Management Standards 
 
To summarise the similarities across these three standards, and identify the points of 
general agreement, four stages of risk management are observed4:  
a. Risk identification;  
b. Risk analysis; (called assessment in COSO) 
c. Risk treatment; (called response in COSO) 
d. Risk control/monitoring.  
Risk identification: the identification of potential risks (cf. Dey et al., 2013). Returning to the 
concept of exposure (Holton, 2004), risks are identified that the organization may be 
exposed toward. 
Risk assessment: is the quantification or qualification of a series of latent events as being 
potential for loss or imprecision and in mature models as a classification of the risk in either 
means of impact or situation. Risk analysis follows risk assessment (in COSO these two 
processes are combined into the assessment phase). The assessed risk is taken and 
                                                             
4 Business continuity management (BCM) resides across all of these phases. Incident management is the management 
of an existing event, already likely to have resulted in some loss.  
 
 COSO ERM ISO/BS31000 AIRMIC/ALARM 
Focus of 
standard 
An enterprise level 
standard, based in 
finance principles. 
Focuses on control 
frameworks 
An industry/sector 
independent definition of 
risk and the phases of 
management of risk 
Practical implementation 
of a risk management 
approach, refers some 
sections to ISO31000 
Stages 
(in order) 
Event Identification 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Response 
Control 
Monitoring 
(figure 5) 
Risk Identification 
Risk Analysis 
Risk Evaluation 
Risk Treatment 
Monitoring 
(figure 4) 
Risk Analysis 
Risk Identification 
Risk Evaluation 
Risk Reporting 
Decision 
Risk Treatment 
Reporting 
Monitoring 
(figure 6) 
Risk is: Possibility of an event 
that will have an adverse 
effect on achieving 
business objectives. 
Acknowledges positive 
events as having positive 
outcome on objectives. 
An obstacle in achieving 
the organizations 
objectives.  
Upside (positive) and 
downside (negative) 
outcomes of uncertainty 
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considered for pre-emptive treatment, this results in one of several risk treatments (section 
2.5). Risk assessment includes a number of sub-processes, for example cost-benefit analysis, 
selection of defences and resource allocation.  
Risk treatment: COSO (2009) calls risk treatment risk response (although this can be 
confused with Incident or Accident Management). Risk treatment is the selection of a course 
of action in response to the identified and assessed risk. There are several treatments 
available. 
The review of the risk standards provides a framework for understanding the risk 
management process. It has identified that the standards have developed from a range of 
context, but all seek a level of generalizability in their application. The literature review 
progresses to consider the different categories and disciplines within risk management, 
with a focus on risk that is described as operational or a risk in operations. Operational risk 
is discussed first. 
2.3 Operational Risk 
Due to both rapid evolution (Power, 2005: 581) and because it initially came about as a 
catch-all category for other risks (Lopez, 2002), Operational risk has a pluralistic translation 
in application causing the term either to be over generalised “it is a label for a diverse range 
of practices” (Power, 2005:579), or de-scoped to have a meaning closer to “Operations Risk” 
(Loader, 2007). Operations in this context describe the function in an organization, whereas 
Operational is the activity being undertaken. Concept stretch (Hines et al., 2004), damages 
efforts for precise transfer into a non-finance context, because as a definition “it is not global 
enough” for transfer into other industries (Kalhoff & Haas, 2004:5). Seeking precision in the 
definition has more than a semantic resolution, there is benefit through precise definition as 
a concept being operationalized, it: “re-positions their location and status for managerial and 
regulatory purposes” (Power, 2005:578).  
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Power (2005; 2009) considers the extension of the concept of Operational risk, based on a 
historical analysis of the term. Critical differences are exposed. Operational risk is discussed 
in depth within the finance literature (i.e. the Basel definition). There are many different foci 
of this literature, most relating to the financial discipline of the firm, for example: 
requirements for disclosure (Brown et al., 2008; Ozbilgin & Penno, 2005), reputational 
impacts of disclosure (Gillet et al., 2010), impacts on the financial structure of the firm (Ross, 
1985), identification of risks (Trkman & McCormack, 2009) and quantitative models for 
assessing and measuring Operational risk (Allen & Bali, 2007; Chavez-Demoulin et al., 2006; 
Ebnother et al., 2003; Jarrow & Yu, 2001; Tang, 2006). The discussion of Operational risk has 
developed to include: related assessment of financial systemic stability (Elsinger et al., 
2006), the process of Operational risk hedging (Takezawa et al., 2007) the impact on 
capacity decision, similar to those seen in supply-demand risk (Hasija et al., 2008; Chod et 
al., 2010), the application of Basel Accord AMA approaches (Chapelle et al., 2008) and the 
challenge of differentiating between operational losses and reputational damage (Gillet at 
al., 2010).  
A financial orientation of risk analysis has been spurred on by the Basel Committee (section 
2.3.1), which codified both the definition and valuation of different risks. However risk 
measurement in the finance sector is still considered dysfunctional (Power, 2009; Mikes, 
2011), because many Operational risks are assumed to be non-financial (Mikes, 2011:231), 
but measured and analysed from a financial perspective. Aside from the organizational 
impact that performance management of risk is understood to have, in Mikes’ (2011) study 
it was found that top management’s (e.g. Chief Risk Officers) performance management of 
risk had less diagnostic purpose (i.e. finding and correcting specific risks) but an interactive 
learning purpose (self-reflecting and self-improving).  
From this literature it is understood that:  
 Operational risk is perceived to be a finance sector based definition (Basel Committee, 
2006; Mikes, 2011; Power, 2005); 
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 Transfer of the term outside of the finance community has become synonymous and 
perhaps confused with the idea of risk in operations (cf. Lewis, 2003).  
The use of the term Operational risk and the Basel Accord are intrinsically linked (cf. Basel 
Committee, 2006). 
2.3.1 Basel Committee Definitions 
The Basel Committee and its 1990s and 2000s directives/frameworks form a critical body of 
text. To the Basel Committee Operational risk is: 
“The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and 
systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes 
strategic and reputational risk” (Basel Committee, 2006: para644) 
It is an established standard for banking supervision (the purpose of the Basel Accord). It 
refers to risk as loss (Basel Committee, 2006:644); it identifies the causes as those that stem 
from the operation: Processes (referring to the transformation process), people 
(transforming resources) and systems (referring to information systems). These causes are 
all consistent with the Operations Management paradigm, where there exists transforming 
resources (staff and equipment) and transformed resources (materials and information) (cf. 
Mooney et al., 1996).  
The literature on Operational risk is seen to contribute to the understanding of pure risk 
(Colquitt et al., 1999), because operational and hazard risks are seen as the historical focus 
of the enterprise risk manager. Operational risk in the Basel definition is considered a 
category of residual risks5 (Currie, 2004:70) making the understanding of its boundary 
terms: market and credit risks relevant. Market and credit risk are closely associated terms, 
seemingly considered boundary terms of Operational risk.  
  
                                                             
5 This is different to residual risks defined by Bell et al. (2001), rather a default category for risks not defined as 
Market or Credit risks. 
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Credit risk is:  
“the risk of economic loss, from the default before final settlement of a cash flow 
with a third party. This may either be counterparty credit risk or sovereign 
credit risk” (Basel Committee, 2006: para49i & 52). 
There is difficulty in separating credit risk from Operational risk. This can be explained using 
an example of a defaulting client. This is where a manager has allowed, against a company 
credit policy, to extend credit to his client creating, an Operational risk. This is different to 
loss in default where a company has legitimately accepted a risky customer for potentially 
higher returns. This differentiation offers a vision of process and control as being central to 
the Operational risk classification. Therefore Operational risk is best bounded by a failure of 
a process or control (Crouhy et al., 2006). 
Non-finance sectors may exhibit credit risk as “counterparty credit risk” (Jarrow & Yu, 
2001:1766). Extending the finance definition may include the ability to secure and maintain 
credit lines from banks and therefore also considered credit risk. This is the influence of the 
term counterparty. Counterparties are companies the organization trades with (Crouhy et 
al., 2006). The dispute on delineation from process or system-based Operational risk is 
challenging whether counterparty risk is a risk associated to the billing and collections 
process or the credit checking and monitoring process? Credit risk adopts new 
characteristics, or at least different priorities, as it is extended. This conflict is in the Basel 
definition. When is a failure in transaction (one with consideration of cash payment), a 
credit risk realised, or a failure in billing, collections or even credit checking – an 
Operational risk? Credit risk stems from the performance of the customer and their ability 
to pay. Operational risk is the process of credit checking which has an embedded risk 
appetite/tolerance built into the decision process. Crouhy et al. (2006) acknowledge the 
contention residing in the overlap between different risk classifications. 
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Market risk is:  
“risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movement in 
market prices” (Basel Committee, 2006: para 683i).  
Market risk is understood to include movement of price for stocks and commodities and 
changes in interest and exchange rates. It is through the definition of market risk that the 
plasticity of the term risk between pure and speculative risk can be observed. 
Conceptually, Market risk overlaps Operational risk. As part of the definition of Market risk, 
the importance of uncertainty (volatility) in the price of commodities is exposed (Crouhy et 
al., 2001:179). Market risk is reserved for the price of commodities; it also affects the 
availability of commodities. A pure risk consequence of market risk is that not all firms have 
elasticity in their ability to purchase commodities. Therefore volatility in commodity price 
transfer is volatility in availability. This definition in practice means Market risk has risk of 
loss and potential for gain, this is speculative risk (Banks, 2004).  
This definition is clear in the context of finance, but there seems to be some uncertainty 
when extended into non-financial contexts. Market risk in a non-finance context (i.e. not 
equity price risk, exchange risk or interest rate risk), is commodity risk (Crouhy et al., 
2001:179), which is part of the internal or external supply chain. It is considered the most 
advanced segment of risk in terms of modelling techniques in the banking industry (Power, 
2005:582). Market risk has a meaning different to that implied in the Basel Accord when 
extended into new sectors, (i.e. in the energy sector, market risk can describe the volatility 
in the cost of coal; this becomes commodity risk). Therefore application and knowledge of 
market risk practices has some limited transferability outside of the finance sector (cf. 
Denton et al., 2003; Foxon et al., 2005). 
Operational risk is unique from credit and market risk, because of the difficult nature of 
quantifying expected losses (Crouhy et al., 2001). Potentially these Operational risk losses 
may be vast; in some estimation these potential losses may exceed the aggregate of credit 
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and market risk (Power, 2005). Kuritzkes explains Operational risk as “non-financial” risks 
(2002:47). Differentiation from market and credit risk serves to isolate it as a category of 
risk, which is orientated to loss-based events, and not imprecision. Management of 
Operational risk has a much broader objective, and is strategically important (cf. Crouhy et 
al., 2001). However, senior risk managers view Operational risk as a line management 
problem (Mikes, 2009).  
The Basel Accord and its definitions of risk should represent a complete description of risk 
with no overlaps or gaps, in order to provide a precise and un-contentious categorisation of 
risks. However the boundaries are not well defined. Examples have been discussed that exist 
within more than one category of risk, (e.g. a failure in a cash payment transaction). The 
terms do have meaning outside the financial sector, but this requires development beyond 
the specific definitions provided within the Basel Accord. It offers some level of 
transferability into the energy sector, but this must be done with understanding of the 
limitations this brings.  
2.3.2 Transferability of Operational Risk 
The previous sections have suggested that Operational risk is a finance term and that there 
are issues in generalisation outside of the financial context. However financial risk 
management approaches are a mature discipline, and provides opportunity for 
development.  
As a matter of unity in literature and practice, Operational risk is commonly understood to 
reference only pure risk (Crouhy et al., 2001; Institute of Operational Risk, 2009; Lewis; 
2003; Lam, 2003; Power, 2005). This is largely regardless of whether it is being applied to 
financial or non-financial contexts. This view is supported through best practice guidelines 
(Institute of Operational Risk, 2009), case studies into operations failures and successes 
(Abkowitz, 2008), Nicholas Leeson’s “rogue trader” (Loader, 2007) which is situated as the 
origin of Operational risk (Power, 2005:579), failure-centric definitions in Basel II (2006) 
and wider presentation as loss-making events (Engemann & Miller, 1992:141; Power, 
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2005:584). As a direct comparison between financial and non-financial communities, 
Operational risk outside of the finance sector may be considered to be more aligned to “risk 
management control and practices” (Power, 2005:582), than the objective of capital 
adequacy. 
Operational risk is used as a generalizable definition of risk, both as a specific term and the 
supporting frameworks it infers. Financial institutions may be focused toward management 
of financial portfolios but they are not uniquely privileged to losses caused through 
operations or the performance of their systems and processes. Controls placed on rogue 
traders (Greener, 2006), may be equally applicable to controls placed on retailers in the 
energy industry. It is because of its industrial application (Aven et al., 2006; Denton et al., 
2003; Gouveia & Matos, 2009; Panjer, 2006; Sadeghi & Shavvalpour, 2006), that the 
description and associated concepts must be clearly defined. 
The existing Operational risk literature has a bias towards discussion of high-impact low-
probability events (Christopher, 2011; Power, 2005). This is to be expected, as High-Impact 
events are probably the only events worth documenting as an organization, either for 
legislative or reporting requirements. Information on low impact events and their frequency 
is limited. 
Power (2005) makes a demand for greater data and research on high-impact and low-
probability (HI-LP) events. Current case studies and their regularity of appearance in papers 
show that HI-LP events are well documented, for example: The Macondo Well Incident 
(Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012), Three Mile Island (Hill & Schneeweis, 1983) and Fukushima 
Disaster (Visschers & Siegrist, 2013). Instead it is the HP-LI events that seemingly go 
unchartered. Power is in agreement that these high regularity loss-events in aggregate do 
contribute significantly to organisational failures. To focus on HI-LP events may be seen as 
an extension of Power’s view that historical data is not necessarily valid to predict future 
failure. This is in contrast to Crouhy et al. (2001) that historical data is the bedrock of 
objective probability assessment. This is a view formed because failure is often followed by 
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correction and that the initiating causal force is often not recorded. Power’s proposition is 
one of industrial risk data pooling can be used to overcome this limited understanding. 
There are concerns however that this could reduce competitive advantage of the 
participating organisations. 
Attributing failures to single blame events is inaccurate (Perrow, 1984). Failure is brought 
about by a complex series of overlapping causal events; so HP-LI events can stack (cf. 
Ackermann et al., 2007). It is this complexity that Lewis (2003) sees as challenging if not 
impossible for the corporate machine to control from above. 
Learning from Operational risk, beyond the financial and banking context (i.e. into service 
industries) is subject to concept stretch. It exposes that there has been a bias toward HI-LP 
events in its development; which may be a product of information availability. The focus of 
research in this area is still a matter of contention, between the need for greater focus on HI-
LP events or the LI-HP events. 
This understanding exposes two models. The first reflects how the organization approaches 
the use of risk and event data, and the associated perceptions of quantitative assessment 
(Calculative Cultures). The second is the organizational approach to managing risk, 
reflecting four different designs (ERM Ideal Types). These are now discussed in turn: 
2.3.3 Power (2005) Calculative Cultures: 
Calculative Cultures is where organizations confronted by the requirement to assess and 
analyse risk fall into one of two categories: idealists or pragmatists (Mikes, 2009; Power, 
2005). Pragmatists use risk numbers to direct their understanding. So risk measures 
become attention-directing devices, and pragmatists do not use them in isolation to select a 
treatment: “Risk scoring systems make risk capital visible for management purposes and help 
steer behaviour in the right direction” (Power, 2005:592).  
Idealists assume risk numbers are a reflection of a complete truth: “they [the manager] have 
a reductionist, non-pluralist view of Operational risk management and worry constantly about 
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the robust and hard nature of Operational risk analysis” (Power, 2005:593). For idealists the 
focus moves the use of risk numbers to a definitive activity. This has been further elaborated 
as the difference between soft risk management, “pragmatism” (Power, 2005:592) and a 
more quantitative risk management approach, “idealism” (Power, 2005:593).  
The idealist seeks to treat Operational risk no differently from market or credit risk (Power, 
2005). The pragmatists acknowledge learning from credit and market risk approaches, but 
instead the emphasis is on the practices.  
This research involves an understanding of both performance systems and the risk 
management process, including the part that management personality and individual 
behaviour have on this relationship (cf. de Waal, 2003). Calculative Cultures provides a 
simple dichotomy of the organizational and individual approach to risk data and the impact 
this has on the risk assessment process. However as seen in the next section (section 2.6), 
this relationship may be more complex (cf. Slovic, 1964), for example the differences 
brought through gender (Byrnes et al., 1999:367).  
An extension to Calculative Cultures, considers the philosophy and organizational approach 
to the risk management framework, this is Mikes’ ERM Ideal Types (2009; 2011).  
2.3.4 Mikes (2009) ERM Ideal Types: 
Mikes (2009), similar to Power (2005), refers to the management styles of risk in context of 
Operational risk, and that Operational risk is an inherent part of Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). This links the two bodies of work: Risk Management Standards and the 
Basel Accord’s definition of risk. There is recognition that risk management is not a pure 
issue of financial outcome, and that there are non-financial impacts on performance (cf. 
Leibenberg & Hoyt, 2003); the inference being that this is increasingly important as 
Operational risk understanding develops. There are four types of risk management 
discussed by Mikes (2009):  
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Type 1: Risk Silo Management (RSM), with a focus on quantification (particularly Value at 
Risk [VaR]) and control. Risks are tasked within their specific categories. RSM embodies the 
quantification of Operational risk. Crouhy et al. (2001) deal with the application of VaR in 
some depth. VaR is a statistical measure of anticipated loss (Mikes, 2009); it requires an 
understanding of the different loss distributions. The impact is that risk categorisation has 
an influence on organizational practices. This is characteristic of first-order risks (Mikes, 
2011) where measurements are collected into ordered groups. 
Type 2: Integrated Risk Management, recognises relationships between different risk silos, 
and uses a common denominator of risk measurement to assess risk. Risk aggregation is 
characteristic of second-order risks (Mikes, 2011), where units of measurements serve as 
the backbone of performance management. Mikes suggests there is a tendency toward using 
economic capital as the single metric of risk. Arising from the Basel Accord, use of economic 
capital as the common denominator is given legitimacy (cf. Mikes, 2011).  
Type 3: Risk Based Management, this reverses the association. Risk valuation is used to 
inform the organization of expected value from parts of the business or its processes. Risk 
valuation feeds back into the operation, using calculations such as Risk Adjusted Return on 
Capital (RAROC).  
Type 4: Holistic Risk Management, the difference in this risk type is the recognition of non-
quantifiable risks. This challenges established definitions of risk. The aim is to turn non-
quantifiable into quantifiable risks as experience and knowledge progresses. This approach 
reduces the reliance on quantitative measurement, and use of single metrics. The impact is 
formal recognition of a broader consideration to consequences in risk management. 
However there is little understanding between the various types of risk (Mikes, 2011) for 
example political, people, reputation, market or finance (Ackermann el al., 2007). 
Mikes’ four risk management types (2009) recognise that measurement devices provide a 
link back to the finance community’s quantification approaches. Specifically VaR, which is 
located in Type 1: risk-silo management. Although a recognised approach across many 
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communities its applicability is challenged when centred on statistical measures of 
Operational risk. There is a limitation of these tools for calculating catastrophic risk (Crouhy 
et al., 2001: 507). Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) suggest that risk silo approaches are the 
opposite of ERM practices. 
The risk-silo approach is a line-management responsibility (Mikes, 2009). Whereas Power’s 
(2005) view that Operational risk is a broad and strategic concern that should attract 
management by senior executives. A senior management body, having oversight of all inter-
dependencies, should become involved in risk management (Perrow, 1984). However little 
has been developed in terms of our understanding of the consequences of ownership of the 
Operational risk management process.  
Quantitative assessment can have distinct benefits (Mikes, 2009), because risk management 
cascades into the organisation and may result in a granularity of risk pricing or risk portfolio 
management. It provides a scientific and structured approach to resource management 
throughout the organisation. Mikes (2011) describes those who are dedicated to risk 
measurement as quantitative enthusiasts. Quantitative enthusiasts are similar to Power’s 
(2005) calculative idealists. The link between Calculative Cultures and Risk Management 
Types is discussed further in the next sub-section. 
The Link between Calculative Cultures and ERM Ideal Types 
Bringing the two concepts together: Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005; Mikes, 2009, 2011) 
and ERM Ideal types; ERM by the numbers, quantitative enthusiasm (type 3) and Holistic 
ERM, quantitative scepticism (type 4), seem to have a direct relation to idealist and 
pragmatist cultures (respectively). 
Further that “Thermostatic conception” (Power, 2009:851), the singular thermostatic control 
of risk management, similar to the Integrated Risk Management Type, is in contrast to 
understanding of risk taking behaviour by Slovic (1964), that risk-taking propensity is in its 
own right multidimensional and subjective. Even where a systems view is adopted, decision-
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making is understood to be largely individualistic (Lewis, 2003; Slovic, 1964). Power’s 
contribution is that organizational understanding of risk performance may exist in both 
tangible and intangible formats of a control system. That precise rules (advocated by idealist 
cultures) may be “institutionally attractive, and persists because it offers a regulated 
transparency to the risk management process” (Power, 2009:852). This requirement to 
embed internal control systems seems now to be accepted practice within the ERM 
community. 
The approach to the singular thermostatic control of risk, and the understanding that a 
single measure of risk in the Integrated Risk Management Type exposes the question of risk 
valuation, is covered in the next sub-section. 
Risk Valuation: 
The practice of Operational risk management appears to be based on risk quantification 
(Mikes, 2009; 2011), and principally quantification in monetary terms. There are a number 
of valuation approaches that are considered for use with Operational risk, for example Value 
at Risk (VaR). These approaches have not significantly progressed outside of finance and 
insurance literature and continue to be immature in their implementation outside of finance 
(Power, 2005). Valuation approaches have been adopted from the more mature practices 
for market and credit risk management i.e. VaR. They may be considered as retrofitted 
concepts, when applied to Operational risk. However Operational risk valuation using VaR is 
criticised for being inappropriate because of the shape of the distribution curve of this type 
of risk (Nocco & Stulz, 2006), because Operational risks have a long probability tails and are 
not evenly distributed. This is contrary to the assumption of normal distribution being an 
underlying principle of calculating VaR.  
Much of the critical analysis discusses the financial as well as the non-financial 
consequences of Operational risk (cf. Kuritzkes, 2002; cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 2012), and may in 
different contexts be considered a non-financial category of risk. This makes a single 
measurement of risk challenging and imprecise. Further quantitative valuation approaches 
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of Operational risk are confused, because of the relationship and genealogy to credit risk, 
where financial measurement of risk is considered appropriate. Therefore financial 
measurement of Operational risk appears to be only one approach to analysis of risk.  
2.3.5 Summary of Operational Risk Literature  
Positive imprecision in an Operational risk context does not lead to loss-making events, as 
such effort is usually understood to focus on downward mitigation (Institute of Operational 
Risk, 2009). This has the consequence that the risk-reward dynamic is rarely central to the 
discussion of Operational risk, unlike its more financially orientated boundary terms 
(market and credit risk). These are theoretically termed speculative risk are risks associated 
to the financial dealings of the firm. There is limited discussion of Operational risk 
treatments, but it is felt that it cannot be hedged (Nocco & Stulz, 2006). 
Operational risk as a concept is both over generalised and has been used outside of the 
original context it was defined to operate within (Power, 2005). In the Basel Accord it is a 
complementary risk type, alongside market and credit risk, which are financially aggregated 
types of risk. However in extension it is also a category of non-financial risk types. There is a 
certain unity in literature that Operational risk is a description of pure risk (Lewis, 2003; 
Power, 2005). 
Operational risk continues in the third Basel Accord (Basel Committee, 2006) to exist within 
these constraints. Its definition is in the medium term unchanged. Operational risk as an 
issue for capital adequacy is increasingly important. The portability of this term seems 
limited when technically applied outside of the finance domain.  
There is an understanding of the inter-relationship between risk and its use in performance 
management. The simple dichotomy of Calculative Cultures expresses this as a choice 
between calculative idealism or calculative pragmatism (Power, 2005). This is extended in 
the understanding of the different risk management types observed in Mikes’ research 
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(2009; 2011). These four risk management types are generalisations of the approaches to 
risk management, ranging from the silo approach to the holistic approach.  
How does the extension of Operational risk affect understanding of risk in an Energy 
context? There is clear contention in the definition of Operational risk, which seemingly has 
not been resolved. The contention is symptomatic of a lack of reconciliation with non-
finance descriptions of risk. There is an outstanding question as to whether classification of 
risks is best made through a causal description, as made by the Basel Accord.  
While the limitations of Operational risk as a specific definition are exposed, the next 
reference point is operations risk. Operations risk is a closely related term (Loader, 2007). 
Crouhy et al. (2001) suggest a view later reflected Lewis (2003) that Operational risks are 
not the same as operations risks.  
2.4 Risk in Operations 
The distinction between risk categories is based on the understanding that seeking a 
definition is more than a pure semantic exercise; it provides “delimitations of potential 
jurisdictions” (Power, 2005). It appears these jurisdictions have multiple meanings, 
including the organizational structure, reporting of risk and the tools used in managing and 
treating the different risk types. 
Operations risk is considered (in financial institutions) as failure in operations or back office 
functions. Operational risk is understood to span the whole supply chain and the 
organisation’s external environment. In the search for causal forces generating Operational 
risks, a broader approach is required (Lewis, 2003), beyond that of the traditional 
operation.  
The different definitions of risk have occurred through breadth of terms being employed 
and different contexts, not least different organisational interpretations being used. These 
contingent and paradigmatically specific definitions, i.e. supply chain risk (Kleindorfer et al., 
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2003:53), disruption risk (Kleindorfer et al., 2003:54), project risk (Dey, et al., 1994; Dey, 
2002), legal risk (Basel Committee, 2006), people risk, political risk (Jensen, 2005), culture 
risk (Securities Institute, 2004:1-8) are a mixture of outcome orientated classifications (i.e. 
financial loss), procedural (i.e. transportation risk) as well as technical descriptions (i.e. 
counterparty risk).  
The bridge between Operational risk and risk in operations (operations management and 
supply chain literature) is limited. Examples include the discussion of the framework of 
cause, consequence and control (Lewis, 2003), assessment of Operational risks by 
professionals and the role of experience in making decisions (Tazelaar & Snijders, 2013) and 
the ignoring of Operational risks and the reoccurrence of loss events, based on limited 
knowledge acquisition (Hora & Klassen, 2013).  
The extant literature has several notable features: that a distinction is regularly made 
between modelling of risk assessment (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007), decisions in risk 
analysis (cf. Dey, 2004)  and management of realised risks (i.e. response to incidents). There 
is a clear separation of the literature in operations focusing either on demand and capacity 
risk management, supply-demand coordination risks (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005); and 
management of operations or disruption risks (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). These are 
reviewed in turn. 
2.4.1 Supply-Demand Coordination Risk 
Supply-Demand Coordination Risk (SDCR) is “risks arising from the problems of coordinating 
supply and demand” (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005:531). The risk-reward relationship can occur 
in supply chain risk: “Such coordination [of supply and demand coordination] requires both 
optimization of specific risk-reward tradeoffs associated with each player’s environment as 
well appropriate design of the customer-supplier relationships that link each player in the 
supply chain.” (2007:531). 
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SDCR utilise quantitative modelling methods, they provide tools to achieve optimal 
configuration of demand and capacity decisions within the firm (Cohen & Kunreuther, 
2007). SDCR refers to a potential for loss as well as gain in configuration decisions. This is 
speculative risk (Banks, 2004). 
Risk taking or making decisions when seeking optimal configuration is still highly subject to 
risk propensity of the organisation and its managers (Gan et al., 2004). Gan et al. (2011) 
extend this understanding between agents in a supply chain relationship; where there often 
exists non-parity in risk propensity between firms and the impact this can have on equality 
of profit and risk sharing. It seems that the limitation of this concept (particularly when 
viewing operational failure) is that the Pareto-optimal solutions discussed assume 
transferability of risk between agents. The transferability of risk between agents is a 
concept framed by Principle-Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). In understanding the 
transfer of risk between agents, this is understood for financial transactions, but the 
transferability of non-financial risks: reputation, health and safety and regulation are not 
clear.  
Further, Options contracts may be used to benefit in SDCR (Fang & Whinston, 2007), seen 
also in Cohen and Kunreuther’s SC risk management framework (2007). These are in 
addition to treatments of mitigation (Kliendorfer & Saad, 2005:59).  
SDCR frameworks provide an alternative means of strategic choice valuation (Kulkarni et al., 
2004). They consider whether economies of scale have a fundamental impact of the risk 
accepted by the firm. These are limitations of Kulkarni et al.’s findings when directly applied 
to managing the risk of failure. By deriving the optimal configuration it seems their model 
overlooks consideration for threats from introduction of single points of failure. These 
process configuration decisions (typical of existing operations management) have 
significant impact on risk propensity (Kulkarni et al., 2004) and risk management principles 
developed in alternate communities may offer valuable insight (Fang & Whinston, 2007; 
Sodhi, 2005). 
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So, contrasting with the Basel definition, there is a relationship between market risk and the 
propensity for operational failures, for example: “Network Traffic Options Pricing” (Fang & 
Whinston, 2007). It demonstrates how firms may take options to secure bandwidth. It shows 
how failure to secure capacity will quickly lead to communication failures (a pure risk of 
communication capability). It is a criticism of this literature that it independently discusses 
the problem of supply-demand coordination risks without tackling the related disruption 
risk. The two risk categories can be inseparable. 
 Finance principles in assessment and valuation may be transferred into the SDCR problem 
(Seshadri & Subrahmanyam, 2005). This includes a sharper focus on the learning already 
undertaken in industry by developing links to the finance discipline (Peck, 2006; Sodhi, 
2005) and economic evaluation of scale dependent investments (Lederer & Mehta, 2005).  
The second risk type discussed by Kliendorfer and Saad (2005) is disruption risk. 
2.4.2 Disruption Risk 
The work of Kleindorfer (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Klieindorfer & Wu, 2003) and a 
testimonial paper for his work by Cohen and Kunreuther (2007) are central to this body of 
knowledge. A limitation of this work is the focus on low probability high impact risks (LP-
HI).  
Disruption risk is “risk arising from disruptions to normal activities” (Kleindorfer & Saad, 
2005:53), it is closely associated to risk in operations. Disruption risks are understood as 
events that reduce effectiveness or efficiency (or total failure of) a supply chain leading to 
damage in profits, competitive ability and more recently concerns relating to sustainable 
practices i.e. environment and social perception (Kleindorfer et al. 2003). 
Disruption risk is a risk associated to operational failure, it is a risk in operational capability. 
There is little distinction between the financial definition of Operational risk “failure in 
people, processes and systems” (Basel Committee, 2006) and SCRM’s definition of disruption 
risk: “equipment malfunctions, unforeseen discontinuities in supply, human centered issues 
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from strikes to fraud, and risks arising from natural hazards, terrorism and political 
instability” (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005:53). Other than its specific context and the difference 
in exclusion of political risk there is little practical difference; Kliendorfer and Saad refer to 
Disruption Risk as Operational risk.  
There are several observations in disruption risk that contribute to understanding risk in 
operations:  
a. Risk measurement is key (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005); 
b. Supply relationships increase and decrease risk (Ireland & Webb, 2007); 
c. Context is important in understanding risk (Gan et al., 2004); 
d. There are a variety of risk treatments advocated (Kleindorfer et al., 2003)); 
e. Learning increases the risk management potential; and 
f. Individual behaviours, perceptions and experience (cf. Dey, 2004)  influence risk 
management (Gan et al., 2004). 
These are now reviewed in turn. 
Risk measurement is key: 
Risk measurement has a fundamental role in risk management process (cf. Dey et al., 2013; 
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). Both quantitative measurement (cf. Dey, 2004; Dey et al., 1994) 
and subjective assessment are intrinsic aspects of the risk management suite (Cohen & 
Kunreuther, 2007; Dey, 2004; Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005).  
Supply Relationships Increase and Decrease Risk: 
Supply chain relationships increase risks by introducing uncertainty in relationships or 
decreases risk by increasing the access to information across the whole supply chain 
(Ireland & Webb, 2007). This is based upon the balance of power between agents as well as 
the levels of trust in place. Power, is risk reducing and trust, risk-increasing (Mayer et al., 
1995). Power, a relationship of control or influence (Mayes & Allen, 1977), and trust, “the 
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willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another” (Mayer et al., 1995:712), are 
different means of managing uncertainty (and therefore risk) within the supply chain.  
Different agents in a relationship infer, transfer and incur risk between partners 
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). Systems and tools used to formerly or informally manage this 
process of risk between partners are not developed. Risk is contingent, so different agents 
will have a different understanding of what risk means. Risk definition does not fall within a 
consistent framework, even within a single supply chain (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). So, 
there is a lack of industry attention to managing interdependencies of risk between internal 
and external supply chains (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007). Therefore, risk management 
becomes a “divide and conquer” approach (a reductionist approach), and ignores the inter-
related, system perspective (Peck, 2006).  
Information sharing is a theme within the SCRM literature (Ireland & Webb, 2007; 
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Neiger et al., 2009). Knowledge sharing may both increase risk 
awareness across the supply chain, but that parity of information may also expose firms to 
risks of loss of competitive advantage (especially in knowledge intensive markets). 
Inevitably this becomes a debate on the dynamics of power within the supply chain and the 
balance between information sharing to increase risk assessment, and valuable knowledge 
that becomes commercially threatened (Ireland & Webb, 2007). 
Context is important in understanding risk: 
National context (Makhija & Stewart, 2002), environment (Dey, 2002) and even 
improvement programmes are known to affect perceptions of risk (cf. Ellis et al., 2010), the 
inherent risks and the risk management approach taken. For example: 
 Where an organization adopts Lean practices it can increase the level of vulnerability of 
the firm, because of a removal of redundancy, contingency and diversification, 
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005:55; Faisal et al., 2006); 
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 Different national contexts drive diverse approaches to risk assessment. As seen in 
Nuclear Power Plant’s (NPP) safety assessment (Cepin, 2007), where there are different 
standards applied between nations.  
 There are different representations of risk are influenced by the environment’s 
configuration, e.g. technology, market and importance of product (Ellis et al., 2010). 
There are a variety of treatments advocated: 
Real options approach, which is the purchase of a right to buy an asset or service at a future 
time of the organization’s choosing, can be used to manage disruption risks (Fang & 
Whinston, 2007), and Operational risks (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). Insurance, which at the 
most basic level is the financial reimbursement of a failure from a third party against a 
specified event, is an approach to reduce the variation in short term financial losses, and to 
spread the cost of financial loss over a longer period. However there are limitations to 
insurance principally that catastrophic risk cannot be insured (Vaughan, 1997).  
Risk mitigation is the reduction of risk to a lower level. Mitigation approaches can consider 
the use of multiple sourcing partners, development of the supplier relationships, the 
implementation of quality initiatives (Spekman & Davis, 2004), increasing flexibility of 
relationships to respond to events (Ritchie & Brindley, 2004) and redesign of processes to 
remove sources of risk (Christopher et al., 2011). Further redundancy can provide slack in 
the system (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999), as it offers a buffer from variance in the 
environment. 
Learning increases risk management potential: 
Learning capability, learning culture, system design and managerial risk perception 
influence the management of risk (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009; Peck, 2006; Perrow, 
1984). Learning increases the risk management potential of the firm (Braunscheidel & 
Suresh, 2009), this can be developed through observational learning both within and 
between sectors, (i.e. learning from understanding of other’s successes and failures, Hora & 
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Klassen, 2013). However it is felt that firms often fail to learn from observing losses 
occurring in their own industry, which could help develop their practice (cf. Hora & Klassen, 
2013).  
The development of expertise within the firm may appear an alternative or complementary 
approach to learning where observational intra-organizational learning is not available. 
However, the process-performance paradox suggests that although experts have different 
mental models (from the lay-person), it does not lead to better assessments of risk (Glaser & 
Chi, 1988). It puts into question, whether the development of expertise improves risk 
assessment as experts neither use less data nor are they faster in their assessments 
(Tazelaar & Snijders, 2013). There are some influences that experts are known to have, e.g. 
experienced professionals (in the case of banking auditors) have a lower perception of risk 
than non-specialist auditors (Taylor, 2000). 
Individual behaviours and perceptions influence risk management: 
The limited improvement in decision-making that experts provide (Glaser & Chi, 1988), 
exposes the role of the individual in an organization’s risk management. It is found that risk 
assessments are based on subjective managerial judgement (Ellis et al., 2010; Gan et al., 
2004). Therefore, informing this decision, representation of risk is fundamental in risk 
assessment. It is known that an individual’s risk perception is influenced by quantitative 
assessment and the analysis approach (Knemeyer et al., 2009).  
So where consistency is a desirable quality in decision-making (Dilla & Stone, 1997) it is a 
further challenge that managers are known to perceive the same risk differently if presented 
in alternative constructions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, 1964). This area of 
understanding is covered in greater detail in Section 2.6, however even within this domain 
of knowledge there is disagreement, for example Ellis et al.’s (2010) findings are in direct 
contradiction to March and Shapira (1987), that probability assessments have little 
influence on managerial judgement, rather probability has almost double the impact on risk 
assessments. 
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2.4.3 Summary of Risk in Operations Literature 
Supply demand coordination risk and disruption risk literature provides knowledge on 
several points:  
The manager and their perceptions and judgement are central to the management of risk. 
Contentions between Ellis et al. (2010) and March and Shapira (1987) identify a difference 
in understanding. This includes whether probability assessments are formative on the 
decisions. Where Supply-demand coordination risk is heavily based in numerical analysis 
and optimisation, disruption risk is much more aware of subjectivity as a legitimate part of 
valuation. 
Different types of risk infer different practices. The focus of SDCR is quantitative and 
conforms to Power’s (2005) Calculative Idealists. Disruption risk literature does not make 
any great distinction from the discussion of Operational risk in finance. 
There are different approaches to valuation driven by financial and non-financial measures. 
There is less demand for quantitative valuation approaches to be used in disruption risk. 
However much of the analysis of disruption risks is focused on high impact low probability 
events, with the limitations this incurs.  
There are different types of treatment to consider. SDCR literature identified options 
contracts and mitigation; whereas disruption risk literature was inclusive of real options, 
insurance and mitigation treatments. Risk treatments are discussed further in the next 
section. 
2.5 Risk Treatment  
A risk treatment is: “the process by which existing controls are improved or new controls are 
developed and implemented.” (Purdy, 2010:883). It is also used to refer to the specific 
description of the controls, which in ISO31000 includes: avoiding, taking, removing, 
changing likelihood or consequence, sharing and retaining (BS ISO31000, 2009). 
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The presumption is that the (risk) decision-making process takes inputs (from a range of 
sources, not excluding the management belief set) and disposes of the risk through a 
number of treatments accessible to the organization. This application of the treatment is 
then scrutinised in the control phase. The selection of risk treatment should be based on 
organizational objectives (O’Donnell, 2005). There are two ways firms manage risk, and the 
selection of treatment: a) each risk on its own, b) as a portfolio of risks (Nocco & Stulz, 
2006). 
One of the limitations in the extant literature is the lack of explanation between treatments 
that are employed primarily to affect the occurrence (the probability) of an event, or those, 
which principally are employed to manage the impact of an event. This difference is 
identified in ISO31000 as changing likelihood or consequence (Purdy, 2010), and by Gan et 
al. (2009) it is the difference between defensive or controlling strategies.  
An example of available risk treatments is seen in Crouhy et al. (2001): investment, 
avoidance, acceptance and transfer. A common management mantra is the “4Ts of risk 
treatment: Tolerate, treat, transfer and terminate” (Hopkin, 2012), this typology seems an 
over generalization and hides the subtlety in choice. 
Risk treatment is discussed by Slack et al. (2010) in an operationalized manner, for example: 
Designing out failure (2010:467-9) through “redundancy”, “maintenance” and “fail-safeing”, 
aligned to probability reduction. Fail-safeing has roots in quality management techniques 
(i.e. Lean’s Poka-Yoke, Slack et al., 2010). Whereas, failure mitigation is closer to impact 
reduction approaches (2010:473): “mitigation-planning”, “containment”, “reduction” and 
“substitution”. Substitution has similarities to redundancy “but does not imply excess 
resources” (Slack et al., 2010:473).  
There is further diversity of terminology used to describe treatments: Avoidance, Reduction, 
Retention, Transfer, Sharing (Vaughan, 1997), Reduction, Protection, Transfer, Financing 
(Crockford, 1980), Loss control, Loss financing, and Risk reduction (Banks 2004). Although 
there is a wealth of research on each of these individual strategies, there is a limited and 
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imprecise literature discussing or presenting risk management as a cohesive set of 
approaches. Much of the extant literature is industry specific or presented as part of a wider 
risk management process (i.e. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis). 
The treatments considered in the following review are reflective of Crockford (1980), 
Hopkin (2012), Slack et al. (2010) and what is felt to be the most exhaustive of 
consideration relevant to operations, Vaughan (1997). 
The risk treatments reviewed are: 
a) Accept or take risk (includes retaining, Vaughan, 1997); 
b) Transfer/Sharing (Insurance and Outsource); 
c) Avoid/Withdraw; 
d) Mitigate (probability and impact) and reflects Vaughan’s reduction and protection; 
e) Option taking; 
These different treatments are reviewed in turn. However returning to the earlier review of 
Holton (2004) which requires an individual’s self-awareness as a component of risk, the 
review begins by covering the issue of consciousness and the ignoring of risks and how this 
may also be differentiated from risk acceptance. 
2.5.1 Ignorance and Consciousness 
The difference between ignoring a risk and accepting it is whether there is a conscious 
treatment. Differentiation between unconscious and conscious management is a 
demarcation separating decision-making from omission of decision. Consciousness affects 
accountability, the learning process and measurement. From an applied perspective ignored 
risk can be difficult to separate from accepted risk. Categorisation challenges the meaning of 
ignored risk or the activity of ignorance of risk. The meaning of ignored for the purpose of 
this paper is defined through its omission of consciousness (cf. Farthing, 1992); more 
precisely the lack of a decision process when confronted a risk. 
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Discussion of consciousness has deeply philosophical roots, as well as psychological and 
ethical backgrounds. Using James’ 1910 definition and the modern application in Farthing’s 
The Psychology of Consciousness (1992), there are four requirements for consciousness: 
1) Consciousness is subjective (Farthing, 1992:25; James, 1910 in Coren et al., 2004). The 
subjective nature of ‘consciousness’ means it must be understood in context with an 
organisation’s risk decision-makers; 
2) Consciousness is not a passing activity, it is a process constantly going through change 
(Farthing, 1992:26; James, 1910 in Coren et al., 2004), it supports consciousness as being 
an evolving thought process, addressing new knowledge and changes in environment;  
3) Because it is subjective, changes being addressed will be personal to the individual. 
Consciousness will also exhibit continuity (Farthing, 1992:27; James, 1910 in Coren et al., 
2004); 
4) Selectivity, is the personal attribute of choice (Farthing, 1992:28), this is the influence of 
both voluntary and non-voluntary factors. This is critical as organisations look to control 
the level of consciousness of risk. But debate whether a reflex decision is a conscious 
decision is raised. If a manager routinely responds to a risk having made an initial 
consideration (by doing nothing), is this ignorance or acceptance? The same debate has 
raged within the psychology field, as the volitional/reflexive debate (Farthing, 1992:39). 
Reflex action is understood as taught, inherent or a priori conditioned decision. Reflex 
may be considered a level of physical consciousness. As a decision-making process, reflex 
decision is included in the consciousness of risk management. This is separable from a 
risk being identified and no act or thought process being applied, i.e. dismissed without 
analysis. Farthing’s description of a volitional act may be taken to describe this process, 
one which creates “overt behaviours or further cognitive acts” (1992:38). 
A distinction that this definition creates is the organisational inability to be conscious, it is 
reliant on the existence of decision makers in the firm to act as the subjective and selective 
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body for handling risk. Holton’s (2004) need for individual’s self-awareness in risk 
definition would seem to support this point. 
So with this understanding, deciding on a risk treatment even where there is inaction (i.e. 
risk acceptance) is differentiated by the consciousness of the decision-maker, even where 
this has become a reflex action. 
2.5.2 Accept 
With both accepted and ignored risk there is no noticeable change in the activity (or lack of) 
employed by the organisation in handling the risk. It is the conscious (Farthing, 1992) lack 
of activity that separates the two paths. Acceptance is a conscious activity. 
Several characteristics influence this understanding:  
 That the managerial characteristic of optimism, is commonly adopted (March & Shapira, 
1987); 
 Optimism means managers will positively skew predictions of probability and impact 
(Schwenk, 1995); 
 Illusions of control encourage managers to think that they influence positively the 
outcomes of a process (Schwenk, 1995); 
 Mangers attribute visions of failures of to “external factors” (Bowman, 1984; Clapham & 
Schwenk, 1991), this discourages personal responsibility from being taken in loss-
situations. 
Using a figure plotting impact and probability, these different influences are understood in 
the perceived changes to a risk. 
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Figure 2.6 Accepting Risk 
The implication of accepting risk is that neither probability of occurrence nor impacts are 
altered in any way.  
The acceptable risk in the organization may be a subjective valuation (an order of 
magnitude, rather than as a specific valuation). This may be described as the risk profile of 
the firm, and sometimes described as the risk appetite of the firm (Kaplan et al., 2009). It is 
the role of the CRO (where appointed) to align this understanding of current and expected 
risk (cf. Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). Some risk management approaches (e.g. COSO ERM), as 
adoption of ERM approaches (or processes), are expected to move the organization away 
from acceptance of risk toward forward proactive management of risk (O’Donnell, 2005).  
2.5.3 Transfer (Financial) 
An organisation may transfer its risks or specifically transfer the economic cost of a risk being 
realised. This involves the operating party (the insured) to identify a specific risk, and 
contractually transfer the impact (or part) of the risk to a 3rd party (the insurer). This is 
commonly undertaken as insurance. Examples of insurance in operations and maintenance 
used as a risk treatment evident in Dey (2004): Pipeline Insurance Plan.  
Insurance as a discipline is not an appropriate replacement for risk management (Crockford, 
1980:44; Engemann & Miller, 1992:143), rather it should be one of a number of tools 
encompassed within risk management. This confusion is rooted in the relationship between 
pioneers of risk management and their heritage in insurance practices. 
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Illusions of control (Schwenk, 1995) 
External factors (Bowman, 1984) 
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Commercial insurance is understood as a move of variable costs relating to failure to a 
predictable fixed cost (Knight, 1921: 213). Smaller (e.g. domestic) types of insurance 
collects: “from many to pay for the losses of the few that suffer them” (Crockford, 1980:45). 
However, there is limited permanent transfer of loss costs to the insurer in commercial 
markets. Insurers for other than catastrophic losses, will recover the cost of losses either in 
increased premiums, or will have done so prior (Crockford, 1980). Operational failures 
when transferred to the insured are the cost of impact plus the administration costs and 
normal profits of the Insurers. Consideration of political risk (Dey, 2004), socioeconomic 
and cultural matters are essential in the consideration of transfer (Vaughan, 1997; Jensen, 
2005).  
Not all events and their impacts are commonly insurable. Vaughan (1997) proposes four 
principles for an insurable risk: 
1) “There must be a sufficiently large number of homogeneous exposure units to make the 
losses reasonably predictable” (Vaughan, 1997:210) 
Where there is a refusal of insurance or unacceptable premiums being offered can lead to 
formation and use of Mutuals or Captives (Crockford, 1980:51). 
2) “The loss produced by the risk must be definite and measurable” (Vaughan, 1997:211) 
Measurability presents significant obstacles for insurance for anything other than direct 
financial loss. Indirect loss, reputational loss and strategic loss become difficult to 
conceive in an insurance agreement. Even where an organisation manages to purchase 
insurance on social matters (i.e. insurance against the cost of planning application being 
refused), the premiums may be higher (the specifics covered by the insurance limited to 
directly attributable losses). There are three categories of insurable political risk: 
expropriation risk (confiscation of assets), transfer risk (limitation of repatriation of 
profits) and violence risk (war or civil disturbance) (Jensen, 2005). It is seen that the 
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economic consequence of political risk is currently the only insurable aspect of political 
risk.  
3) “The loss must be fortuitous or accidental” (Vaughan, 1997:211) 
Where probability is subjective uncertainty; for a mutually acceptable and beneficial 
premium this presupposes that the insurer and insured exist in a market with uniform 
and available knowledge. Experience may create imbalance in the insurance market. An 
organisation with strong risk management processes may be disadvantaged by 
proportionally weaker risk management across an industry, upon the acceptance of the 
insurance approach to law of large numbers (Vaughan 1997:211). 
4) “The loss must not be catastrophic” (Vaughan 1997:211) 
Following catastrophic failure, for example: The Chernobyl Disaster (1986), Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill (1989), The Attack on The World Trade Centre (2001), and The Macondo Well 
Incident (2009), insurance can be enforced by regulation (i.e. Nuclear Risk Insurers 
Limited). As these catastrophic events occur there is pressure on the ability of insurance 
companies to cover the costs, and places the insurance companies under significant 
strain (e.g. AES, 2008 and Lloyd’s of London, 2001). The insurance against catastrophic 
loss is vital to firms as it not only stands to damage earnings and value of the firm but 
also the potential for its very existence.  
There are two common mistakes of buying insurance, too much and too little (Vaughan, 
1997). The costs of these common mistakes can be significant, with the former it can be 
existence threatening and the latter can damage any economic advantage, through 
operational cost inefficiency. “Insurance always costs more than the expected value of the 
loss” (Vaughan, 1997:69). 
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Figure 2.7 Transfer Risk (Insurance)  
Figure 2.7 demonstrates a reduction in the impact of an event when insured. It does not 
influence the probability of the event. The impact is not reduced to zero because the insured 
needs to recognise the cost of insurance and the excess being. This is therefore a limited 
transfer of impact to the insurer. 
2.5.4 Risk Transfer (Outsource)  
Outsourcing is the turning over of an organization’s functions to an external service 
provider (Teng et al., 1995) or “turning over to a supplier those activities outside the 
organization’s chosen core competencies” (Sharpe, 1997:538). This is a strategic decision to 
be made by the organization (Teng et al., 1995). The nature of outsourcing has led to the 
discussion of the relationship between outsourcing and risk (cf. Kaplan et al., 2009), as the 
outsourcing decision to be the causal influence on risk being incurred (Adeleye et al., 2004; 
Aubert et al., 2001; Lonsdale, 1999). Outsource may be used as a risk treatment, in response 
to projects or operations considered too great or complex for the organization to manage 
(Cucchiella & Gastaldi, 2006; Richmond & Seidmann, 1993), this is a potential to “transfer 
the risk of emergency costs or the costs due to an incapability to realise the investment in-
house” (Cucchiella & Gastaldi, 2006:708). However, outsourcing also incurs increased risk 
(cf. Kaplan et al., 2009), for example knowledge leakage, where valuable information or 
know-how is shared outside of the organization (Narasimhan & Talluri, 2009). Contracting 
out services can result in moving risks away from the operating party into a 3rd party. This is 
under a different and more specific relationship than insured-insurer. It may include legally, 
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Reduced financial loss in of a realised 
risk in short term (excess still 
applicable) 
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economically, socially and morally binding features (Vares, 2004:25). This includes 
reputation, staff and motivation that would not be managed within the insurance 
relationship. 
The benefits of outsourcing can provide access to “best in class skills and capabilities” and 
“improvement of products and services” (Harland et al., 2005:841), this can reduce the 
probability of the loss event or at least a better prediction of the loss event (cf. Kaplan et al., 
2009). But there are still divisions in the views of the role of outsourcing. The mantra of 
“don’t outsource a problem” is still topical (Ishizaka & Blakiston, 2012; Soderberg & 
Bengtsson, 2013). Whether it should be used as a risk treatment (because it can reduce the 
inherent risk), it can solve problems (Mazzawi, 2002) or whether it increases the level of 
inherent risk in an operation or function, as the risks in outsourcing are large (Murthy et al., 
2002). Combined with the application of partnering contracts (Levery, 1998) or service 
Level Agreements (SLA) which may have limited damage clauses, this may insulate the 
organization from limited short-term financial losses, much in the same way as commercial 
insurance. Away from the valuation of risk as a financial measure, reputational risk is 
understood to be difficult to protect against in an outsource relationship (Ang & Inkpen, 
2008; Christopher & Gaudenzi, 2009; Hoetcht & Trott, 2006). 
Figure 2.8, represents these different influences on the risk position. That financial loss can 
be reduced through contract (Murthy et al., 2002), but that non-financial risks (i.e. 
reputation) may be increased through the relationship; these affect the potential impact axis 
of the inherent risk. Further the probability of risks may be reduced through the increased 
skills being bought through the contract (cf. Harland et al., 2005). 
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Figure 2.8 Outsource Risk 
Treating risk through outsourcing needs to understand this relationship between the offset 
of financial risks being transferred to the 3rd party, and the increase in the non-financial 
risks (e.g. reputation). Further, that the change in risk may be materially influenced by the 
reduction in probability by engaging increased skills. 
2.5.5 Avoid or Withdraw 
Withdrawal (when in a path of a risk) or avoidance (when decision to enter a path of a risk) 
requires total removal of any probability of occurrence or any impact of occurrence (or 
both). Any interim position is considered as a mitigation strategy, and as a typology, 
mitigation is assumed a more moderate response to risk.  
There is limited theory developing the concept of risk management as a process of 
withdrawal or avoidance. The notable exception is Pauwels and Matthyssens (1999). 
Avoidance requires an organisation’s total removal from an environment, or to make event 
consequences within that environment totally valueless. The reasons for adopting such 
avoidance are considered where the costs of impact are significantly greater than any 
expected returns; or where probability of impact is so high as to move negative outcome 
into a description of near certainty. Where withdrawal is based upon the possibility of 
threat-rigidity this is termed as tactical withdrawal (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 1999:4).  
Increased skills (Harland et al., 2005) 
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Reduced financial loss through 
contract, but increased non-financial 
risk (Murthy et al., 2002) 
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Withdrawal is the selection of a course of treatment that results in a different economic and 
social position, and avoidance of the specified market. The practical effect of whether 
avoidance treatment was chosen based upon direct threat or strategic alternative is a result 
of the decision-making process. Response to a direct threat has increased stigma attached to 
the decision (Pauwels & Matthyssens, 1999:21)6 perceived as moving away rather than 
moving-toward a market. Figure 2.9 represents a withdrawal treatment. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Risk Avoidance 
2.5.6 Mitigate  
Mitigation is an active and conscious risk management treatment. There is a difference 
between mitigating the probability or mitigating the impact (sometimes called resilience) 
(Gao, 2009). 
Mitigation covers recognised and actively managed risks, where either the impact of risk has 
been altered or there has been a change in the likelihood of occurrence; this is where “one 
variable helps to ameliorate another variable” (Faisal et al., 2006:5). 
With mitigated impact the probability is unchanged but the scale of impact has been 
reduced. Mitigation impact may be considered a defensive strategy whereas mitigation 
probability may be considered a controlling strategy (Gao, 2009). 
The concept of hedging, is discussed as a mitigation technique in a non-financial context, as a 
“portfolio of ventures” (Oren, 2001:4) or “as investment of backup systems” (Crouhy et al., 
                                                             
6 although limited by their convenience sample frame in analysing international market withdrawals 
Probability 
Impact 
Inherent risk 
Total removal of probability 
Total removal of impact 
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2001:476). This is a bridge between the financial and non-financial discussion of risk 
management. The impact consequence of hedging is understood as the offsetting of an 
outcome through adoption of a negatively correlated process (cf. Kaplan et al., 2009); it 
becomes a specific sub-category of a mitigate impact strategy. 
The two different approaches of probability and impact mitigation are discussed separately. 
Mitigate probability 
Treating a risk through mitigating the probability leaves the impact of the risk unaffected, 
whilst affecting the likelihood of the risk occurring. This may include the implementation of 
quality control processes, and failsafe devices (for example Poka-Yoke in Lean). In literature 
examples of mitigation-probability are seen in integration of suppliers in supply chains to 
reduce potential for coordination failures (Faisal et al., 2006:3) or insourcing of IT 
department to avoid divisions between business and IT strategy (i.e. RBS who insourced IT 
staff against a sector trend of outsourcing to manage large projects; Currie & Willcocks, 
1998:125).  
An example of two naval risk management treatments: radar and lifeboats are used to 
exemplify the difference between probability and impact mitigation. Radar has no value 
where a collision has already occurred, but will aid the avoidance of obstacles, reducing the 
probability of a crash. Whilst lifeboats has no impact on reducing the probability of a 
collision, but where a collision has occurred is used to reduce the loss to life, and is an 
impact mitigation approach. 
Figure 2.10 demonstrates how an approach to probability mitigation only affects the 
probability axis and leaves the impact unchanged. 
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Figure 2.10 Probability Mitigation 
In operations, mitigation of probability is seen in the carrying of buffer stocks, using 
alternative sources of supply (Spekman & Davis, 2004), developing multiple sourcing 
partners (Ritchie & Brindley, 2004), “safety”, implementation of preventative measures 
(Davies & Walters, 1998:2), “buffers”,  (ibid, 1998:3), “reserve” (Oren, 2001:4) These are 
tactics (Spekman & Davis, 2004) in reducing disruption occurring in the supply chain. These 
are controlling strategies (Gao, 2009). 
Mitigate impact 
Application of impact mitigation strategies is better evidenced in literature and practice 
than probability mitigation, these include: joint ventures (Currie & Willcocks, 1998:124), 
and multiple-supplier sourcing (e.g. ICI  in Currie & Willcocks, 1998:123). Joint ventures 
were intended to share both risk and reward and the latter to reduce the impact of a single 
supplier failure. These decisions to outsource may exhibit characteristics of both mitigate 
probability and mitigate impact as it could be inferred that outsourcing approaches (a route 
of impact mitigation) increased the capability of the operation and shared the discomfort of 
failure.  
Figure 2.11 demonstrates how mitigation of the impact leaves the probability of the 
inherent risk unchanged. 
  
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Probability reduced, impact unchanged 
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Figure 2.11 Impact Mitigation 
There is close association of specific characteristics that identify impact mitigation being 
adopted: “contingency” (Davis & Walters, 1998:4; Engemann & Miller, 1992:146), “backup” 
(Currie & Willcocks, 1998:129), “sharing” (Currie & Willcocks, 1998; Oren, 2001:1), 
“limitation & preparation”  (Davis & Walters, 1998:1; Faisal et al., 2006:1), “flexibility”, the 
creation of capacity or operating flexibility (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999:707), “redundancy”, 
holding of reserve resources (ibid, 1999:707) and “agility” (Faisal et al., 2006:2), which 
provides for responsive actions to be taken on failure. These are defensive strategies (Gao, 
2009). 
Impact mitigation in supply operations are seen in increasing flexibility of suppliers 
(Christopher et al., 2011), and creating redundancy in the system by developing slack 
(Grabowski & Roberts, 1999). Figure 2.12 demonstrates how combined impact and 
probability mitigation approaches can be used to reduce the overall risk affecting an 
operation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Combined Mitigation Strategies 
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Impact reduced 
Probability reduced 
Impact 
Probability 
Inherent risk 
Impact reduced, probability unchanged 
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The reality is that organizations use a mixture of mitigation approaches, treating both the 
impact of the event and the probability of the event occurring, (e.g. the development from 
simple arm’s length relationship to long-term partnerships in Miller et al., 2008).  
2.5.7 Defer (Options Approaches)  
An area not often exposed in operations risk management, are options approaches. An 
options approach is the delay of a decision to a point where there is a change in knowledge 
regarding probability or impact expectation. It can suit situations where complexity is high. 
An options approach may be useful in explanation for many social or noneconomic activities, 
for example marriage and suicide (Dixit & Pindyke, 1994:23). This is a challenge for those 
that believe real options are the territory of pricing based decisions (Amram & Kulatilaka, 
2000:17). Gopal et al. (2005) consider attractiveness of options in risk treatment. Options 
can be used in situations where economic values of an impact are not easily calculated, 
perhaps because the costs are largely indirect. These are effective in situations where there 
is significant influence from social forces in addition to the more empirically observable and 
predictable forces (e.g. plant and equipment). It provides the organization the option to take 
action at a future point in time, whilst not committing high levels of capital or resources to 
the treatment.  
The option approach in operations risk management is borrowed from the finance 
community, “analogous to a financial call option – it has the right but not the obligation to 
buy an asset at some future time of its choosing” (Dixit & Pindyke, 1994:6). This extension of 
financial options pricing models to the discipline of “real options” approaches (Amram & 
Kulatilaka, 2000:15) may be applied to the concept of suspending or decommissioning 
assets. Suspension or decommission is only a subset of the real options approach, which is 
technically considered in the domain of a company’s strategic options (Amram & Kulatilaka, 
2000:17). Use of suspension options means that an avoidance strategy does not become 
irreversible, i.e. commitment of sunk costs (Huisman, 2001:4). Mothballing (suspension) a 
factory or power station or purchase of land for future development would be classical 
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examples of an option approach in a noneconomic context. An example of this was E.ON’s 
mothballing of Grain A Power Station in 2008 with the plan to close in 2012 (Schaps, 2012).  
An option has a cost. It is a concept embedded in English Case Law: Mountford v Scott [1975] 
1 All ER 822, it has a value and when exercised the investment is irreversible. When it is 
exercised it is expected to “yield a positive net payoff” (Dixit & Pindyke, 1994:30). Under an 
investment or abandonment decision, an increase in the uncertainty (probability) of “payoff” 
or rather cost of a decision should increase a firm’s effort in seeking to delay social, political 
or financial commitment (Huchermeier & Loch, 2001:86), this is the options approach.  
This section has analysed the operations risk treatments exposed in extant literature. It has 
focused upon the effect of each treatment type against the influence on the impact of the risk 
and the probability of the risk. The next section summarises the risk literature. 
2.5.8 Summary of Risk Literature 
Figure 2.13 provides a summary of the different concepts in the risk literature. It 
differentiates between: a) Definitions of risk; b) The process of risk management; c) Risk 
treatments. It can be seen where the concept is understood as a generic consideration (i.e. it 
is not specifically aligned to a sector or an organization) or where it is a specific concept, 
situated in an identified sector. 
The links represent a relationship between concepts, without inferring causal direction. It 
identifies that definitions of risk have separation between the generic and specific contexts. 
However the process of risk management and the different risk treatments are not shown to 
be specific to any sector or company. 
A point of contention is identified in the link between Operational risk, situated as a specific 
definition arising from the Basel Accord (Basel Committee, 2006), used within the banking 
and finance sectors. Risk in operations is situated in the generic category. It is found that the 
difference is more than a semantic issue. 
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VaR, a risk valuation tool (section 2.3.2) is specific to monetary valuations seen in the 
finance community, but it is also viewed as a technique to be transferred across disciplines. 
There is a detailed discussion of the different risk treatments, combining knowledge from a 
broad range of sources. This enables representation based on impact and probability 
(derived from the ontology of risk) for each treatment. This literature provides a description 
and influence of the different goals of the risk management process entering into the 
analysis.  
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Figure 2.13 Summary of Links in Risk Literature 
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The review moves onto Decisions under Uncertainty. This changes the point of reference 
from the organization and its risk management approaches and descriptions to an 
understanding of the individual and their behaviour.  Section 2.4.2 identified a strong link 
between understanding the risk management decisions being made by managers and their 
perceptions of risk. This is the humanistic link between the presentation and understanding 
of risk, which later is analysed for the impact of performance management. 
2.6 Decisions under Uncertainty 
This section looks at existing theories and models relating to decision making under 
uncertainty, based heavily in the decision sciences and psychology literature.  
The review begins with the long-established Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), a representation of individual’s choices when faced with 
uncertainty. From Prospect Theory we understand that the decision maker’s interests are 
known to affect outcomes of decision-making and the process of decision-making (Dutton & 
Webster, 1988), and that these influences on the decision-maker can be both conscious and 
unconscious (Dutton & Webster, 1988). This means that representations of risk play a 
dominant role in the decision-making process (Ellis et al., 2010).  This is the basis for 
undertaking a review of the decisions under uncertainty literature. 
2.6.1 Prospect Theory 
 “people systematically violate the requirements of consistency and coherence, and 
we trace these violations to the psychological principles that govern the perception 
of decision problems and evaluation of options” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981:453), supported by Fischhoff (2009) and Hsee and Hastie (2006). 
In 1981 there was a move away from an Expected Utility Model (a theory supposing people 
make rational choices based on the highest expected utility) toward Prospect Theory. 
Prospect Theory comprises a two stage process of framing and evaluation. It proposes that 
76 
 
people are risk averse for gain and risk seeking in loss, and therefore explains the non-
rational choice behaviour observed in their research (Hertwig et al., 2004; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Prospect Theory describes that losses loom larger than gains (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992), extended by Bilgin (2012) that losses also seem more likely.  
Choosing a decision frame can be an ethically significant act. It means that an individual’s 
framing of a problem is contingent, and that human perception of risk is imperfect. This can 
be through the adoption of minimal accounts (a simplified and reduced statement of the 
choices) when framing problems. Minimal accounts are adopted because it assists 
simplification and therefore cognitive strain and that it reflects intuition that consequences 
are related to acts (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). 
Figure 2.14 shows that the utility (the value associated) of an outcome is not defined by the 
weight of its probability; it is defined by a multiplication of the decision weight associated to 
the value. So that high gains have a decreasing weight associated to the value, and high 
losses have an increasing weight associated to the value (i.e. losses loom larger than gains). 
The curve is therefore depicted as a S-shape curve, this is different to the expected utility 
value which would be linear in depiction. 
 
Figure 2.14 Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) 
Utility Value expressed in Prospect Theory does not differentiate or distinguish the unit of 
measure; it is assumed as a financial measurement. This infers that non-financial and 
financial measures of impact will be equivalent in their perception. This is a key limitation of 
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this literature and an area of further study. Prospect Theory opens up consideration of 
several concepts: 
1) Intuition and Reasoning (Hodgkinson et al., 2008; Kahneman, 2003); 
2) Framing (Marteau, 1989; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); 
3) Decision Strategies (Payne et al., 1988); 
4) Time pressure (Pennington & Tuttle, 2007; Wedell & Senter, 1997); 
5) Information load (Chewning & Harrell, 1990); 
6) Rationality (Chater & Oaksford, 2000); 
7) Informational attributes (Edworthy & Adams, 1996; Leonard, 1999); 
8) Weighting (Bleichrodt, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); 
9) Risk and Imprecision aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998); 
10) Bias (Hsee & Hastie, 2006); 
11) Personal contingencies (Sullivan-Taylor & Wilson, 2009). 
These concepts are integrated, creating a link between the different subjects: 
 
Figure 2.15 Decisions Under Uncertainty Concept Links 
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The figure is developed from the discussion in literature, where concepts refer to supporting 
concepts in their understanding or in their mitigation, a link is established7.  
Later it is discussed whether the performance system has direct control (i.e. maintains the 
organizational influence). However, decision-making under uncertainty means managers 
will fall back onto judgement heuristics (Lewis, 2003). The different concepts are taken in 
turn.  
2.6.2 Intuition and Reasoning 
There are two types of decision-making: intuition and reasoning (Kahneman, 2003). 
Intuition is “thoughts and preferences that come into mind quickly and without much 
reflection” (2003:697), intuition occurs almost instantly (Hodgkinson et al., 2008). 
Reasoning is a calculated and deliberate process that occurs when intuition is not 
forthcoming. Kahneman does not relegate intuition to a lower order of decision making 
quality; rather acknowledges that intuition can be a more powerful analysis tool when used 
by the skilled decision maker, and a skill acquired by prolonged practice (Kahneman, 
2003:699). Intuiting (using intuition) is “a complex set of inter-related cognitive, affective and 
somatic processes, in which there is no apparent intrusion of deliberate, rational thought” 
(Hodgkinson, 2008:4). Intuition is influenced by habit, and therefore more difficult to 
control or modify, it involves concepts evolved through language. Intuition is used in 
identifying patterns with minimal information and guides problem solving in complex 
environments. Intuition can provide an advantage in complex situations (cf. Eubanks et al., 
2010; Hodgkinson et al., 2008). 
The relationship between intuition and reasoning appears to be ordered; reasoning is a 
control or test of intuition, therefore reasoning endorses intuition through application of 
valid rules, correction of known biases and adjusted by anchors (Kahneman, 2003:711), the 
concept of doubt is more closely aligned to the application of reasoning.  
                                                             
7 The length of links has no meaning. The position on the x-axis is decided with sympathy to a readable format, 
position on the y-axis infers increasing levels of organizational influence. 
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Intuition has a lack of sensitivity to sample size (Kahneman, 2003:698). Accessibility (which 
is the ease of availability of a mental model) increases with skill and therefore practice 
(2003:702). Where probability estimates are being made under intuition, this analysis is 
“mediated by attributes such as similarity and associative fluency” (Kahneman, 2003:704), 
but intuition is understood to yield more conservative estimates (Peterson & Beach, 1967). 
Reasoning dominates where there is the ability to yield relationships between versions; this 
is where intelligence and statistical thinking become apparent. Reasoning tools, such as 
decision trees are deemed inappropriate for complex decision problems (North, 1968). 
However reasoning is impaired by time pressure, the logical deduction being intuition is a 
quicker process. Time impairment (Pennington and Tuttle, 2007) affects the impact of 
information overload (section 2.6.5), although the association with intuition or reasoning is 
not made explicit.  
Descriptive statistics underlie intuitive inferences (Peterson & Beach, 1967). This is 
consistent with the concept that mental models are formed by previous experience 
(Kahneman, 2003), and those mental models are used in intuition. Intuition and reasoning 
are therefore seen as two related but independent approaches to decision-making, affected 
by experience, time pressure and the complexity of the decision. Both of the approaches 
have their limitations, for example intuition’s lack of sensitivity to sample size.  
The forming of reasoned decisions is influenced by the quantity, perceived quality and 
presentation of data. These are discussed in the concepts of framing and weighting.  
2.6.3 Framing 
Framing is the manner in which probabilities are presented (Marteau, 1989). Framing has 
an influence on an individual’s risk preferences. It is closely associated to the concepts of 
weighing which is an individual’s sensitivity to probabilities. Framing is influenced by 
accessibility and awareness.  
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Accessibility and an increase in multiple dimension awareness are seen in framing. They are 
closely related to reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Accessibility is determined by 
human cognition, changes in attributes are more accessible than absolute numbers, further 
that presentation of data as average results are more accessible than data as sum of results 
(Kahneman, 2003:702). When people are confronted with a difficult decision sometimes 
they answer an easier question instead (Kahneman, 2003). In complement to the concept of 
framing, Peterson and Beach (1967) analysed the statistical capabilities of the individual, 
including: accuracy of estimation, confidence in estimation and sample size utilisation. 
Therefore framing describes the effect of the measure. For example, where a manager is 
faced with performance reports for their operation, the effect of having multiple metrics 
covering different dimensions of the operation may be used as a relative change in 
performance rather than assessment of absolute numbers. 
2.6.4 Decision Strategies 
There are nine different decision strategies that can be used in making a discrete decision; 
these are outlined in the highly cited paper by Payne et al. (1988): 
 Weighted additive (WADD) (multiple attributes with different weights); 
 Equal weight (EW) (multiple attributes, same weight); 
 Satisficing (alternatives one at a time, first required value wins); 
 Majority of confirming dimensions (MCD) (pairs of alternatives compared, all 
considered, best wins); 
 Lexicographic (LEX) (primary attribute compared, best option wins); 
 Lexicographic semi-order (LEX on primary attribute and progresses onto other 
attributes where primary close); 
 Elimination by aspects (EBA) (cut-off value for primary attribute, then progress onto 
secondary attribute); 
 EBA +WADD (EBA for three choices and then WADD); 
 EBA + MCD (EBA for small range and then MCD). 
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There are differences between those decisions that contain either high or low dispersion 
dimensional attributes (e.g. are the number of attributes informing the decision minimal and 
similar - low dispersion, or high and covering many different aspects of the operation - high 
dispersion?). Further these decision strategies can be subdivided into compensatory and 
non-compensatory decision strategies. WADD, EW, MCD are compensatory strategies (they 
are decisions made on appreciation of multiple attributes), the remaining are non-
compensatory (where single attributes are compared). 
The suggestion is that a move toward non-compensatory models is a less cognitively 
demanding approach, as it considers attributes independently. It supports that where 
information overload is experienced, less information is utilised; supportive of the move 
toward single attribute processing (Wedell & Senter, 1997). Wedell and Senter (1997) 
remark on the evidence that shows strategic sampling occurs in complex choice tasks, 
reflective of a non-compensatory coping strategy being employed. Chewning and Harrell 
(1990) and Pennington and Tuttle’s (2007:518) view that “the use of coping strategies 
reduced decision quality” then seems at odds with Payne et al.’s (1988) findings, where 
lexicographic or semi-lexicographic deliver relatively high levels of accuracy. This is unless 
the presumption that all decision-making starts with a weighted additive approach. The 
view that time pressure (a decision characteristic) reduces quality of decision-making that is 
also reflected by Maule and Edland (1997), adding weight to the findings of Pennington and 
Tuttle (2007). The relationship between intuitive decision-making and the specific 
strategies employed in the decision making process seem to have little empirical basis.  
2.6.5 Time Pressure 
Where there is an impact of time pressure, people are shown to be highly adaptive in their 
decision making capability. Decision making skill reduces the need for coping strategy 
adoption (Pennington & Tuttle, 2007) and that relevant information attracts greater 
attention (Wedell & Senter, 1997). There are three approaches to handling decisions under 
time pressure: acceleration, filtration and a change in the choice heuristic (Payne et al., 
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1988). This is in compliment to the effects of information overload as found by Pennington 
and Tuttle (2007) whom acknowledge acceleration (for short periods), filtering and then 
change of the decision model as coping strategies. This change is the move from a 
compensatory to non-compensatory strategy (section 2.6.4). This three step model for coping 
strategies is extended by Maule and Edland (1997): acceleration, filtration, change and also 
do nothing (in order). People weight importance they increasingly look at the information 
(Wedell & Senter, 1997), although this has not been proved in reverse (this 
misunderstanding is seen in Pennington & Tuttle 2007:493), this is supportive of filtration. 
The three coping strategies outlined by Payne et al. are valid approaches to coping with 
decisions under time pressure (Pennington & Tuttle, 2007). However, Pennington and 
Tuttle’s research state that acceleration and then change in decision strategy were observed 
coping strategies in their study, but there was no proof of filtration approaches found in 
their sample. This discrepancy was attributed to their use of “experienced professional 
subjects” (Pennington & Tuttle, 2007:518), and exposes the potential for a contingent 
relationship between experience and coping strategy.  
Confidence can be reduced under the pressure of time (Maule & Edland, 1997). There is an 
expectation that simpler strategies are used but also that strategies are used in incomplete 
formats. The impact on risk propensity in decision-making is more pronounced under Maule 
and Edland’s work; that in low dispersion environments (where there are low numbers or 
similar attributes in decision) risk taking in decisions is not subject to a material difference, 
whereas in high dispersion environments there was a significant impact. The impact in high 
expected value environments increased risk taking, and in low expected value environments 
there was a decrease in risk taking (Maule & Edland, 1997:192), and that time pressured 
choices were largely less extreme in difference. Where time pressured decisions are 
required, non-compensatory strategies are utilised (Maule & Edland, 1997). Time pressure 
does change the individual nature of judgement and decision making, and that this can be 
categorised into seven areas, it:  
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a. Reduces quality; 
b. Changes propensities;  
c. Increases importance of internal sources;  
d. Affects use of coping mechanisms;  
e. Changes weights;  
f. Changes weights assigned to sources;  
g. Changes perceptions of alternative choices. (Maule & Edland, 1997) 
2.6.6 Information Load 
Information load is understood as volume of dimensions rather than amounts of 
information on a single dimension. Load and a threshold for manageable load is dependent 
on the individual (Chewning & Harrell, 1990; Pennington & Tuttle, 1997). Information load 
causes less consistent decisions (Pennington & Tuttle, 1997); this is supported by the 
concept of compensatory versus non-compensatory decision-making (Pennington & Tuttle, 
2007; Maule & Edland, 1997; Wedell & Senter, 1997). 
Larger samples will incur greater processing, but they may offer more accurate inferences. 
Larger samples are subject to the issues of information load on the decision maker (Maule 
and Edland, 1997; Chewning & Harrell, 1990). Sample size can be controlled by either pre-
selection of sample size in advance of decisions or through optional stopping (Peterson & 
Beach, 1967). Optional stopping is where the individual can decide to stop accessing the 
sample data at the point they are content with their decision. This reflects a satisficing 
strategy (cf. Payne et al., 1988). However confidence increases with sample size (Peterson & 
Beach, 1967:114).  
2.6.7 Rationality 
Formal rationality, is rationality that uses mathematical theories of good reasoning (Chater 
& Oaksford, 2000:65). This supports Kahneman and Tversky’s differentiation between 
reasoning and intuition (1984); that reasoning is a check on intuitive decisions (it is a higher 
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order cognitive process). It reflects the need to underpin intuition with rational models, 
even if this is not done consciously at the time. To define rationality, it should be viewed as a 
decision leading to the achievement of goals relating to the agent (Chater & Oaksford, 2000). 
Rationality is instead replaced by managerial perceptions, what is termed the effect of ludic 
fallacy (Sullivan-Taylor & Wilson, 2009). This achievement of goals when seen through 
formal rationality, leads to the selection of optimal solutions. It infers subjectivity in defining 
the optimal solution, and therefore rationality itself becomes subjective.  
Another form of rationality is Lay rationalism (Hsee & Hastie, 2006:37). Lay rationalism 
proposes an irony that in chasing a desire to be rational, people often make less rational 
decisions. This can be seen in a bias for economism, functionalism (similar to attribute 
possessing) and important to management science. Lay scientism is understood where 
decision makers revert to using only objective information, to the ignorance of subjective 
information (e.g. the differentiation between financial measures seen as objective versus 
and non-financial measures which are seen as subjective valuations). 
Rationality is associated to consistency in decision-making, where consistency (ability to 
evaluate information consistently) is perceived as a desirable quality (Dilla & Stone, 1997; 
Pennington & Tuttle, 1988:498). The desirable quality comes from the ability to be 
consistent and rational (Chater & Oaksford, 2000). It would appear that irrationality would 
be a negative characteristic in decision-making. This relationship exposes the link to bias in 
decision making (Chater & Oaksford, 2000; Hsee & Hastie, 2006). 
2.6.8 Informational Attributes 
Risk perceptions are themselves influenced by both informational and iconic factors 
contained within risk information (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). Colour, font-size, shape 
comprise the critical elements of iconic factors (Edworthy & Adams, 1996) but also 
contribute to the informational factors.  
85 
 
Colour and colour words have equal significance in evaluation by individuals (Leonard, 
1999). Colour is known to influence cognitive processes (Mehta & Zhu, 2009), although 
colours are not shown to affect relative assessment as often indicated by common standards 
(Leonard, 1999). Colour influences are thought to be learned associations (Elliot et al., 
2007). Leonard (1999) tested these associations using colours and signal words. This 
demonstrated a valid association between colours and predefined warning words. Colours 
were also shown to have a defined order of severity perception (Severtson & Henriques, 
2009).  Confusion of order in low threat colour usage, notably confusion on green and blue 
usage, is demonstrated in a study of Homeland Security Advisory System warnings 
(Mayhorn et al., 2004). The use of colour coding, typically red, amber, green in performance 
systems are documented in Caramona and Gronlund (2003). 
Perceptions of risk are affected by a number of factors including both colour and framing 
effect (Williams & Noyes, 2007). Colour may contribute to the attention grabbing features, 
which includes font-size and accompanying shape of the signal (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). 
Colour signals influence perceptions of urgency, and can be interpreted as a guide to 
priority, whereby red is the highest level of risk, followed by orange, black, green and blue 
respectively (Lehto, 1992). The use of red signals has a further effect, that compliance is 
increased, this is relative to the use of green or black signals (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). 
This is extended in understanding by Severtson and Henriques (2009) and Cleveland and 
McGill (1984), who’s study of format modification on warning labels, demonstrated that 
colour grading was the least responsive element in their study of ten visual features.  
These studies have shown that beyond the information being conveyed to the decision-
maker, what is described as the informational content, the format of the information and the 
accompanying shape and colour also has an impact on the perceptions of risk and the 
priority assessment, this is the iconic factor in the communication.  
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2.6.9 Weighting 
Weighting is “the non-linear sensitivity of people towards probability” (Bleichrodt, 2001:185). 
Weighting of information and framing of decisions affects choice (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981; Wedell & Senter, 1997; Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). The weighting function is 
described through discriminability and attractiveness. Discriminability describes how people 
discriminate probabilities. This is developed from Prospect Theory, that diminishing 
sensitivity is that people become less sensitive to changes in probability as they move away 
from the reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Attractiveness recognises that some 
people find speculative uncertainty more attractive than others (i.e. under or overweighting 
of the same probability in Gonzalez & Wu, 1999). However, weighting of losses is elevated 
over weighting of gains (Abdellaoui, 2000). 
Accuracy of estimation increases with observation time (Peterson & Beach, 1967), but 
increased data weighting increases data access time (Wedell & Senter, 1997). Weighting of 
attributes is seen in the Weighted Additive decision strategy, but multiple attributes increase 
the cognitive demand (Payne et al., 1988). It is understood therefore that weighting of 
attributes increases accuracy but has two negative implications: it increases processing time 
and increases cognitive load on the decision maker (Payne et al., 1988). 
The medium of choice description can have an impact of the weighting assigned by the 
decision maker. Hertwig et al. (2004) found that rare events have less subjective weight 
assigned when based on experience, and greater weighting when described by a third party. 
Their findings suggested that expectation of rare event probability reduction is based on the 
idea that many people will not experience the rare event; this does not mean that the event 
will be underestimated, just that the expectation is lower. However an individual that does 
experience the rare event is far more likely to produce a better assessment of the likelihood 
of the event (Hertwig et al., 2004). Wiseman and Gomez-Meija state that prior success in 
selecting risky choices is also understood to positively skew evaluation (1998). This is 
87 
 
consistent with Kahneman’s (2003) view that decision making can be improved with 
practice.  
Weighting is therefore understood as both a product of the decision strategy being used 
compensatory (weighted) or non-compensatory (un-weighted) and the experience of the 
decision-maker; whereby experience results in less subjective weighting of rare events and 
previous success increases risky choice. The reverse of this influence where risky choices 
are avoided is discussed in the next section as risk aversion. 
2.6.10 Aversion 
Risk Aversion is the desire to avoid risks. There are two types of risk aversion discussed in 
the literature: risk aversion and loss aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). This seems to 
have particular importance in the difference between risk as imprecision (speculative risk) 
and risk of loss (pure risk).  
Risk aversion is where aversion is based on a dislike of the unknown, and a desire to control 
the outcome. Loss aversion is where the aversion is dominant in the dislike of loss; the 
individual’s attention is driven by the concern over losing wealth more than the desire to 
gain it (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). Loss aversion arises because individuals imagine 
what they will lose; it is the individual’s imagination that increases this evaluation of 
subjective probability (Bilgin, 2012). Aversion can relate to both the individual and a 
collection (Abdellaoui et al., 2011). 
Therefore aversion is the dislike of uncertainty and/or loss, they are separate 
considerations. Aversion is a subjective and personal consideration. In the case of pure risk 
management it may be deduced that both loss aversion and risk aversion will influence the 
decision-maker. Aversion therefore affects the decision-makers choices and their attention.  
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2.6.11 Bias 
Biases are “deviations from logical or statistical principle” (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011:451). This may be understood to be an explanation for why decision-makers ignore 
part of the information in their decision process. Biases affect perception and the stability of 
preferences (Lai, 2001). Biases exist in several formats. Hsee and Hastie (2006) identify four 
types of bias:  
i) Projection;  
ii) Distinction;  
iii) Memory;  
iv) Belief. (Hsee & Hastie, 2006) 
Projection bias is based on the situation of the decision maker. Distinction bias is based on 
the existence of different evaluation modes (i.e. single-evaluation mode or multiple 
comparison models). Memory bias is affected by past events. Belief bias is influenced by held 
individual assumptions (Hsee & Hastie, 2006). The last two suppositions are based on the 
understanding that people reconstruct the past, even if this is inaccurate, because they may 
reformat random events into logical and causal relationships (Kemdal & Montgomery, 
1999). People demonstrate a bias towards inaction rather than intervention (Baron, 1994); 
however this does not reflect obligation on the individual (e.g. holding a managerial office). 
With underlying biases, there are two approaches to judgement of risk (Fischhoff, 2009):  
1. Absolute, judgement based on anchors;  
2. Relative, comparison between choices.  
The concept of absolute judgement and its relationship to anchors has an impact on risk 
perception, and therefore the systems controlling risk. People generally overestimate small 
frequencies and underestimate large frequencies, this judgement is changed with supply of 
anchors (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). Anchors are reference points, by which the individual 
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makes judgement. A low anchor was shown to reduce over-estimation of small frequencies 
(Fischhoff, 2009).  
Previous loss or failure events are known to influence not only the way in which 
organizations but whole industries operate, e.g. Nick Leeson, Rogue Trader (Harland et al., 
2003) and the Macondo Well Incident (Bea, 2011; Brewer & Mckeeman, 2011, Rathnayaka 
et al., 2013; Skogdalen & Vinnem, 2012). These cases form an understanding of previous 
losses, or memorable events; this is the influence of weighting (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981) and bias (Hsee & Hastie, 2006).  
2.6.12 Personal Contingencies 
There are a number of contingencies in risk perception, brought by the individual and their 
role. They influence the individual’s decision making (Pablo et al., 1996). These are 
described as personal contingencies effecting risk perception.  
Environment and context can affect managerial decision making under uncertainty (Villena 
et al., 2009). Analysis of executive decision making showed that loss of executive control due 
to external environment, increases risk aversion (Villena et al., 2009). Executives may avoid 
taking choices beneficial to the organisation, if this could have a personal potential for loss. 
More difficult targets increase risk taking and that when individual’s remuneration is 
attached to firm wealth, riskier choices are made; and that when agents bear too much risk 
they become risk averse (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). Rewarding results rather than 
behaviour may privatise the risk choices being made and that private security of the 
executive actually increases the risk seeking in decisions (Villena et al., 2009). This has 
implications on the affect that individual risk has on the decisions they are making for the 
organization. These relationships are a product of risk transfer between agent and 
organization, a concept discussed in Agency Theory.  
Being explicit about targets and statement of magnitude of outcome has an impact on 
driving risk aversion within the manager (March & Shapira, 1987). Individual managers 
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adopt an overly optimistic view of risk (Kaplan & Mikes, 2012; Sullivan-Taylor & Wilson, 
2009). However, decision makers may base their choices on rules rather than predictions 
(Hsee & Hastie, 2006:36). These can be rules of good behaviour that are contrary to their 
own predicted experience. This suggests organizational rules take primacy over individual 
knowledge. 
Where decision-making can be understood to be the formalisation of common sense, it 
includes both a numerical calculation and a subjective expression of preference (Warner 
North, 1968). These two stages of risk determination, demonstrate that it is difficult to 
separate a decision from the amalgamation of both objective information and the subjective 
interpretation of the decision maker. The subjective interpretation therefore becomes a 
product of both the environment and individual (Looney et al., 2008). 
Reflection on the risk taker influences managerial judgment (cf. Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). 
Specifically, Zuckerman and Kuhlman (2000) identify that personality, sensation seeking 
and attention gathering effect risk taking in individuals, therefore suggesting that the 
reflections on the individual decision-maker are important forces. This is seen in 
organizations that rely upon incentive payment which perform more poorly than their 
competitors (cf. Bloom & Milkovich, 1998:284). 
For the individual, financial measures are prioritized in allocation of bonuses and incentives 
(Ittner et al., 2003). This does not suggest that non-financial measures do not form part of 
the evaluation criteria, just that the financial measures have greater weighting in decision-
making (Baddeley, 1994; Cardinaels & Veen-Dirks, 2010; Lipe & Salterio, 2002). This is 
explained by the Outcome Effect (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981), where evaluators weight measures 
of outcome over behaviours (Dilla & Steinbart, 2005; cf. Ittner et al., 2003). Individual 
therefore respond differently according to their evaluation criteria. So, reward systems that 
favour individual unit thinking, are difficult for individual managers to overcome (Spekman 
& Davis, 2004). This exposes the role of personal risk bearing on the individual. 
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The relationship between risk management as a set of disciplines and practices and 
individual decision-making is understood further in a deconstruction of the different 
components influencing managerial risk judgements. This is explained in Principle-Agent 
Theory (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). Principle Agent Theory develops an understanding of the 
relationship between the organization and the individual. 
2.6.13 Principle Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
Principle-Agent Theory is a perspective developed from Agency Theory (Principle-Agent 
Stream). There are two actors in the relationship, the Principle and the Agent, this 
relationship is held together by a form of contract.  
“Given that the principle is buying the agent’s behaviour, then a contract that is 
based on behaviour is most efficient. An outcome-based contract would 
needlessly transfer risk to the agent…” (Eisenhardt, 1989:61). 
The Principle’s measures may include more than pure financial outcomes (Eisenhardt, 
1989:71), for example it recognizes that self-interest as well as risk aversion can be 
understood through this transfer of responsibility: 
“according to agency theory we would predict that such managers [of the 
operation] will be very sensitive to outcome uncertainty” (Eisenhardt, 1989:65).  
Principle-Agent theory, has a perspective that the performance system is operating as 
contract between Principle and Agent (Eisenhardt, 1989); control systems are a contract 
(Anderson & Oliver, 1987). The performance measurement system is proxy for a contract: 
“the unit of analysis [performance measure] is the contract between Principle and Agent…”, 
(Melnyk et al., 2004). Celly and Frazier (1996) outline this role as a matter of co-ordination 
and McMillan (1990) as a matter of control. 
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There are different options for contract construction: contract with the individual or with a 
collective. However, groups (collectives) are riskier than individuals in their choices 
(Dorwin, 1971).  
Agency Theory suggests that there is a “pursuit of self-interest at the individual level and goal 
conflict at the organizational level” (Eisenhardt, 1989:63). It informs how the difference 
between managerial levels might be displayed. “Risk Bearing plays an important role in 
agency models of executive behaviour” (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998:136), this is the 
“Perceived risk to an agents wealth that can result from employment risk or other threats to 
agent wealth” (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998:136). Taking this view, managers’ rewards 
might become an influence in both the sensitivity to different risk assessment metrics but 
also the decision-making processes. The impact on group risk bearing is harder to establish.  
Agency theory provides an understanding that risk as a latent concern can be transferred. It 
supports the concept of exposure to risk (Holton, 2004). The transfer being described by 
agency theory is from the principal (the firm) to the agent (the employee). In understanding 
that risk can be transferred to the agent, and that the approach to transfer can have a 
material effect on the agent. This highlights the potential for personal contingencies (the 
context of the agent, their beliefs and emotions, see section 2.6.12) to have a bearing on the 
subjective valuation of the risk. Further, agency theory suggests that in transferring the risk 
to the agent through outcome measures that this becomes an inefficient process for 
managing risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore risk is determined both at an individual and 
organizational level (Spekman & Davis, 2004:417). 
2.6.14 Decisions Under Uncertainty Summary 
The role of weighting (Wedell & Senter, 1997), framing (Looney et al., 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Fischhoff, 2009; North, 1968), information load (Chewning & Harrell, 
1990; Maule & Edland, 1997; Pennington & Tuttle, 2007), aversion and rationality (Gomez-
Majia & Revilla, 2009; Hertwig et al., 2009; Peterson & Beach, 1967; Villena, 2009) and risk 
preferences (Kemdal & Montgomery, 1999; Lai, 2001; Wiseman, 1982) explain some of the 
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influences on decisions (under uncertainty). It extends Slovic’s (1964) suggestion that risk 
taking and individual behaviour has a complex relationship. This section has reviewed the 
knowledge on how risk decisions are affected by different influences, it has shown:  
 There are two types of decision-making: intuition and reasoning (Kahneman, 2003); 
 Accessibility and reasoning are closely related, however accessibility relates to the 
individual, whereby changes in attribute are more accessible than sums (Kahneman, 
2003); 
 Mental models are formed by previous experience (Kahneman, 2003), and those 
models are used in intuition; 
 The use of mental models, the derivation of estimates from experience, is associated 
with intuition (Fischhoff, 2009);  
 There are nine types of decision-making; these can be grouped as either compensatory 
or non-compensatory. The difference is based on the attention to the inclusion of all 
attributes in the decision. This is affected by the different coping strategies under time 
pressure; 
 Time pressure in decision-making is managed through an order coping response: 
acceleration, filtration and moving to a non-compensatory decision strategy (Maule & 
Edland, 1997); 
 People are generally overconfident with their choices, where overconfidence is more 
typical of difficult choices and under-confidence with easy ones (Fischhoff et al., 1997; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); 
 There are distinct gaps in risk judgement between lay people and experts (Fischhoff, 
2009); 
 That when communicating information on which to make risk decisions it is important 
to supply the information in order of expected impact on decisions (Fischhoff, 2009), as 
larger samples increase the information load (Chewning & Harrell, 1990); 
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 Managers have a tendency to use rational decision-making when confronted with 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921); 
 Information communicated includes both informational and iconic information 
(Edworthy & Adams, 1996), colour use is iconic (Leonard, 1999); 
 Format and use of words and phrases influences judgement (Dilla & Stone, 1997); 
 Increased weighting increases data access time (Wedell & Senter, 1997), although 
weighting increases accuracy it increases cognitive load and processing time; 
 Risk aversion is comprised of two different influences: loss aversion and imprecision 
aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998); 
These different influences on risk judgement may be configured through the medium of 
communication (Erev & Cohen, 1990), the types and format of measurement (Edworthy & 
Adams, 1996) and the purpose (cf. Kahneman, 2003) of the information provided. The 
performance measurement and management systems used in organizations are considered 
as a framework for this communication (cf. Otley, 2008). The next section reviews the 
performance management literature, to understand the role of the performance system. 
2.7 Performance Management  
The body of Performance Management knowledge is described by Franco-Santos et al. 
(2007), as distributed and diverse ranging from “strategy management, operations 
management, human resources, organisational behaviour, information systems, marketing” 
(2007:784) through to management accounting and control. Authors in the performance 
management field are from diverse backgrounds, from accounting through to information 
systems (cf. Neely, 2005). The lack of consensus of definition is therefore an issue (Franco-
Santos et al., 2007). The link between performance management, performance 
measurement and management control systems is explained by Otley: 
“Performance management therefore provides an important integrating 
framework, both academically and practically. It goes well beyond the traditional 
95 
 
boundaries of management accounting… The use of management accounting and 
control systems can be fruitfully analysed from the framework of performance 
measurement and performance management.” (Otley, 1999:381) 
These three schools of understanding: Performance Measurement, Performance 
Management and Management Control Systems (MCS) have a long lineage8. This body of 
work seems more mature and integrated than the risk management literature. There are a 
number of codified approaches to implementing performance systems, these include: The 
Balanced Scorecard, Performance Prism and MCS, amongst others. 
The Balanced Scorecard has been extensively academically and commercially analysed over 
the past 15 years, contexts are broad including: supply chain performance (Brewer & Speh, 
2000), Information Systems management (Martinsons et al., 1999), a strategic management 
system (Atkinson, 2006; Kaplan & Norton, 2000, 2006, 2008; Malina & Selto, 2001), 
research and development (Bremsner & Barsky, 2004; Eilat et al., 2008), process 
improvement (Amaratunga et al., 2001), financial performance (Davis & Albright, 2004) and 
even as far as predictive use of risks becoming realised, i.e. terrorist attacks (Beitel et al., 
2004). The contexts are as far ranging from healthcare (Radnor & Lovell, 2003), to 
education (Karathanos & Karathanos, 2005; Kim & Davidson, 2004). 
MCS, based in the management accounting community have historically discussed the use of 
financial measures; only recently expanded this discussion to include non-financial 
measures. They have been used predominantly as systems to control the organization, with 
limited feedback loops and generative learning mechanisms. Anthony’s (1965) focus on 
operational attributes of control systems has attracted some criticism, that it separated itself 
from strategic concerns. It was a criticism that is addressed in Kaplan and Norton (2008) 
and Otley (1999; 2008) 
                                                             
8 The term “performance system” is used throughout as a collective term for performance management systems, 
performance measurement systems and management control systems.  
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The MCS is one which is “the mediating activity between strategic planning (objective setting) 
and task control (the carrying out of specific tasks).” (Otley, 2008:25). This identifies two 
control system attributes:  
 Alignment of objectives from strategy;  
 Implementation into specific tasks. 
The Performance Prism focuses on data retrieval processes: acquisition, collation and 
sorting and the learning processes: analysis and interpretation (Neely et al., 2002:3). 
However this is not only an operational reporting tool.  
So the body of performance knowledge has two perspectives: 
 Discussion of named techniques e.g. Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; 2000; 
2008), Performance Prism (Neely & Adams, 2002) and Management Control Systems 
(Anthony, 1965; Otley, 1999); 
 A theoretical discussion of roles and functions of the performance system/control 
system e.g. Franco-Santos et al. (2007) and Dresner (2010). 
The latter approach is favoured in developing the research, as it avoids issues in controlling 
specific implementation of a technique, and whether it has been correctly interpreted by the 
organizations studied. However, learning from both bodies of work aids an understanding of 
theoretical and practitioner perspectives. This idea of a theoretical perspective is borrowed 
from Broadbent and Laughlin (2009), which itself developed from Otley’s work (1999). 
Reviewing the literature it appears that the three schools of work can be compared through 
understanding: the breadth of metrics employed and the feedback mechanism they imply. 
Figure 2.16 outlines the relationship between the different concepts as understood from the 
literature. Specifically how the performance management and measurement fields have 
taken greater consideration of a breadth of financial and non-financial metrics in discussion.  
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Figure 2.16 Overview of Performance Systems 
The difference between the three schools presents semantic issues between definitions of 
measurement and management. Much of what is written differentiates only subtly between 
the two. Theoretically the difference may exist between their use of feedback loops into the 
operation and with the development of strategy. 
It is not always clear of the distinction between performance management and performance 
measurement. This is a consistent issue between authors, for example the Balanced 
Scorecard is referred to as a measurement system (Neely & Austin, 2002:42), and as a 
management system (Barnes & Radnor, 2008:98; Radnor & Lovell, 2003; Lawrie & Cobbold, 
2004:611). Even within individual texts both terms are used interchangeably (Neely & 
Austin, 2002:44)9. The performance measurement system is a backward looking “of past 
action” (Neely et al., 2002:2). The performance management system is a system that 
incorporates enablement of action: “[The performance management system] enables 
informed decisions to be made and actions to be taken” (Neely et al., 2002:2). The 
measurement system is an input into the management system (Kagioglou et al., 2001); and as 
a function conceptually separable from it. The measurement system is a constituent and 
wholly encompassed facet of the management system (Bititci et al., 1997). 
                                                             
9 It is considered that at the point of writing or the context, the differentiation is insignificant and therefore no criticism 
should be levelled. Rather it opens up the discussion to be inclusive of both.  
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The development from performance measurement system to performance management 
system is considered in the influence it has on decision-making. Otley suggests a move in the 
frame of reference for performance measurement research: “we shall broaden this 
perspective by looking beyond the measurement of performance to the management of 
performance.” (Otley, 2008:24). This move from a passive system of measurement toward an 
active system of management: “Management of” as defined is “to administer and regulate 
resources” (Simpson, 2006:762), includes control and direction and resources includes (e.g. 
people, systems, knowledge and capital within the firm).  
Therefore it is appropriate to consider the three schools of literature in a review of 
performance systems. The next section reviews the different functions of the performance 
system from these three bodies of literature, both in terms of codified approaches and 
theoretical discussion of the performance system. 
2.8 Performance System Functions 
Analysis of the literature adopts an approach to illicit the different functions of the 
performance system. The control system “consists of several interrelated but often loosely 
coupled parts.” (Otley, 2008:24). These parts may be separate (but sometimes causally 
related), therefore defining choices or configurations of a system (cf. Ferreira & Otley, 
2009). By deconstructing the performance system into the different functions, this supports 
the first step in Bhaskar’s (1989) approach, which is “Resolution of the complex event into 
components” (Collier, 1994:162), discussed in the research strategy (chapter 3).  
In reviewing the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and Performance Prism (PP), the nature and 
application of the performance system is dependent on the component configuration and 
priorities, reflecting the different functions. They appear to be different configurations, 
rather than fundamentally different concepts. The BSC is dominated by the transfer of 
strategy into objectives and measures. The Performance Prism focuses more on 
understanding the different stakeholder contributions. It is apparent that definitions used in 
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the literature (on performance systems) are contingent (cf. Holloway & Thorpe, 2008:3; 
Broadbent & Laughlin, 2009). By approaching through a lens that looks at the various 
functions of the systems, it mitigates much of the contingency effect on this definition.  
System functions are in complement to features and process. Functions include: 
measurement, strategy measurement, communication, influence behaviour and learning and 
improvement (Franco-Santos et al., 2007:797). 
Table 2.2 Summary of Performance System Functions from Literature 
 
The review exposes the some of the considerations performance systems may have on risk 
management decision-making. Broadly these functions of the performance system are 
summarised as: 
1. as a Measurement System; 
2. as a Communication Function; 
3. as a Strategy Tool; 
4. its impact on Learning. 
These are discussed in turn. 
Role Ferreira & 
Otley 
(1999) 
Franco-
Santos et al. 
(2007) 
Kaplan & 
Norton 
(2008) 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
Kennerley & 
Neely (2002) 
Performance 
measurement 
system 
Neely & 
Adams 
(2000) 
Performance 
Prism 
Communication ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Measurement ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Learning ∎ ∎ ∎  ∎ 
Strategic 
Alignment 
∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ 
Evolution & 
Influence 
∎     
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2.8.1 Performance System as a Measurement System 
A performance system includes a measurement function: “The process of quantifying the 
efficiency and effectiveness of action” (Neely et al., 2002:1). The measurement function is 
discussed in Melnyk et al. (2004), Otley (2008) and Pinheiro de Lima et al. (2009).  
The measurement system includes: 
a) Data acquisition; 
b) Data collection; 
c) Construction of measures. 
There are a number of dimensions affecting measures:  
 Tense (Melnyk et al., 2004); 
 Lag-lead balance (Evans, 2004:222; Kaplan & Norton, 1993); 
 Balance of finance and non-finance orientated measures (Clarke, 1995; Drucker, 
1990; Evans, 2004; Gomez et al., 2004; Kaplan & Norton, 1993, 1996; Manoochehri, 
1999;Melnyk et al., 2004; Schneiderman, 1999), also advocated by the management 
accounting community (Bhimani, 1993:21; Ferreira & Otley, 2009:269; Mikes, 
2009:22); and  
 Stakeholder representation (Neely & Adams, 2002; Schneiderman, 1999). 
The approach advocated by Schneiderman would have a ratio of non-financial to financial 
measures at 6:1 (1999:7); although this is largely in the context of the BSC. Melnyk et al. 
(2004:212) encourage selection of financial and non-financial measures as a recipient 
consideration. Whereby, top managers focused on financial metrics, they are outcome 
orientated and focus on operational measures, and are predictive orientated (Melynk et al., 
2004). It shows that there must be a blend of to provide measures for both groups within an 
organization.  
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Stakeholder representation in measures is closely related to financial/non-financial 
consideration of measure usage. The common stakeholder groups considered are: customer, 
financial and market, human resources, supplier and partner (Evans, 2004:221). Stakeholder 
presentation in the metrics should be a reflection of stakeholder value in the process, and 
directly related to promotion of this value (Mikes, 2009:22).  
There is pressure on maintaining a manageable set of measures, this seems to agree with 
Pennington and Tuttle (1997). Measures must be understandable (Melnyk et al., 2004). The 
managerially effective number may be as low as 10 to 30 measures (Kaplan & Norton, 1993; 
Schniederman, 1999). There may be a distinct difference between the strategic 
measurement systems as opposed to operational measurement systems. An aspect is 
understandability as the benchmark by which to gauge how many measures. In 
Schniederman’s vision this is an “8½ x 11 sheet of paper, 18 pica or larger font size…” 
(1999:7). This relates to the discussion of informational and iconic factors (Edworthy & 
Adams, 1996), which defines the different properties of measure communication. 
Strategic intent, learning and system capability should inform selection of measure (Malina 
& Selto, 2004). So, firms operating in risky environments may select qualitative and non-
financial performance measures, as a response to their environment (Malina & Selto, 2004). 
The banking sector have developed financial measurement of potential loss in the same way 
as market or capital risk, using VaR, although this is widely understood to be an ineffective 
approach for Operational risk (Matz, 2005:3).  
Decoupling measurement and communication can be challenging. However, not all 
measures need to be or are communicated, so the representation of measures, directly 
considers this function of communication. 
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2.8.2 The Communication Function 
The communication function can be understood as the method (the channel and target) and 
the protocol (the format), for representing measures and targets. There are several different 
considerations in the communication function of the performance system.  
The method of communication: 
Performance system communication can be as diverse as internal and external channels (i.e. 
shareholder reports), for example environmental disclosures (Wiseman, 1982). Public 
disclosures from control systems have the consequence of broadening the range of 
stakeholders involved in the performance management of the organization (Wiseman, 
1982). 
There are different targets (stakeholders) for the communication. Best-fit stakeholder 
balancing supported by Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984) is 
that no single stakeholder has primacy over the others and is likely to have conflicts in 
demands. This suggests that different types and delivery of communication are needed to 
reflect individual stakeholder demands. 
The protocol of communication: 
The considerations of communication protocol are intrinsically linked to the perceptions 
and judgements of managers (Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004); this is discussed in section 2.6, for 
example framing (Marteau, 1989), informational attributes (Edworthy & Adams, 1996) and 
information load (Pennington & Tuttle, 1997).  The performance system becomes the vehicle 
for communication to an organization of both explicit and implicit risk measures and 
targets.  
There should be a move toward more eye appealing presentation of information, so as to 
decrease the complexity of the decision-making process (Speier, 2006; Vessey, 1991), this 
links to the discussion of increased informational attributes (Payne et al., 1988).  
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Measures may be provided as a list or as a matrix. A matrix presentation is more cognitively 
demanding (Hong et al., 2004). Presentation and use of tables, graphics and matrix are 
contingent on the individual and decision-making being required (Yigibasioglu & Velcu, 
2012). Purpose, task requirement, individual knowledge and user personality should be 
considered in design of the communication protocol (Yigibasioglu & Velcu, 2012). The latter 
consideration, user personality is related to: aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998), bias 
(Hsee & Hastie, 2006), and informational attributes (section 2.6.12). In responding to the 
issues of data load and resulting cognitive strain not all measures need to be published to be 
effective (Malina & Selto, 2004). 
The considerations in communication protocol include choices on: 
 Volume of measures (Hong et al., 2004); 
 Financial or non-Financial Measures (Schneiderman, 1999); 
 Breadth of stakeholder representation (Freeman, 1984); 
 Balance between internal and external measures (Keegan et al., 1989); 
 Measures for early indication, and past performance (Bourne et al., 2000). 
The performance system is therefore understood to contain different choices in 
communication method and protocol. Further it is the mechanism by which to influence 
management behaviour (Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004:615). The organization must establish 
channels of communication to feedback the delivery against objectives (O’Donnell, 2005).  
The knowledge of performance system communication is the link to influences on risk 
judgement (section 2.6), and operationalizes these choices, for the purpose of influencing 
managerial behaviour (cf. Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004). 
2.8.3 The Performance System as a Strategy Tool 
Performance systems are the tool by which strategies are implemented into an organisation 
(Bititci et al., 1997; Kloot & Martin, 2000; Malina & Selto, 2004; Otley, 1999). It is the 
articulation and transfer of strategic ambition into objectives, measures and hence targets, 
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and to assess the implementation of strategy (Bourne et al., 2000). The other components of 
the performance system appear to be supporting functions to this requirement.  
Performance systems are used both as strategy implementation tools and as an influence on 
the formation of strategy (Langfield-Smith, 1997). The BSC literature is central to 
understanding the link between performance systems and strategy. 
BSC literature comprehensively covers the process of strategy mapping, this is the 
dissemination of strategy into objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 2000), and it is the cornerstone 
of the BSC framework (Kloot & Martin, 2000; Pun & White, 2005). The BSC encourages use 
of financial/non-financial measures and lag/lead measures (Kaplan & Norton, 2003). This is 
reflective of choices exposed in the discussion of measurement (section 2.8.1) and 
communication (section 2.8.2). The BSC literature infers a top-down approach to creation of 
objectives. 
However in reverse, measurement should be used to challenge strategic assumptions 
(Bourne et al., 2000), it requires constant revision to ensure that the measurement of the 
organization is still aligned to the strategic intentions. In doing so managers should become 
the mediators between strategy and the performance system, not just recipients of the 
objectives, especially where there are discrepancies (Langfield-Smith, 1997). This dual role 
of a performance system therefore both challenge the strategic assumptions and also 
measure the performance against strategic objectives (Bourne et al., 2000). This reflects a 
change in focus from the backward looking accounting based control system apparent in 
Anthony’s MCS, toward a system that assists organizational change (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
There is an alternate perspective as to whether measures should be derived from strategy 
(Neely et al., 2002). This is seen in the Performance Prism, it is an understanding that 
strategy is the route rather than destination of the organisation (Neely et al., 2002:164).  
This link between the performance measurement system and strategy implementation 
extends to the individual’s objectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), and this influence extends 
into individual decision-making (Micheli et al., 2011; cf. Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). 
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This links to performance measure design (section 2.8.2) for example, the use of non-
financial measures (Ittner & Larker, 2003).  
It is therefore understood that the link between strategy and performance management is 
both a top-down influence (i.e. strategy mapping) and also a check and balance to the 
strategy (Bourne et al., 2000). This link between strategy and performance management 
influences managerial decision-making (Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004; Micheli et al., 2011), it is 
integral to the considerations of performance measurement and communications. 
2.8.4 Learning in the Performance System  
Learning within the performance system has several considerations: development of 
feedback loops (Bititci et al., 1997; Otley, 1999), to enhance strategic development (Kaplan 
& Norton, 2000; Kloot & Martin, 2000), influence organisational design and change (Bourne 
et al., 2000; Busco et al., 2006) and develop mature learning practices (Argyris & Schon, 
1978) (i.e. a move from single-loop, corrective learning to double-loop, generative learning). 
The development of a generative learning approach is highlighted as a desirable attribute 
(Anand et al., 2009) it enhances the impact a performance system may have on an 
organization (Otley, 1999), and is indication of an evolved or mature system (Ballentine et 
al., 1998). Generative learning drives continuous improvement and improvement in supply 
chain risk practices (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). It helps challenge past action and 
decisions evident in individual’s choice and judgement (Slovic, 2000). The requirement for 
driving learning in the performance system is reflected in the BSC literature, as 
implementation of a BSC aids organisational planning. It integrates long-term planning with 
performance measures, it should “foster a kind of learning often missing in companies” 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996:36). It is understood therefore that learning is a desirable 
component in the performance system (Anand et al., 2009), and it affects managerial 
decision-making.  
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These are the four main functions of the performance system (measurement, 
communication, strategy alignment and learning). Deconstructed in this way identifies the 
core attributes of the system. Next, the evolution and influence of the system is explored, 
this is separate to the functions of the performance system and describes the evolution of 
the performance system itself. 
2.8.5 Performance System Evolution and Organizational Influence 
Not described as a function of a performance system, but a description of how a 
performance system evolves and its organizational influence, for example: centralization 
versus decentralization of power (Chenhall, 2003). 
Performance systems can be organic and mechanistic models of structure (Chenhall, 2003). 
It is a description for the system’s evolution (Davenport, 1998). Organic system evolution 
describes a Darwinian effect, as the system develops and responds to its environment. 
Mechanistic evolution is planned, a deliberate development of the system against a number 
of pre-defined criteria. Bourne et al. (2000) provide examples of when performance 
measurement system should be developed or reviewed: 
 Periodic review and revision of targets and standards; 
 Contextual changes that require a development of individual measures; 
 Changes in the competitive environment or strategic direction, may drive a 
comprehensive review of all measures; 
 In challenging the strategic assumptions. 
These examples suggest that there may be revisions both to the individual measures and 
targets and the complete set of measures. This check and balance of the measures should 
respond to internal and external changes, and as a development activity. In challenging the 
strategic assumptions, it highlights the need for the measures to feed back into the activity 
of development and review of strategy, and not just as an output of the process.  
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The performance system also reflects a broader organizational development. It reflects 
allocation of power and autonomy (Busco et al., 2008). The performance system is used to 
manage different organizational relationships: centralization versus decentralization, lateral 
versus vertical relations and convergence versus differentiation. It reflects a growing move to 
disseminate power and greater autonomy to the operating units (cf. Busco et al., 2008). 
2.8.6 Performance System and Risk 
This section, reviews what is known about the relationship between performance systems 
and risk. There is an expectation that risk management is embedded within the 
organizational objectives: 
“Risk management and mitigation processes should be explicitly related to organizational 
and sub-organizational objectives” (Power, 2009:849).  
This understanding is supported by the limited discussion in extant literature on: Enterprise 
Risk Scorecards (ERS) and Key Risk Indicators (KRI). Secondly there is direct mention of 
risk measurement in the Balanced Scorecard and Performance Prism literature, although 
this is not well developed. Finally, the Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) is reviewed to the 
understanding this provides on the control of risk.  
Risk Management in Performance Prism and Balanced Scorecard: 
Inclusion of risk measures is more inferred than explicit in Performance Prism literature 
(Neely & Adams 2002). The discussion of risk is focused upon using a failure mode and 
effect analysis (FMEA), to identify strategic destinations, and scenarios an organization 
wishes to avoid (Neely & Adams 2002:61).  
In the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2004) risk management is stated as worthy of 
attention in performance measurement. Contained largely within their “internal perspective” 
these included measures of “Leverage leadership in risk intelligence. Comply with risk 
management processes. Manage our books of risk” (2004:73). The discussion in this literature 
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does not progress to critically assess how this is achieved or the limitations of the exercise, 
beyond these limited examples. An exception is the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi case (Kaplan 
& Norton, 2006), where risk was considered as an influence in BSC design. This supplements 
the measures of risk to “growing revenues” and “enhancing productivity” (Kaplan & Norton, 
2006). 
The literature appears reasonably underdeveloped in the application of risk in performance 
management, leaving a gap in understanding as to the interplay between financial and non-
financial measurement and whether risk is implicit or explicit within the broader 
performance metrics. The suggestion of development of an ERS (Calandro & Lane, 2006) has 
had little development in literature, but advocates a separate scorecard for risk 
measurement. The same distinction seems to occur in the isolation of key risk indicators as a 
subset of key performance indicators (Proctor et al., 2009).  
Enterprise Risk Scorecards:  
A link between measurement of risk, communication of risk and the performance system is 
provided by Calandro and Lane (2006). They advocate inclusion of risk measures as a 
separate balanced enterprise risk scorecard (ERS), rather than embedding risk measures in 
the BSC. It is understood the ERS can be developed in the same manner as the BSC: 
“1. If all of the measures required to comprehensively measure risk are inserted into a 
performance scorecard the resulting complexity could dramatically decrease the 
scorecard’s usefulness; 
2. Frequently, the people and departments that measure risk are different from the 
people and departments that measure performance; 
3. Having two separate scorecards for performance and risk can balance managerial 
time and attention between performance and risk; and 
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4. Risk measures and performance measures can resemble one another…” (Calandro & 
Lane, 2006:38) 
This approach assumes that ERS and BSC are consistent, that managers look to the ERS in 
the management of risk only and that decision makers respond consistently and 
appropriately to the quantitative directions of the ERS. This important relationship does not 
suggest whether tools (i.e. BSC) impact the management of risk in operations. Little is still 
understood about this relationship “the subject of risk comprises very little of the hundreds of 
pages written on the BSC…” (Calandro & Lane, 2006:32).  
Key Risk Indicators: 
Key Risk Indicators (KRI) (Proctor et al., 2009; Witty et al., 2009), are a subset of Key 
Performance Indicators. A KRI has a distinct attribute of being a leading indicator (Proctor 
et al., 2009:2), however history is seen as a poor predicator of future risk (Matz, 2005). This 
is in direct conflict with the suggestions made by Power (2005), for increased industry data 
pooling (section 2.3.2).  
Risk Measurement: 
There are limitations on risk management when using capital investment appraisal 
techniques, such as IRR and NPV (Milis & Mercken, 2004), as risks are sometimes not 
accounted for (Martinsons et al., 1999). A purist quantitative approach to performance 
management of risk has well documented failures “There are many other examples of firm 
failures in which quantitative analyses either failed to identify increasing risk levels and/or 
failed to convince executives of the need for dramatic risk management changes , e.g. Enron, 
Adelphia, Parmalat, etc.” (Calandro & Lane, 2006:31).  
There is a perceived disconnect between the actual business activity and its quantitative 
modelling, which is where implementations of performance systems and specifically the BSC 
is meant to correct (Calandro & Lane, 2006). With these limitations this would seem still not 
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to alleviate the issue of risk management through these tools (Milis & Mercken, 2004; Wu & 
Olson, 2009, 2010). 
Kaplan and Mikes (2012), discuss VW’s Risk Event Card, which identified a range of risk 
measures (e.g. outcomes, indicators and controls). It demonstrated different (and bespoke) 
approaches for representing and managing risk data, although none have appeared as 
generically adopted across sectors. 
Non-financial Risk Measurement 
The impact of a risk can be deconstructed into financial and non-financial impacts (Arena & 
Arnaboldi, 2014; cf. Cardinaels & Veen-Dirks, 2010; Eccles, 1991; Kaplan & Mikes, 2012; 
Khandwalla, 1972; Lipe & Salterio, 2002; Mitchell & Kalb, 1981). Example of a non-financial 
risk is Reputational or reputation risks (cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). These are difficult to 
measure (Eccles et al., 2007); however quantitative measures are desirable, and should be 
pursued, but in doing so it must be recognised that qualitative measures also exist and have 
a role (Eccles et al., 2007). Mikes observed: 
“an alternative style of risk management which resists the urge to push metrics into 
carefully protected areas of judgement. In this style of risk management, the emphasis 
is on using ‘softer’ instrumentation to frame and visualise non-measurable 
uncertainties” (Mikes, 2011:227).  
The Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) is considered next as a more theoretical perspective of 
the relationship between performance management and risk. 
2.8.7 Simons (1995) Levers of Control: 
The Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) proposes four theoretical levers in the control system 
(i.e. Belief, Boundary, Diagnostic and Interactive). The framework offers an understanding of 
the strategic implications a performance system may have, and that different components of 
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a performance system may have alternative uses (Ferriera & Otley, 1999), for example 
providing failsafe or developing the creative function of the organization.  
There are four levers defined (Simons, 1994; 1995): 
- Belief Systems: these contain the core value of the firm (Ferreira & Otley, 2009); 
- Boundary Systems: these specify the “risk to be avoided” (Ferreira & Otley, 2009:6); 
- Diagnostic Control Systems: these contain the “critical performance variables” (Ferreira 
& Otley, 2009:6); 
- Interactive Control Systems: these manage the strategic uncertainties (Ferreira & Otley, 
2009). 
This typology of levers excludes informal control procedures, and explicitly requires that the 
systems are information systems10 (Simons, 1995).  
There are limitations to The Levers of Control. The diagnostic and interactive functions of the 
control system are not always possible to separate in implementation (Ferreira & Otley, 
1999). Simons suggests a move from diagnostic to interactive is developed through 
managerial interaction. Interaction is where top managers become engaged on a regular 
basis. Therefore this questions whether interactive levers are more than a physical 
embodiment of a system or the behaviour of the managers (cf. Simons, 1994). The 
development from diagnostic to interactive also has some reflection of the move from 
measurement to management systems (see section 2.7). Diagnostic levers are used to track 
deviation from the objectives (Simons, 1994), but this can be challenging to define in terms 
of risk, and what are the diagnostic measures of risk, where risk is a latent force. 
The same criticism of separation is levelled in the division between boundary and belief 
systems (Ferriera & Otley, 2009:34). Boundary and Belief systems are opposing forces of 
control: “the yin and yang” (Simons, 1995:84). Boundary systems are the outer limits, which 
operating within is seen as enhancing the creative function in the organization. Boundary 
                                                             
10 Information systems are data systems using a network of hardware. 
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systems are influenced by ethics and morality (Simons, 1994). This causes some confusion 
in its separation from belief systems that may be understood as a closer match to these 
influences. However, Simons is clear that the implementation of a boundary system is strong 
in response to failure. Belief systems are a reflection of the core values of the firm; they 
provide momentum to develop creative behaviours (Simons, 1994). Ferriera and Otley 
criticise the applicability of the Levers of Control in structures where the design of the belief 
systems are outside control of the organization, perhaps as a subsidiary of a larger group. 
To this point the discussion conducted has been generic in terms of performance 
management, other than the explicit statement that boundary systems specify risk to be 
avoided. However risk management is at the core of the framework. The four levers control 
different aspects of risk (cf. Simons, 1999). Reference to risk control is deliberate as it is not 
a system for risk valuation11. The different levers are understood to have the following 
relationship with the control of risk and risk management behaviours: 
1. Belief Systems are seen as a failsafe/safeguard, which protects against loss in core 
values of the organization (Simons, 1999:92);  
2. Interactive systems protect against the evolving and uncertain development “strategic 
uncertainties” (Simons, 1999:94), this is framed as a link into the learning capability of 
the organization; 
3. Boundary systems operate as a negative control, stopping the organization from 
breaching critical limits (taking on increased risk); however Boundary systems do not 
map routes of action as seen in positive controls. These are prohibitory controls that 
contribute to the continuance of the system (cf. Simons, 1999); and 
4. Diagnostic systems are designed to identify failure or deviation from the objectives, 
which would infer increased imprecision in the output of the organization. 
These four levers operate as a suite of influences on risk taking and risk management within 
the organization. Linked to the impact this has on managerial action and individual risk 
                                                             
11 Simons (1999) offers a risk calculator to help identify general movements in risk trends, but this is under-
developed in literature. 
113 
 
judgement, the Levers of Control begins to explain the influences that the performance 
system has on the management of risk in the organization. 
2.8.8 An Integrative Model of the Performance System  
Section 2.8.1 to 2.8.4, identified the core functions of the performance system, and exposed 
that these functions operate as a collection of inter-related activities. This section of the 
literature review develops upon these different functions to understand the order of 
activities, for example the process of mapping strategy into objectives and consequentially 
measures and targets (cf. Kaplan & Norton, 2008) and the use of measures to challenge the 
strategic assumptions (Bourne et al., 2000).  
This review is developed further, with a specific aim of understanding the flow of events and 
relationships between the different components and the operation. The establishment of 
links between functions is subject to interpretation of the literature. Taking in turn the 
different functions of the performance system, the literature supports the following links: 
- The performance measure is mapped from strategy and vision (Kaplan & Norton, 2008; 
Kloot & Martin, 2000; Langfield-Smith, 1997), this mapping informs the target setting 
(Otley, 1999), this is the implementation of strategic management (Band, 1990; 
Globerson, 1985; Henri, 2006); 
- The decision-maker is influenced by communications (Chater & Oaksford, 2003; cf. 
Kahneman 2003; Ranyard et al, 1999; Otley, 1999), including framing, weighting (Lai, 
2001), and informational features (Edworthy & Adams, 1996); 
- Decisions being made influence the activities in the operation (cf. Nilsson & Darley, 
2006);  
- Learning influences the Operation (Ballentine et al., 1998; Bititci et al., 1997), for 
example: learning in speculative risk practices (Brennan, 1998; Turner et al., 1989), 
pure risk in Health and Safety (Edmondson, 2002) and disaster management (Kotze & 
Holloway, 1996); 
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- Information is retrieved from the operation back into the measurement system; this is 
the activity of measurement (Otley, 1999; Melnyk et al., 2004; Neely et al., 1995; 
Schneiderman 1997); 
- The operation influences strategy, this is a bottom-up perspective, Slack and Lewis 
(2011) and, learning or environmental perspectives (Mintzberg et al., 1998); 
- Measurements of performance feed into the learning cycle, both corrective or 
generative learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978 & 1996), development of continuous 
learning capability (Ghalayini & Noble, 1996; Johnson & Kaplan, 1991; Medori & 
Steeple, 2000; Noci, 1995) and learning as a system consideration (Bourne et al., 2005; 
Flynn & Flynn, 2004); 
- Measures are communicated (Kaplan & Norton, 2000; Malind & Selto, 2004; Simons, 
1994; Shneiderman, 1999). The COSO cube (2004; 2004b) references this role in ERM; 
- The strategy is operationalised and disseminated through measures and targets (Kunc, 
2008). Operationalising objectives comes about through the monitoring of performance 
(Bhimani, 1993; Blenkinsop & Davis, 1991; Gomez et al., 2004; Grady, 1991; Neely et al., 
2005) and that control systems focus attention on strategic uncertainties (Simons, 
1994); 
- The measures are used to challenge strategic assumptions, more than just confirming 
alignment with the strategy (Bourne et al., 2000). 
From this understanding a presentation of the performance system, its component parts 
and influences on the operation is provided in figure 2.17.  
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Figure 2.17 Integrated Performance Management System and Risk 
Figure 2.17 shows the performance system in operation and exposes the complex 
relationships between the different performance system components.  
2.8.9 Summary of Performance System Literature 
The review of performance systems considers literature from the performance 
management, performance measurement and management accounting disciplines, these 
were synthesised to identify four core functions of the generic performance system 
(measurement, communications, strategy alignment and learning). Further the review 
considered knowledge from specific system implementations (e.g. BSC).  
The semantic issue between performance measurement and performance management, did 
not present a limitation to understanding. Rather it is understood that measurement is a 
wholly encompassed component of the performance management system. The management 
control system literature developed an understanding of the use of financial metrics. This 
refers back to the work of Power (2005) and Mikes (2009), see section 2.4.3. 
In summary the literature can be broken down into a relationship between three areas: the 
codified approaches (i.e. BSC), the four functional lenses (i.e. communications function) and 
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specific considerations (i.e. stakeholders). These areas and their relationships are outlined 
in figure 2.18. 
 
Figure 2.18 Overview of Performance System Concepts 
Figure 2.18 identifies that all three approaches reviewed had consideration of the different 
functions apparent in the review; however the BSC and Performance Prism had greater 
reflection of stakeholders in the design. It was shown that understanding the influence of 
the performance system (on decision-makers) benefits from reference to the decisions 
under uncertainty literature (section 2.6), and that there is a limited link in knowledge with 
the risk management literature; although it is this latter limitation in literature which this 
research seeks to develop. 
2.9 Synthesis of the Literature 
This literature provides an understanding of existing knowledge of performance 
management, risk management and decisions under uncertainty. The review has established 
that the shape of the body of knowledge for risk is diverse and is covered in a broad set of 
communities. The discussion of risk in operations is implied within the supply chain 
literature, the accounting community and Operational risk (a closely associated concept) is 
defined within the discussion of financial supervision. However as the level of analysis 
reduces from organizational risk management and its standards to the individual, 
understanding of the risk decisions (or decisions under uncertainty) is explained further in 
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the psychology literature. Principle-Agent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) establishes a link 
between the organizational structures in risk management and the individual’s risk 
perception and decisions. The framework in understanding this relationship has been 
further explored in the context of the performance management system; resulting in a 
logical flow of performance management of risk. 
There appears to be no single framework or theory to answer what the treatment strategies 
for risk in operations are, or what influences the selection of treatment strategy. However 
there are a number of frameworks and theories that aid an understanding to approach the 
research aims:  
1) Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005) is a description of the approach and purpose of 
valuation in an organization when managing risk. Organizations can be described as 
calculative pragmatists (use the numbers as a guide), or calculative idealists (use the 
numbers as a definitive point of reference); 
2) ERM Ideal Types (Mikes, 2009; 2011), describes an organization’s approach to ERM 
through four types. This highlights the different focuses of an ERM implementation. 
This includes: Risk Management Silos, Holistic Risk Management, Integrated Risk 
Management and Risk Based Management types; 
3) Levers of Control (Simons, 1994; 1995) defines the control system as having four levers: 
boundary, belief, diagnostic and interactive systems. These four levers may exist within a 
single system, and range from providing outer limits of the organization’s function 
through to developing interactive engagement between managers and the control 
system.  
There are a number of judgements that can be made in reviewing this literature: 
 That the terms Operational risk and risk in operations are separate terms. Their use has 
attachment to the context and community. The term Operational risk is developed from 
the finance community and that generalisation of its usage changes the meaning and 
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purpose of the term. Mikes (2009; 2011) and Power (2005) discuss Operational risk in 
the context of the performance management system; 
 If the decision-maker sits between the performance system and the risk management 
process (Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004) it infers that the existing frameworks explaining the 
decision-making process should be understood, and specifically the impact on risk 
judgement (Ellis et al., 2010). The issue outlined by Slovic (1964) is that risk choices are 
multidimensional and subjective. Mechanical adjustment of a performance system to 
affect a decision-maker, infers then that reasoned decision-making is being applied, and 
there is no mediating influence on the decision-maker; 
 From the finance literature we expect there to be financial orientation in risk decisions 
(cf. Basel Committee, 2006). As this knowledge develops to risk in operations non-
financial impacts need recognition (Mikes, 2011). This is the issue of 
multidimensionality. Risks can be defined as more than financial consequence (Mikes, 
2011), and this is understood as being relevant. There is not an agreed classification of 
risks, and this itself leads to confusion in the term; 
 An interpretation of Mikes (2009) and Power (2005; 2009) is that financial orientation 
infers quantitative approaches. This does not hold in reverse; that quantitative 
approaches are more than financial. The difference in Calculative Cultures exposes two 
approaches to using quantification (i.e. idealism and pragmatism). There is no 
understanding of how the adoption of different cultures impacts the selection of risk 
treatment; 
 Performance systems are used to influence decision-makers (Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004; 
Mikes, 2009); 
 Management behaviour should be considered the key recipient of the control system, 
and that the control system must be considered in both its formal and informal 
constructions (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). Performance systems, measures and 
configurations are contingent on their environment; these differences are reflective of a 
range of different recipients, and their individual needs and expectations. Differences 
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between top managers, and operational managers, featured within existing research as 
examples of this divide (Melnyk et al., 2004). The literature combining understanding of 
risk and control of management behaviour is summarised in table 2.3 
Table 2.3 Summary of Risk Influences 
 
 The performance system literature does not resolve which of the function/s become 
influential in affecting risk decisions. It does not demonstrate how risk objectives or 
requirements are incorporated (i.e. definition of risk appetite or communication of risk 
behaviours). The performance system’s influence on changing risk decisions is not 
understood (cf. Arena & Arnaboldi, 2014); 
 Nahlik (2008) challenges whether performance measurement is a pure dimension of 
performance management. The explanation that “The received wisdom is that to manage 
performance, you first have to measure it” (Nahlik, 2008:43). It is a crux of this 
understanding that knowledge is partial and imperfect, that the use of measurement 
and associated components is not understood in a realist perspective to offer a simple 
route to outcome. The influence is more subtle in the response to measures and targets, 
Concept Literature 
Probability and Impact Banks (2004); Coughy et al. (2001); Craighead et al. (2007); Ellis et 
al. (2010); Knight (1921); March & Shapira (1989); Mitchell (1995); 
Mikes (2011); Harland et al. (2003); Lu & Yan (2013); Hallikas et al 
(2004); Williams (1966); Zsidisin et al. (2004) 
Financial and non-
financial measures 
Crouhy et al. (2001); Eccles (1991); Harland et al. (2003); 
Matthews et al. (2002); McNamara & Bromiley, (1999); Meulbroek 
(2002); Mikes (2011); Schwartz & Gibb (1999); Zahra (1991); 
Incentives and the risk 
taker 
Carpenter et al. (2003); Dhaliwal (1982); March & Shapira (1987); 
Gardner and Steinberg (2005); Govindarajan & Gupta (1985); 
Power (2009); Sjoberg (2000); Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia (1998);  
Historical data  Cabedo & Moya (2003); Harland et al. (2003);Hendricks (1996);  
Risk management process  Calandro & Lane (2006); O’Donnell (2005); Hallikas et al. (2004);  
Risk standards, processes 
and tools 
Harland et al. (2003); Hopkin (2012); Hunter et al. (2004); Mikes 
(2011); Shaw & Centry (1988); Simon (1999); Yeo et al. (2001); 
Zwikael & Sadeh (2007) 
Alignment with strategy Daniel & Reitsperger (1991);Eisenhardt & Sull (2001);Hallikas et al. 
(2004); Langfield-Smith (1997);  
Perception of risk Bansal & Clelland (2004); Eccles (1991); Eccles et al. (2007); Ellis et 
al. (2010); Harland et al. (1999); Melchers (2001); Mitchell (1995); 
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indeed some measurements invariably lead to distraction from the core issues and 
management consideration (cf. Nahlik, 2008:45). This distraction or inconsistency in 
influence on individual perspectives is partially explained by the knowledge of biases 
(Hsee & Hastie, 2006), individual risk aversion (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998), and a 
range of personal contingencies (i.e. experience, environment and context of decision). 
Understanding of whether an organization’s knowledge of risk, its risk management 
practices and its strategies in managing risk are aligned is imprecise. This review 
demonstrates that the term risk has a long history, with a debatable origin. It is not a 
surprise that there is concept stretch and semantic disagreement or that as different 
communities have used the term it has developed it in a manner to suit their discipline. 
The gap in understanding, which this research seeks to explain, exposes two research 
questions: 
RSQ1: What are the treatment strategies for risk in operations? and 
RSQ2: What influences the selection of treatment strategy? 
To answer these questions, two cases from the European Energy Industry are analysed. 
These cases are good examples of multinational, vertically integrated energy companies 
operating retail, generation and distribution functions within the sector.  
This concludes the foundational literature review.  
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Chapter 3 
3. Research Strategy 
This chapter outlines the philosophical position, methodology and approach underpinning 
this thesis. There is a presumption that the applied method is consistent with the 
philosophical beliefs of the research and researcher, it needs to be consistent with the 
research topic and availability of data (Collier, 1994; cf. Walsham, 1995). Discussion of the 
methodology and approach is conducted in reference to the research questions. 
3.1 Research Strategy Overview 
I adopt the Critical Realist paradigm, acceptant of its limitations. The Critical Realist 
paradigm is focused upon identifying generative mechanisms (Collier, 1994), by identifying 
the causal forces in our environment it allows us to develop in-depth knowledge. Critical 
Realism is sometimes criticised for being an uncommitted research position: acceptant of 
quantitative testing, whilst also recognising the way in which people socially construct their 
world (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000; Kwan & Tsang, 2001). However this broad awareness is 
presented as strength in seeking an understanding of performance managing risk, where 
theory development is nascent (cf. Edmonson & McManus, 2007). 
In combination with an abductive methodology (Easton, 2010), the methods available are 
varied and their use appropriate for the pursuit of understanding the generative 
mechanisms held. The abductive methodology (discussed later) is an iterative process 
moving from the empirical to the theoretical and back (Kovacs & Spens, 2005). It 
continuously seeks the most appropriate frame of reference by which to answer the 
question/s.  
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3.2 Philosophy 
There are three principle considerations in setting out on the research process: ontological 
assumptions, epistemological stance and the impact these have on choice of methodology. 
These are discussed in turn. 
Ontology is the study of being or truth, “the way we think the world is” (Fleetwood, 
2005:197). Ontological selection is commonly discussed along an axis, the two extremes 
being objectivism and subjectivism (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, 492). Objectivism is the belief 
that truth and therefore knowledge is a matter disconnected from the perspective of the 
individual mind. Therefore that truth is consistent regardless of the standpoint it is seen 
from: “reality as a concrete structure” (Morgan & Smircich, 1980, 492). Subjectivism is the 
opposite position that truth is a concern of the individual mind, that truth is entirely 
dependent on the mind that sees it: “reality as a projection of human imagination” (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980, 492). There is a midpoint on the ontological spectrum. This is ontological 
realism: “for realists, patterns of events are explained in terms of certain generative 
mechanisms…” (Tsoukas, 1994:290). Realism regards truth as independent of the individual 
mind and considerate of context where knowledge is a journey rather than a destination 
reached in a single attempt. 
Epistemology is the study of how knowledge or how truth is acquired: “what we think can be 
known about it [the world]” (Fleetwood, 2005:198). Epistemology is axial, where the 
extremes are empiricism and constructivism. Empiricism is the belief that truth is discovered 
through sensory data, and leans toward a grounded ontology (Dooley, 2009:40; Flynn et al., 
1990). With a grounded ontology evidence is collected as a route to understanding the truth. 
This epistemological position is most clearly associated with hypothesis testing (Lee, 1991). 
Constructivism, the other extreme, is a view that truth is an issue of mental construction. It 
is a matter of human beliefs and ideas. That regardless of the sensory experience it is the 
way in which an individual experiences and their interpretation that is important (Mir & 
Watson, 2000).  
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In conjoining the ideas of ontology and epistemology there are several commonly accepted 
paradigms that describe the influence on an individual’s research. There are many, 
including: Positivist (e.g. Spender, 1998), Social Constructivist (e.g. Mir & Watson, 2000), 
Pragmatist (e.g. Richardson & Kramer, 2006) and Realist (e.g. Bhaskar, 1986). Positivists are 
empirically-guided objectivists (Spender, 1998). Where truth is independent of the 
individual and that it can be discovered through sensory observation and recording. It is 
independent of bias in observation by the researcher: “the positivist position is that 
knowledge deals with things ‘out there’ for which we can gain positive evidence” (Spender, 
1998:234).  
The Social Constructivist is ontologically subjectivist and epistemologically constructivist. 
Truth is dependent on the individual’s perspective. Truth is a matter of how people see the 
world and articulate it, this infers that the research in itself will bring the researcher’s 
heuristics into the data collection process, Mir and Watson state that “constructivists view 
the process more as an act of sculpting, where the imagination of the artist interacts with the 
medium of phenomena to create a model of reality which we call knowledge.” (2000:943). 
I acknowledge these different paradigms. My background, the concept under analysis and 
the community I exist within all influence my position. More appropriately I recognize it is 
the Critical Realist paradigm that I take the greatest influence and learning from.  
3.2 The Influence of Critical Realism 
Critical Realism, earlier Transcendental Realism (Bhaskar, 2008), is understood to be 
ontologically Realist and epistemologically Relativist (Collier, 1994:90; Johnson & Duberley, 
2006:151).  
The Realist perspective identifies the importance of causal mechanisms, rather than empirical 
regularities. Realism is understood through a stratified ontology, which presents three 
domains: the real, the actual and the empirical. Realism does not reject empirical regularities 
in the journey to understand and seek the generative mechanisms, it recognises that the 
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third level of a stratified ontology is the empirical. This is in contrast to empiricist’s flat 
ontology, which only deals with the empirical.  
Bhaskar explains that our experiences are separated from the real structures causing them: 
“real structures exist independently of and are often out of phase with actual patterns of 
events” (2008:13). The stratified ontology can be applied to the concept of risk management 
where causal mechanisms such as human, system and external mechanisms exist in the real, 
loss-events exists in the actual and on occasion realised in the domain of the empirical (cf. 
Collier, 1994). The same may be true in the analysis of the performance system where 
components (and sub-components) of the control system exist in the real, influence on risk 
management outcomes exist in the real, but as events they exist in the actual, they do not 
need to be observed to be ontologically true events (Bhaskar, 2008:179).  
A Relativist epistemology influences the approach adopted, through a process of retroduction 
(Bhaskar, 2008). Retroduction is the iterative movement from a description of phenomenon 
to explanation of cause. Retroduction is a method of maintaining science as a “process‐in‐
motion” that may “sustain the rationality of scientific growth and change” (Bhaskar, 
2008:15). It is a fusion of the idealist’s creative model‐building process and empiricist’s 
empirical‐testing process. The retroductive process is a movement from “a description of 
some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it” 
(Bhashkar, 1986:68). It is the search for underlying causal powers highlighting the 
“conditions which activate the structures and the mechanisms which produce events” (Smith, 
2003:319). Collier summarises Bhaskar’s decompository-retroductive approach into four 
steps:  
1. Resolution of a complex event into its components (causal analysis); 
2. Redescription of component causes; 
3. Retrodiction to possible causes of components via independently validated normic 
statements; 
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4. Elimination of alternative possible causes of components. (Collier, 1994:162)  
The decompository-retroductive approach is distinct from the analogical‐retroductive 
approach, which is best suited to theoretical explanations (Bhaskar, 1986:90). The 
application of the decompository-retroductive approach can be seen throughout the 
research beginning with the literature review which breaks down the constituent parts of 
both performance system and risk management, to a level that is intended to expose the 
mechanisms and powers (that exist in the domain of the real). These mechanisms are then 
empirically analysed to identify the critical mechanisms that allow development into the 
concept of the performance system. This is consistent with Bhaskar’s transcendental realist 
approach: 
“The ‘real entities’ the transcendental realist [CR] is concerned with are the objects 
of scientific discovery and investigation, such as causal laws.” (Bhaskar, 2008:26). 
In Critical Realism it is understood that social entities are conceptually mediated. 
Intransitive objects and their resulting causal powers may not be directly observed rather 
they must be theoretically speculated (Johnson & Duberley, 2006:166). Aspects of the 
performance system are clearly tangible in nature: measurement, communication and 
targets. These conform to the dominant Operations Management paradigm and growing 
preference for use of empirical methods (Meridith, 2009; Sanders, 2009; Theoharakis et al., 
2007). However the incorporation of risk extends the performance system to include 
managerial interpretation and subjective description of risk requires acknowledgement of 
the role of social mediation in the relationship. I believe the world of risk management may 
not be reduced to such a closed system image. There is greater complexity affecting the 
world than may be observationally accounted for and perception of empirical regularities. 
This is not totally sufficient for establishing knowledge in this field – this is the Realist’s 
view.  
Finally the term Critical in Critical Realism seeks to deliver an understanding that could 
enable change in the organisational performance management of risk; and the more 
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emancipatory objective of developing risk management practices that offer a safer 
employment environment and risk management practices that are socially and 
environmentally sustainable, rather than the monolithic aim of economic enhancement. 
Learning from Critical Realism and the process of conducting Relativist research, this 
research uses an abductive approach. Abduction and retroduction are closely associated 
terms, and are complimentary approaches (Easton, 2010). Peirce (in Fann, 1970) used the 
term abduction; abduction is understood to be an aspect of retroduction (Chiasson, 2005). 
Retroduction highlights the need to test hypothesis as it moves toward a deductive phase 
(cf. Collier, 1994), whereas abduction focuses more on the discovery of hypotheses to test 
(cf. Dubois & Gadde, 2002).  
The next section discusses the abductive approach and the influence of systematic 
combining. 
3.3 Abductive Development: Systematic Combining 
The Critical Realist perspective encourages seeking generative mechanisms underpinning 
the complex relationship between an organization’s control systems and management and 
treatment of risk. The chosen methodology must support this aim. Methodology is:  
“The general study of method in particular fields of enquiry…To investigate the methods 
that are actually adopted at various historical stages of investigation into different areas, 
with the aim not so much of criticizing, but more of systematizing the pre-suppositions of 
a particular field at a particular time.” (Blackburn, 2005).  
Selection of methodology is therefore contingent both to the subject and the availability of 
data. The abductive approach is considered fruitful if trying to discover new things. Its 
emphasis is development of theory rather than generation of new theory (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). Abduction is a process beginning with a real-life observation where either the 
theories are in contention with observation, or there is an absence of understanding (Kovacs 
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& Spens, 2005). Abduction is an iterative process, to extend theory or offer new theory, 
perhaps ending in deductive research (Kovacs & Spens, 2005). It is a cycle of theory 
matching, observation and suggestion, completing with conclusions (Kovacs & Spens, 
2005:139); this is what Dubois and Gadde (2002) term “Systematic Combining”. 
Abduction is closely associated with the Pragmatist approach to research (e.g. Richardson & 
Kramer, 2006). However learning from the Critical Realist understanding is also consistent 
with the abductive approach (Easton, 2010). The link between retroduction, abduction and 
Crirical Realism already discussed that: “Retroduction means ‘moving backwards’ and that is 
what the process involves.” (Easton, 2010:123). The process of “systematic combining [is] 
grounded an abductive logic” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002:559).  
Systematic combining has two distinct elements: matching and redirection. Matching is the 
“non-linear, path-dependent process of combining efforts with the ultimate objective of 
matching theory and reality” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002:556). Redirection (or direction and 
redirection), supports the process of matching, involves incorporation of multiple different 
sources, which allows for broader appreciation of the issues presented. Use of multiple 
sources can reveal “sources unknown to the researcher, i.e. to discover new dimensions of the 
research problem.” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002:556). Therefore in this research multiple 
iterations of data collection and analysis are required. This is consistent with the abductive 
approach. Thus, this research is a mixed-method, quantitative and qualitative study. This is 
done to understand the treatment strategies for risk in operations and what influences their 
selection. 
This cycling between observation and theory considers both inductive and deductive 
approaches. If quantitative analysis is used to test hypotheses this supports deductive 
studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), some quantitative methods e.g. Exploratory Factor 
Analysis, can be used in an inductive manner (cf. Hair et al., 2011). Qualitative analysis is 
expected to yield an insight into the different influences brought on the relationship and 
supports inductive studies (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This research uses quantitative 
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and qualitative approaches, to systematically combine understanding in theory and practice. 
This is the process of matching and redirection. 
This research adopts the following approach, based on Bhaskar’s decompository-
retroductive and the abductive approaches: 
1. Resolution of a complex event into its components: The terms of Operational risk, risk in 
operations, performance management and measurement have been deconstructed into 
their components (chapter 2). The performance management literature was analysed 
for relationships between components of the system and for theories of interaction 
with managing risk. This decomposition extends further to deconstruct the different 
risk management treatments.  
2. Redescription of component causes: Learning developed during the decomposition is 
situated in both the context of energy and the inter-relationship that can be described 
between the performance management theories established for managing risk in 
operations (e.g. ERM Ideal Types, Mikes, 2009). These re-described components were 
then taken as basis for understanding the relationship between the two concepts. The 
performance system at the start is considered the generative mechanism in the 
relationship with managerial decision-making; although this assumption is challenged 
as the study progresses. Redescription of the performance system as functions (i.e. as a 
communications function) is completed in the foundational literature review. 
3. Retrodiction to possible causes of components: Iterative phases of observation and 
theory development, including thematic analysis are used to explain the application of 
performance system components. The frame of reference becomes increasingly 
granular, from corporate structures to individuals, in its search for revised generative 
mechanisms. Retroduction is the focus of chapters 4, 5 and 6, as the research cycles 
between observation and explanation. Each chapter is informed by the previous level of 
analysis and integrates its understanding in the discussions. 
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4. Elimination of alternative causes of components: Challenges whether there are alternate 
explanations to the relationship. So at all phases it is questioned as whether this 
relationship is appropriate to describe the problem. This is the “direction and 
redirection” explained in the process of systematic combining (Dubois and Gabbe, 
2002:555).  
In summary this thesis adopts a process of systematic combining (Dubois & Gadde, 2002), 
and learning from the Critical Realist literature. The approach of systematic combining as a 
method to understand the research question is in response to the nascent nature of theory 
development within the field of risk in operations and performance management.  
The next section details how the design of the research conforms to the understanding of 
abduction and systematic combining. It details the frames of reference and focus of research 
for each cycle of observation and explanation. 
3.4 Research Approach and Methods 
The context of this thesis is the European energy sector. Each successive level of analysis 
considers both its method of data collection, and means of analysis. 
Direction and Redirection 
Systematic combining involves two aspects: matching and redirection (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). This research followed four phases in the search for the generative mechanisms 
involved in performance managing risk in operations. Table 3.1 shows the phases of the 
research: 
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Table 3.1 Abductive Phases of Research 
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As the research evolved it not only moved the frame of reference from the firm to the 
decreasing granularity of the individual, it also developed from analysing structures towards 
individual decisions and influences. This representation can be seen in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Path of Abductive Development 
Each frame of reference develops an understanding of the research question, but in doing so 
opens up a further gap in understanding. It is the combined understanding developed across 
frames that has provided insight into the risk management process. Different causal 
influences were seen to dominate, as were the desired outputs from each level. 
At each phase, there was consideration to the most appropriate method. This research 
approaches the question using the levels: firm, function, collective (group) and then 
individual. 
In the first and second phases (firm and function-level) reflecting Dubois and Gadde (2002), 
a case study method was adopted. This used triangulation of data (cf. Jick, 1979): interviews 
of key staff and managers, observation of their meetings, inspection of reports and analysis 
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of their communications. This approach enabled an atheoretical12 analysis to be completed. 
The results were treated and reported in a thematic style, looking both for commonality and 
contrast between the firms. The firm-level analysis demonstrated convergence between 
cases. However within each firm representation at risk oversight meetings demonstrated a 
difference in perspective between Generation and Retail Business Units (BU), this lead to the 
second phase using function differences as the frame of reference.  
The second phase (function-level analysis) exposed differences between asset and service 
orientation, the accounts started to show some difference between management levels. This 
frame of reference was adapted to look at how the different groups made their risk 
decisions.  
In the third phase, (still reflecting back on the incomplete discussion of structure and 
process) to develop an understanding of the complex order and influence of decisions a 
method of causal mapping was employed. Rather than triangulation of the data this took the 
accounts of the individuals and coded results to create causal maps. These causal maps were 
aggregated into collective groups to identify different perspectives. Only in this way could 
the generative mechanisms be surfaced that were not apparent when employing only a 
thematic analysis. 
In the fourth phase, the study focused on the individual. It was felt that neither a case study 
nor causal mapping method could be employed. The causal mapping approach was close to 
its limitations aggregating seven accounts per sample, and was subject to loss of information 
in selecting the majority view above this volume of accounts. However from the previous 
three phases a number of questions could be identified, and although limited in their 
attachment to literature they gave a basis for developing the data collection. The individual’s 
accounts examined a series of influences (e.g. company strategy or perception of the 
individual) on risk decision and the selection of treatments being employed (e.g. avoidance 
                                                             
12 This is distinct to a grounded approach, as the literature and potential theories had already been exposed. Further 
as the researcher I already had experience of these organizations and some of the perceptions already held.  
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or mitigation). This administered a survey and resulted in an exploratory factor analysis. 
Table 3.2 summarises the four levels of analysis, the methods of data collection and analysis. 
Table 3.2 Levels of Analysis and Methods Employed 
 
The methods are outlined in more detail in each of the chapters (representing successive 
phases). The firm and function-level analysis use the same method so is only outlined at the 
start of the firm-level analysis (section 4.1). 
The research reflecting understanding of systematic combining means that for each phase 
(frame of reference), there is: 
 An introduction to the frame of reference; 
 A statement of method (where this is different to the previous phase); 
 Outline of data sources; 
 Analysis and results; 
 Discussion (reflecting on the findings within that frame of reference); 
Level of 
analysis 
Method Method of data collection Means of analysis 
 
Firm 
 
Case Study 
Interview, meeting and 
system observation, 
document and report 
review. A-theoretical 
unstructured interview 
protocol 
Thematically structured 
analysis 
 
Function 
 
Group 
Case Study/ Causal 
Mapping 
Semi-structured interview 
Cognitive mapping and 
thematic analysis 
 
Individual Survey Electronic survey 
Exploratory factor analysis, 
T-tests, Chi-square tests 
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 An integrative discussion (reflecting on developed understanding across previous 
frames of reference)13. 
The research begins with a firm-level analysis.  
                                                             
13 There is not an integrative discussion at the end of chapter 4, firm-level analysis as it has no previous reference 
point. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Firm-Level Analysis 
Chapter Four uses a case study method to analyse two different organizations from the 
European Energy Sector. It used findings developed during exploratory workshops14 and 
extant literature to inform the questions and identify respondents for interview. The 
structure of this chapter is conventional: method, results/analysis and discussion.  
A method section provides outline for the justification of the case study approach. Two cases 
are outlined, including context and explanation of the markets they exist within.  
In analysis, the different thematic categories are summarised. In turn these themes are 
discussed, looking for both convergence and contradiction. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the results.  
4.1 Case Study  
Application of the case study method is a powerful approach in the development of new 
theory (Boyer & Swink, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989:532; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Jaspers, 
2007; Voss et al., 2002). It has both inductive (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) and deductive 
(Dubois & Araujo, 2007) uses, it continues to be favoured for its ability to develop theories 
(Jaspers, 2007:210), where the existing understanding is nascent in nature. The case study 
approach is clearly documented by Yin, that case research is appropriate: “to cover 
contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated variables” (2003:xi). In 
approaching an exploratory case study15, the unit of analysis is critical but also challenging.  
Case research: “deals more with direct observations of object reality compared to people’s 
perceptions of object reality” (Meredith et al., 1989:302), it “is used to investigate a specific 
                                                             
14 An exploratory workshop was conducted with representatives from 2 companies, and 3 different operational 
functions. 
15 Exploratory case studies are one of six different types of case study approaches outlined by Yin, 2003 
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phenomenon through an in-depth limited-scope study” (Steenhuis & Bruijn, 2004:3), case 
research therefore provide a basis for analytic generalisation. The case method itself allows 
questions of how, what and why, to be posed and explored (Voss et al., 2002). 
In design the sample does not need to be representative of some population (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007:27), this is the fallacy drawn across from positivist methods. Instead the 
cases should be chosen because they are suitable and interesting in their nature. Voss et al. 
(2002) support this consideration in discussion of the practical barriers and facilitators in 
gaining access to an organization. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that although single case 
studies are valid, the opportunity to develop multiple case studies can lead to a stronger 
foundation for theory building. The ability to explore a wide range of research questions 
that can emerge from the process should be encouraged (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007); this 
is consistent with the abductive process (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Ketokivi & Choi, 
forthcoming).  
Opportunity for research access should not be ignored and the “opportunity for unusual 
research access” (Yin, 2003:26) is a valid consideration. The development of “polar types, in 
which a researcher samples extreme cases in order to more easily observe contrasting patterns 
in data” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007:27) is an important sampling consideration. Voss et 
al., (2002) and Handfield and Melynk (1998) identify that multi-site case studies are useful 
in both theory building and theory testing. 
Case studies are likely to rely on qualitative data; this can be gained through interview, 
reports, observations, archival data and surveys amongst other sources (Sanders, 2009). 
Triangulation of data is advocated by Voss et al., (2002) and Jick (1979) as this increases 
result validity (i.e. that the test measures what it was designed to measure). Whilst 
consistent with the Realist aim of seeking generative mechanisms, case study research is 
capable of eliciting the causal mechanisms in much greater detail (Jaspers, 2007; Yin, 2003). 
Eisenhardt and Graebner encourage researchers to be explicit about the desire to build 
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theory, and to enrich the accounts by “liberally use footnotes to sharpen the distinctions…” 
(2007:28). 
Shah and Corley (2006) encourage the use of multiple methods in the development of 
theory. In research where complexity is high (e.g. organization studies):  
“as scholars we should strive to rely on multiple complementary methodologies, and 
avoid creating and a adopting a dogmatic position which excludes valid empirical 
methodologies” (Carter et al., 2008:693)  
This understanding provides justification for the development and combining of methods to 
explore an issue. Voss et al., (2002) identify that in theory testing the combination of case 
study and survey-based research can be used for triangulation. 
There is consideration as to whether a case study selection should be based upon a 
retrospective or current case (cf. Voss et al., 2002). Longitudinal case analysis is seen as 
particularly useful as it provides an increased account as to the relationship between cause 
and effect (Voss et al., 2002).  Retrospective cases however do offer the researcher more 
control over the selection, as the cases are already likely to be distinguished in their criteria 
for selection. 
A clear warning is common in the literature discussing case research and more generally in 
theory building research, that being inductive does not give licence to enter into the study 
without some understanding of “the general constructs or categories we intend to study” 
(Voss et al., 2002:199), this is echoed by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). The discussion of 
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967 & 2009; Glaser, 1992) cannot be divorced from 
the discussion of the inductive case method. The extreme of entering into a case with no 
prior knowledge or attachment to literature is much argued, however taking understanding 
from Eisenhardt’s (1989) case study approach there is a more planned cycle in research 
design and selection of cases. 
Therefore in adopting the case study method, we are left with the following understanding: 
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- Case study is consistent with the abductive approach (Ketokivi & Choi, forthcoming); 
- Case studies explore the how, what and why (Voss et al., 2002); 
- Opportunity for interesting and unusual access should be exploited (Yin, 2003) and that 
extreme cases should be sought (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007); 
- Triangulation of data increases validity (Jick, 1979) and is capable of eliciting causal 
mechanisms (Jaspers, 2007); 
- However some prior understanding will provide general constructs and categories 
being studied (Voss et al., 2002). 
4.1.1 Approach 
The use of the case study method is accepted and prevalent in the operations management 
community (Boyer & Swink, 2008; Carter et al., 2008). Furthermore, case study approaches 
are desired where behavioural theory is examined (Boyer & Swink, 2008), behaviour is 
implicit in this study of individual risk treatment decisions. Specifically the aim of the firm-
level analysis is to identify and understand: 
 The different influences on the risk management process through the adoption of 
standards (section 2.2) and use of risk terminology/descriptions and the process being 
prescribed (cf. Power, 2005);  
 The different recipients of risk communication (cf. Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984); 
 The roles associated to the risk management process and their influence; 
 How risk decisions are being made at the firm-level. 
Table 4.1 summarises the approach taken to case study in chapters four, five and six:  
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Table 4.1: Adopted approach to case study 
 
 
 
S
te
p
 
C
o
n
si
d
e
ra
ti
o
n
 
S
o
u
rc
e
s/
 R
e
fe
re
n
ce
 
D
at
a 
ga
th
er
in
g 
U
si
n
g 
fi
rs
t 
h
an
d
 o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s,
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
(c
f.
 
M
er
ed
it
h
 e
t 
al
., 
1
9
8
9
; Y
in
, 2
0
0
3
) 
 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 R
is
k
 (
se
ct
io
n
 2
.3
) 
 
 
R
is
k
 in
 O
p
er
at
io
n
s 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 2
.4
) 
 
In
h
er
en
t/
re
si
d
u
al
 r
is
k
 (
se
ct
io
n
 2
.1
.1
) 
 
R
is
k
 a
s 
lo
ss
 o
r 
im
p
re
ci
si
o
n
 (
se
ct
io
n
 2
.1
.2
) 
 
U
se
 o
f 
d
ef
in
ed
 r
is
k
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
st
an
d
ar
d
s 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 2
.2
) 
 
 
R
ec
ip
ie
n
ts
 o
f 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
, b
as
ed
 o
n
 s
ta
k
eh
o
ld
er
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 (
N
ee
ly
 a
n
d
 A
d
am
s,
 2
0
0
2
 a
n
d
 s
ec
ti
o
n
 2
.8
.4
) 
 
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 s
ys
te
m
s,
 e
xp
li
ci
tl
y 
o
r 
im
p
li
ci
tl
y 
u
se
d
 t
o
 
m
an
ag
e 
ri
sk
 (
se
ct
io
n
 2
.8
) 
 
 
T
h
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
u
se
d
 a
n
d
 v
al
u
at
io
n
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
es
 (
se
ct
io
n
 
2
.8
.1
) 
 
T
h
e 
sy
st
em
s 
u
se
d
 t
o
 r
ec
o
rd
 a
n
d
 p
ro
ce
ss
 r
is
k
. 
D
ef
in
e 
th
eo
ry
 
T
h
e 
u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
li
te
ra
tu
re
 a
n
d
 w
o
rk
sh
o
p
 a
re
 u
se
d
 
to
 d
ef
in
e 
th
e 
th
eo
ry
 b
as
e,
 t
h
er
e 
ar
e 
m
o
d
el
s 
o
f 
ch
ar
ac
te
r 
an
d
 
b
eh
av
io
u
r 
(c
f.
 S
te
en
h
u
is
 &
 B
ru
ij
n
, 2
0
0
4
; V
o
ss
 e
t 
al
., 
2
0
0
2
) 
 
C
al
cu
la
ti
ve
 c
u
lt
u
re
s 
(P
o
w
er
, 2
0
0
5
) 
 
 
R
is
k
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Id
ea
l T
yp
es
 (
M
ik
es
, 2
0
0
9
) 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 
se
le
ct
io
n
 o
f 
ca
se
 
an
al
ys
is
 
T
h
is
 is
 a
n
 e
xp
lo
ra
to
ry
 c
as
e 
st
u
d
y.
 T
h
er
e 
is
 d
el
ib
er
at
e 
sa
m
p
li
n
g 
o
f 
ri
sk
 m
an
ag
er
s,
 r
is
k
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
an
d
 r
is
k
 o
v
er
si
gh
t 
m
ee
ti
n
gs
 a
s 
th
e 
so
u
rc
e 
o
f 
th
is
 u
n
d
er
st
an
d
in
g 
at
 f
ir
m
-l
ev
el
 (
cf
. E
is
en
h
ar
d
t 
&
 
G
ra
eb
n
er
, 2
0
0
7
; M
cC
u
tc
h
eo
n
 &
 M
er
ed
it
h
, 1
9
9
3
) 
 
D
at
a 
an
al
ys
is
 
It
 is
 q
u
al
it
at
iv
e 
in
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
, u
si
n
g 
ve
rb
al
 a
n
d
 w
ri
tt
en
 
d
ir
ec
ti
o
n
. T
h
er
e 
is
 b
o
th
 d
at
a 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
 a
n
d
 lo
gi
ca
l a
n
al
ys
is
 
th
ro
u
gh
 t
h
e 
co
n
jo
in
in
g 
o
f 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s,
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
an
d
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
 
ac
co
u
n
ts
. D
ev
el
o
p
in
g 
th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 f
ro
m
 c
as
e 
d
at
a,
 r
eq
u
ir
es
 a
 
sy
st
em
at
ic
 a
p
p
ro
ac
h
 t
o
 c
o
d
in
g 
th
e 
d
at
a 
(i
n
te
rv
ie
w
, 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 a
rc
h
iv
al
 d
at
a)
, r
ed
u
ci
n
g 
th
is
 in
to
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
(c
f.
 J
ic
k
, 1
9
7
9
; E
is
en
h
ar
d
t,
 1
9
8
9
) 
 
140 
 
In result, comparison was sought during this abductive process at different levels (e.g. firm 
and function-levels). In analysis this comparison identified convergence and clarification. 
These principles (McCutcheon & Meredith, 1993) informed the approach to the case 
analysis.  
4.1.2 Sample Frame 
Energy in Europe was the sector being studied. I had unique access to this sector. The 
Energy sector presented an interesting dynamic, containing a multiplicity of both financial 
and non-financial risks. Not only were there many different types of risk, but many different 
causes of risk (e.g. political, consumer and environmental).  
The privileged access afforded to me, and a study of what the energy companies reflected as 
their: “soft underbelly of risks, risk management and general handling of threats” (CFO, 
Energy Company). The cases presented operated in the same markets, with subtly different 
influences on their culture and standards, these are outlined in section 4.1.3 and 4.1.4. The 
case organizations (Firm Level: FCORP and GRS) are now described: 
4.1.3 Case Organization: GRS 
At the time the research was conducted, GRS was a European vertically integrated energy 
company. Its focus of business was energy, including production, trading, retail and 
distribution (2010). Originally GRS was a conglomerate that in the 90s saw a major change 
in strategy, shedding all of its non-energy assets and businesses; it then used its capital to 
acquire an international (mainly European) portfolio of energy companies. It had shared 
assets in upstream gas fields and gas transportation. It was an international company, with 
moderate links to its host country (where the headquarters existed). There was not a strong 
national identity running through the company, as it valued the local market unit cultures 
(in 2010). This was specifically valued in the retail business units, where attachment to host 
nation (and therefore customer market) was seen as a core requirement. In total there were 
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over 100,000 permanent employees, the number of contractors is not reported at a group 
level. 
The UK market was managed by a market unit CEO, and included a CFO and a managing 
board. This function had diminishing authority within the group structure and was used as a 
risk management and political alignment structure. The heads of the different business units 
were members of this managing board. These business units were legally independent from 
one another, themselves controlled by managing boards and supplying a set of independent 
accounts.  
In the UK market of GRS there was Business Units (BU) for: Retail (ERS), Generation (EGEN), 
Distribution, Business services and Engineering Development. Two of these subsidiaries 
ERS and EGEN are described in the function-level analysis (chapter 5). 
4.1.4 Case Organization: FCORP 
At the time the research was conducted, FCORP was vertically integrated. FCORP had a bias 
in the structure of its business toward generation activities, and specifically nuclear 
generation and build. FCORP employed a structure of national market units; although there 
was indication that economies of scale may be increased by a greater functional alignment. 
FCORP had market that covered most of Europe, and some non-European investments 
(specifically south East Asia and Africa). The UK market contained functions of retail, 
generation (non-nuclear), nuclear, distribution and central services. The trading function 
was not dedicated to the UK market16.  
FCORP had a very strong national culture, derived by its close links to the government and 
its investors, of which 85% of investments came from this nation. FCORP encouraged local 
cultures to be accepted within its national market units. However there was a clear bias in 
                                                             
16 Following the study (2012), the Trading function of FCORP was setup as an international trading function, as an 
equal peer of the market unit structure. The trading function itself then created national trading business units, one 
of which was based in the UK. 
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the top management roles, which were predominantly occupied by nationals of the parent 
company. FCORP had over 160,000 employees. 
Two of the subsidiaries in the UK market were considered in the function-level analysis 
(chapter 5). FRET was the retail subsidiary and EAM was the generation (non-nuclear) 
subsidiary.   
4.1.5 Case Summary 
The two Energy companies, based in the European Energy market were identified as having 
generally similar objectives and corporate structures, competing within similar (often the 
same) marketplaces. At firm-level there was no presumption as to the management of risk, 
or the performance management of risk. However understanding that these corporate 
bodies were assembled through a wide range of semi-independent BUs, the study was 
designed to explore an expected difference between those business units that were asset 
focused, against those that were service focused, because of introductory discussions with 
energy representatives, who suggested: 
“we [asset business] are fundamentally different in the way we describe risk, record 
risk, process risks and the strategies we employ to manage them than our 
counterparts in retail.” (Asset Manager, GRS). 
The data collection periods between firm-level and function-level overlapped for a short 
period, reflecting that it was difficult to separate between discussions of corporate relevance 
and BU relevance. This was because managers exist within both structures. However all 
effort was made to undertaken the analysis sequentially. Table 4.2 summarises the firm-
level case organizations. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of Case Organizations 
 
4.1.6 Firm-Level Data Collection 
The case study comprised: 
- Inspection of stated risk management policies and processes; 
- Observation of risk oversight meetings; 
- Discussion and interview of the corporate risk managers.  
The general constructs and categories17 sought are outlined in section 4.1.1. This is extended 
to identify the different questions posed (Appendix A) to interview participants, and the 
questions being asked during observation and analysis of reports. These questions are 
referred to in the summary of thematic categories (table 4.4). 
In total nine staff were interviewed (covering all roles as identified as formative on the risk 
process), six risk meetings (these were the total of risk meetings in the research access 
period) and nine reports (again the total number of reports available in the research access 
period) were analysed. The following sources were used during the firm-level analysis, 
summarised in table 4.3: 
                                                             
17 This reflects Voss et al.’s (2002:199) statement of entering into Case Study research. 
 GRS FCORP 
 
Business Units 
Analysed 
UK Market Unit: 
 
ERS (Retail & Services) 
EGEN (Generation) 
UK Market Unit: 
 
FRET (Retail) 
EAM (Generation – non-nuclear) 
Nature of Business 
Vertically integrated 
 
Vertically integrated 
National Influence 
Host nation in Europe, National 
influence on retail business. 
Generation assets legally owned 
by UK market unit. Multi-national 
culture 
Strong singular national culture. 
Generation assets based in UK. 
Operates separate business unit 
for retail activities in the UK 
which is independent. 
 
Region of Business 
Pan-European, some new 
ventures in Russia 
Pan-European, some minor 
subsidiaries in Asia and Africa 
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1) Data were collected over three months (June-September, 2011), it used a semi-
structured interview protocol (see Appendix A); 
2) Observations from meetings and reports were summarised freehand; 
3) Six of the reports were copied, but were prohibited from being reproduced (table 4.3, 
marked with an *). Where copies of reports could not be taken field notes were made 
during the meeting describing the results and data published; 
4) Critical statements in meetings were transcribed where possible. It was not permitted 
to take slides or recordings of any of the meetings being attended; 
5) Detailed notes were taken during system observation sessions; 
6) Draft process flow diagrams were created freehand to identify the order of risk 
information processing. These were supplied to the hosts to confirm accuracy in 
understanding;  
7) Interviews were recorded where possible, and transcribed (using a professional 
transcription service). Where it was not possible to take an audio recording, field notes 
were taken; this included the main points in discussion and a transcription of any key 
statements made; 
8) Following the data collection, notes and transcriptions were coded using NVivo against 
the main themes. The two cases were thematically analysed.   
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Table 4.3 Firm-Level Data Collection 
TR 
Recorded and transcribed, FN Indicates field notes, * Reports copied 
 FCORP 
12 visits (June-August 2011) 
GRS 
14 visits (July-September 2011) 
Interviews 
Group Risk Manager, Chief Risk 
Officer (CFO’s dept)FN 
UK Head of Risk, Risk Manager (UK 
FD’s dept) TR 
UK Risk Analyst FN 
Head of performance reporting i/c 
risk reporting TR 
Corporate Risk Manager (Board 
appointment), in UK TR 
UK Finance Director (FD) in charge (i/c) of 
risk management TR 
UK Performance analyst (FD’s dept) i/c Risk 
reporting FN 
Head of IT Services (UK), dual role head of 
risk planning FN 
Internal Auditor (UK) i/c risk controlFN 
Meetings 
attended 
UK Performance review meeting 
(risk session only) 
Risk Review: Business Unit Analysts 
meeting 
Critical incidents wash-up meeting 
Risk Oversight Group (UK) 
Pre-board risk planning meeting 
Information Services Monthly Risk Audit  
Reports 
Reviewed 
All with UK Risk Analyst 
2011 Annual risk and mitigation 
summary, group submission 
June M[arket] U[nit] risk report * 
July M[arket] U[nit] risk report * 
August M[arket] U[nit] risk report * 
 
Quarterly board risk report (Q2, 2011), with 
head of UK risk * 
UK update report [to group] mid-term 2011, 
with head of UK risk * 
Risk oversight meeting report (August, 
2011), with UK performance analysts 
Risk oversight meeting report (Sept, 2011) 
with UK performance analysts 
Internal audit report, with Auditor 
IT Services UK report (June)*, with head of IT 
Services 
Systems 
observed 
UK Risk Register 
UK Risk Matrix 
Risk reporting intranet page 
Combined MU UK Risk Register 
Risk Matrix 
Risk reporting tool 
Near hits reporting tool 
Documents 
Group Risk Policy (English) 
Communications Policy [Translated] 
Group website 
Group Risk Policy 
UK Risk Policy 
Group website 
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4.2 Firm-Level Results and Analysis 
Table 4.4 shows the following themes that appeared during the analysis. These were 
contrasted between GRS and FCORP. 
Table 4.4 Inductively Developed Thematic Categories at Firm Level 
 
Continued… 
Category Thematic Category Key Terms Characteristic Level 3 
responses 
Questions posed, see Appendix A (Firm-level interview protocol): 
What does risk mean to your organization? 
What is the terminology used to describe risks? 
Review documents reporting risk management to shareholders and staff. 
Risk Types 
RT1 In Public 
Communication 
Public, consumers, 
safety 
“An incident occurred at A power 
plant, no injuries or threat to local 
environment was reported.” (i/c 
Risk, FCORP) 
RT2 In Investor 
Communication 
Investors, shareholders, 
financial, credit risks, 
market risks 
“The company operated in 
challenging financial times, but 
had managed to maintain its 
profits by increasing efficiency in 
the production process through 
investing in new technology.” (FD, 
GRS) 
RT3 In Internal 
Communication 
Staff, awareness, 
updates 
“Risk to safety is not tolerated, it is 
everyone’s responsibility to 
identify, and communicate safety 
risks.” (FD, GRS) 
What informs the approach adopted to manage risk? 
What roles in the organization manage risk? 
Review reports and submissions detailing firm-level risks. 
Observe risk oversight meetings, agreeing corporate reporting submissions. 
Risk Governance 
RG1 Policy ERM, corporate 
guidelines, marketplace 
“We operate an enterprise risk 
management approach 
throughout the company” (GRM, 
FCORP) 
RG2 Risk Roles CFO, risk manager The CFO is the responsible 
manager for risk in the business 
unit 
RG3 Reporting Corporate process, 
reports, feedback 
“Information feeds upwards, but 
there is little in feedback to us on 
the process” (Analyst, FCORP) 
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As the different themes are discussed, both convergence and contradiction are sought. This 
happens at two different levels, 1) within case, and 2) between cases (cf. Huberman & Miles, 
2002). For brevity, these are combined in the results. Having triangulated the data for the 
case analysis (using reports, observations and interviews), it is apparent where there was 
internal contradiction or where there was convergence. These are analysed in turn: 
4.2.1 Risk Types: Public Communication (RT1) 
FCORP used the terms: Safety, Sustainability, Legal and Political risk in public 
communications. The discussion of Safety made clear both their legal and moral 
requirements, and that this was their risk management priority: 
“When it comes to risk, what I think is a largely negative term, we know, or we 
think we know, what our customers and the public want to hear. This requirement 
doesn’t seem to differ between different market unit], as the people, the public and 
the regulators are largely consistent in their concerns… when we talk about 
nuclear, they think Chernobyl, they don’t think about low cost and reliable energy, 
when we talk about oil they think about the thick sticky stuff that floats on water 
and kills wildlife, they don’t think about a proven technology where we are 
sweating the asset” (Risk Officer, FCORP). 
Category Thematic Category Key Terms Characteristic Level 3 
responses 
What is the strategy to manage risks? 
Review documented corporate risk management process and standards recognised. 
Risk Strategy  
RS1 Mapping Risk management 
process, stakeholders, 
strategic impact, 
alignment 
“The prioritisation of risks reflect 
the strategic priority of the 
company”  (IA, GRS) 
RS2 Desirable Decision-
Making 
Optimal solutions, 
through reasoned and 
empirically informed 
decisions 
“The Market Units are expected to 
demonstrate diligence in their 
decisions and provide optimal 
solutions in the management of 
risk in their operations” (IA, GRS) 
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GRS used the terms Operational, Environmental, Regulation and Political risk in the 
communications. The term Operational risk18 was closely associated to Safety, and the terms 
were interchanged. The communications were supplemented with a corporate 
responsibility of workforce safety. GRS understood this focus of their communications: 
“Risk is something they [the public] want to manage away, if it doesn’t impact them 
or family they are largely agnostic about the statements we make. I feel this has 
changed somewhat over the last decade where people have developed a 
consciousness about the environment, but the reality is they want to hear warm, 
fluffy statements about how we are not going to hurt them. The money men are 
savvy about this and see the numbers sitting behind statements. It is about 
perception, will the public support statements we make, will the business still be 
there, and will their investment still continue to grow? It is really is as simple as 
that.” (Risk Manager, GRS) 
Figure 4.1 compare the different risk types being used, and that there was a level of 
alignment of terms between FCORP and GRS: 
 
Figure 4.1 About Us Risk Types: Public Communication (adapted from Company Websites)  
There were four different top-level risks being discussed (figure 4.1). Although the terms 
used are subtly different, the underlying meaning of each aligned very clearly between 
cases. This was a product of the market and the environment they worked within. 
                                                             
18 This is not in reference to the Basel Accord definition of Operational risk, but a generic term relating to risks 
occurring in the transformation process. 
GRS  FCORP 
Operational (Safety)  Safety 
Environment  Sustainability 
Regulation  Legal 
Political  Political 
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It was seen that the externally stated risk policy was aimed at satisfying the inquisition of 
the public, that risk management was management of negative impact and perception of 
negative impact. GRS showed there was a deeper level of consideration: that satisfying the 
public through appropriate communication was a requirement to satisfy the investors, they 
were seen to predict the public (and therefore the consumer) reaction in their assessments 
of the business. 
There was limited difference separating the two cases in their almost bland production of 
risk-based communication to the public. It was defensive communication, expressing only 
positive treatment of threats. The analysts suggested that enough needs to be said to show 
awareness and priority, but that saying too much might indicate a problem and draw 
attention to a non-existent issue. 
Both cases separated communication to investors and interested public within their 
websites. They treated them as different targets of information. In communicating to the 
public, there were attempts to use concise language and duplicity was avoided. In this theme 
both organizations were consistent with one another. 
4.2.2 Risk Types: Investor Communication (RT2) 
Investor reports used the same risk types (section 4.2.1) to structure discussion to investors. 
FCORP reports provided an example:  
“Having recognised a potential fault in [plant A], it was taken out of operation. Rather 
than returning it immediately to production we have taken the opportunity to fit the 
plant with enhanced technology, giving it increased efficiency for the next 7 years of 
operation.” (Report, FCORP).  
Further, FCORP articulated a desire to change their risk management communication, 
encompassing greater awareness and recognition of all their key stakeholders, and not just 
their investors.  
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In GRS communication of risk types was consistent between public and investors. This link 
between public and investor perspective is explained by GRS: 
“Identifying a risk can just be an opportunity to make investment, the spin to the 
investor is a positive operational enhancement activity, to the public this is confidence 
in managing a potential hazard” (Risk Manager, GRS). 
Both cases attempted to demonstrate that risk was well managed, it was a positive message. 
There was evidence that inference to risk being well managed was linked to the 
organization’s potential to satisfy investors and maintain their support. 
The language used in investor reports was similar to the terminology being used in financial 
institutions, particularly terms seen in the Basel Accord, for example: counterparty and 
credit risks, market risk and Operational risks. This process was driven by two distinct 
functions: Audit and Oversight.  
Investor communication was both about mitigation and to drive investor confidence. It used 
more precise language, aimed at a financially aware reader. The use of financial risk 
classifications distinguished the different technical applications of risk. There was a lack of 
quantitative valuation, in non-financial risk discussed (e.g. Operational risks). These were 
communicated using a qualitative explanation, for example “there is risk of sustained media 
attention” (GRS Website, 2010). 
4.2.3 Risk Types: Internal Communication (RT3) 
In documented risk policies the investor perspectives dominated. Risk was articulated in the 
financial sense and used the classification seen in the financial community. This energy-
based financial perspective was embellished with more detailed causes of risk that provided 
greater detail in context of energy: 
“The major Operational risks come from the rapid adoption of new technology [off-
shore wind production] the lack of internal skills we hold, the high ratio of contractors 
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to employees, that I can’t change their behaviour overnight… that type of person 
[contractor] just likes to take a few chances that I don’t tolerate from my own 
engineers” (FCORP, Risk Manager). 
In this statement the risk manager had used the term Operational risk, as a catch-all category 
of risks stemming from the operation’s activities and identified the magnitude of the risk 
(i.e. major). It was a reflection of the inherent risks brought about through the use of 
contractors and the inability to adjust their behaviour. 
As part of the analysis of the different data sources, the different relationships between risk 
classifications were mapped. This was to seek whether certain classifications are being used 
within specific communications, and whether there were dual terms being used. The 
different risk types had a structured (but undocumented) relationship with each other. 
Some risk types were sub-categories of other risk types. To expose this difference these 
were mapped, shown in figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Hierarchy of risk (FCORP), developed from internal risk policy document (2009) 
FCORP kept safety risk as a separate and non-financial risk category. Safety risk was a top 
level of risk. It was not converted into a financial value, instead discussed in parallel to 
financial consequences of risk (FCORP). 
Financial 
Sustainability 
Environment 
Capital 
availability 
Market Counterparties 
Regulatory & 
Political 
Legal 
Safety 
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The process of mapping different risk types was also possible in GRS. This showed a 
mapping of all risks to a financial outcome. Safety risk was converted to a financial 
presentation through an amended set of HSE guidelines (figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4 GRS Hierarchy of Risk, developed from internal risk management document (2010) 
In GRS capital adequacy was seen in counterparties and investors19. GRS shows a single unit 
of risk valuation as currency. In GRS, the conversion mechanism from safety to financial 
used the HSE guidelines (figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5 HSE (2011) Average Unit Costs for Injuries20 
This use of HSE guidelines informed the valuation of health and safety impacts:   
“we use the HSE across the different market units, that provide us with a nominal 
value of injury and death. We don’t use these figures precisely, in fact we use them as 
the lower limit of valuation and then use some level of morality to the exact valuation 
of how much an injured employee is really worth” (Risk Manager, GRS).  
                                                             
19 Representation of risk types as a hierarchy is an original presentation appearing through the thematic analysis. 
On presentation back to GRS, this has been adopted within the Risk Management Process to ensure an 
organizational understanding of risk types. 
20 Costs to individuals per case, average unit cost for 2010/2011 (£ in 2010 prices) 
Financial 
Sustainability & 
Environment 
Market 
Counterparties 
& Investors 
Regulatory & 
Political 
Asset Safety Legal 
 Non-Financial 
Human Costs 
(rounded) 
Financial Costs 
(rounded) 
Total Costs 
(rounded) 
Workplace fatal accidents 1,084,000 187,000 1,271,000 
Reportable injuries 11,500 -700 10,800 
Minor injuries 30 20 50 
Ill health 8,700 -600 8,100 
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This quote demonstrated that health and safety impacts were converted to a financial 
valuation. However, the imprecision and moral issues of this process were significant, and 
only used as a guide rather than a definitive valuation. 
In both cases it appeared that a mix of risk types were employed. Descriptions of risk were 
either: ‘Impact of…’ or ‘Impact from…’. Financial measures of risk were a consistent unit of 
analysis, although the process was not documented by the firms. Financial risk was a 
description as “impact of…”. This is important because the extant literature is not precise in 
differentiating between the two categories, and yet the implications on the interpretation of 
the risk description were later shown to be formative on treatment selection (section 6.5).   
Within the internal communication there was an expectation to derive the risk information 
from operational and strategic targets and measures. This was an implicit discussion of risk. 
This was less positive in articulation, and highlighted threats not fully managed. 
The hierarchy of risk, shown in figure 4.3 and 4.4, demonstrated in detail the risk arising 
from individual processes and how this contributed to the overall risk categorisation in the 
organization. Although generally consistent between cases, a difference in the perspective 
and valuation of safety risk emerged. This multi-tiered approach was not expressly outlined, 
but inherent in manager’s articulation, reporting and risk meetings.  
4.2.4 Risk Governance (RG1): Risk Policy and Standards 
Reference to risk management standards (e.g. COSO ERM) was not always explicit, but there 
was an underlying influence in both cases. FCORP with national ties and listing on the 
national stock exchange meant a mandatory adherence to COSO. This was a process of audit 
and compliance, demonstrating a correct application of the standard. In FCORP it permeated 
into the culture of the corporate managers, and the articulation of what risk meant at firm-
level:  
“We are COSO compliant, and proud of this as [an] achievement, it is now part of the 
way we do things around here…” (Risk Manager, FCORP).  
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FCORP had a complete but imperfect adaption of an ERM standard in their application of 
COSO. FCORP demonstrated an understanding of how a risk culture driven by COSO 
adoption existed within the firm, but that this had potential limitations and 
misrepresentations.  
“the old halo effect of working in a plant, systematically permeates all corners of the 
organization, that risks of any type need to be mitigated – it just doesn’t translate well 
across the business units. Holding a handrail in a power plant has real and material 
consequences if you don’t, walking up a flight of stairs with a cup of coffee in an office 
isn’t comparable. This total risk aversion influences the way you make business 
decisions… the organization draws to a halt and no one will ever make a decision on 
experience” (FCORP, Head of Risk).  
This statement was a reflection on the required risk culture in the asset BU versus the 
service BU, and that with a lack of understanding to the purpose of the approach to risk 
could permeate into the wider business decisions (i.e. investment) and create an unwanted 
and risk adverse culture (cf. Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998). 
In communication of risk the corporate function’s discussion of failure was nearly non-
existent, unless it was to provide a comparative example or signify market disturbance. For 
example:  
“Post-Fukishima, we are required not only to explain the mitigation of a threat, but 
in detail the requirement is to show that threats do not exist” [Translated] (FCORP, 
Communications Policy).  
Under COSO the description of risk was developed to consider velocity and proximity (COSO, 
2004). This was seen in the risk management policies in FCORP, but not in GRS. 
FCORP recognised the “difficult to quantify” or non-financial types of risk and stated a desire 
to develop this through greater awareness and recognition of non-financial risk types. They 
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felt this this must be “led from the top” and reflected in their strategic conversations of 
risk/risk management. 
In GRS the valuation of risk was deliberately simplistic: impact by probability. In GRS there 
was an understanding that they were practicing Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), but no 
standard specifically (i.e. COSO). There was no national requirement to conform21. ERM was 
being used by GRS to denote a framework; in reality this framework was ISO31000, as 
evidenced by the alignment of terminology and the risk management process. What ERM 
meant to GRS was a holistic and integrated appreciation of risks that flowed from bottom to 
top of the organization that created a standard set of terminology between different market 
units and functions. This was later found to not be the case:  
“We call it assessment, they call it analysis, I suppose that is the difference 
between an engineer and someone who actually talks to customers” (SHE 
Manager, GRS).  
Both cases indicated a requirement to show efforts had been made in the systematic 
identification and scanning of the environment, seeking potential threats, even where there 
was difference in policy the aim was the same. In GRS there was a limited recognition of 
non-financial measures of risk, but unlike FCORP had not identified this as an area for 
development of the risk management process.  
What GRS and FCORP consistently demonstrated was the desire to demonstrate stability in 
the energy sector. GRS had an incomplete and partial adoption of an ERM approach. This 
was because a number of components of ERM were not implemented (e.g. an integrated 
cycle of control).  
                                                             
21 GRS had recently withdrawn from the Dow Jones due to the onerous reporting requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act, and had replaced the gap in risk management reporting with “an ERM process”, which was loosely based on 
ISO31000. 
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There was consistency in senior managers’ desire to understand their competitor’s risk 
appetite, then to use their ability to take more risks in the market, which without experience 
would be significant:  
“We need to leverage our experience and operate in markets that are hazardous 
to competitors, because they don’t understand it as we do. That way we open 
opportunity for bigger returns and better investment.” (Chief Risk Officer, 
FCORP). 
This was a desire to increase strategic risk taking and business risk, as discussed by Nocco 
and Stultz (2006), who state that the purpose of companies is to take strategic and business 
risk. 
4.2.5 Risk Governance (RG2): Risk Roles 
A Chief Risk Officer (CRO) was appointed within the corporate function, and at market unit 
management team in GRS. The BU Chief Finance Officers had responsibility for the risk 
management process. In GRS, the Chief Finance Officer (CFO) was also the CRO at corporate 
level (this is a dual role). 
In FCORP the appointment of a CRO occurred at all three levels: corporate function, market 
unit and BU. Further a Head of Credit Risk, spanning all business units was appointed and 
worked in Energy Trading. The CFOs had responsibility for the risk management process, 
and the CRO reported into the CFO. 
In both cases, the board responsibility for risk management was with the CFO. This 
structure was repeated throughout the organization structure until it met the operational 
functions of the BU. In both cases the CRO and the administration team managing the risk 
process were separate from each other. A risk manager (not CRO) ran the administrative 
function of risk. The Board level reporting line of the CRO and association to CFO role was a 
clear reflection of the financial influence and importance of the risk management process. 
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Discussions were observed as to the definition of a “risk professional”? Although the 
structures put risk managers in finance departments only one was a qualified accountant; 
although they felt they should be. None of the risk managers interviewed had any formal 
risk management qualifications. They were individuals who had experience across multiple 
functions within the organization, and demonstrated some quantitative analysis skills. The 
approach of defining risk managers was a theoretical desire to read into the subject of risk 
management, but like many people interviewed found the subject to be: too theoretically 
focused, around specific valuations or tool usage, or with a focus on the different sub-
classifications of risk sources. To great frustration they felt insulted by the need for subject 
authors to outline the requirement to have meetings and conversations on collecting risks 
from across their organization:  
“you wouldn’t explicitly tell a business analyst to talk to people, so why the need to 
tell a risk manager?” (FCORP, Risk Manager).  
They felt that risk management as a discipline was dominated by risk categorization and 
risk description. Because of this lack of original insight, many were developing or innovating 
new ways of expressing and articulating risks in their business. However comparing FCORP 
and GRS, these innovations were largely consistent, giving no unique position to either (e.g. 
GRS had mapped out a time line of each different risk, with a nominal value attached to 
expected, realised and desired risk position, whilst FCORP had done the same activity but 
with a table of desired position and current appraisal of risk taking).  
4.2.6 Risk Governance (RG3): Risk Reporting 
GRS market units provided risk reports to the corporate centre on a quarterly cycle. There 
was no feedback loop from these reports into the market unit or BUs. This was poorly 
reflected on by operational and risk managers in the market units: 
“We do this [providing risk reports] only as a matter of being a good corporate 
citizen…” (FD UK, GRS).  
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At a firm-level the unidirectional flow of information and the lack of understanding as to 
how the data they were providing, meant that there was scepticism and concern as to how 
information was being used. GRS had a particularly strong criticism of this corporate 
requirement:  
“I’m very careful what I put in these reports, it is so easy to take the headline 
numbers, and the limited explanation I am able to put into these reports and get 
the meaning totally wrong. This isn’t helped by the translation [from English] it is 
subjected to” (Risk Manager, GRS).  
The market unit management team did not understand the purpose of these reports other 
than providing some limited narrative for the annual reports. This was also an issue in 
FCORP with limited feedback from corporate centre. It had been recently changed, with 
some positive perceptions of integration of different functions. 
FCORP’s UK market unit had adopted a consistent format across their business units to 
present information. This comprised a couple of pages of narrative called “the risk story”. 
Reflecting risk proximity seen in COSO (2004), the risk matrices were broken into imminent, 
medium and long term threats. Each risk matrix provided in common format: impact and 
probability values. Because it was a summary report of the risks, the market unit had 
already “vetted” the risks presented to corporate centre. This limited risks to high/medium 
classifications. To show that the Market Unit was handling risks, the second column had a 
description of control measures applied. This used a red/amber/green status (iconic 
information, Edworthy & Adams, 1996), to signify relative success of the control. This iconic 
information was attention directing and a subjective influence the Market Unit could apply 
to the report. Included in the report was a narration of risk velocity (COSO format), between 
current and previous reports. This allowed them to reflect change in risk over the month. 
FCORP showed that adoption of the COSO standard had a material influence on reporting 
standards and perceptions of risks in the organization, towards understanding the speed of 
risks being faced by the organization. 
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FCORP had recently (2010) implemented a feedback-loop from the aggregated corporate 
reports back into the market-units. The effect of this was not yet known, but had increased 
the perceived value of reporting. The feedback comprised an aggregated risk position, 
across all market units.  
However the feedback report offered little operational value as it was 8-10 weeks out of 
date on return to the market units, so many of the critical risks had materially changed. 
Figure 4.6 shows the risk reporting evidenced in the firm-level analysis, highlighting the 
flow and properties of the process. 
 
Figure 4.6 Risk Reporting 
The risk reporting happened in parallel to the performance management of risk at the firm-
level, the two processes were intrinsic. The flow of strategy into the risk communication is 
presented in figure 4.7.   
Business Unit/ 
Function
Market Unit
Corporate
Critical risks only
Critical risks only
Objectives (Market 
Unit)
Targets implicit of risk
Risk Reporting
Feedback
loop
Direct feedback to 
Business Unit in FCORP 
only
Selection criteria of 
critical risks for 
elevation to next level 
of authority
Operational objectives 
and targets implicit of 
risk measures
“we do this only as a 
matter of being a good 
corporate citizen” (FD 
UK, GRS)
“we report only those 
risks that are graded 
very high to the 
business unit” (Analyst, 
FCORP)
“The Market Unit 
selects only those risks 
that have a very high 
impact as perceived by 
the MU analysts” 
(Internal Audit, GRS)
“There has been an 
increase in discussion 
between the HQ and 
individual business 
units in aligning their 
objectives and review 
their reported risks” 
(HoR, FCORP)
Properties Exemplar Quotes
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Figure 4.7 Performance Management of Risk 
Figure 4.8 draws together the communication and reporting seen in G1-G3 and RT1- RT3 
(figures 4.6 and 4.7). In the lines of communication (e.g. investor) the role and the structure 
of communications is described.  
Strategy
Objectives
Internal
Communications
Public
Communications
Investor
Communications
Attention directingConfidenceConfidence
QualitativeFinancial Impact Causal
Corporate
Market Unit
Function
Corporate 
Management
Corporate 
Communication
Risk 
Management
Management 
of risks
Mitigation of 
risks
Not risks, but behaviours
and outcomes
Critical only to the
Function
(Holistic)
Critical only to the
Market Unit
(quantitative)
Critical only 
to the Group
(FCORP only)
Role of Communication
Structure of Communication
 
Figure 4.8 Firm-Level: Risk Management and Communication 
Figure 4.8 identifies three different influences at firm-level: corporate communication, 
corporate management and risk management. Corporate communication was an outward 
Strategy
Objectives (Market 
Unit)
Investor
Strategy mapping
Market Unit Risk 
Reporting
Risk Communication
Strategy is mapped 
into MU objectives at 
mid-term plan
- Investors are 
provided confidence in 
management of risks
- Public detailed how 
risk is being managed
- Internal being 
identified objectives, 
implicit of risk
- Investors offered 
financial 
representation of risks
- Public provided 
qualitative accounts of 
risks
Corporate risk 
reporting reflected in 
MU objectives at an 
operational level
“… there is continued 
instability of wholesale 
markets representing a 
3% increase in 
wholesale costs” (GRS, 
Interim report)
“Responding to events 
in Japan a review of the 
generation technology 
is being conducted, 
and existing 
developments 
suspended” (GRS, Press 
release)
“… we need to respond 
to the increasing 
regulation and 
switching behaviour of 
domestic customers, 
focusing further on 
efficiency and a price 
defined market” 
(FCORP internal brief)
 
“The unexpected and 
significant change in 
wholesale price has to 
be reflected in an 
increase in variance in 
expected return on 
capital for second half 
of the year” (FCORP, 
internal brief)
Properties Exemplar Quotes
Public Internal
Mitigation Management
Attention
Directing
Incorporation in
MU targets
Performance Management
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facing process, used in developing confidence in risk management. The internal 
communications, which were attention directing, appeared as part of the central governance 
function, with cascade of strategy into objectives which were subsequently communicated, it 
was a top-down flow of information. The risk management process was largely an upward 
flow of information, filtering at each layer of organizational structure (FCORP showing 
recent evolution of this process to provide feedback loops). The interface between risk 
management and corporate management were not well defined, with limited feedback from 
the risk management process into the corporate objectives22.  
4.2.7 Risk Strategy (RS1): Mapping of risk in strategy 
Risk strategy can be understood as statements of risk appetite (Hopkin, 2012) and 
statements of priority, tackling threats in the critical path of the firm (cf. Hopkin, 2012). 
They are closely related concepts in literature. However in the research, there was limited 
evidence of both aspects, these are covered in turn. 
Risk appetite: Risk appetite was a term used by managers, but with no reference point in 
meetings or reports, the term did not have any consistency in use. This was consistent with 
the findings in Beasley et al. (2010) that risk appetite is poorly stated in the context of 
organizational objectives.  
Priority and objectives: There was evidence of belief-based statements being used to infer a 
company objective. But these were difficult to relate back to specific organizational 
missions. These were implicitly setting rules for risk management, for example: “we do not 
hurt people” (GRS, mission statement23).  
GRS did demonstrate through its reports, discussions and meetings an order of risk priority: 
safety was top priority, followed by environmental risks and all other risks were considered 
in a financial sense and prioritised on value.  
                                                             
22 This description has great parity to the case of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi in Kaplan and Norton (2006), showing 
strategy cascades down and the risk process is aggregating bottom up. 
23 Every site had this statement written on all points of exit and entry into the buildings. 
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GRS were critical of current process and stated they wished to develop “rigour and 
professionalism in risk management, seen in financial institutions” (GRS, FD UK). This was a 
destination statement of what they wished risk management structures to look like. 
Priority of different risk types was difficult to identify in FCORP. It was felt that safety risk 
was the top priority (but not explicitly stated). There was no other inferable order of risk 
priority. 
FCORP had limited desire for risk management to become a separate consideration or 
process, instead FCORP felt that the organization should be more aware of risk management 
as an integrated requirement in standard management activities.  
The role of performance reports from market units in both cases, were seen and reflected on 
as immature by senior members of the organization. The risk management systems were 
operational in design and demonstrated limited strategic benefit. The vision of the firm did 
seem to steer the organization through great disturbance in the sector, but this did not 
specify any risk management behaviours24. 
4.7.8 Risk Strategy (RS2): Decision-Making 
The corporate functions demonstrated an expectation of subordinate functions’ (Market and 
BU) decision-making. In GRS the corporate risk functions were clear to express that for the 
big capital investments or the high impact risks, a structured and detailed risk management 
process had been performed. Further the expectation was for the BU to present their 
decision-making when challenged, for example: 
“If the Business Units have gone through a systematic, justified and detailed risk 
assessment, they should also be able to demonstrate this when challenged. This 
should not be a retrofitted process, and if we believe that is the case we will 
become more challenging in our oversight of their function. All potential avenues 
                                                             
24 The study did not observe the process in creating company objectives. It is seen that statements of high level risks 
is the result of a bottom up process, the strategy mapping exercise was a top down process. The two are not 
necessarily consistent with one another. 
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should have been explored, and although they [BUs] have different operational 
demands, their decisions must be reconciled to the corporate vision” (Corporate 
Risk Manager, GRS) 
In FCORP the centralised governance of risk was not as explicit, but it did have a consistent 
focus on the expectations of rationality in decision, for example: 
“Clearly we don’t have the same level of understanding to the problems and threats 
as the Business Units, this is their domain. They are able to synthesise this tension 
between making operational decisions and the need for reflecting the company’s 
strategy, they don’t always align. They do this by exploring the different options 
available to them, and arriving with the best recommendation. Clearly we subtly 
influence them through the blunt levers we have in the centre” (CRO, FCORP) 
In FCORP, there was the suggestion of using levers to weight their decisions in managing 
risk. For both firms this demonstrated an expectation of reasoned decision-making, which 
further inferred that optimal solutions could be found. This positioned the corporate centre 
functions as quality control of the BU’s decision process, whilst recognising that some 
influence could be exerted on the process. 
These eight themes (table 4.3) reflected on the structures, roles and standards exhibited at 
firm-level. The differences were limited, and the active risk management processes seemed 
inseparable from one another. The implication of these findings and justification for the next 
level of analysis is presented in the next section. 
4.3 Firm-Level Discussion 
There was similarity of accounts between FCORP and GRS; this arose from the similar 
operating environment and shared markets. The commonality between cases included: risk 
process, types of risk (articulated and communicated), ERM adoption, approach to mapping 
risks to strategy and the expectation of subordinate reasoned decision-making. There was 
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awareness of multiple sources of risk, evidence of holistic risk management (Leibenberg & 
Hoyt, 2003). Risk categories were understood in a similar manner: safety, legal, political and 
environmental. Risk communication had internal targets and external targets (public and 
investors). The two external audiences had different language and focus in their 
communication. This was recognition of multiple stakeholders taking differing value from 
the relationship. This conformed to stakeholder contribution and requirements described 
by Neely and Adams (2002).  
Risk Categories 
There was an undocumented order and relationship of risks. In both cases, financial 
expression of risk was a top tier risk type. Sub-categories of risks had association to the 
descriptions used in external communication. Both cases had conversion mechanisms 
between lower level risk types and financial categories of risk. FCORP differed by keeping 
safety risk as an independent category, not converted into a financial value.  
Risk Management Types 
Both cases demonstrated characteristics outlined by Mikes’ ERM ideal types (2009). 
However, Mikes presents the typology as a singular and static characteristic. It was 
observed that there was a difference between a current status, and intent to develop. This 
spanned more than one ERM ideal type. FCORP exhibited “A Holistic Risk Management Ideal” 
(2009:26), evidenced by reflection of non-quantifiable risks (e.g. safety), and strategic 
conversation developed within senior management. However FCORP articulated a desire to 
move toward a Risk-based performance measurement ideal, where there was increasing 
embedding and integration of risk management, reflective of stakeholder demands.  
GRS exhibited a “Holistic Risk Management” approach; but with desire to become 
increasingly risk quantified. This inferred a move toward “Risk Silo Management” (Mikes, 
2009:23). In GRS this ability to quantify and understand loss distributions was reflective of a 
financial company. Interviews evidenced desire to become and “catch up” with the financial 
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institutions in management of risk. GRS showed less attention at firm-level to use and 
develop non-quantifiable measures and articulation of risk. This was under some 
classifications, a move away from ERM practices (cf. Beasley et al., 2006). Table 4.5 
summarises the current risk management type and the desired risk management type, using 
Mikes’ (2009) risk management ideal types: 
Table 4.5 Firm Level Risk Management Ideals 
 
Risk Standards 
Corporate oversight in both cases was quantitatively driven; it was characteristic of 
measurement activities. There was limited access to risk information/metrics flowing back 
to business units, and lack of dissemination of analysis. This needed to be explored further 
at function-level analysis. There was no articulation of firm-level risk appetite. Defining a 
risk appetite was a requirement defined in COSO (2004), and more generally as an ERM 
principle (Beasley et al., 2010). Risk appetite is known to be at the heart of the risk 
management process, as it defines the risk taking in the organization (Power, 2009). 
Risk Roles 
There was no documented evidence of corporate functions recognising the role individuals 
or senior managers had in managing and moulding the risk management process. Although 
during meetings it appeared as a subjectively driven process, influenced by the characters of 
 FCORP GRS 
Current Type 
(ERM) 
Clearly Holistic. Non-quantifiable 
recognised and promoted, strategic 
conversations developed. 
Majority Holistic. Non-quantifiable 
recognised but not promoted as a 
good approach. Limited strategic 
conversations developed. 
Desired Type 
(ERM) 
Risk-based performance 
measurement. Encouraging the 
organization to become risk 
responsive. 
Risk Silo management. Held in high 
esteem the ability to control and 
quantify all risks regardless of 
source.  
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senior employees. This was reflective of Gan et al. (2004) who indicated risk propensity is 
subject to the organization’s managers. 
Operational Risk 
It appeared that Operational risk is not specifically reported, other than as a term in GRS 
equivalent to safety risk. The terms of market and credit risk were used in retail and trading 
functions, it did not reflect into generation or distribution functions. The terms credit and 
market risk had a similar interpretation as in the Basel Accord, but not used to calculate VaR 
and capital adequacy. This was reflective of the performance system being used as a 
measurement tool and not a management tool in the relationships with BUs.  
Supply Chain Risks 
The cases were operating an energy supply chain within the firm (i.e. vertically integrated). 
This direct link between functions had been eroded with the de-regulation of the market, 
and the increased dominance of trading. There was no evidence of managing supply chain 
risks at a firm-level; instead this was an operational decision being made by the individual 
BUs.  
Use of the Performance System 
The corporate functions used performance systems, typical of MCS (Anthony, 1965) to 
assess the individual business/market unit’s performance. This was completed as a financial 
measurement, with very little qualitative appraisal. There was indication that business units 
used a multitude of (inconsistent) performance management structures and presentations. 
This indicated that an adherence to a specific risk management standard did not inform the 
use of a specific performance system (e.g. BSC). Risk management standards were meant to 
define structure, definitions and process of risk management. However, there were two 
different standards being used, but similar processes and structures. There were only 
limited differences in the terminology being applied. Table 4.6 summarises the finding 
between FCORP and GRS. 
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Table 4.6 Summary of Firm Level Analysis 
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The next level of analysis moves from firm to function, because preparatory discussions 
identified potential differences between functions based on different motivations and 
expectations. BUs were self-contained operating units.  This bypassed the organizational 
reporting structure of Market Units. Market Units were holding functions in the 
organization’s structure, differentiating the geographic responsibilities. The composition of 
Market Unit management teams was as a collection of BU heads; therefore the function-level 
analysis represented the BU structure of the organization. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Function-Level Analysis: asset and service 
Chapter Five builds on the firm-level analysis. It expands to the function-level of analysis 
using the case study method. There are four business units analysed in chapter five, these 
are sub-units of the two firm-level cases.  
5.1 Introduction to Function-Level Analysis 
The research has showed a number of features of the risk management processes. At firm-
level there appeared a consistency between organizations. However there was evidence of 
different influences from subordinate Business Units (BU) that were not consistent within 
the firm. This indicated that the generation BU and the retail BU maintained different inputs 
into the risk management process, for example differences in risk reporting submissions. 
The function-level analysis sought explanation to these gaps in understanding: 
 Risk Management Standards were being applied at the firm-level; however there 
was a difference between the adoption of a formal COSO ERM standard in FCORP 
and the generic adoption of ERM in GRS. There did not appear to be a material 
impact from this difference in adoption at firm-level. It was not understood how the 
adoption of a risk management standard permeated into the practices of the 
Business Units.  
 There appeared to be different perspectives in risk submissions to risk oversight 
groups within each firm. The generation and retail businesses seemed to have the 
greatest contrast in their submissions and process of managing risk25. 
 The framework of ERM ideal types (Mikes, 2009) differentiated the desires of the 
organizations and their ambitions for future risk management, and it showed both a 
                                                             
25 There is opportunity to provide a contrast in analysis between Generation and Retail business units within each 
case organization. This provides a polar comparison as suggested by Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007. 
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current risk management type and a future aim of the firm. This conceptual 
underpinning helped explain a number of firm-level features, for example the 
approach to valuation of risks.  
 There were consistent descriptions of risk between firms. These were well 
articulated and understood by central managers. Therefore did this categorisation 
and description of risk permeate into the different functions within the firm? 
The sample in the function-level analysis reflects Eisenhardt and Graebner’s (2007) view 
that samples for case study can be selected where there is the opportunity for unusual 
research access. This selection of service and asset BU allowed for polar types to be 
examined so that contrasting patterns in the data may be observed. Asset functions were 
concerned with the management and protection of tangible assets and operated in a 
physically hazardous environment, whereas service functions operated information and 
customer processing operations, where risks predominantly affect reputation. 
The remainder of this section is structured as: a summary of cases, development of 
inductively developed thematic categories, and a function-level discussion, followed by an 
integrative discussion referring back to the firm-level. 
5.2 Method: Case Study  
The function-level analysis used the case study approach as described in chapter four 
(section 4.1.1). It extended the analysis from the two case organisations, splitting each into 
their separate asset and service functions, which had different foci and influences on their 
risk management processes.  
Defining asset and service 
The energy industry, and its supply chain, exhibits characteristics of production, 
manufacture and service. Reflecting potential differences in organizational output, the 
functional classification used defined a case as either:   
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 Asset; 
 Service. 
An asset function has a number of fixed assets that provide the ability to undertake the 
transformation process, of raw materials into energy (electricity). The ratio of tangible to 
intangible assets may be greater than one, therefore the majority value is held in physical 
assets. Production operations have processes where production precedes consumption and 
separate from the consumption by the customer (i.e. electricity). Measurement of quality is 
objective (i.e. voltage can be measured) and is invisible to the consumer (Slack et al., 2010). 
The alternate classification is a service function. 
A service function has few tangible assets. Transforming resources are typically staff (semi-
skilled staff and professionals). Production and consumption are simultaneous, meeting the 
characteristics of a service process (Slack et al., 2010). In the case of service operations 
descriptions of quality are often subjective and difficult to measure. In the energy sector 
there was a mix of financial, reputation and legal influences.  
In the energy sector there was a difference between the engineering discipline and the 
service discipline. The asset businesses had a high proportion of engineers whilst in the 
retail functions transforming resources were a mix of professional and semi-skilled, many of 
which had mobility between sectors and industries (e.g. staff from insurance, banking and 
telecoms). This mix of skill and the difference in staff constitution between functions meant 
there were many influences on the character of the staff and their risk perceptions. 
Both cases (i.e. FCORP & GRS) had BUs displaying characteristics of both asset or service26. 
By selecting two polar examples: 1) a generation BU (asset), and 2) a retail BU (service), 
there were limited contentions in the classification. The split of asset or service was 
therefore used as a frame of analysis. 
                                                             
26 There are also business units and functions that are difficult to classify using this dichotomy, these tend to be 
engineering and consulting practices and start-up activities attached to the firm. These are avoided during the 
selection of cases, so as to ensure polar examples are used in a cross case analysis.  
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5.2.1 Sample Frame 
Taking the same firms (GRS & FCORP), two business units from each were selected to 
represent a) An asset function b) A service function. Selection of these cases control for 
national influence and were all based in the UK. Table 5.1 summarises the nature of the 
different function-level cases analysed. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Case Organizations (Business Units) 
 
The UK power and gas market was deregulated in 1998; it was highly competitive in pricing. 
Both products were homogenous, difficult to differentiate between suppliers and highly 
politicised. Margins in the market were limited, as a partial response to both issues of 
differentiation and low margin; competitors in the market had developed supplemental 
services. These supplemental services differed between market segments. In the domestic 
market, boiler service and repair was a common supplemental service. 
5.2.2 Case Organization: ERS (GRS) 
At the time of the research, Energy Retail and services (ERS) was a major subsidiary of GRS 
within the UK. ERS retailed power (electricity) and Gas to all segments of the market. It 
serviced over four million power customers and three million gas customers (2010). The 
sales segments included strategic accounts (e.g. Wembley Stadium) through to corporate, 
SME and domestic customers. Customers could purchase power and gas independently or 
through dual-fuel contracts.  
Structurally ERS had a board of directors, independent accounts and strategy department. It 
was managed by GRS on a ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) measure, reviewed annually. 
 ERS EGEN FRET EAM 
Firm GRS GRS FCORP FCORP 
Nature of 
business 
Retail and 
Services 
Generation Retail Generation and 
Asset 
Management 
Location UK UK UK UK 
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There was no symbiotic relationship with other parts of GRS, so the relationship with the 
Group was limited. There was a single shared service facilities management for building 
contracts and payroll functions. ERS had approximately 15,000 staff, and 1,500 contractors 
(2010). 
5.2.3 Case Organization: EGEN (GRS) 
At the time of the research, EGEN was GRS’s UK generation BU. EGEN had a varied portfolio 
of assets, with total production over 10,000 MW, this included coal, gas, combined heat and 
power, biomass and wind27. Further EGEN managed two distinct wholesale gas 
transportation lines. EGEN, similar to ERS, was autonomous in operating activities. 
The standard activities of EGEN’s operation were split into two distinct categories: 
production and maintenance. Production phases had the objective of maximum utilisation of 
assets, focused on minimal outage or downtime. In the maintenance phase, priority was for 
quality of maintenance and minimising extension of planned outages.  
Different assets were used in different phases and demand-times in supplying The Pool. The 
interface to The Pool was called Local Dispatch, owned by Group Trading. Local Dispatch 
was used to call on and off supply from different assets in the EGEN portfolio, in response to 
the long-term supply contracts, and the more profitable spot market. Typically, assets that 
were more expensive to run were used in supplying the spot, where higher premiums were 
commanded; the cheaper (by unit) generation capacity was used to contribute to base load. 
Usage of assets considered the ability and speed of technology to be two-phased (being 
brought on and off the network on demand). Those that were faster to bring to production 
provided agility supplying the market demands. Two-phasing a plant incurred increased 
wear on the plant and often increased the chance of failure of the asset; therefore it was 
avoided where possible.  
                                                             
27 Although GRS had a nuclear interest (development and partnership operation), this was contained in a separate 
business unit with no operational relationship. 
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EGEN had a high percentage of chartered engineers working for it, in total EGEN had 4,500 
permanent staff and 1,000 contractors. In the maintenance phase additional contractors 
were brought onto the plant, “flooding the site”, and contractor population increased by 
300+ contractors over a four-month maintenance phase. 
5.2.4 Case Organization: FRET (FCORP) 
At the time of the research, FRET (FCORP Retail) was FCORP’s sole retail presence within 
the UK market. It offered power and gas products to all segments within the market. It had 
the biggest (by customer number) supply to non-domestic segments of all retailers in the 
UK. Power and gas were bought separately and on dual-fuel contracts. It had over 5 million 
customers. It had 8,500 permanent employees (many of which were working on flexible or 
part time contracts). FRET’s segmentation of its customer portfolio was simplistic: domestic, 
business and large business. Differentiation between business accounts was done on volume 
or complexity of metering. 
FCORP was in direct competition to GRS in the retail market. FRET entered the UK market at 
deregulation in 1998, and quickly acquired a sizable portfolio of customers. FRET’s response 
to the increasingly price competitive market, and increased mobility of customers, driven by 
price comparison and switching services, had meant that brand development has been 
increasingly important. FRET had a strong and recognisable brand within the UK; it had a 
strategy of sponsoring major events, competitions and celebrities. 
5.2.5 Case Organization: EAM (FCORP) 
At the time of the research, Energy asset Management (EAM) was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of FCORP. EAM produced 1,300 MW by gas plant (combined cycle) and 4,000 MW 
by conventional coal plant. This portfolio included growing renewable energy sources; it 
had 70MW, but had over 500 MW in the building phase (2010)28. 
                                                             
28 The significant nuclear production operations were held in a separate business unit within the UK market unit. 
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Subject to the same objectives as EGEN, the plants operated in two distinct phases, 
production and maintenance. Although this differentiation could be seen to change in 
renewable production facilities (wind), weather limitations could force a maintenance 
intervention to be taken out of schedule. 
5.2.6 Function-Level Data Collection 
The data for the case study at function-level, used multiple sources of data to triangulate 
information (cf. Jick, 1979). It represented subjective accounts of managers, risk meetings 
and reports in evidence. The data were gathered through: 
- Analysis of risk registers and risk matrices; 
- Semi-structured interviews with managers, that were operating the BU risk process or 
responsible for operational decisions in the BU (see Appendix B, function-level 
interview protocol); 
- Observation of risk management groups and meetings (these had different titles, e.g. 
“performance review” or “risk review”,  they were selected because they had the same 
responsibility of reporting, discussing and providing decisions on risks managed in the 
BU); 
- Inspection of the risk management systems; 
- Observation of delivery of risk reports to the managing board. 
In total 17 interviews were conducted, six systems observed in operation, five meetings 
attended and six reports analysed. Table 5.2 summarises the different sources of data used 
in the function-level analysis: 
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Table 5.2 Function Level Data Collection: 
 
The firm-level analysis suggested that standards did not define the risk management 
process, but influenced the language in the risk management process (e.g. proximity of risk, 
section 4.2.4). There were different degrees of ERM implementation, and there were 
different focuses on what ERM meant to each case. It was observed that the complex inter-
relation of stakeholder groups was understood. There were different risk descriptions being 
used, but these largely converged on four points, which were:  1) operational safety, 2) 
environment, 3) regulation and 4) political. There was limited evidence of a feedback 
mechanism from top down. Risk management therefore fulfilled a reporting and 
measurement function. It was found that the firm-level relied on financial lag measures. The 
semi-structured interviews followed an interview protocol to reflect these different 
constructs and categories sought (see Appendix B). 
 FCORP GRS 
FRET 
Retail, Service 
5 visits (Sept 2011-Oct 
2011) 
EAM 
Generation, Asset 
4 visits (Sept 2011-Oct 
2011) 
ERS 
Retail, Service 
4 visits (Aug 2011-Oct 
2011) 
EGEN 
Generation, Asset 
2 visits (Sept 2011) 
Interviews 
Risk Portfolio 
ManagerFN 
Assurance Manager 
Analyst (Risk) FN 
Head of BCM 
(Business Continuity 
Management) 
Head of Risk (Unit 
Risk Manager) 
Risk Analyst 
Performance Analyst 
Plant Manager 
Chief Engineer 
Head of Portfolio 
Analysis, i/c Risk 
Management 
Risk Analyst 
Performance 
Manager 
Operations Manager 
(Billing) FN 
Head of Asset 
Management 
Plant Manager 
Risk and 
Performance 
Manager 
Portfolio Analyst 
Systems 
Risk Register Risk Register Risk Log 
Near Misses Report 
Asset and Risk 
Register 
Meetings 
attended 
Risk Review Performance Review 
Asset Investment 
(Special Funds) 
allocation meeting 
Risk Oversight Group, both ERS and EGEN 
have their own separate reports and sessions in 
this meeting 
Reports 
Risk summary (to 
Market Unit) 
Risk Matrix (at Sept 
2011) 
Risk summary (to 
Market Unit) 
Quarterly Risk Matrix 
(August 2011) 
Report to risk 
oversight group 
Report to risk 
oversight group 
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 The observations were conducted over three months (from August 2011 to October 
2011)29. Notes were made of the observation, the flow of information through the system 
was drafted as field notes; risk meetings were attended in person and notes were made of 
the different comments. Recording of meetings was not permitted nor was the copying of 
meeting minutes/slides. Salient points from these meetings were documented as field notes.  
Reports were viewed electronically, and on all occasions the report author was able to 
narrate the report in person. Copying reports was not permitted; field notes were used to 
record the specific points, and the terminology being used.  
Interviews with staff were all conducted in person; this was completed at the site/office of 
the individual. Most of the interviews were recorded and then professionally transcribed30. 
Where recording was not permitted, field notes were taken and specific comments were 
recorded as close to actual language used.  
5.3 Function-Level Results and Analysis 
The data were collected, compiled across the different sources and thematically analysed. 
Thematic categories are summarised in table 5.3: 
  
                                                             
29 System observations were completed in person at the site of the company 
30 The professional transcription service would identify by timestamp any words or terms that were not understood. 
These were analysed and completed by myself, in all cases the terminology could be inserted. 
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Table 5.3 Inductively Developed Thematic Categories at Function Level 
Continued… 
 
Category Thematic Category Key Terms Characteristic Level 3 
responses 
Questions sought, see Appendix B: 
How do you manage risk, what aids you in this process? 
What informs your decisions on selecting risk treatment? 
Observe a risk being recorded from notification through to report. 
Observe a discussion of a risk being prioritised in a meeting. 
How risk is being managed 
M1 Risk Systems Information System, 
Technology, Risk 
Register, Asset Register 
“We use an excel spread sheet 
to record the risk” (Assurance 
Manager, FRET). The register 
is embedded in the asset 
register 
M2 Risk Amnesties Amnesty, Clean sheet, 
volume, identification 
An amnesty was conducted to 
surface all risks. 
M3 Risk Valuation Financial, impact, 
analyst, identification 
The financial impact is 
calculated. The analysts 
provide an objective view of 
the risks. 
M4 Risk Treatments Mitigation, decision, 
portfolio, investment 
A portfolio of treatments are 
used. Selecting which 
approach to invest in . 
M5 Risk Grading Risk matrix, corporate 
level notification, 
boundary risk, RAG 
status 
This is a relative activity. 
“Positioning on the risk matrix 
gives you a relative 
perspective. We use a RAG 
status.” (Performance 
Manager, ERS) 
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The different thematic categories are analysed in turn.  
5.3.1 Risk Systems (M1) 
Time was spent in all four organizations (ERS, FRET, EAM & EGEN) exploring and 
documenting their use of systems that supported the risk management process. The service 
businesses (ERS and FRET) were recording risk through a register; they used nothing more 
developed than manually administered bespoke spread sheets. This had significant 
implications. Although advocating an iterative risk management cycle, learning from 
previous risks and their treatments, the system underpinning it was fundamentally linear in 
Category Thematic Category Key Terms Characteristic Level 3 
responses 
How is management of risks steered in the organization?  
How does the organization reflect on its ability to manage risk? 
Observe the review of risks and the risk management process and standards used. 
Review performance reports, organization and individual performance objectives. 
Performance System influences 
P1 Learning in the 
system 
Understanding wrong 
judgements, qualitative 
assessment 
“Wrong decisions only become 
bad ones when they are 
repeated. You need the 
qualitative assessment to 
understand the full detail.” 
(Plant Manager, EGEN) 
P2 Performance 
systems in use 
BSC, measures, reports, 
safety, objectives 
“Safety is the number one 
objective.” (Plant Manager, 
EAM) The communication is 
based on a number of reports, 
these are embedded in the 
personal objectives 
What function controls the risk management process? 
How is decision making in the risk management process overseen? 
Observe risk steering group and noted roles. 
Reviewed documentation on risk management process in the organization, and job descriptions 
available. 
The Manager 
R1 Options and 
decisions 
Proximity, hedging, 
treatment, prioritization 
“We prioritise the allocation of 
capital to those risks that 
present the most relevant 
risks” (HoR, EAM) 
R2 The risk manager’s 
role 
Oversight, administer, 
being objective, 
meetings 
The risk manager provides an 
independent and objective 
review of the risks 
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nature. This meant that learning embedded in the system was corrective and transactional. 
Much of this process was developed from project risk management processes (i.e. where 
there is a defined start and end to a project). Therefore as a risk was managed (either 
successfully or not), or the project reached the end of its impact potential, history and 
learning was lost as it was removed from the register. Figure 5.1 presents the interfaces 
observed into the risk register: 
 
Figure 5.1 ERS Risk Register 
Figure 5.1 shows that the register had a limited purpose and two incoming feeds. Risks were 
identified causing a new item to be recorded, and updates were recorded as changes or 
milestones were reached. There was no processing within the register.  
In contrast the asset businesses had adopted asset management risk modules (an integrated 
register of risk management) into their systems. This developed from standard engineering 
practice as every asset presented potential failure options. As assets were standard across 
the estate, failure or the potential to extend the life of assets was shown, this understanding 
was embedded in future risk management decisions. The volume of information was so 
great that a structured system for recording risk was perceived as the only feasible 
approach. The operational managers and risk professionals developed the asset 
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management systems. In FCORP the language of proximity and velocity did not appear on 
the risk register, this understanding was super-imposed on the reports generated by the 
asset register to comply with corporate reporting requirements. Figure 5.2 represents the 
risk register, embedded within the asset management system. There was continual check 
and balance of the register reflecting the asset list, and the asset list reflected understanding 
in the risk register. There was internal processing of risks, providing up to date assessment 
of impact and identifying potential interaction between assets. 
 
Figure 5.2 EAM Risk Register (embedded module) 
Risk registers were embedded modules within the wider asset management systems, 
drawing together the detailed record of plant and asset design as well as history of failures 
and impacts experienced. This meant all failures were recorded for posterity, this was an 
iterative approach and indicated some generative learning characteristics. 
5.3.2 Risk Amnesties (M2) 
Risk amnesties were mentioned by both FRET and ERS (service functions). Both cases had 
in the previous two years run a risk amnesty, with the desire to gain better understanding of 
the risks inherent in their organisation. Both organizations strongly regretted this approach: 
EAM: Asset Management Module: ss t t l
Risk Registeris  ist r
OEM data
added to asset
register
Risk identified
Assessment calculated
In module
Treatment
&
Control
updates
Challenge back to OEM data,
Updates provided to OEM
Interaction between 
assets and risks
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“The risk amnesty was in response to a feeling that issues were being hidden or not 
dealt with inside the organization… so an amnesty was run for identification of the 
issues so we could get a wider appreciation of the issues and scale of issues in 
existence. However on reflection this was a poor decision…” (Risk Portfolio Manager, 
ERS) 
 Risk amnesties they felt had two damaging outcomes: 
a. Managers once reporting a risk had felt a cathartic response, no longer feeling they 
were responsible for managing the risk, having notified their superiors: 
“Nobody took responsibility for risks they had recorded during the amnesty” (Risk 
Portfolio Manager, ERS) 
b. So many risks were reported that it was difficult for the risk management process to 
distinguish the priorities, and ERS had experienced several high level failures because 
of this lack of sight and lack of ownership following the amnesty:  
“It is good to know the risks out there, but more importantly know the important risks out 
there. We have been swamped by a volume of low-level risks where we can’t distinguish 
what is important” (Head of BCM, FRET) 
In the asset organizations, there had been no mention of amnesties, probably because risk 
identification was an inherent part of the operational process. 
5.3.3 Risk Valuation (M3) 
Financial valuation of risk was dominant in service functions. In FCORP, it was a two-stream 
valuation at the firm-level, where safety was recognised as an equal measure with a financial 
representation. In FRET the hazards were such that safety issues in the FRET were low 
grade, and instead were converted into lost time and capacity issues in the event of illness 
and sickness31.  
                                                             
31 This was even the case in the consideration of a pandemic flu outbreak, where the risk was considered 
in terms of percentage operability of the call centres and billing routines. 
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Financial valuation in energy did not use VaR32 (i.e. they didn’t estimate a risk value for 
unknown probabilities of risk). Instead the valuation was based on known risk and an 
estimated impact. The total value of was used for creating a relative list of importance. It 
was seen that the service functions looked favourably on the processes adopted by financial 
institutions as a better approach to risk valuation:  
“we aren’t there yet, but I would like to think in four to five years we might be as 
advanced in our understanding and representation of risk as say HSBC” (ERS, Risk 
Manager).  
This was a common sentiment repeated across both ERS and FRET. The valuation in the 
asset functions was not financially driven, but did have a financial component for mitigation 
cost assessment (the cost of the mitigation treatment). Risk categories used a predefined 
criterion for classification into red/amber/green risk types. It was not possible during the 
study to expose the different calculations being applied, but under a limited analysis there 
seemed to be little difference between EAM and EGEN33 in this assignment.  
Different risk types were classified by the asset management systems (EAM & EGEN). 
Engineering risk had a defined set of financial measures attached:  
 Cost of production loss; 
 Cost of damage to asset; 
 Cost of replacement or maintenance in mitigation. 
The cost evaluation of asset redundancy (i.e. as a mitigation approach) was a process 
performed by both analysts and engineers. This included both a cost of replacement and a 
cost of increasing redundancy. The proposal stated how mitigation changed the probability 
profile of a total production failure.  
                                                             
32 Value at Risk, see Basel Accord (2004) risk valuation. If VaR is used, it would take a percentage of estimated risk 
and stated as the VaR figure (usually based on 1% failure in day).. 
33 In EGEN, a red/amber/green status could be overwritten by the record owner or manager; but this 
activity required comment when doing so. 
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For safety and environment risks the valuation was a range of qualitative descriptions (15 
point scale in EGEN and 5 point scale in EAM). The risk analysts (or assigned engineers) 
were measured on completing a mitigation proposal with costs within 21 days (EGEN) this 
was a target (undisclosed) in EAM.  
The contrast between service and asset functions was clear, that although asset businesses 
did not financially value all of their risk types, they did grade the risks based on an 
underlying quantitative valuation. This was consistent against all categories of risk. In the 
service functions all risks were articulated in a financial manner, even where the valuation 
was imprecise because of the inherent subjectivity and estimation in their creation. The 
imprecision of valuing reputational (cf. Eccles et al., 2007) and strategic risk was understood 
by the CROs/Risk managers, for example: 
“…the inaccuracy of our assessments in relation to reputational impact is magnitudes 
greater than in the more exact science of market risk or even customer portfolios” 
(EAM CRO).  
Moreover, asset managers and especially engineers articulated a strong belief in valuations 
and grading completed in their respective risk/asset registers. This was characteristic of the 
calculative idealist as defined by Power (2005). In near total contrast the service functions 
sought a financial valuation, based on a subjective opinion; they were mindful of the 
limitations. This was representative of the calculative pragmatist (Power, 2005), because the 
risk data helped steer analysis, rather than using it as a robust measure. 
In risk oversight meetings the focus on valuation changed. Service functions used risk 
valuation for defining the treatment and priority, with unrelenting adherence to the initial 
valuation. Each risk was dealt with in independence, and compared against a “hurdle rate” 
(i.e. the cost of mitigation). If the cost of mitigation was less than the predicted impact, the 
risk was managed (otherwise it was accepted).  
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Asset functions acknowledged the earlier valuation but used this only as a guide when 
choosing to invest. The risks were considered in their holistic sense. Further, the risk 
managers looked at the whole portfolio of risks to consider which risks were treated. This 
difference seemed almost contradictory in nature, that those functions seeking a precise 
valuation only used them as indicators. Whereas, service functions were acceptant of the 
limitations in risk valuation, they relied more heavily on resulting valuation in deciding on 
treatment. 
5.3.4 Risk Treatments (M4) 
The function-level analysis did not show any theme of different treatments being advocated 
across service and asset functions. It was felt that a greater percentage of risks were being 
treated in the asset businesses because of special capital funds being made available: “a 
budget code to be spent” (EGEN, Risk Manager). Because of this it was inferred that 
mitigation (i.e. investment in redundant plant) was more prevalent in the asset function, 
whereas calculated acceptance (taking the risk) more so in the service function.  
It was felt by the risk managers that because of the lack of resources to fund the treatment of 
risks in the service functions, more risks were ignored (unless there was a direct 
relationship to the decision-maker where they could be personally criticised). In the service 
functions they had to use operational budgets to resource treatments: 
“If I have to control a risk through extra staff, I have to find that from somewhere else 
in my budget, something else goes without” (FRET, Operations Manager) 
The nature of service function’s markets also meant that there was an opportunity to hedge 
individual positions as departments:  
“as long as my overall position is positive by the point of review, I can do what I like, 
lose a few, win a few, if I could make the EBIT return by making cotton dolls I would 
still be in business by the end of the year, therefore it is a matter of understanding my 
whole portfolio and the precision of my objectives. I can usually survive and do well by 
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achieving the big-ticket objectives, and fail a few others where I can justify my lack of 
direct control...” (ERS, Operations Manager). 
Asset functions valued their risks individually but in reference to the collective operation’s 
risks; it was understood that each risk had a dependency on the whole system.  Mitigation 
and acceptance were perceived as commonly available treatments and within a manager’s 
authority: 
“It is totally within my authority, probably expected of me, to find effective means to 
reduce the potential impact if this event was to materialise” (Operations Manager, 
FRET) 
All grades of manager made risk mitigation decisions, but the default position that all 
managers had, was the ability to accept the risk: 
“The default position available to me as plant manager is to accept the risk…” (Plant 
Manager, ERS) 
This was used except in circumstances of safety risk, where the primary company value (i.e. 
“we don’t hurt people”) was in jeopardy. This was a boundary condition, over-riding all other 
treatment decisions; it indicated that action must be taken to control the risk. 
5.3.6 Risk Grading (M5) 
The uses of risk matrices were a central part of the service functions’ risk process (ERS & 
FRET). Senior managers used the risk matrix to aid an understanding of the risk portfolio 
management, where risks were relative to each other. 
Subjective assessments were inherent in service functions grading of risks. The use of the 
risk matrix was well developed in ERS. As risk was understood to be a combination of 
probability and of impact (section 2.1), these formed the matrix axes. Both axes used 
qualitative descriptors to standardise valuation. Multiple descriptions for impact, safety, and 
reputational risks were provided. Figure 5.3 reproduces part of the ERS risk matrix: 
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Figure 5.3 Example Risk Matrix 
Demarcations were created in the risk matrices, including “very high”, “high”, “medium” and 
“low” risk types (based on probability X impact). These lines of demarcation between 
regions were understood by the operation: that only very-high risks were reported to 
corporate centre and high risks to the Market Unit. It was observed that another influence 
impacted risk categorisation: Managers were observed to increase grading where they 
wanted attention, perhaps to gain resource or capital support for treatment, or to create a 
“burning platform” (particularly when taking post in a new role). Alternatively, risks were 
graded lower where they didn’t want attention because of the knowledge of increased 
senior management focus or to hide potential issues they thought they were able to handle 
without intervention. This was gaming of the system. Therefore subtle modifications of 
grading on risks close to the boundary caused a loss of information provided to the market 
unit and corporate centre.  
An extract from ERS risk matrix showed how they mapped reputational and operations risk 
consequences using qualitative descriptions. They were open to subjective valuations 
 
 
 
 
Site outage >2 
weeks
'very 
high'
Site outage 1-
2 weeks
Site outage 2-
7 days
'high'
Site outage <2 
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1-2 days
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Table 5.5 Qualitative Impact Descriptors (ERS Risk Matrix, 2009) 
 
There was a desire to provide a scale of magnitude of impacts that allowed a comparison 
between different types of risk (i.e. reputation and operations). Although this provided a 
framework for impact categorisation, there was still opportunity for subjective biases, for 
example “sustained” versus “extensive” was not defined, and deferred to the decision-maker. 
Further, that although this was represented as an interval scale (cf. Hair et al., 2011), 
analysis demonstrated this was representative of an ordinal scale (cf. Hair et al., 2011). The 
reality was that the category bands were not equal and could be misinterpreted. 
This same risk matrix also qualitatively described the five different ranges of likelihood. This 
reflected Fischhoff’s (2009) discussion of anchoring, that the provision of a reference point 
would alter the individual’s judgement of the situation (section 2.7.11). The individual was 
required to estimate the probability of the event based on these descriptions. ERS provided 
two different bands of probability: a) a full description based on past experience, b) single 
phrase descriptor, see table 5.7. 
  
Reputation  Operations 
Widespread and sustained public media 
attention 
 Site out of service for 2 or more weeks 
Sustained public and media critism [sic] in 
UK 
 Site out of service for between 1 and 2 weeks 
Sustained regional public and media 
concern 
 Site out of service for between 2 days and a week 
Extensive regional public and media 
concern 
 Site out of service for up to 2 days 
Limited local and public and media 
concern 
 Part of site out of service for between 1 and 2 days 
Isolated complaint with no anticipation of 
coverage 
 Part of site is out of service for less than 1 day 
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Table 5.7 Qualitative Probability Descriptors (ERS Risk Matrix, 2009) 
 
This risk matrix exhibited characteristics from the AIMIC (2002), which used a 5x6 matrix to 
value risk, and provides both qualitative and quantitative descriptors. The risk matrix 
provided an understanding of the separation of different impact areas (ERS Risk Matrix, 
2009) for example reputation and operations. In addition to these two risk types, ERS had 14 
further impact areas, for which they provided specific consequential descriptions, for 
example legal impacts, safety impacts and financial impacts. 
Risk matrices were not used in the asset functions. Therefore it was seen that a difference in 
the risk management process existed between service and asset functions in their grading, 
and tools used for grading risks. 
5.3.7 Learning in the System (P1) 
The difference in learning between asset and service functions included: the learning cycle 
and the knowledge repository being built. In service functions, risks were being managed as 
an individual transaction (this is evidenced in the application of the risk register, section 
5.3.1). In asset functions, risks were being managed as a portfolio of threats, which through 
their identification and treatment was reflected in a holistic understanding of causes and 
consequences (section 5.3.1). In doing so, the asset functions attempted to remove the 
subjective valuation of risk, by building a knowledge base of previous issues and individual 
Full qualitative descriptor Single phrase description 
 
Conceivable only in extremely rare circumstances 
 
Almost inconceivable 
Hasn’t happened yet but could conceivably happen 
 
Rare 
Has occurred here or elsewhere albeit infrequently or as an isolated 
event and/or could happen again 
 
Unlikely 
Has happened sporadically on one or more occasions and is likely to 
happen again 
 
Possible 
Happens regularly 
 
Likely 
Frequent event/ ever-present Almost certain 
 
191 
 
component relationships. This had developed a more precise understanding of probability 
(through historical record) and for new risks being recorded; probability of failure was 
automatically valued by the system through documented failure rates (i.e. the failure rate of 
an off-shore transformer). This knowledge developed beyond the company itself and 
extended to data being provided by OEMs (the register would record both the OEM failure 
rates and also the developed understanding through operation of that component).  
In the service functions, learning was inhibited by the transactional nature of the process. 
The history of risk valuations and outcomes was removed from the register on closure of the 
risk (when it became degraded or controlled). This was justified because: 
“No two scenarios are the same, we haven’t got the capability at present to develop a 
long, long term history and understanding inter-dependence of risks” (ERS, Risk 
Analyst). 
Therefore all the knowledge and experience was contained in the staff and their memory. 
This was a weakness in maintaining an organizational history of events and risk 
management, as staff were mobile within the organization and throughout the energy 
sector. This was called “the disturbance of corporate memory” (COO, EAM). 
5.3.8 Performance Systems (P2) 
EGEN had a complex and detailed set of measures within the performance system. They 
used a traffic light34 presentation, year to date and month to previous year month 
comparison. However none were explicit of risk targets. 
Calandro and Lane (2006) suggested that a risk scorecard may be used to performance 
manage the risk management process (section 2.9.7). However, the use of risk scorecards 
was not evidenced in any of the cases. Further, there was no evidence of BSCs (Kaplan & 
Norton, 2000) or Performance Prisms (Neely & Adams, 2000) being used in the asset 
                                                             
34 Traffic light presentation is the use of red, amber and green to denote bad, indifferent and good. In both cases this 
is an accepted format. 
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functions. Instead the performance management process was being conducted through a 
collection of measures and targets in organizational statements and individual’s objectives. 
In service functions there was evidence of some “Scorecard like adaptations in use…” 
(Manager, FRET).  
Group/ Organizational Objectives: 
Asset managers felt that their smaller working groups (by virtue of plant production teams) 
needed less attention to presentation format:  
“they understand their contribution to overall success of the operation, and just need 
some simple data to inform that decision” (Manager, EAM)  
Performance reports were limited in direct reference to risk, (as seen in exhibit 1). In EAM 
specific measures based on production and LTI (lost time injuries). Exhibit 1 was the 
“dashboard” placed in the entrance hall, refreshed on a weekly basis to inform staff of 
performance, it contained only three measures (YTD LTI: Year to date, lost time injuries).  
 
Exhibit 1: (EAM target results, Renewable Plant) 
In service functions, managers and analysts did not feel they had any explicitly risk-based 
objectives; they were measured by outcomes delivering broader business objectives. In both 
cases operational managers felt there was a difference when adopting risks personally. 
Examples of objectives used in service functions included: 
“Deliver the EBIT target of [x]% in 2011” (FRET) 
“Maintain call centre availability at an average of 98% availability in month” 
(FRET) 
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Individual Objectives: 
There were individual objectives being used to supplement group objectives. There were 
limited differences exposed between functions. They were contingent on the individual’s 
past performance, their role and varied in the language used. There were limited examples 
observed that were attributable to risk management, for example: 
“Demonstrate you have documented, recorded and assigned threats to safety 
and environment that you observe in your role and as a member of the [team]” 
(Individual objective, EAM).  
This related to identification process in the risk management cycle. 
“Demonstrate your upholding and support of Rule One: We don’t hurt anyone” 
(Individual objective, ERS).  
This related to identification, analysis and treatment of risks. 
It could be seen from these examples that risk measures were being expressed as measures 
of past performance. In service functions there were no individual or organizational 
measures explicit of risk targets. This reinforced the implicit nature of risk management 
being performance managed. 
5.3.9 Options and Decisions (R1) 
Senior managers in asset functions were considering proximity of risks as they allocated 
capital funds in mitigation treatment; this was regardless of organizational adoption of the 
COSO standard that advocates the use of proximity as a dimension of risk. Managers were 
using risk valuations as statements of precision. However recognising the complexity of the 
environment and making relative decisions on priority, pragmatic decisions were being 
made on which risks attracted investment. This highlighted the role of individual 
experience. 
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Having broken down risks into different time horizons and adopting a portfolio approach to 
risk prioritization, treatment of risks in asset functions was controlled and scheduled; there 
was limited time pressure. When asked how an unexpected risk gets funded for treatment, 
asset representatives believed: 
“it is an uncommon scenario where you see unidentified risks materialising. Sometimes 
we misjudge the probability but this feeds back into the asset register for future 
calculations… there is expectation of having identified all risks, where we haven’t any 
response then comes out of the operational budget, although an overspend on risk 
treatment is rarely criticised.” (Risk Analyst, EAM).  
In service functions there was greater articulation of managing the risk as a portfolio 
including both upside and downside risks. There was evidence of hedging practices 
(selection of inversely correlated market positions, for example the supply and purchase of 
green energy certificates). Furthermore in the service function, individual managers were 
making decisions on risk treatments independently. These decisions occurred in isolation to 
knowledge of wider system or related risks. Therefore, this was not an integrated practice, 
as advocated by ERM standards. Managers demonstrated a limited understanding of risk 
proximity, instead decisions were based on, “do we, and can we afford to treat the risk?” 
(Operations Manager, FRET). Instead, service functions felt that by not treating a risk 
(acceptance), a positive gamble was made, avoiding an operational cost. 
This transactional and isolated treatment of risk was symptomatic of risk management 
being reactive and short-term. Managers in ERS and FRET described operations managers 
as highly pressured and forced into making “not thought through” decisions, because of both 
the volume and time criticality of decisions they were faced with. In response, these fast or 
immediate decisions were reflected on as the benefit of having experienced operations 
managers:  
“…they use gut instinct, with many scars from previous decisions, you aren’t a proven 
manager unless you have a few scars to show…” (Operations Manager, ERS).  
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In service functions, the explanation of risk mitigation choices showed less use of calculated 
and considered methods, that the decision-making strategies were highly localised and 
selective in nature. This could be described with reference to Payne et al.’s work (1988), that 
discrete decisions in asset functions conformed to weighted additive or MCD strategies in the 
absence of time pressure. Whereas, in service functions, satisficing (i.e. decisions meeting 
the requirement regardless of optimality) or lexicographic decision strategies (i.e. where a 
single decision criteria is being used, ignoring other variables), were employed.  
5.3.10 The Risk Manager’s Role (R2) 
Risk managers were employees with authority to deploy resources in controlling risk. The 
difference in authority appeared pronounced between senior and middle managers. All 
organizations had named risk analysts, who were considered as risk managers. This was a 
stretch of the definition as in service functions the risk managers did not control any 
resources other than in the reporting of risk.  
However in these risk manager roles, a difference was exposed between asset and service 
functions. In the service functions, there was no pre-requisite training or education that was 
required to hold this position. It was seen as a junior role (non-managerial grade), and 
largely administrative in function; these would have been better described as reporting 
administrators. The role was based around the collection, aggregation and presentation of 
the vast registers of risks. They were tasked to chase the appropriate managers for updates 
on risks and treatments being employed. They did not add any professional oversight or 
analytical experience to the task. In both service organizations the analysts seemed focused 
on the next board or oversight report and an accurate and usually “easy on the eye” 
(Manager, FRET) presentation of the risks. In risk oversight meetings, they offered a 
minimal background to the risks when challenged and then operated as the conduit 
between the oversight group and the responsible manager in conclusion of the query or 
issue. 
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In the asset functions risk analysts, were considered “risk professionals”; they were able to 
deploy resources and make investment decisions. These were experienced engineers or 
asset managers, that had through selection, (and in the case of EAM had passed a 
challenging exam35) been awarded a coveted role as a risk manager. Several of these roles 
were then extracted from operational (or specific plant) activities and brought into the 
central functions. Instead of administering the risk register they operated as an internal 
point of expertise to the level of accuracy in the risk assessment, and had a strong role to 
play in the selection of the risk treatment. Their involvement in the risk oversight meetings 
was as a critical consumer of the risk reports. Their influence on the senior members of the 
organization (both EAM and EGEN) was substantial, and usually the only point where 
system grading of a risk was over-ruled. On cross-examination in the oversight meetings 
these risk managers would have the full detail (Performance Review meeting, EAM), and 
would be expected to represent the risk in fine detail, without having to refer to the 
operational managers. Because of this the operational managers gave “open door and 
priority access” (performance Manager, ERS) to these risk managers who were seen as a 
major point of resolution and access to special capital for treatment of the risk.  
The risk managers in asset functions (especially EGEN) were able to influence the 
operational and senior managers to ensure that appropriate objectives were in place across 
the teams. Therefore the operational managers felt there was a clear relationship between 
the use and availability of risk registers, valuation routines and risk oversight meetings and 
the role of the risk managers.  
A difference can therefore be drawn between service function risk administrators 
(administering the process), and asset function risk managers (deploying resources and 
adding specialist knowledge to the process). 
                                                             
35 In the case of EAM these roles had a salary grade increase and a special duty payment in their time in the 
function. 
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5.4 Function-Level Discussion 
The function-level exposed a difference in the risk management, complementary to the firm-
level. There was “an engineering core” (HoAM, EGEN) in asset functions36. There was limited 
movement across the organization. The engineering backgrounds in common between asset 
function staff, was a strong influence in the convergence of perception seen in the asset 
functions, as the language and methodologies employed were consistent with one another.  
In contrast in service functions, staff identified their high mobility between organizations 
and sectors. Therefore there was great volatility in roles and authority lines. 
A major difference between functions was the level of development and integration of risk 
systems.  The asset risk systems were embedded in existing software and process. Staff did 
not separate processes between managing risks or managing the operation, this was 
integrated. In service functions this seemed less mature; there was limited integration in 
risk processes or systems with operations functions. The risk register in service functions 
was a “stand alone excel spread sheet”, managed intermittently as a secondary role of an 
analyst. This was still a legitimate medium for controlling risk (Panko, 2006), however was 
seen as less mature than the embedded nature and knowledge developing approach seen in 
the asset functions. 
There appeared a complexity in risk management decisions, not fully explained in literature. 
This difference in decision process informed the group-level analysis, which seeks a 
representation of the mental models held by managers and their collective groups (group 
selection is discussed in the next chapter). Service functions took each risk on a 
transactional basis, meeting or failing a hurdle for being allocated capital. All capital spends 
on managing service risks were seen as “Opex” (Operational Expenditure), an additional cost 
on the business. Perceptions were different in the asset functions. Risks were seen as 
engineering challenges occurring as part of the standard operational process. Asset 
                                                             
36 Plants are the term used to describe power/gas stations and associated engineering locations. 
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managers looked at risk treatment as investment in plant or operation (perhaps because 
there was physical evidence of investment), but these decisions were made as part of a 
portfolio.  
Each case evidenced use of performance management systems. Asset functions extensively 
used wall-board performance updates, these included a few important measures against a 
target. Service functions relied heavily on the collection of performance data, but this was 
aimed at the management teams. Interpretation of performance measures and response to 
them was considered a task for individual managers. 
Generally, the performance system and the risk management process seemed to exist in 
independence from one another, there was little evidence of risk measures being embedded 
in targets and the risk was independent of other performance systems. However, the risk 
register and asset register were intrinsic to one another. 
Table 5.8 summarises the different findings between service and asset functions. As there 
was convergence in understanding between EAM and EGEN and separately ERS and FRET, 
these case specific findings are consolidated to represent an asset and service perspective.  
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Table 5.8 Summary of Function-Level Analysis  
 
ERS and FRET (service) were similar in the themes emerging from the analysis. EAM and 
EGEN (asset) also demonstrated similarities. However the asset and service functions 
differed from one another. Although different on many levels, the points of note are: 
- The asset functions used embedded risk management systems, to record, value and 
maintain in perpetuity data on risks. The service functions used manually valued, 
Category Sub-category Asset (EAM/EGEN) Service (ERS/FRET) Comments/ 
Literature 
Character Operating model Multiple assets, 
standardised and simple 
operating model 
 
Complex operating model  
Risk systems Software Asset management software, 
module integrated 
 
Spread sheet  
Data archive In-perpetuity Removed at end of cycle 
 
 
External data OEM (feedback loop) 
 
None  
Description of process 
 
Iterative Transactional  
Risk amnesty  No Yes Service functions 
regret having run 
risk amnesties 
Valuation Assessment Objective, inherent in 
system, use OEM data 
 
Subjective, internal 
knowledge only 
Power (2005) 
Treatment Mediated by expert opinion 
– portfolio approach 
In independence, qualitative 
idealism to meet “hurdle 
rates” 
 
 
Types of risk Safety, Engineering and 
Environmental 
 
Multiple-types financially 
converted 
 
Treatments Budget 
 
Special budget OPEX  
Default 
 
Mitigation Acceptance  
Perceptions Authority defines availability of treatment 
 
 
Financial valuation Aids selection of treatment Defines the requirement for 
treatment cost 
 
 
Consequences of 
treatment 
Investment Cost  
Grading Approach As a portfolio each 
considered 
Selected by criteria through 
breaching boundaries 
 
 
Presentation 
 
Red, amber, green Risk matrix  
Filtering None observed Defined by boundary 
 
 
Learning System Corrective at individual risk 
level 
 
Corrective at portfolio level Argyris & Schon 
(1988) 
Developed through system 
history 
 
Reliant on individuals  
Individuals Part of the profession  
 
Only for senior staff  
Performance 
Systems 
Type 
 
Few measures BSC (amended)  
Approach 
 
Behaviour Outcome Agency Theory 
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and transactional risk registers. Data on these systems was removed after the risk 
has expired. This drove many of other differences at the function-level, which 
included the loss of learning opportunity, the failure to manage risks as a set of 
interconnected risks and lack of expertise being developed in risk analysts; 
- The budgets used for risk treatment in asset functions came from special revenue 
budgets. These are budgets were reserved for the development and improvement of 
operations in direct response to risk. This opened up the treatment of risk to be 
perceived as investment. In service functions, risk treatment came from the 
operational budgets. This meant that risk treatment was a cost to the operation, and 
required a diversion of capital from another source; 
- Risk managers in the asset functions were experts. They were senior engineers or 
project managers that through a proven track record controlled, challenged and 
championed issues through the risk management process. In service functions these 
risk managers were administrative in nature, providing limited ownership and 
expertise in the process. 
5.5 Integrative Discussion (Firm & Function) 
The firm-level analysis showed limited differences between cases, with similar perspectives 
and structures. At firm-level the market seemed to influence perspectives of risk. 
Furthermore, the firm-level analysis identified one distinguishable difference between the 
firms in their adoption of risk management standards (COSO ERM in FCORP and informal 
ERM adoption in GRS). 
At the function-level, differences between service and asset functions were pronounced. 
Within the analysis, several theories/concepts were recognised as providing distinction 
between the asset and service functions, including: Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005), ERM 
Ideal Types (Mikes, 2009) and Decision Strategies (Payne et al., 1988; Pennington & Tuttle, 
2007): 
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Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005): It appeared that the asset function was calculative 
idealist, and service was a calculative pragmatist, because asset functions had invested in 
developing objective valuation systems, based on previous historical data, and used this to 
inform their valuation. Service functions had developed an appraisal of the risk/s based on 
subjective opinions, with some indications of predictive values of impact, demonstrating a 
pragmatist approach to valuation. There was a discrepancy, as typing of culture at the 
analysis phase did not provide a full description. In the overt decision-making process (the 
treatment phase), this categorisation reversed. Asset functions demonstrated a pragmatist 
culture, increasing the value of expert opinion and subjective account, reducing the focus on 
the numbers. Service functions demonstrated an idealist culture in rigorous adherence to 
the numbers (which were derived subjectively) in forming a decision on treatment. This 
change ignored the subjective basis of the risk measures and incorrectly assumed a 
precision in the numbers advocated by the idealists. Table 5.9 summarises this change in 
calculative culture. 
Table 5.9 Function-level Calculative Cultures 
 
ERM Ideal Types (Mikes, 2009): The discrepancy in calculative cultures is understood 
through the ERM ideal types. Asset functions demonstrated a Type 3: Risk based 
management, with risk valuation embedded in understanding the value of its business. 
Service functions were less easily categorised, but demonstrated characteristics of Type 1: 
Risk silo management, with a fixation on quantification; but yet to implement any robust tool 
e.g. VaR. 
At the firm-level, different ERM ideal types appeared as subtle differences in the Holistic 
Management Type (although there were differences in intention, see section 4.3). However 
 Asset Service 
Calculative Culture at 
Identification and Analysis 
Idealist Pragmatist 
Calculative Culture at 
Treatment selection 
Pragmatist Idealist 
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this had changed at the function-level and the individual risk management types in the 
function were pronounced. Importantly functions seemed to converge on different types 
and stable in their classification. This was a major change between the findings in firm and 
function-levels. 
Decision Strategies (Payne et al., 1988): At the function-level, there were different decision 
strategies being used between functions. This is evidenced by the arguments being 
delivered during the oversight meetings, for example:  
1) The service functions, whilst appearing pragmatic, hid imprecision in analysis through 
explaining the need to take a specific course of treatment; this was a pre-determined 
investment approval process. The service functions exhibited selection and treatment 
on a single financial attribute, and this decision was made on achieving a hurdle rate, 
this exhibited a satisficing strategy, which is a non-compensatory decision strategy 
(Payne et al., 1988). It was not known whether this was a response (i.e. a coping 
strategy, Pennington & Tuttle, 2007) to information load and time pressure, or a 
deliberate selection of approach. 
2) The asset functions appeared quantitatively driven, exposing the full analytical process 
and explaining why the different treatments were considered, excluded and why final 
choices were made. Payne et al. (1988) describe this: the asset functions appeared to be 
weighting the different attributes being considered, this was a compensatory decision 
strategy.  
Research at the firm-level analysis highlighted four points for further investigation, these 
are summarised in table 5.10: 
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Table 5.10: Summary of findings and questions from firm-level analysis 
 
These questions carried forward from the firm-level analysis are discussed in turn: 
Permeation of risk management standards: 
There was no evidence in the transmission of risk management standards into the business 
units. There was awareness of the standards; however there were no choices of process 
design or classification based on either COSO ERM (FCORP) or ERM (GRS). Therefore risk 
management standards were a mechanism residing in the corporate function, and were a 
firm-level decision. It suggested that if adoption of a formal standard were removed there 
would be no material change in the risk management process at function-level. 
Differences in risk management perspective: 
At the firm-level the different business units were operated as a portfolio, bringing different 
market risks and different operating risks. In the business units there was a change from the 
use of vertical integration (as a firm-level risk management strategy) toward a management 
of specific risks; and in the case of asset functions, management of risks was a set of inter-
dependent threats. For example, within the firm a risk position was hedged between the 
generation and retail functions, with backed volumes of production and supply37. This had 
changed with the decoupling of generation and retail and the interaction of trading 
                                                             
37 This meant that whether wholesale or retail became profitable, the market returned profits to the company. 
 Firm-level finding Question carried forward into 
function-level 
1 Risk management standards are being 
applied differently between firms. 
There appeared no material impact 
from this difference. 
How does the risk management 
standard permeate into the business 
units? 
2 Risk submissions from the firm’s 
business units differ in their 
perspective. 
What are the differences in perspective 
between the business units to risk 
management? 
3 The firms exhibit different risk 
management ideal types (both current 
and future intention) 
Is the firm’s risk management ideal 
type exhibited in the business units? 
4 There are consistent descriptions of 
risk in the firms (based around four 
types). These are understood by the 
managers. 
Does the firm’s description of risk 
permeate into the business units? 
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functions in the centre of the market; whereas, in a business unit (i.e. FRET) a risk was 
managed in isolation of its impact on the firm’s performance. 
ERM Ideal Types: 
The research showed that risk management ideal types did not permeate through the 
organization. The firm-level analysis demonstrated the ability to categorise the firm’s risk 
management type. However the firm’s risk management type did not reflect in the business 
units. There were strong and different characteristics seen in service and asset functions. It 
was unexpected to see the different functions between cases converging. This provided an 
indication that it was the nature of the operation that derived the risk management ideal 
type and not the firm. 
Descriptions of Risk: 
The descriptions (and the understanding) of the different risks types demonstrated 
consistency across all firms and business units. However there was different risk types 
being managed in asset functions compared to service functions.  Asset functions discussed 
environmental, production and safety risks, whereas service functions discussed financial, 
reputational and legal risk. This indicated that there were different weights attached to each. 
These different weights were based on importance to each function. This inferred a 
potential for bias, as explained by Hsee and Hastie (2006). It was not clear whether this bias 
was a projection of memory or beliefs. 
Summary: 
It seemed that difference between functions is independent of individual firms. Asset 
functions show similarities and service functions show similarities, but within firm the 
differences between asset and service functions were distinct. It was unclear whether there 
was a normalisation between firms through transmission of ideas between the two service 
functions or two asset functions, which would explain this similarity. Service functions 
competed with one another and had clear legal separation in the retail markets. In asset 
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functions, the only point of sharing was use of common OEM providers; this would not be 
enough to influence the business’ risk management process. 
Within the function-level there has been a dichotomy of risk perspective and management 
influences emerging from the analysis (either characteristic of a service or asset 
organization). However there were clear examples (i.e. example of offshore wind risk 
treatment) that demonstrated potential differences between populations of manager and 
their perspectives on risk management. Furthermore, the function’s culture and processes 
did not explain fully the influence that performance systems had on the management of risk. 
Specifically two questions emerged from the function-level analysis: 
- How does the difference between levels of managerial seniority influence the risk 
management decision process? (see section 5.4), or 
- What is the impact of an individual’s experience and beliefs on the selection of risk 
treatment? 
Therefore reflecting the difference between management levels and the observation that 
function orientation was an influence on the risk management process, the frame of 
reference moves to a segmentation of management level, whilst maintaining function 
separation. The focus of research moves away from the structures and organizational 
process and takes greater consideration of decisions and the paths in decisions. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Group-Level Analysis 
Chapter Six builds on the firm and function-levels of analysis. It expands to a new level of 
analysis (the group-level). At this point, the process of systematic combining includes 
thematic analysis with causal mapping to understand the manager’s mental models and 
perspectives. It results in four group causal maps and quantitative analysis of these maps. 
Arguably the use of causal mapping is a continuation of the case study approach (cf. 
Nadkarni & Shenoy, 2004), but a difference in analytical approach.  
The research at the firm and function-levels showed that there were differences between 
service functions and asset functions in their perceptions and management of risk. There 
were differences in the risk systems being used, and different approaches to risk valuation 
dependent on function. However the path to selecting risk treatment was not yet 
understood in the context of the performance system. Furthermore there was an indication 
that managerial seniority (presumed authority) and the individual’s experience and beliefs 
influenced the decision-making process. The group-level analysis seeks an understanding of 
these gaps in understanding. 
The use of causal mapping as the means of analysis was influenced by:  
1. The experience in the function-level analysis, showing that the understanding of 
treatments were consistent between managers. But the influences on this decision 
were fundamentally different (section 5.4);  
2. The concepts being explored in progressing from the function-level had narrowed, 
and the journey (path of decisions) was identified as being critical to the 
understanding of how the risk managers might be influenced through performance 
systems.  
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3. Causal mapping is an exploratory method (cf. Akkermans et al., 1999; Wilk & 
Fensterseifer, 2003), and relevant to nascent theory development (Edmonson & 
McManus, 2007:1160).  
In analysing the group-level, there is a focus on the decision influences, and understanding 
the complex paths of decisions. This was achieved through a process of interview, to gather 
the rich accounts of managers and their perspectives of risk, and represented as causal 
maps, using a process of causal mapping (cf. Huff, 1990).  
The structure of Chapter 6 begins with a return to literature, to reconcile the organizational 
and managerial view of risk. Next, the method section outlines considerations, challenges 
and analytical approaches used in causal mapping. This continues to discuss the research 
strategy being applied in the group-level analysis; including the sample frame, the approach 
to data collection and the techniques used for analysis. Next, the results and analysis are 
conducted in parallel, using qualitative and quantitative techniques. The chapter concludes 
in two levels of discussion: 1) Discussion of the group-level results, and 2) An integrative 
discussion reflecting on the firm and function-levels of analysis. 
6.1 Reconciling the Organizational and Managerial View of Risk 
At the firm and function-level there has been an assumed role of performance systems. In 
the literature review (section 2.8) it was found that no single model or framework either 
theoretically or empirically informs the relationship between performance systems and 
selection of risk treatment. If the selection of a treatment is considered a discrete and 
rational decision (cf. Chater & Oaksford, 2000), the performance system should be the only 
mediating influence on the analysis and selection of treatment (as was expected by the firm) 
on the specific context of a risk. This theoretical relationship is outlined in figure 6.1. If 
objective then the biases and beliefs held by the manager would not influence this decision.  
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Figure 6.1 Simplified Risk Management Decision Process 
Following the firm and function-levels of analysis, the research showed that the market 
derives some of the types and classifications of risk (i.e. credit risk), the types of risk being 
experienced (i.e. environmental risks), the risk management standards adopted (in the firm-
level analysis did not significantly alter the process of risk management or communication, 
for example the adherence to COSO ERM or informal use of an ERM standard), and 
specialised language being used (reflecting the specification of the standard, e.g. velocity and 
proximity of risk). The greatest influence was seen at the function-level, whether an 
operation was an asset or service function, this included influences on volume of risks being 
identified and managed, systems being used for risk control, and valuation approaches to 
risk.  
The integrative performance system model (section 2.8.7); reflected the functional view of 
the performance system, it assumed a bi-directional formation of strategy. That strategy is 
influenced both by a bottom-up process, as well as a top-down process. This is reflected in 
the design of the group-level analysis, which separates different communities of managers 
in the design of its sample. The next section highlights the different perspectives of risk that 
may be taken. 
The level of significance or magnitude of a risk will affect the perception of the risk, whether 
it has strategic or operational impact. This may produce differential approaches to decision-
making (Ritchie & Brindley, 2004). Different levels within the organization will have 
different thresholds and attention to levels of risk (Nocco & Stultz, 2006).  
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Companies are in business to take “strategic and business risk” (Nocco & Stulz, 1996:9). A 
financial perspective: market and credit risk management has been the focus of strategic 
decision-making; and that this is strategic risk taking (Baird & Thomas, 1985). This infers 
that risk decisions can be strategic, but does not isolate where risk is strategic. Operational 
risk management is as an issue of protecting the organization from loss (Power, 2005). This 
is where people, process and systems (Basel Committee, 2006) are the source of failure. The 
Basel definition specifically excludes “strategic risk” (see section 2.4.1). Disruption risk 
literature demonstrated a development of operational capability as being critical to effective 
treatment (Sodhi, 2005). However operational capability is a consideration for operations 
strategy (cf. Juttner et al., 2003). Therefore, even if Operational risk excludes strategic risk 
(as stated in the Basel Committee definition, 2006), the consideration and management of 
operations risk can still be strategic. 
A different perspective on the same problem is presented by Crouhy et al. (2006), that 
strategic risks can be considered either: Operational Strategic Risks (OSR), or Operational 
Failure Risks (OFR). This differentiates whether risks are endogenous (internal to the 
organization, i.e. failure in business process) or exogenous (external to the organization). 
 
Figure 6.2 Operational Strategic Risks and Operational Failure Risks 
Operational Strategic Risk
(External Influences)
Operational Strategic Risk
(External misalignment)
Operational Failure Risks
(Failure in PPS)
Operational Failure Risks
(Failure in business process)
can lead to
can lead to
A. Relationship between OSR and OFR adapted 
from Crouhy et al 2001
B. Proposed alternate view of relationship between 
OSR and OFR (author)
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The model presented by Crouhy et al. (2001), may be reversed. Logically Operational Failure 
Risks can lead to Operational Strategic Risks; endogenous risks can cause external 
misalignment, itself a strategic risk.  
It seems that the term strategic is used to denote both the type of decision as well as the 
significance of the risk. Strategic risk in the sense of significance appears to be a description 
of an impact that has long-term and high value. Strategic risk taking (the type of decision) 
appears to be a decision that has a long-term perspective and considerate of the capabilities 
of the organization as a whole (cf. Kaplan & Mikes, 2012). For risk, this may be statement of 
risk appetite. Statement of risk appetite is outlined as a requirement in COSO (2010), where 
risk appetite has been commonly articulated as the strategic statement of risk in an 
organization (Davies & Haubenstock, 2002; Davies et al., 2006; Kumar & Persaud, 2002).  
When performance managed, information symmetry (the imbalance of information between 
parties) impacts risk management decisions (Yang et al., 2009) and perception of risk 
appetite, (the desire to personally or organizationally take on risk, cf. Davies et al., 2006; 
Davies & Haubenstock, 2002; Kumar & Persaud, 2002). 
This provides a justification for differentiating between managers that are privileged to 
strategic decision-making and those that are by their position in the organization focused on 
operational decision-making. This distinction informs the design of the sample frame 
(section 6.3.1). The remainder of the chapter continues by outlining the method of causal 
mapping, defining the sample and analysing the results, before concluding with a discussion 
of results. 
6.2 Method: Causal Mapping 
When researching risk management, perception of risk is paramount, as it is understood to 
be highly subjective (Slovic, 1964). This was evidenced in the function-level analysis. In turn 
this leads me to look at the belief sets influencing treatment selection. Causal mapping was 
used in project management studies to expose the underlying belief sets and therefore the 
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risk decision processes (Edkins et al., 2007; Maytorena et al., 2004; Williams et al., 1997), 
and provides a precedent to the use of the method.  
Application of the causal mapping approach is popular in the investigation of individual’s 
and group’s cognitive models (Axelrod, 1976; Hodgkinson et al., 2004; Huff, 1990). Causal 
mapping is a family of techniques for representation and elicitation of individual’s beliefs 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2004; Wilk & Fensterseifer, 2003). Consistent with the Critical Realist 
paradigm, causal mapping is undertaken to expose the cause – effect relationships; what 
Bhaskar (2008) would term generative mechanisms. Causal mapping is a term used 
interchangeably with cognitive mapping when used to discuss the mapping of perceptions 
and beliefs; this is the creation of causal maps based on subjective accounts. In undertaking 
causal mapping (of cognition) participants are presented a set of interview questions 
relating to pre-defined variables (cf. Hodgkinson et al., 2004). In this research the 
performance system functions and the risk types and treatments derived through literature, 
and are used to represent the variables.  
The causal mapping method is a positivistic analysis technique, which through a degree of 
procedural convention (Ackermann et al., 1992), commonality in output (Langfield-Smith, 
1992) and integration of collection and analysis provides a structured method for analysis 
without losing the richness apparent in qualitative data. It is this richness that offers 
extreme value in researching matters that are not necessarily observable (Godfrey & Hill, 
1995). However a problem with qualitative data is the large data sets it provides, it is 
difficult to find a structured way in which to analyse the data. There is a relative richness of 
data, but there is a lack of accepted rules for processing it (Hodgkinson et al., 2004). Causal 
mapping has greatest power when pictured in graphical format (Axelrod, 1976). The map is 
the visual representation of an individual or group’s belief systems; and representation of 
their mental models (Ackermann et al., 1992:2), for example in structured problem solving 
(Wilk & Fensterseifer, 2003) or to provide structure for handling and analysing large 
volumes of documentary data (Ackermann et al., 1992).  
212 
 
Where causal maps are created, they require coding and the original language kept as 
accurate record of an individual’s beliefs. To make comparison within and between 
respondents, involves increased treatment and exposes the risk of interpretation, as the 
coding and aggregation of accounts. This aggregation is completed through a cycle of coding. 
A first cycle of coding, is done to maintain as much of the original language used by 
participants as possible, selecting repeated concepts between participants, separating the 
data source into ideas. These ideas may be a single phrase or sentence (Ackermann et al., 
1992). These concepts are noted and impact recorded where there is a relationship between 
ideas (nodes), the relationship (arc) is analysed, identifying where nodes are cause or affect. 
This may be developed into a matrix (cf. Kelly, 1988). A matrix provides a basis for 
quantitative study, building the strength of perceived relationship within a frame; it can be 
used to identify conflicts within the models. The convention (Ackermann et al., 1992) 
suggests that in final presentation, goals are positioned on the map’s right and the process is 
worked back from goals to strategic directions and finally to potential options. To reduce the 
modeller’s subjective interpretation the original language used in the transcript should be 
retained as far as possible (Ackermann et al., 1992). 
The strengths of visually mapping of the model are the order and visual representation that 
can be derived from rich data. It allows for new terms, concepts and descriptions to be 
introduced that were originally outside of the researcher’s a-priori knowledge (Daniel et al., 
2003). The method is flexible, ranging from individual to group participation (Suwignjo et 
al., 2000), and allowing aggregation or averaging of individual’s results to create a group 
vision (Langfield-Smith, 1992). At this point of group modelling the results yield some of the 
most insightful views, where differences and similarities in population beliefs can offer 
theoretical development; however it is the grouping of models that generates the greatest 
contention in method and in interpretation, as it is subject to researcher bias. 
Group models are understood to be a good representation of the cognitive processes 
occurring within the group, but may not be a representation of an individual’s mental model 
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(Hodgkinson & Clarkson, 2005); it highlights cultural knowledge, collective belief systems 
and organisational culture in particular as contingent influences, for example: the need for a 
shared map in coherent social groups (McCaskey, 1972), unaligned linkages in supply chains 
(Akkermans et al., 1999), resolving vicious belief circles in manufacturing projects (Williams 
et al., 1995) and deconstructing processes in construction projects (Edkins et al., 2007). 
Studies have shown ability for causal maps to progress onto secondary quantitative data 
analysis, allowing for comparison of group cognitive consensus (cf. Langfield-Smith & 
Worth, 1992; Markoczy & Goldberg, 1995). Their approach advocates a potential to transfer 
causal maps into quantitative data. Caution should be taken when employing quantitative 
analysis as the essence and subtlety of a belief system through a purely numeric 
presentation is lost (cf. Eden, 1992). This approach should be contained to providing a mark 
of comparison between individuals and groups at best, and as a companion to the visual 
maps being presented. It is with this understanding that the research strategy in Chapter 6 
is defined next. 
6.3 Research Method 
The question posed in the group-level summary is how the difference between levels of 
management seniority (designated by their seniority and function in the organization) 
influence on the risk management decision process. Further what is the impact of experience 
and beliefs on the selection of risk treatment? For this phase, the research moved away from 
the alignment to case organizations, and looked at the decision-makers as distinct groups of 
managers; and thus created group-level causal maps. 
6.3.1 Sample Frame 
This is a group-level analysis. The groups are defined through the influence of the function-
level analysis that demonstrated a difference between asset and service functions. This 
separation of function is maintained. A further separation of the sample is sought in the 
management level. 
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Data were collected from two groups of managers as their perspectives on risk as expected 
to be different. The performance management literature suggests that managerial level may 
influence how metrics are understood. Senior managers are less aware of risk exposure than 
operational managers and staff (Simons, 1999:86) and there are potential differences in the 
perception of performance measurement between management levels (Bremser & Chung, 
2006). Further the function-level analysis demonstrated a difference in influences on 
reaching a treatment or control between different groups of managers. This appeared to be 
due to different levels of authority, and potentially different experiences. 
Bremser and Chung (2006) split C-suite (CxO roles) and P-suite (process managers), in their 
study of performance measurement. Unlike Bremser and Chung, this research is not 
restricted to being a sample of executive roles only, and the categorisation in this research 
must incorporate European wide terminology; for example selecting on job names (e.g. 
Director) may not be appropriate. As some of the case organizations are based in German 
systems, where director and managing director (Geschäftsführer & Geschäftsleiter) have 
subtleties that are difficult to control. Instead it is appropriate to look at an approximation of 
personal risk bearing (cf. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998)38.  
For managerial groups a distinction is made: 
S-suite (Senior-suite), senior managers direct the organization, take strategic responsibility 
and direct the company. S-suite maps closely to C-suite roles (cf. Bremser & Chung, 2006). 
In this research, S-suite was identified by the following role titles:39 
1) Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/ Managing Director40 (MD); 
2) Chief Finance Officer (CFO); 
                                                             
38 In one case organization the role title did not have an effective mapping of manager and executive/ director, 
instead there was a local hierarchy: there were ‘A&B level managers’ and ‘C level managers’, in this case the roles 
were clearly banded in organizational responsibility (in organization charts) and following some discussion with 
the Human Resources department the adopted classification could be overlaid.  
39 Individuals already contributing to firm or functional level analysis are excluded from this sample. 
40 The role MD is comparable to CEO in some instances where the organizational unit demonstrates full autonomy, 
and operates as a separate business unit; in the case of FRET (EAM) and ERS (EGEN).  
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3) Chief Operating Officer (COO); 
4) Chief Information Officer (CIO); 
5) Chief Risk Officer (CRO); 
6) Directors (undesignated)/General Managers; 
7) Strategy Manager; 
8) Members of the senior managing team or executive members of the managing board.  
M-suite (Middle-suite), middle managers operate the organization, contribute but not 
deciding on company strategy; similar to P-suite roles (Bremser & Chung, 2006). Individuals 
are process managers generally with staff reporting to them; this includes matrix 
management responsibility. In order to be considered a manager the individual had to 
control some of the company’s resources (i.e. staff or capital budgets). In this research M-
suite included operations, project and asset managers. Therefore M-suite managers are 
considered as operational decision-makers applying the strategic vision; they are 
accountable to S-suite managers.  
Interview Participants 
Interviews were conducted with managers and executives from FCORP and GRS (both 
functions in both cases), lasting between 60 and 90 minutes. A balance between asset and 
service functions units was maintained, with equal contributions from each. Each 
managerial group (i.e. S-suite, service function) was interviewed until concept saturation (cf. 
Nelson et al., 2000; Axelrod, 1976) was achieved.  
Concept saturation is the need to exhaust, to a practical level, the number of new concepts 
being introduced by successive interviews (Nelson et al., 2000). Demonstrating concept 
saturation is a time consuming process when undertaking interview collection in a highly 
distributed sample set (cf. Scavarda et al., 2006) and requires both data collection and data 
processing to occur in near parallel. The practical approach in managing this required for a 
single data collector, who became knowledgeable to the responses, informally recording the 
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number of new concepts introduced at each successive interview. Formal representation of 
concept saturation was demonstrated post completion of the coding phase.   
Although there was potential to interview Risk Managers, (risk managers as defined in firm-
level analysis) they were excluded from the group accounts, as these specialist roles can 
have a strong bias towards calculative idealism, where there is a strong focus on the 
development of quantitative analysis (cf. Mikes, 2009). Rather than control for the variation 
between specialist and generalist risk managers, the latter was sought. The sample frame is 
shown in table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Group Level Analysis Respondents 
 
It was not possible to identify the causal influence at function-level analysis. Reflecting the 
understanding with performance system literature, the link with stated and implicit goals 
was explored (i.e. risk mitigation). In the role of the manager, both the effect that 
performance system places upon them as risk decision-makers, but also how the manager 
cascades the goals and behaviours into their own teams was sought. 
6.3.2 Data Collection 
The approach to causal mapping and creating group maps followed Hodgkinson and 
Clarkson’s (2005) outline: Knowledge elicitation, construction of cause maps, analysis of 
 
 Role EGEN (GRS) ERS (GRS) FRET (FCORP) EAM (FCORP) 
 Number of visits (3 visits) (4 visits) (4 visits) (3 visits) 
S
-s
u
it
e
 
Managing Director 1 1 1 1 
Director/ CxO 1 1 1 2 
CRO 1 1 1  
Plant Manager 3   3 
M
-s
u
it
e
 
Operations Manager 1 2 2  
Programme/ Project 
Manager 
 2 1 1 
Risk Manager   1  
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cause maps and aggregation of cause maps. This defined that individual maps are created, 
coded and developed before aggregation. Using the sample frame (section 6.3.1) this was 
split into four group maps. The process followed eight steps: 
1. Data was acquired through semi-structured interviews (protocol included in Appendix 
C). Interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed; 
2. Transcribed accounts were coded, identifying terms of influence and the subject and 
object of each statement of causality (termed nodes); There are six means of linking 
concepts (Axelrod, 1976): 
 Positive; 
 Negative; 
 No effect; 
 Indeterminate (but non-zero) effect; 
 Not positive; 
 Not negative. 
Huff (1990) supplements this with two further concept links: Equivalence (terms that 
had equal meaning) and Example (statements that were justified through an account). 
These lead to a range of terms indicating influence, for example: but, because, if, so, 
therefore… 
3. The nodes were reduced, to a smaller number of consistently named nodes (Scavarda et 
al., 2006), this was an iterative process, in this case these were three iterations: 
a. Grouping comments based on their subject and action, with minimal change in 
language being used; 
b. Using the node categories based on the performance system nodes (i.e. 
communication or measurement) and risk management nodes (i.e. use of risk 
tools), developed from literature (see table 6.2), highlighting nodes not yet 
aggregated; 
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c. Taking the unassigned nodes and developing a new aggregated description of the 
meaning of the subject; 
4. The coded accounts and their causal relationships (arcs) were entered into a matrix 
(Kosko, 1986), for individual accounts. An example matrix from step 4 is presented in 
figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3 Example Coding Matrix 
5. Individual maps were combined, through the addition of the matrices in the sample. 
Nodes and arcs demonstrating a majority opinion (Bougon et al., 1977) within the 
sample are included in the group map; 
6. The group map was presented as a causal diagram (section 6.4.1); 
7. Individual maps were analysed; 
8. Maps were compared, looking for patterns in mental models between samples. 
There were over 42 hours of recorded (audio) interview41. This was professionally 
transcribed. I conducted all interviews. Only the participant and I sat in the room during the 
interview. Seven of the transcripts were returned to the participant to confirm true and 
                                                             
41 All groups contained at least one female 
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2 Reputation Risk
3 Financial Risk
4 Operations Risk
5 Safety Risk
6 Regulation Risk
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8 3rd Party Risk
9 Legal Risk (DPA)
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11 Strategic Risk
12 Margin/ Credit Risk
13 Project Risk
14 Asset Risk
14.1 Engineering Risk (Type) 1 1
14.2 Behavioural Risk (Type)
14.3 Contract/ Sub-C risk 1
14.4 Environment Risk
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accurate recording and representation of the interview42. Confirmation was received from 
five participants, and no response from two participants (this did not indicate a 
disagreement with the transcription). 
Node Definitions and Descriptions 
The coding approach uses the structure of performance system functions (section 2.9), risk 
treatments (e.g. insurance, section 2.6) and risk types (e.g. reputational risk, as sources). The 
node descriptions are provided in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Node Descriptions43 
 
Continued… 
                                                             
42 The transcription service on occasion, could not understand words being said. Most often this was a case of not 
understanding technical terminology being used. Where this occurred the transcription service time stamped the 
transcription, this was then reviewed, and in nearly all cases the correct terms were inserted. 
43 Table excludes risk types, and risk treatments, these descriptions are consistent throughout the study.  
 
Node Description Characteristic responses/topic 
Performance System Nodes 
Strategy alignment 
(section 2.8.3) 
The strategic statement, vision and 
mission. Includes objectives, 
activities and definition of targets. 
Risk appetite 
Competitive advantage 
Business plan 
Measure (LAG) 
(section 2.8.1) 
Collection and analysis of data. 
Includes type of data, frequency 
and process. 
Plant availability, Lost Time 
Injuries, profit to date. 
Measure (Lead) 
(section 2.8.1) 
Predicted outcomes or trends, 
usually based on forecasts or in 
complex cases models of linear 
regressions. Intra-measure 
analysis of company outcomes  
Communication 
(section 2.8.2) 
Formal distribution of information. 
Presentation of data, including 
communications protocols. 
Control charts 
Corporate report 
Written reports 
Stakeholder meetings 
Control structures 
 
The internal control influence 
within the organization. This is a 
representation of the key internal 
stakeholders, including 
corporate/central control 
mechanisms.  
Audit and compliance 
Corporate risk team 
CEO 
Learning 
(section 2.8.4) 
Activity and structures behind 
learning, development and 
reflection. 
Competitor understanding 
Understanding symptoms 
Critical incident review 
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To confirm suitability of coding and association to node, assignments of individual 
statements were independently reviewed. A research assistant from the business school and 
final year PhD student undertook this review. First they confirmed the nodes, at this point it 
was suggested that Measure (BP) of the Business process (already identified as distinct from 
risk management measures), could be further separated into LAG and LEAD measures. 
Resulting from the coding, it was found that measures in the system could be broken down 
into three different groups44: 
1) Measure as a lag indicator (i.e. Measure of achieved operational performance, Net 
Promoter Scores, number of staff employed even matters such as measures of process 
maturity); 
                                                             
44 This has been done with the knowledge of the resulting reviewer feedback regarding separation of LAG and LEAD 
measures 
Node Description Characteristic responses/topic 
Risk Management Nodes 
Structured decision making 
(Risk management process) 
Structured decision-making 
process, including policies and 
procedures for risk management. 
Identify, assess, treat and control 
cycle. 
Risk Policies 
Treatment authorisation 
Risk prioritization 
Measure (Risk Measures) Collection and analysis of risk data. 
Includes type of data, frequency 
and process.  
Risk value, probability, impact 
(using different consequential 
descriptors) and frequency of 
historical failures (including OEM 
specifications). Impact of past 
failures. VaR 
Risk Tools Use of tools and risk standards, 
systems or risk management 
structures including risk 
committees in managing risk. 
Risk Matrix 
ERM/ ISO310000 
Risk Register 
Other 
Beliefs Role, attitudes and beliefs of 
individuals or groups 
Personal risk aversion 
Value of common sense 
Being professional 
Environment Environment the organization 
exists within, including national 
considerations, market conditions, 
regulated or governed practices 
and influencing legislation. It 
includes representation of the 
external stakeholders. 
HSE executive 
Competitive market 
Regulator 
Licence conditions 
External stakeholders 
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2) Measure of risk, specifically utilizing the term risk or risk measures embedded within 
risk tools (i.e. VaR, RAROC , Equivalent Value (EV), OEM probability scores, volume of 
risks, proximity of risks); 
3) Measure as a lead indicator (i.e. estimations of plant availability). 
Secondly, a sample of nodes were selected (2 for each reviewer), and working back through 
the coding schema, considered the assignment and association of the original statements. No 
conflicts in coding were found at this point. 
Map Aggregation: 
There are two methods of creating a group map, this is a choice between: 
1) An aggregate map (Edens, 1989). It combines all individual maps (without loss) into a 
single representation; 
2) An average map (Bougon et al., 1977). This majority view is where consistent 
relationships are represented as the group map. 
I was originally agnostic about which approach (i.e. average or aggregate) to adopt. I 
considered the benefits of an aggregate map being a full representation of all the different 
paths; however the benefit of the average map became apparent in an early pilot of the 
process. It was shown that a map quickly became un-readable where there are more than 30 
arcs. The average approach is reflective of Hodgkinson and Clarkson’s (2005) view that 
maps will be a good representation of the cognitive processes occurring in the group, even if 
it is not an exact representation of the individual’s mental model. It also provided for a more 
focused analysis between maps in the discussion section. In this research, group causal 
maps are constructed, using an average approach and is reflective of Bougon et al.’s (1977) 
approach. 
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Concept Saturation 
Concept saturation is the demonstration of data collection being complete, by identifying a 
point where no new (or very limited) insight is elicited from sources by further collection. It 
provides a level of confidence that a representative picture is being recorded. This is 
demonstrated by reaching a point of redundancy, it “determines the adequacy of the sample 
size” (Armstrong, 2005:24). Scavarda et al. (2006) in their methodology for constructing 
collective causal maps predicted a geometrical decline in the number of new concepts for 
each respondent.  
The figure below demonstrates development of new concepts through successive 
interviews. All samples found redundancy by the 7th interview. This was fortunate as it 
allowed for balanced samples (i.e. equal numbers of respondents in each group) throughout 
the analysis.  
 
Figure 6.4 Concept Saturation 
In S-suite (service and asset) there was value in developing from 6th through to 7th 
interview. In M-suite, there was less benefit between the 6th and 7th interview. There was not 
the geometrical decline seen, as suggested by Scavarda et al. (2006). 
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6.3.3 Data Analysis 
The causal maps were presented in graphical format at the start of the results section. 
Secondly the maps were quantitatively analysed using three different calculations: 
 Map complexity, a description of the map and its complexity; 
 Map density, a description of the map and its degree of links between each node.  
 Node centrality, a description of a node and relative assessment of its importance in the 
map; 
Map Complexity (MC): 
The Map Complexity Calculation is an original measure to calculate the number of links in 
the map, based on the total number of potential links in a map. Map complexity is based on a 
simplified version of Langfield-Smith and Wirth’s “Formula 12” (1992). This provides an 
indication to the complexity of the map, regardless of the number of concepts being 
presented.  
 
Equation 6.1 Map Complexity 
This calculation returns 1 where a relationship exists between every node, and highly 
complex. It returns 0 where no relationships between nodes exist. This allows for self-
reinforcing arcs to be recognised. 
The difference in complexity score inferred both a difference in detail of mental model. Or it 
identified where extraction of procedural and cognitive detail has not been complete with 
other group models. Nodal complexity calculation occurred post aggregation of individual 
accounts. 
 
               
  
            
 
Where  is the number of arcs and  is the number of nodes 
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Node Centrality (NC): 
Centrality (Armstrong, 2005) is a nodal measure (NC). It is a ratio the number of arcs it has 
against total number of arcs contained in the map. This test has been developed by Knoke 
and Kulinski (1982). The result of 1 for a node would infer that all relationships reflect back 
to a single node. This measure is used to highlight the important nodes in the map. Nodes 
with high centrality scores demonstrate a position in the mental model with high referential 
or influenced links. These become critical points of interest. In application it is these nodes 
that are investigated for their ability to influence the outcome (goals) of the mental model. 
There is a modification in this research that differentiates between nodes that are a central 
influence and nodes that are central outcomes. This differentiates whether a node has 
centrality through virtue of being an influencing force (“Out-degree” Armstrong, 2005), or 
whether it has centrality of being an influenced node (“In-degree” Armstrong, 2005). 
Map Density (MD): 
Map density is a map level measure, it is “the ratio of links between a concept and the total 
concepts in the map” (Armstrong, 2005; Carley & Palmquist, 1992). This works at map level, 
where the calculation is the total number of arcs in the map divided by total number of 
nodes in the map. This is similar to the map complexity calculation; however this gives a 
ratio of nodes to arcs. Where the map density (MD) is greater than 1, this indicates more arcs 
than nodes. This infers that there is an expression of understanding between cause and 
effect between nodes. Where density is less than 1, then there are concepts for which the 
cause or effect is unknown, or the concept is potentially unrelated. The three measures are 
used together to describe the structure of the map. 
6.3.4 Reflection on method 
The process of mapping interviews developed over several months. Initially each interview 
was taken and coded with the intention of creating an individual map of the interview. 
Coding interviews began by breaking each transcription into its constituent parts then 
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linking successive concepts as they appeared. Relationships were described as one of 
Axelrod’s six relationships. Maps were created manually, starting at the centre of a blank A3 
paper. A concept description was used, although for practicality this was an abbreviation of 
transcribed words. Arrow lines were drawn between concepts, and the map continued until 
the end. An early working copy of a hand drawn map is included in figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.5 Example Handwritten Causal Map 
The realization was that the map was a useful by-product, and not the core output. The 
record of paths (arcs) and shared nodes were the main output, which in a final 
presentational layer could be crafted into maps. 
After several interviews were analysed, four issues became apparent.  
a. Because the start of interview and weight/density of concepts contained did not have 
any particular relationship, maps needed linkages across pages and large gaps 
appeared in regions of the map; 
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b. Linkages were complex, where a participant related concepts back to points earlier in 
the interview. The impact of this was that arcs overlapped, and sometimes became 
unreadable/difficult to follow; 
c. There is a space issue and although larger pieces of paper could have been used (with 
the limitations above), the temptation was to abbreviate too far from the words being 
used by the participant. This highlighted an issue that codification and creation of 
relationships should probably be performed in two distinct steps; 
d. As aggregation of different interviews began, it was time consuming45 searching for 
related concepts across large maps. It raised an almost unavoidable potential for 
duplication/omission. This imprecision was intolerable and alternative mapping 
processes are developed. 
In result, a bespoke Microsoft Access (2007) database was used to store, code and create the 
data used for creating the causal maps. The maps were graphically drawn in Microsoft 
Visio46. Using the results from these maps, nodal complexity, density and centrality were 
calculated for group map analysis. 
6.4 Group-Level Results and Analysis 
The group-level are presented as causal maps47and a thematic analysis. In this section 
results and analysis are combined. 
The group maps shown are averaged maps (cf. Bougon et al., 1977), split by asset and service 
functions, S-suite and M-suite, providing a 2x2 sample frame. Each map was created from 
                                                             
45 It was estimated that 1 hour of interview would take 14 hours of transcription and coding, however this was 
found to be almost double using this method. 
46 A number of off the shelf system solutions were investigated. Tools such as Visio, Smartdraw and Decision 
Explorer reviewed. These were largely visual aids, subject to many of the problems associated to the manual process; 
none of them overcoming the potential for omission during aggregation. NVivo 8 was reviewed in depth, with 
vendor training and consultancy from vendor representatives. Although the coding process became more precise, 
with greater ability to associate concepts back to original statements, ability to record (in a directional manner) 
relationships between concepts was limited. It became clear that the method was becoming adjusted to suit the tool. 
47 It is possible to trace back to the individual statements associated to the individual nodes and arcs. Reference is 
made to these statements in Chapter eight. 
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seven interviews48 (see section 6.3.2). Within group maps, there were a number of nodes 
that did not demonstrate a commonly agreed relationship with any other node, (however 
the node exists as a common concept). These floating nodes are not included in the maps; 
they infer no causal force. Floating nodes were included in the map calculations, as they form 
part of the mental model, even though they did not infer a causal relationship. In describing 
the composition of a map three measures were used: 
Significant Nodes: 
The number of nodes per group ranged from 22 to 26. This demonstrated a small difference 
between groups. However, the range of results indicated that there are different 
considerations between groups. Through logic, a higher number of significant nodes 
indicated a greater number of concepts affecting the mental model of the group. 
Arcs: 
Arcs represent the total number of relationships between the nodes in the mental model. 
The number of arcs ranges between 18-27. A higher number of arcs indicated more 
relationships were articulated between nodes.  
Presented Nodes: 
There were nodes in each of the group’s mental models that did not have an established arc 
with any other node, these were called floating nodes. Floating nodes were not presented in 
the maps but were included in calculations, as they did not demonstrate causal force but 
formed part of the mental model. Presented nodes are nodes, which have an associated arc in 
the mental model. The difference between significant and presented nodes, gave an 
indication of how the different concepts were linked in the mental model. The results 
showed the number of un-associated nodes ranged from 3 to 7 nodes. 
                                                             
48 With seven interviews per sample, a majority view required at least four consistent statements 
between nodes for the arc to be represented. 
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Table 6.3 provides a comparison between group maps, highlighting the significant arcs, 
significant nodes and presented nodes. 
Table 6.3 Cognitive Map Summary Nodes and Arcs 
 
Asset M-suite showed the highest number of significant nodes in the group model. However, 
only 70% (18 of 26 nodes presented) of these nodes had relationships with each other. 
Whereas, asset S-suite had a high inclusion of nodes into the model; demonstrating a more 
integrated mental model. In service, there is a corresponding increase between M-suite and 
S-suite. Service S-suite had a more integrated mental model (19 of 24 nodes), than service 
M-suite (15 of 22 nodes). This was not due to decreased types or treatments, but inclusion 
of different influences on the map (e.g. risk tools).  
6.4.1 Causal Maps 
Figures 6.6 (Service M-suite), 6.7 (Asset M-suite), 6.8 (Service S-suite) and 6.9 (Asset S-
suite) present the causal maps. 
 
  
Group Arc Significant Nodes Presented Node 
Service M-suite 18 22 15 
Asset M-suite 24 26 18 
Service S-suite 24 24 19 
Asset S-suite 27 23 20 
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Figure 6.6 service M-suite Map 
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Figure 6.7 asset M-suite Map 
 
 
  
R
e
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
 R
is
k
S
a
fe
ty
 R
is
k
T
ra
n
sf
e
r
R
is
k 
Ty
p
es
R
is
k 
Tr
ea
tm
en
ts
A
ss
et
 M
-s
u
it
e
E
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
 R
is
k
M
it
ig
a
te
R
e
a
c
t
A
c
c
e
p
t
E
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t
L
e
a
d
 M
e
a
su
re
L
e
a
rn
in
g
R
is
k
 M
e
a
su
re
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
d
 R
is
k
 
D
e
c
is
io
n
 M
a
k
in
g
S
tr
a
te
g
y
 A
li
g
n
m
e
n
t
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
S
tr
u
c
tu
re
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
L
a
g
 M
e
a
su
re
B
e
li
e
fs
R
is
k
 T
o
o
ls
d
ec
re
as
es
d
ec
re
as
es
d
ec
re
as
es
d
ec
re
as
es
231 
 
Figure 6.8 service S-suite Map 
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Figure 6.9 asset S-suite Map 
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6.4.2 Map Complexity (MC) and Map Density (MD) 
Map complexity (MC) and density (MD) calculations describe the relationships between arcs 
and nodes.  They are map level descriptions. Section 6.4.1 established the quantity of 
different nodes and arcs, this is a relative calculation within each map.  
Map complexity calculation (0 – no relationships - 1 relationships between every node) 
provides a description of the interconnectedness of nodes within the map.  
 
Equation 6.2 Map Complexity Calculation (author) 
Map density is a different perspective on the same data, representing the ratio between arcs 
and nodes, (e.g. a result of 1.2 suggests for every node there are 1.2 associated arcs on the 
map).  
 
Equation 6.3 Map Density Calculation (Armstrong, 2005) 
Map Density and Complexity are both map level measures. Map Density provides an average 
of ratio between nodes and arcs. Map Complexity, demonstrates the degree of 
interconnectedness.  
  
 
               
  
            
 
Where  is the number of arcs and  is the number of nodes 
 Map density = a / N 
Where a is the number of arc and N is the number of nodes 
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Table 6.4 Map Complexity and Density Results 
 
These results show that there were limited differences in Map Density between the groups 
(1.20 to 1.35) indicating more arcs than nodes49. The Map Complexity results demonstrated 
a moderate difference between M-suite and S-suite maps; with higher complexity in M-suite 
(.140 and .150) than S-suite (.126 and .129). This finds that there were more potential paths 
in the M-suite maps. With a Map Complexity score of .150, this finds there were 15% of 
potential paths in the map expressed.  
6.4.3 Node Centrality (NC) 
Node centrality is a node level measure. For each group the central nodes were presented. 
Further, the nodes of central influence and central outcome affect are identified. The 
difference between central influence (the causal influence in the model) and central 
outcome affect (a centrally affect node) are explained in figures 6.10 and 6.11. 
 
Figure 6.10 Nodes as Central Influence 
                                                             
49 This calculation is performed before removing the floating nodes. 
 Arcs (a) Significant 
Nodes (N) 
(N(N-1))/2 +N Map 
Complexity 
Map Density 
Service M-suite 18 15 120 .150 1.20 
Asset M-suite 24 18 171 .140 1.33 
Service S-suite 24 19 190 .126 1.26 
Asset S-suite 27 20 210 .129 1.35 
 
Central Node
Node
Node
Node
Node
Node
Floating Node
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Figure 6.11, demonstrates where the central node was the central outcome affect. The 
central outcome affect node was the consequence of the other nodes.  
 
Figure 6.11 Nodes as Central Outcome Affect 
This measure was specific to each node in the map. A high centrality score (relative to other 
nodes on the map) indicated the importance of that node in the mental model. Table 6.5 
compares the central nodes for each group. The top result was Structured Decision-Making 
(SD-M); it had the greatest power across all maps.  
Table 6.5 Group Node Centrality Scores 
 
NC*: Node Centrality, this only includes the number of arcs i.e. either incoming (affect) or 
outgoing a specific node divided by the total number of arcs. Top nodes from each group are 
provided in a centrality table.  
Central Node
Node
Node
Node
Node
Node
 Central Node NC * Central 
Influence 
NC * Central 
Outcome 
NC * 
 
Service M-suite SD-M .53 Communications .17 SD-M .33 
Asset M-suite Control 
structures 
Communications 
Learning 
.22 
.22 
.22 
Safety 
Environment 
Control 
structures 
.13 
.13 
.13 
Communications .17 
Asset S-suite Measure (RM) 
Belief 
Control 
structures 
.25 
.25 
.25 
Measure (RM) .17 Financial .13 
Service S-suite Measure (RM) .26 Measure (RM) 
Belief 
.15 
.15 
Control 
structures 
.11 
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This difference between being an influence or outcome was seen in the communications 
node, which in service M-suite was a significant influence node, and a significant affected 
node in asset functions. This analysis demonstrated that there were very different central 
influences on the mental models between groups. However Risk Measures appeared as the 
central node for each function’s S-suite, where it was not central for M-suite. Asset (M-suite 
and S-suite) identified no dominant node, as the top centrality score was shared across 
three nodes. 
Table 6.6 summarises the top 15 nodes and how these compared in usage across maps.  
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Table 6.6 Group Node Summary  
 
Structured decision-making (SD-M)*, was the top node in discussion and linkage. 
Communication, similar to the firm-level analysis is the next major node, there was a 
difference between S-suite and M-suite that communication is an influence in M-suite and a 
outcome affect node in S-suite; this is a major change in understanding within the same 
Node Centrality (NC) 
 
Asset M-
suite 
Asset S-
suite 
Service M-
suite 
Service S-
suite 
SD-M* Node 0.17 0.20 0.53 0.16 
Communication Node 0.22 0.15 0.33 0.21 
Measure (RM) Node 0.17 0.25 0.07 0.26 
Learning Node 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.11 
Belief Node 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.11 
Control structures Node 0.22 0.25 - 0.21 
Strategy alignment Node 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.16 
Environment Node 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.11 
Measure (Lead) Node 0.17 0.20 - 0.16 
Measure (Lag) Node 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.21 
Mitigation Treatment 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.05 
Acceptance Treatment 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.05 
Safety Type 0.17 0.20 - - 
Financial Type - 0.10 0.07 0.00 
Risk Tools Node 0.00 0.05 0.07 - 
Reputation Type 0.06 - 0.07 0.11 
Transfer Treatment 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Engineering risk Type 0.11 0.05 - - 
Portfolio management Treatment - - - 0.11 
Avoidance Treatment - 0.10 - - 
Insure Treatment - - 0.07 - 
Planning risk Type - - - 0.05 
Environment risk Type - 0.05 - - 
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function. The performance management system components (i.e. lead measure) featured 
high in the node table, as did the Belief node. It showed an increasing interest in 
understanding managerial beliefs in the mental models. 
6.5 Group-Level Thematic Analysis 
The data from the interviews were thematically analysed, using the same method as firm 
and function-levels. The thematic categories are summarised below in table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 Inductively Developed Thematic Categories (Group-Level) 
 
Category Thematic 
Category 
Key Terms Characteristic Level 3 responses 
Questions sought: 
What approaches do you employ to achieve these goals? 
What leads you to choose between different approaches in managing risk? 
G1 Decision-
Making 
Structured decision-
making, rationality 
and intuition 
“The criteria for reaching a risk 
response is controlled through the risk 
reporting software” (M-Suite, Asset) 
“No system is going to tell me what 
the right thing is to do, I make 100 of 
these decisions a day…” (M-suite, 
Service) 
G2 Barriers Levels of authority, 
requirement for 
committee approval 
“In order to make this investment [for 
mitigation] I need to seek approval 
through the budget line” (M-Suite, 
Asset) 
“These [outsource] are big, strategic 
decisions, ones that require the 
intelligence and insight of the 
managing board to adjudicate on” (S-
Suite, Service) 
G3 Subjective 
influences 
Reference points, 
subjectivity and 
experience 
“I don’t care what the policy is, I 
experienced the fall out of the last 
death. No policy would have mitigated 
against it” (S-Suite, Asset) 
“The OEM data is always low, over the 
last 5 years we have always improved 
on their stated figures” (M-Suite, 
Asset) 
G4 Environment 
pressure 
Time pressure, data 
quantity 
“The environment moves so fast, it 
isn’t about the optimal choice, but a 
good choice” (M-Suite, Service) 
G5 Decision order Directives, Rules, 
Beliefs, Morality and 
Experience  
“We don’t hurt people, that is our 
mantra… so you can’t be taking risks 
when it comes to safety” (M-Suite, 
Asset) 
 
239 
 
6.5.1 Decision-Making (G1) 
The first of the group-level themes reflected on the way managers perceived their structure 
of decisions.  
Asset S-suite managers reflected on engineering practice and engineering skills, and a high 
value was given to a structured decision process. A decision, regardless of the time pressure 
needed to be methodically thought through, distilling the important influences, but then 
understanding the complexity of the environment to reach an informed decision: 
“The environment we operate within is complex, but actually very stable, this means that 
a methodical approach can be taken to robustly describe the problem being faced. We 
use the experience and knowledge of our engineers to achieve this. This then allows us to 
reach a plan of action in a considered and defendable method” (Asset S-suite). 
Service S-suite managers demonstrated a conscious approach to their complex 
environment, acknowledging the velocity of their environment. In contrast the environment 
was less stable than in generation. The decisions that were made relied less on engineering 
science, but the experience within their management community: 
“The framework we operate within is unhelpful, as it provides limited alignment to the 
reality of what is being faced. So the challenge is to provide a logical development of the 
risk being faced, relating to past issues, experienced both within [the firm] and from 
previous organizations we have worked” (Service S-suite) 
Asset M-suite managers reflected much of their senior colleagues, that the engineering 
discipline had led them to think in structured approach. Further that although they might 
not reach an optimal solution to a problem being faced, they could differentiate between a 
good and bad decision: 
“There is no excuse for making an incorrect engineering decision, but the search for the 
perfect solution may be the difference between days of analysis and months of analysis. 
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The benefits of the perfect solution may be offset by the sheer time it takes me in the 
extended analysis. But to face peer review and challenge means you have to be able to 
articulate the influences on your choices” (Asset M-suite)  
The major difference in the structure of decision-making appeared in M-suite service 
managers, this was justified as a product of the number and speed of the decisions they had 
been facing. It exposed a lack of structure or reasoning, as they were perceived as making 
independent and transactional decisions: 
“You know what is right and wrong, this place moves at a speed that doesn’t benefit 
from or reward a drawn out thinking process. It is like the infantry officer who reacts 
by instinct, and then only at the end of battle reflects on what they have done. Welcome 
to retail.” (Service M-suite) 
It was seen that S-suite managers were consistent in their need and approval of highly 
rational and reasoned decision-making; the levels of investment and complexity of the 
environment requiring, rather than prohibiting, a need for structure. Asset managers 
demonstrated the role of the risk valuation systems as part of this structuring: 
“The criteria for reaching a risk response is controlled through the risk reporting 
software” (Asset S-suite). 
It was seen that the difference in decision-making was a combination of both rationality, 
reasoning and in service (M-suite) the use of intuition. Intuition was explained in asset 
managers as knowledge and experience that was used in broader decision-making. 
6.5.2 Barriers and Treatments (G2) 
The second theme exposed, were the barriers to decision-making. These barriers were 
separated between individual authority (based on seniority or role) and collective authority, 
where the: “Intelligence and oversight of the group is paramount in decisions of this 
magnitude” (Service S-suite). 
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It was perceived that selection of some treatments was a strategic decision, for example: 
withdrawal from a market or operation and the decision to outsource. In these cases it was 
felt that these were decisions taken by executive members of the organization: 
“This is a significant strategic decision to remove ourselves from the marketplace” 
(Service S-suite) 
This was a product not only of the levels of capital being committed but the permanence of 
the commitment. The authority to make these decisions resided in the S-suite and 
sometimes had to be a “decision of executive consensus” (S-suite, FCORP). Therefore the 
decisions to take these risk treatments were not available to the individual managers, 
regardless of seniority. Further there was an understanding of relative cost of treatments:  
“There are basic thresholds where a plant manager needs to seek the approval of the 
managing board” (Asset S-suite) 
The difference in perception between cost of mitigating impact and mitigating probability 
was consistent. Mitigating probability was seen as a cheaper, but more specific treatment for 
example implementing quality control steps in the process:  
“I can make simple low cost process changes, that act as a control to ensure these 
events do not materialise” (Asset M-suite) 
The reduction of event impact was much more organizationally challenging and expensive:  
“in a systems thinking approach, impact reduction is a far more reliable treatment, but 
expensive as it requires greater capital investment” (Service, M-suite).  
These accounts infer an order that impact mitigation is more expensive than probability 
mitigation. The cost of treatment further inferred the level of organizational authority 
needed to reach a decision.  
The costs and permanence of decisions were articulated across the accounts of participants 
in interview. Table 6.8, provides evidence to the main treatments discussed: 
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Table 6.8 Treatment Authority, Cost and Permanence 
 
Treatment Authority Cost  Permanence  
Avoidance Collective 
“This is a significant 
strategic decision to 
remove ourselves from 
the marketplace, and a 
matter for the senior 
management team” 
(Service S-Suite) 
 High 
“The investment made in 
entering a market is 
significant, therefore 
when you decide to 
extract the organization, 
this comes at a significant 
abandonment of 
investment” (Service S-
Suite) 
High 
“The reality is once you 
have come out of a 
market, management and 
shareholders will not 
support a re-entry, it is a 
one-way street” (Service 
S-Suite) 
Acceptance Individual 
“It is within my 
discretion to accept 
Operational risks” 
(Service M-Suite) 
Low 
“Accepting a risk costs 
you nothing, until it all 
goes wrong, where the 
costs can then be very 
high” (Asset M-Suite) 
Low 
“On accepting a risk, I can 
immediately change my 
mind, and decide on 
another action… this is 
sometimes just a holding 
point” (Service S-Suite) 
Insurance Collective/Delegated 
“The framework 
contract for insurance 
is managed by the 
corporate centre, 
however I choose 
which assets to insure” 
(Asset M-Suite) 
Moderate 
“Insurance is about 
reducing the variability 
in paying for failure, but 
the insurance companies 
make their penny, and 
you pay for that also” 
(Service S-Suite) 
Low 
“Insurance lasts as long as 
you renew it, however we 
get lazy and don’t 
challenge what we are 
insuring so the list grows 
rather than being efficient 
in its use” (Asset M-Suite) 
Outsource Collective 
“The decision to 
outsource is made in 
consultation with the 
broader managing 
board” (Service S-
Suite) 
High 
“Outsourcing is an 
expensive choice, it seems 
cheap when you first 
start, but the costs grow 
and grow as time goes on. 
You can mitigate to a 
degree by having a 
Rottweiler of a contract 
manager”  (Service M-
Suite) 
High 
“No-one outsources for a 
year, these are deals 
almost in perpetuity, all 
be it with different 
suppliers. A slight change 
in the market, that has 
seen a few reversals, but 
the reality is once you lose 
the operation it has gone 
for good” (Service S-
Suite) 
Mitigation 
(impact) 
Individual (senior) 
“Designing in 
redundancy is a 
strategic decision, and 
is a fine balance, and 
one I would expect to 
be consulted upon” 
(Asset S-Suite)  
High 
“Designing in redundant 
plant, costs up front, and 
in long-term 
maintenance. Plus 
successive managers look 
at the unutilized plant 
and see it as waste” 
(Asset M-Suite) 
Moderate 
“Once the plant is bought, 
you are committed, you 
can bring it into primary 
production but this is rare 
and sometimes move it 
around the fleet 
depending on the 
component” (Asset S-
Suite) 
Mitigation 
(probability) 
Individual 
“I can make simple low 
cost process changes, 
that act as a control to 
ensure these events do 
not materialise” (Asset 
M-Suite) 
Moderate 
“There is always a cost to 
control measures, but this 
is often hidden. Each 
small addition adds up. It 
is like boiling a frog…” 
(Service M-Suite) 
Moderate 
“I can deploy simple 
process changes quite 
quickly within my 
operation, but as the 
practice permeates across 
the organization, it can 
become harder to modify 
or undo” (Service M-
Suite) 
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The balance between providing authority limits to decisions and the continued ownership 
by M-suite was highlighted as a problematic area, that where a risk or its selection of 
treatment had been escalated to S-suite, M-suite managers lost attachment to the issue: 
“It is somewhat a cathartic activity, where managers refer a decision to me, they also 
feel no long-term responsibility. What they need to understand is that they are the 
owner of the risk, and I operate as a check and balance to the investment being 
requested” (Service S-suite) 
However this view was different in M-suite, finding that the process of presenting a 
treatment decision to either senior management or to managing boards, was a bureaucratic 
exercise. The extended process served to separate them from the risk decision process: 
“Because the notification process is so protracted, the report so inflexible and the 
timescales extended. As soon as I need senior management approval for investment, 
and not forgetting the decision is made behind closed doors, I have very little to do with 
influencing the decision. One day I just get told I either have or don’t have the budget. It 
is much better if I can find another way within my authority to get it done, even if it is 
only a partial solution” (Service M-suite) 
It was seen that there were seniority and collective decision barriers in reaching risk 
treatments. Further that this process was divisive in maintaining lines of ownership. 
6.5.3 Subjective Influences (G3) 
There were a number of subjective influences on the selection of risk treatments. This 
seemed unaffected by the level of formal reasoning in the process (section 6.5.1); in 
particular the memory of previous events and using comparisons with stories and 
experiences. These influences permeated across all levels and function types. 
Asset managers, who were confronted with safety risks (e.g. the risk of employee fatality), 
referred to previous health and safety issues throughout their decision process: 
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“I wasn’t the plant manager at the time, but I was part of the investigation team in the 
enquiry… It wasn’t so much that he died, but the way in which he died and the young 
family left behind him. I never forget it, and although policy is good, policy can’t cater 
for all situations… Now that I have that responsibility [plant manager] it [the 
investigation] is the first thing I think about” (Asset S-suite)  
The scale of reference did reduce in M-suite, but also demonstrated a reliance on previous 
experience and events: 
“The young lads have a different mentality, they just haven’t been around long enough 
to experience when things go wrong. It is my role as senior engineer to keep them safe 
until they have acquired that knowledge. There are some things in this place that look 
benign, but I am ultra-cautious of them, because I have seen what really happens if you 
get complaisant” (Asset M-suite) 
In service functions the focused moved from the safety issues to financial and reputational 
risks. The difference between S-suite and M-suite perspectives was only different in the 
level of significance to them and the organization: 
“If we get lazy I can see the same issues appearing in this business as the new 
connections business, and fearing a big financial loss the management team turn 
against you. Before you know it you are either being broken up or sold off to the 
highest bidder” (Service S-suite) 
Service M-suite accounts demonstrated a greater fragility in their position within the 
organization and that in middle management perceptions of performance was attributed to 
recent activities and not the long-term good an individual had delivered: 
“There was a story of [middle retail manager], years of high performance, and one bad 
customer who went to the press. It got regional coverage for about 2 weeks. 2 weeks 
later he carried the can and found himself in the departure lounge. So you must always 
insure [sic] you have your parachute packed!” (Service M-suite)  
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Throughout the interviews there were references to stories and events in the organization, 
which the managers reflected upon in influencing their decisions. These provided a 
significant subjective influence50.  
6.5.4 Environment Pressure (G4) 
The fourth theme was the awareness of the environment. There were specific influences in 
the context of their operation, which affected the risk management decision process. In 
service and asset functions there was a perception of high volumes of information that 
required processing. However, in service functions there was the additional perceived 
influence of time pressure in making the decision: 
“It is all about identifying the important issues and spending time on these. The daily 
risks being faced, you just deal with quickly, it is a law of averages, and as long as you 
get the bulk of them right you can stay afloat” (Service M-suite) 
Service S-suite saw the role of their subordinates as having done the detailed analysis, 
distilling the important factors and presenting discrete decisions for approval: 
“I don’t have the time or the process knowledge to manage the detail of each risk, and 
it is a bad indication where I have concern and dive into the operation, a line manager 
should be worried where I do... They need to make sense of their complex world to give 
me confidence in their analysis, and present me a range of options for challenge… I 
need to connect up all these different silos into one cohesive picture to manage the 
overall risk bearing in the business unit” (Service S-suite). 
Asset functions, demonstrated an influence of changes in the level of analysis between S-
suite and M-suite managers, but also inferred a detailed understanding of the operation at 
senior levels: 
                                                             
50 Many of the stories were second or third hand, and notably there were repeat stories that through 
evolution had changed to reflect their own circumstances. 
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“This is a fairly standardised environment, and engineering has a core set of principles 
which I as the Chief Engineer feel I can offer to assist the line managers. However we 
operate at different levels of analysis, by the time a decision reaches me it has often 
been aggregated to a level where I need to unpick it to get back to the real operational 
concerns in hand. But I also need to operate in a world that non-engineers can 
understand, sadly that is too often an expression of capital” (Asset S-suite) 
The engineering discipline appeared as a common language between M-suite and S-suite 
asset managers. However M-suite demonstrated their limitations of visibility: 
“Engineering practices are a common language, regardless of seniority we can 
converse with each other. However they [senior managers] have an appreciation of 
what is happening across the fleet. The volume of data I am managing is significant, 
and they [senior managers] can’t be expected to know the detail as much as me… I’m 
sure I could learn loads from my counterparts in other plants, but there just isn’t the 
time” (Asset M-suite) 
Therefore, a difference between service and asset managers appeared pronounced in the 
interaction between S-suite and M-suite managers. The engineering language appeared as a 
means of maintaining links between these two communities.  
6.5.5 Decision Order (G5) 
The final theme that appeared in the interviews was the awareness of an order to decision 
influences. It appeared in the analysis that three categories of decision-making influences 
could be established. These were: 
1. Organizational directives, which were the first instinctive response of a manager:  
“It [an organizational rule] is an instinctive response for everyone, you don’t even go 
through a thought process” (Asset M-suite);  
2. Individual beliefs:  
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“I fundamentally believe that we have the morale obligation to ensure people go home 
to their families at the end of the day” (Asset S-suite); and 
3. Reference to the performance management system:  
“where we have flexibility in the decisions being made, you have to interpret through 
the broader targets in the organization how you may impact performance” (Service M-
suite).  
These influences are shown in figure 6.12. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Decision Influences 
There was shown to be an order of these decisions when faced with uncertainty. The 
instinctive responses (defined through rules) were supplemented with and later justified by 
the beliefs of the individual. Individual and organizational beliefs were found to be 
reconciled by managers, for example:  
“Do I influence the way the organization thinks or have I just become part of the 
corporate machine? I would like to think it is a bit more symbiotic than either extreme, 
we reconcile our views with the company and in doing so influence the way the 
organization thinks” (Service M-suite) 
Directives
Individual’s beliefs
Directives are 
expressed as rules or 
requirements
The beliefs of the staff 
and the organization 
are held without 
reference to measures 
or targets. These refer 
to behaviours and the 
implications of 
decisions. Beliefs are 
influenced by 
individual experiences 
and philosophies
The performance 
system does not 
contain specific risk 
measures, but inferred 
through an integrated 
understanding of other 
measures
“there are a few rules in the 
company, that you just don’t 
challenge, they are inherently 
sensible, for example Rule 
One. They are just ingrained 
in the way we operate and 
make decisions” (GRS, Interim 
report) (Asset S-Suite)
Properties Exemplar Quotes
Performance 
management 
system
Organization’s 
beliefs
Decision Influences
“in Retail we have a shared 
understanding of what we 
should be doing, and an 
understanding of how we 
should achieve it. These 
aren’t prescriptively written 
down, it is just understood...” 
(Service M-Suite)
“I fundamentally believe that 
we have the morale 
obligation to ensure people 
go home to their families at 
the end of the day.” (Asset S-
Suite)
“for risk, you have to distil 
from the wider performance 
measures what needs to 
happen, but you can make a 
good judgement based on 
targets and past 
performance.” (Service S-
Suite)
Experience
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It was found that reference to the stated performance measures was made where an 
individual’s beliefs hadn’t previously defined the outcome. However it was seen that an 
interpretation of the broader performance measures was required to make sense of these 
decisions: 
“If the decision isn’t obvious then I will try align the decision to the broader 
performance requirements of the organization, but this isn’t always obvious, and there 
is some level of interpretation required” (Asset S-suite).  
The order of these decision influences is summarised in figure 6.13. 
 
Figure 6.13 Order of Decision Influences 
The final finding was the formative influences on individual beliefs and the creation of 
directives. It originated from the interpretation of organizational performance measures, 
which translated into beliefs of the managers in how they should achieve these objectives, 
for example:  
“In order to achieve the company’s targets, I believe you must be consistent in 
developing a good reputation, I suppose this is managing reputational risk… It isn’t 
defined, but an understanding you develop” (Service S-suite) 
Directives
Individual’s beliefs
Directives are 
supplemented with a 
rationale when 
challenged 
The performance 
system is used to 
influence decisions 
where not defined 
through the ‘rules of 
the organization’ or the 
beliefs of the 
managers. Without 
explicit risk 
management direction 
this becomes an 
interpretation of 
broader performance 
measures.
“the basic tenants of 
operation are engrained in 
our psyche, you don’t need to 
think hard about these... you 
might go on to supplement 
these rules in a more 
reasoned approach, but when 
challenged are aligned to 
basic morality and good 
practice” (Asset S-Suite)
Properties Exemplar Quotes
Performance 
management 
system
Organization’s 
beliefs
Path of Decision Influences
“do I influence the way the 
organization thinks or have I 
just become part of the 
corporate machine I would 
like to think it is a bit more 
symbiotic than either 
extreme, we reconcile our 
views with the company and 
in doing so influence the way 
the organization thinks.” 
(Service M-Suite)
“If the decision isn’t obvious 
then I will try align the 
decision to the broader 
performance requirements of 
the organization, but this isn’t 
always obvious, and there is 
some level of interpretation 
required.” (Asset M-Suite)
Experience
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It appeared that the directives (e.g. Rule One, we don’t hurt people) had been formed 
through evolution of individual and collective beliefs. These beliefs were so fundamental to 
the operation of the organization that they were established as organizational rules, these 
may even be considered organizational beliefs. Figure 6.14 outlines these formative 
influences. 
 
Figure 6.14 Formative Influences 
This analysis demonstrated both an order of decision influences and further the process of 
establishing these different influences. 
The influences shown in the thematic analysis, complemented the causal map analysis, it 
demonstrated the subtly and subjective influences of the decision-making process in 
selecting risk treatments. The next section combines this understanding, beginning with a 
review of the conflicts within groups.  
6.6 Discussion 
6.6.1 Causal Maps: Intra-Sample Conflicts 
Four group maps were created. The maps represented the average opinion of that group.  
However although rare, there were cases where accounts within group that contained 
conflicts in understanding. These were intra-sample conflicts. These were points of 
Directives
Individual’s beliefs
Directives are 
instinctive, formed 
through evolution of 
the organizations 
objectives and beliefs
The performance 
system influences the 
beliefs of individuals, it 
is the interpretation of 
requirement to meet 
the objectives
“Rule One began its existence 
as a Health and Safety 
measure, which has become a 
fundamental belief in this 
organization in that the vast 
majority personally felt this 
way. Over time this is the 
bedrock of the way we 
operate. It is an instinctive 
response for everyone, you 
don’t even you through a 
thought process”  (Asset M-
Suite)
Properties Exemplar Quotes
Performance 
management 
system
Organization’s 
beliefs
Formative Influences
“In order to achieve the 
company’s targets, I believe 
you must be consistent in 
developing a good reputation, 
I suppose this is managing 
reputational risk… It isn’t 
defined, by an understanding 
you develop, with a broader 
awareness” (Asset S-Suite)
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disagreement occurring within the group. The intra-sample conflicts were found in cases of 
M-suite managers. There were three specific intra-sample conflicts:  
 Disagreement in direction of causation between reputation risk and communication 
nodes. Asset M-suite; 
The majority view was that reputation risk causes a reduction in communication of 
organizational measures. The alternate view was that (good) communications 
decreases potential reputational risk. 
 Disagreement in direction of causation between communication and belief nodes. 
Service M-suite; 
The majority view was communications influences belief of the manager. The alternative 
that use of communication is an outcome of the manager’s personality and belief set. 
This would reverse direction of causation. 
 Disagreement as whether, lead measures and risk measures were equivalent concepts, 
or separate in understanding. Service M-suite; 51 
The majority (4) view against alternate view (3) was close; between perceptions that 
lead measures influenced the concept of risk measures or vice versa; the former 
dominated. 
6.6.2 Dominant Risk Types 
Risk types were different descriptions of risk (Ackermann et al., 2007). Respondents used 
different descriptions during interview. The causal maps showed risk types on the left hand 
side. These were represented as inputs of the decision process. Many respondents were able 
to list the different risk types that were important to their roles. There were some risk types 
that had very specific outcome and consequence in the decision process.  
                                                             
51 This conflict existed before the separation of LAG and LEAD measures, as recommended by the reviewers. 
Articulation of the conflict was improved following the revision. 
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There was agreement between samples to terms used in describing risk types; this was 
consistent with firm and function-level analysis (e.g. Safety Risk), it was a common term 
through all levels of analysis. An unexpected result was that all samples identified 
Reputational risk. Financial risk occurred with greater regularity in service and in asset 
functions the terms: Engineering risk and Safety risk was used with greater regularity, see 
table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 Risk Types 
 
At firm-level Financial, Safety, Environment and Reputation risk were all used as descriptions 
of risk types in investor and public communications. The group-level analysis exposed a 
number of other descriptions of risk: Engineering and Planning.  
6.6.3 Dominant Risk Treatments 
Risk treatments were the approaches to manage risk. These were the goals in the causal 
map and placed on the right hand side.  
Participant reference to types of risk treatments was extensive and language used to define 
the risk treatments was consistent (e.g. mitigation). The list of treatments extended beyond 
the foundational literature review, which included: accept, transfer, insure, outsource, avoid, 
mitigate and option taking. The treatments identified within the group maps are 
summarised in table 6.10.  
  
  Reputation Financial Engineering 
& Safety 
Environment Planning 
Asset M-Suite ∎  ∎   
 S-Suite ∎  ∎ ∎  
Service M-Suite ∎ ∎    
 S-Suite ∎ ∎   ∎ 
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Table 6.10 Risk Treatments 
 
There were additional treatments being identified: hedging and portfolio management. 
Hedging was described as: “the activity of offsetting upward movements in the environment 
with highly correlated downward movements” (Service S-suite, GRS). Therefore where an 
aspect of the market causes a loss, there was an equal and opposite reaction resulting in 
gain. This highly developed understanding reflected on the financial and energy markets. 
There was limited mention of hedging in any asset manager’s account. 
Portfolio Management was understood in a similar manner. This was described as “a bucket 
of concerns, some which will return better than you thought and some that will do worse than 
you expected, net effect will be close to your prediction, and hopefully positive” (Service S-
suite, FCORP). This was understood to reduce sensitivity to any single operation, activity or 
marketplace, by reflecting on the result as an aggregated set of issues. 
There was contention in understanding the difference between risk acceptance, reactive 
management and risk taking. They all appeared to result in the same course of action: do 
nothing. However the accounts demonstrated a subtlety to this distinction:  
- Reactive management was criticised for a focus on developing a response function, where 
there was a lack of attention to risk identification; 
- Risk acceptance was seen as a passive activity of deciding that the risk did not meet the 
“hurdle rate” for the next level of treatment (i.e. an active treatment was more expensive 
than the perceived impact); 
  Acceptance Acceptance 
(React) 
Transfer 
(O/S) 
Transfer 
(Insure) 
Mitigate Hedge/ 
Portfolio 
 
Asset M-Suite ∎ ∎ ∎  ∎  
 S-Suite ∎  ∎  ∎  
Service M-Suite ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎  
 S-Suite ∎  ∎  ∎ ∎ 
 
253 
 
Risk taking was seen as a different mind-set, which does not create a judgement relative to 
cost of treatment, instead it was the decision to take a risk based on an absolute judgement 
that the organization wished to retain the risk as identified.  
In developing the causal maps reactive management and risk acceptance were left as unique 
terms as they inferred different perspectives on the same treatment.  
6.6.5 Influences on Decision Process 
There were several influences on the decision process exposed. The first was the difference 
between intuitive and reasoned decision-making (section 6.5.1). The second was the 
influence of time pressure and information load (section 6.5.3). The third was the influence of 
biases (section 6.5.2), and finally an inference on decision strategy. These are discussed in 
turn. 
Firstly, Kahneman (2003) separated the difference between reasoning and intuition as two 
types of decision-making; whereby intuition is a decision process requiring little reflection, 
quick and almost instant (cf. Hodgkinson et al., 2008). Reasoned decision processes in 
contrast are deliberate and calculated. In the analysis of manager’s decision processes 
(section 6.5.1), it appeared that asset managers were characteristic of reasoned approaches, 
and influenced in this activity by the existence of both the embedded risk systems (section 
5.3.1) and the engineering discipline. Service S-suite managers demonstrated a reasoned 
decision process. Whereas, service M-suite provided evidence of intuitive practices, for 
example the quick response to previously similar conditions. The use of intuitive practices 
was understood as a by-product of time pressure and information volume in their 
environment. 
Secondly, Payne et al. (1988) suggest that both time pressure and information load affect the 
decision process. Time pressure causes a number of coping strategies to be employed: 
acceleration, filtering and change from compensatory to non-compensatory decision strategy 
(Maule & Edland, 1997). Filtering was evidenced in service M-suite managers, as they 
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selected the critical risks for greater attention (section 6.5.1). Therefore two different 
approaches were seen: for the volume and low-level risks, the manager was responding 
intuitively (and quotes reflected this was based on a law of averages), and the top risks were 
filtered out for a reasoned assessment. 
However, this was not the only evidence of coping strategies being used, in the case of S-
suite managers there was an expectation that filtering (Maule & Edland, 1997) was 
completed by their subordinates to reduce information load on senior level decision-
making. Therefore both individual and organizational filtering of decisions was performed. 
Thirdly, biases in decision-making were evident. Critical incidents were highlighted as 
reference points. Asset managers were dominated by safety incidents: including the process, 
the organizational impact and the personal impact this had on them. It was notable that 
weighting (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and framing (Marteau, 1989) provided through 
interpretation of performance system measures or targets did not feature in the accounts. 
Instead, there was a clear move away from needing to demonstrate formal rationality 
(Chater & Oaksford, 2000) in decisions regarding safety, for example the dismissal of 
documented procedures or valuations. This was a move explained by Sullivan-Taylor and 
Wilson (2009) as ludic fallacy (section 2.6.7), the perceptions of managers in what may 
happen based on experience.  
Biases were evident in several forms. There was projection bias (Hsee & Hastie, 2006), 
where the decision-makers situation affected the decision, for example the consideration of 
losing one’s job. This encouraged loss aversion (cf. Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998), for 
example a fixation to protecting against loss, even where it was improbable. There was a 
dominance of memory bias (Hsee & Hastie, 2006), where past accounts had had such a 
significant bearing on the individual that the experienced outcomes (i.e. safety) were over-
weighted in the decision process. In service managers, the dominance of health and 
wellbeing (in asset functions) was replaced by the dominance of reputation as the critical 
measure. 
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It was inferred in the causal maps and the thematic analysis, that two different decision 
strategies were used: compensatory (the weighting of multiple attributes, seeking optimal 
solution) and non-compensatory (the reductionist approach to selecting the best option on a 
few key variables) (cf. Payne et al., 1988). Combining the understanding in section 6.5 and 
6.4, the S-suite managers were seeking compensatory strategies to be employed, even where 
the aggregated presentation of risk (as it arrived with them) had already reduced the 
decision attributes. This conformed to the need for optimal investment decisions to be made 
(cf. Pennington & Tuttle, 2007). In service M-suite managers the impact of time pressure and 
the volume of decisions resulted in non-compensatory strategies being employed, therefore 
reducing the cognitive load (Wedell & Senter, 1997) and filtering the information volume in 
a time pressured environment. In asset M-suite managers the presence of risk decision tools 
(i.e. risk register), enabled greater appreciation of historical data, and although time 
pressure did not always allow for an optimal solution to be found, the decision was 
reasoned and selected on specific attributes. This was characteristic of Lexicographic or 
Semi-Lexicographic strategies being employed (cf. Payne et al., 1988). The difference in 
strategy appeared to be an outcome of a complex relationship between the environment 
(time pressure and information load), the seniority (and hence filtering of subordinate staff) 
and the culture (including experience and professional standards). 
Having highlighted the difference between groups, the discussion continues to analyse 
where there were commonalities between groups and converging mental models.  
6.6.6 Map Commonality 
To understand how similar the different models are between groups, figure 6.15 provides a 
quantitative comparison52. This is calculated as a fraction of the number of shared arcs 
between groups. 
                                                             
52 This calculation is completed as the number of shared arcs divided by the sum of unique arcs between groups; 0 
indicates no shared arcs and 1 indicates all arcs are shared between maps. 
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Figure 6.15 Shared Arcs between Groups 
There was a commonality amongst all maps (0.02) this represented a single arc being 
shared. The commonality between M-suite was limited and not discussed (0.05).  
Shared aspects of metal models were found between:  
 Service managers (0.11); 
 Asset managers (0.32); 
 S-suite managers (0.13). 
There was a contrast between S-suite and M-suite maps. There was a level of commonality 
between S-suite maps across functions. There was minimal convergence in M-suite decision 
maps between functions.  
There was a single cause-effect relationships appearing across all four maps, and a number 
of shared treatments and risk types: 
1. Structured decision-making led to mitigation treatments; 
2. Reputation risk was common;  
3. Use of outsourcing, mitigation, and acceptance treatments were common across all 
maps. 
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6.6.7 The S-suite Manager 
Analysis across the two functions (asset and service) in S-suite highlights two areas of 
commonality: 
 A common mental model of measurement through to strategy, this was the core model 
encompassing six nodes; and 
 Risk measures were the central node. 
The S-suite Core Model: 
There was consistency in map, between six of the nodes: control structures, environment, 
strategy alignment, lead measure, risk measure and learning. Some of this relationship may 
seem intuitively obvious; however it was only common in S-suite (Asset and service). Figure 
6.16, identifies the common nodes and arcs in both S-suite maps (asset and service). 
 
Figure 6.16 S-suite Core Model 
This shows that the environment and risk measures influenced control structures. Control 
structures influenced strategy alignment. Independently lead measures influenced risk 
measures which influenced learning. Taking each of these nodes in turn: 
Environment was the context in which the organization existed, respondents existed within 
similar markets and influenced by European cultures (chapter 4). It included the national 
influences, market influences, dynamics such as regulation and legislation. It included both 
macro and micro constraints, for example: 
Environment
Strategy Alignment
Control Structures
Lead Measure
Learning
Risk Measure
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“a major risk is compliance and that is financially orientated, and regulatory 
compliance in the financial area” (Service, S-suite). 
Control structures were the influence and role of executives (including corporate functions). 
They were the line of authority within the organization. They included internal and external 
audit functions. 
Strategy alignment was the strategic statement of the firm, including vision and missions; it 
included the activities in the organization to map the strategy into the performance system. 
As a performance system it was most often seen as an issue of mapping or interpretation of 
vision and mission into operational priorities and targets (cf. Kaplan & Norton, 2000). The 
node represented the degree of coupling between operational activities and strategic 
statement. This included: risk appetite, control of objectives, CSR and developing strategic 
thinking in the organization. For example:  
“…because if you can quantify you can set levels and you can determine and take 
a look at the risk appetite and you can determine where you want to go” (Asset, 
S-suite) 
This didn’t reflect the choice that organizations had to enter or leave certain environments 
at their discretion; this was identified as a withdrawal risk treatment. 
The second relationship was consistent with understanding that the executive role was to 
develop a strategy and influence its delivery. This can be completed both through the 
performance system as well as the risk management process. Control structures had a causal 
influence on strategic alignment. This prescribed to the top-down perspective of control in 
an organization. 
The Risk Measure was Central: 
S-suite node centrality scores showed that risk measure was the central node for both asset 
and service (NC= .21 & .22). It appeared as an influencing node in both accounts (NC= .17 & 
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.15). This inferred that risk management measures, (e.g. Equivalent Value calculations), VaR, 
failure rates, volume and proximity of risk) were central to S-suite understanding. It was 
found that risk measures weren’t just a route of discussion for S-suite, but instead a 
fundamental influence; and that risk management as a discipline was far from a supporting 
activity. It was an influencing process that became central to the decision making process, 
for example:  
“[the corporate risk reporting] process, involves no strategic understanding of health 
indices of our equipment and suchlike to set the strategy of network engineering. That 
includes very much the risk group, things like the AERO process [Risk classification 
process], and the CRAM matrix [Risk prioritization process]. We have other associated 
processes like the operational safety team, which help manage day-to-day risks. In 
quantifying and understanding the risk, understanding what it will cost to mitigate? That 
allows us to make judgment.”  (Asset, S-suite) 
This demonstrated a division between the strategic concerns of risk management from the 
operational daily management of risk; that the different systems, reports and valuations 
became tools to highlight the issue and priorities. Even strategic decisions would refer back 
to the risk management measures as a benchmark of capability, for example: 
“We have a strategy of maintaining a broad portfolio, and working with everybody so 
that if shifts change the market we can keep busy by doing something different but in 
the same market. It is our ability to adapt to the market that keeps us competitive.” 
(Service, S-suite) 
Portfolio management was seen specifically by service managers as a risk management 
treatment, it affected their core organizational structure, their selection of ventures and 
development of products. The views were that not only could they develop their position in 
their market, but also that over an extended period they could influence the market and 
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environment itself. This was reflected by both the cases53.  
S-suite Characteristics: 
In finding, the S-suite manager’s mental model is generalized as: 
 Risk measures were the central node in their mental map, and it is a role of influence; 
 Awareness of both the external environment and measurement of risk as an influence 
on the organization’s control structures; 
 Alignment of the organization’s strategy and objectives was influenced by the control 
structures; 
 Risk measures were predefined by lead measures; 
 Risk measures were used to develop organizational learning; and 
 There was not an exclusive set of treatments being considered by S-suite (although 
service S-suite demonstrated an increased awareness of portfolio and hedging 
practices). 
6.6.8 The Service Manager 
There were commonalities demonstrated between S-suite and M-suite in service. Service 
managers shared five arcs, three treatments and one risk type: 
1. There was a communications – belief loop; 
2. Learning influenced the ability to develop structured decision-making (which led to 
mitigation treatments); 
3. A common recognition of financial risk. 
                                                             
53 This treatment of portfolio management was not included in the risk treatment review as it was felt to be a 
speculative risk management practice (the potential for loss or gain in making a decision). At the time of the data 
collection the case organizations (being vertically integrated) were considering the low risk, low return and highly 
regulated distribution market, and whether they should continue to operate in this market. Six months later it was 
seen that several of the power companies abandoned operating in this market as the risk appetite of the 
organizations were unaligned with competing in the distribution market. 
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Communications – Belief Loop: 
In service managers, beliefs were influenced by performance system components: 
Communications and Lag measures (indirectly), shown in figure 6.17: 
 
Figure 6.17 Service Manager Belief Loop 
Lag measures were an expression of past performance. In service managers this link 
between lag measure and belief was mediated by the role of communications. Selection of lag 
measure had a bearing on the beliefs held by the individual. This was explained as a 
directional effort that over time (many months and years) the individual started to 
articulate their beliefs in reference to the underlying measures, for example:  
“for many years we have been faced by increasing levels of work-place accidents, 
on stairs in cars, until our collective managerial attention was focused on this 
trend it had been largely ignored… It is a matter of common sense that we don’t 
hurt people even in our offices, and it took a campaign of education to change the 
way mangers think about this” (Service, S-suite).  
Communication was the formal distribution of information coming from the performance 
system; this included corporate and business unit reports, investor and public information 
and the ad-hoc “wall-board” communications in offices (sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3).  
Beliefs existed outside of the performance system as defined in this research. These were 
feelings and emotions about conduct, risk-aversion, what it meant to be professional and 
extended as far as common sense. The node did not differentiate between differences in 
beliefs, just that individual beliefs were being brought to effect in the mental model.  
Beliefs
Communuications Lag Measure
decreases
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As this loop was established as an influence on managerial beliefs, there was a contradiction 
being faced; that beliefs detracted from focus on lag measures. Service managers were 
particularly keen to establish that lag measures were not progressive; they focused upon 
what has happened and not thinking about the current and future outcomes. It was 
established that the environment was volatile and the situation constantly changing, that 
risks could not be avoided by looking backwards. Lag measures were useful to develop an 
understanding and not repeat past errors, whilst common sense was seen as the best risk 
tool a manager could possess. This established a negative relationship between beliefs and 
the use of lag measures. 
Learning and Structured Decision-Making: 
Service managers understood that learning influenced the ability to conduct a structured 
and reasoned decision process. Across all maps this was found to increase the selection and 
application of mitigation treatments. The influence on learning was not consistent between 
S-suite and M-suite in service. Although was shown that risk measures was an input into the 
learning process (indirectly in the case of M-suite). 
Financial Risk Type: 
Service managers were consistent in their identification and articulation of financial risk 
(NC=.15 & .06). This was not a node of high centrality in the map, but did appear as a 
common reference point for nearly all accounts within the service manager community. 
Characteristics of the Service Manager: 
Therefore the service Manager’s mental model can be generalised as: 
- An individual’s beliefs reduced reliance on lag measures; 
- Lag measures were perceived as the main thrust of organizational performance 
reporting; 
- Communication of lag measures eroded the manager’s belief of lag measures; 
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- Learning was understood as the main influence on developing an improved structured 
decision-making process, this increased the deployment of mitigation; and 
- Reference to financial risk was common across service managers, they referred to 
outsource and acceptance as common across all mental models. 
6.6.9 The Asset Manager 
There were a number of areas of convergence and similarity within asset managers’ mental 
models: 
 Direct links, from risk type to risk treatment without mediation from the performance 
system nodes; 
 There was a Risk tool – Belief loop; 
 Core mental model; Environment to structured decision-making; 
 Common perceptions of engineering and safety risk. 
Direct Risk to Treatment Links: 
The focus of asset manager maps was different. There were a number of direct risk types to 
treatment selection, which did not appear as pronounced in service functions.  
There were three treatment influences appearing in both M-suite and S-suite:  
1) The path from safety risk to immediate prohibition of risk acceptance. There were no 
intervening influences on this decision. The appearance of safety risk did not define a 
treatment; 
2) Environment risk had a similar direct and prohibitory relationship to risk transfer. 
Transfer of risk was considered in terms of outsource (not insurance). The appearance 
of environment risk meant that this was a problem that could not be outsourced, and if 
the operation was already outsourced, meant that as the principle contractor in the 
operation, they would have to directly manage this risk and not leave it to the third 
party; 
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3) The final direct influence was the relationship between learning and mitigation. This 
was a positive relationship, whereby the use of mitigation was felt to be informed and 
improved by learning, and that learning was embedded as part of the performance 
system. This was reflected upon both at an individual and organizational level. 
Risk Tool – Belief Loop: 
Asset managers shared a causal loop. Although there was a subtle mediating difference in 
the S-suite map, there was similar outcome. In S-suite appearance of safety risk was 
influencing proliferation of risk tools. This reflected adherence to risk standards, risk 
registers (but in asset functions not the use of risk matrices). Risk tools gave access to risk 
measures. Risk measures were identified as predictive or evaluative: “providing quantitative 
estimation to bolster experience and gut instinct” (Asset, M-suite). It was this combination of 
quantitative measurement and experience that formed a relationship with learning. In a 
more intuitive relationship that learning influenced beliefs; the asset manager felt that their 
experience was improved, whilst taking advantage of their experience, both as a product of 
time in role and as educated engineers. The S-suite feedback loop is identified in figure 6.18. 
 
Figure 6.18 Asset S-suite, Feedback Loop 
The strongest relationship was between beliefs and safety risk. The underlying principle was 
that they were operating in a physically hazardous environment, when “things go wrong, 
they go wrong big… accidents are usually life changing or life terminating” (Asset M-suite). On 
several occasions accounts were prefixed by… “even if it wasn’t a stated objective or a legal 
obligation, the ethical and moral beliefs which all humans should have, would lead to the same 
answer” (Asset M-suite). In this way the asset managers reflected that their beliefs were 
Safety Risk
Risk Measures Learning
Beliefs
Risk Tools
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dominant over the company values. The M-suite manager’s safety risk to belief loop is 
represented in figure 6.19. 
 
Figure 6.19 M-suite Asset Manager, Feedback Loop 
Therefore, the asset S-suite relationships were reflected in a simplified version by M-suite. 
M-suite did not articulate the path to beliefs through risk measures and learning, instead they 
demonstrated that risk tools had a bearing on beliefs, in much the same way as S-suite.  
Core Mental Model: 
Asset managers shared a core understanding encompassing five nodes and two treatments. 
There was a consistency in the understanding that the environment drives an increase in the 
use of lead measures. Further the environment decreased the ability to transfer risk 
(especially in outsource arrangements). It was found that generation teams understood 
their long-term responsibility and investment as being eroded though outsource 
agreements. 
Lead measures underpinned the ability to create risk measures. This use of risk measure 
had two effects: a) It increased the accuracy and ability in structured decision-making 
(which increased the deployment of mitigation treatments), b) risk measures increased 
learning within the organization. The core mental model, identified in both service and asset 
M-suite managers is presented in figure 6.20. 
Safety Risk Beliefs
Risk Tools
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Figure 6.20 Asset Manager Core Mental Model 
The asset manager’s core mental model demonstrated that there were a high proportion of 
shared mental maps between asset managers (S-suite and M-suite).  
Engineering and Safety Risk: 
Asset managers used a specific terminology of engineering risk, to describe the risks caused 
through engineering practice in their operations (i.e. the maintenance and production 
phases of the plant). Secondly, asset managers focused on safety risk. Safety risk was not 
isolated to employees, and also considered members of the public.  
Characteristics of the Asset Manager: 
These decision maps found that risk tools and the proliferation of risk measures are 
associated to each other. The characteristics of the asset manager are summarized below. 
 Safety risks drove the proliferation of risk tools; 
 Risk tools influenced the beliefs of the manager; 
 There was a moral link between the asset manager’s belief and the importance of safety 
risk; 
Environment
Risk Measure
Lead Measure
Mitigation
Learning
decreases Transfer
Structured Decision 
Making
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 Asset managers had a direct association between certain risk types and certain 
treatments (or prohibition of treatment); 
 Asset managers identified engineering and safety risk, in addition to reputation risk; 
 There were no specific treatments for asset managers, beyond outsource, mitigation 
and acceptance. 
6.7 Integrative Discussion (Firm, Function & Group) 
The move from firm to function, demonstrated a development of understanding and focus. 
Function differences were pronounced between service and asset functions. The increased 
granularity in frame of reference and corresponding change in analysis exposed a number of 
differences between S-suite and M-suite managers. 
Managerial Beliefs 
The group-level analysis identified that managerial beliefs are a central influence on the risk 
management decision process (0.21 to 0.07). This puts into question the full and 
unmediated influence of the performance system on decisions. This effect of individual 
beliefs was consistent with the extant literature (Peterson & Beach, 1967; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; Slovic, 1964). Beliefs were shown to directly influence choices of risk 
treatment, for example decreased use of insurance (Service M-suite). The belief node 
influenced a range of different performance system functions; but this was inconsistent 
between group maps. Belief was influenced by a range of performance system functions: 
communications, risk tools and learning. Environment (the market, society and culture the 
organization operates within) influenced beliefs.  
It was this role of beliefs, and the inconsistency in the influence beliefs had in the maps that 
led to the last frame of reference (the individual) and the method employed in chapter 
seven. This was done to expose whether there were specific influences of beliefs outside of 
function or managerial group.  
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The difference in influence on treatment selection developed an understanding from Levers 
of Control (Simons, 1994, 1995), although this was not fully aligned: Boundary systems 
mapped to the direct influences (especially in their prohibitive approaches), belief systems 
mapped to the individual belief node and the reference to performance system nodes to 
diagnostic and interactive systems.  
Risk Types 
There were three different risk types, which evoked a prescriptive response from managers: 
Financial, Safety and Environment. There were only a few approaches in measuring and 
targeting safety risk or environmental risk. There was confusion about technical SHE54 
measures e.g. TRIR (Total Recorded Injury Rate). Managers didn’t understand the 
calculation behind the TRIR measure.  
Risk Standards 
Risk standards (e.g. COSO) were not central to the risk decision-making; however risk tools 
did appear as a common node. Risk Tools included: risk-recording systems, valuation 
algorithms and risk matrices, but excluded any risk standards (e.g. ERM). The maps found 
no reliance on risk tools to define the risk process, this was a positive limitation as indicated 
by Lewis: “It may be that believing a risk management system to be comprehensive is itself 
potentially dangerous…”(2003:219). However the literature suggested that risk systems 
have an increasingly important position within the firm (ONE AON, 2007; Babaliyev, 2012; 
Hopkin, 2012).  
Risk Valuation 
The importance of risk valuation in risk measures was consistent across three groups (and 
majority of accounts). Lead measures predefine risk measures, and risk measures influence 
structured risk decision-making55. The structured decision-making node (SDM-node) was 
                                                             
54 SHE is Safety, Health and Environment measure in the UK. 
55 This was the case in all accounts, where only service S-suite had learning as a mediating influence between risk 
measure and decision-making. 
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shown as an influence in selecting mitigation treatments. The valuation approaches did not 
refer to VaR or Risk Adjusted Return On Capital (RAROC) to any consistent level. However, 
asset functions showed an inclination toward RAROC and service functions VaR. The risk 
measures were seen to be simplistic (i.e. probability and impact calculations, where impact 
could be multifaceted). 
Moving to the next level of analysis 
The function-level presented the following questions, the findings are summarised in table 
6.11. 
Table 6.11 Summary of findings and questions from function-level 
 
The group-level analysis showed that risk management decisions do not follow a structured 
or rational order of activity. It demonstrated different paths to treatments, and different 
order of performance system functions used. This was a strong indication of the complexity 
of influences in selecting a treatment. Section 6.4.9 outlined the underlying influences on the 
different perceptions in selection of risk treatment. The last frame of reference, the 
individual-level, tests these influences on risk decisions and the use of risk treatments (i.e. 
insurance).  
 
  
Question from function-level Finding at Group-level 
How does the difference between 
levels of management seniority 
influence the risk management 
decision process? 
There was a fundamental difference between the mental 
models of S-suite and M-suite managers. Although S-suite 
managers had some consistency between asset and service 
functions, a desirable quality (Dilla & Stone, 1997). S-suite 
demonstrated a greater awareness of different forces on their 
decision-making; they also had less complex mental maps. 
What is the impact of an 
individual’s experience on the 
selection of treatment? 
Managerial beliefs have a fundamental role in decision-making, 
it demonstrated the performance system influence was heavily 
restricted by beliefs, and the performance system was not the 
principle influence on the selection of treatments 
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Chapter 7 
7. Individual-Level Analysis 
Chapter Seven extends the group-level analysis, to the individual. The research focus is 
developed to qualitatively understand the perceptions and use of risk treatments and 
specific sensitivities to information affecting risk judgement.  
7.1 Introduction to the Individual Level Analysis 
In Chapter 7, the individual-level analysis is the lowest frame of reference in the study. The 
preceding chapters have researched the firm, functional and the group-levels; which 
analysed the collective decision-making processes, their structures and their influences. The 
individual-level recognises the behavioural influences on the individual decision-maker. 
This is broken into two phases of research (4a and 4b). Phase 4a investigates the sensitivity 
to measures and outcomes. Phase 4b examines the use of treatments. Phases 4a and 4b are 
written up as a single discussion, and had the same frame of reference (the individual), and 
method (i.e. survey). Figure 7.1 outlines the path of research development. 
 
Figure 7.1 Path of Research Development 
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Data collection was completed by an on-line survey, comprising two parts:  
 Risk Sensitivity Survey (RSS),  
 Treatment Application Survey (TAS). 
This resulted in 238 completed surveys (28 were incomplete and discarded). The surveys 
were analysed. In the survey there were 33 different and mutually exclusive results received 
from each participant. The design of the 17 risk sensitivity questions was derived from 
literature and earlier levels of analysis. The analysis of data was split into five parts: 
Part 1: Data were collected using a survey (RSS). It identified the impact of 15 different 
influences. The results were split using the sample frame in Chapter 6 (i.e. Asset, service, S-
suite and M-suite), presented as descriptive statistics; 
Part 2: The data were analysed further using an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), this 
created a number of factors from the observed variables from the RSS. The EFA provided an 
approach to explain the latent influences on the decision-maker. The resulting factors are 
named and described; 
Part 3: The factors from Part 2 were analysed between populations (sample frame defined 
in Chapter 6). The difference between populations was tested by independent sample t-tests 
(ISTT). ISTT showed where there is a significant difference between two-independent 
variables (i.e. managerial level). This indicates where populations were significantly 
different in sensitivity; 
Part 4: Data was collected by survey (Treatment Application Survey). It identified the use of 
different risk treatments; this was demonstrated by the use of Chi-squared tests. The results 
are split using the sample frame in Chapter 6, presented as descriptive statistics, and 
contrasted to the differences between populations; 
Part 5: The results from Part 1 (sensitivity) and Part 2 (treatment usage) were compared to 
identify whether underlying sensitivities demonstrated a propensity toward a specific 
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treatment. Users and non-users of a treatment were compared using Independent Sample t-
Test. Figure 7.2 summarises the research pathway used in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Chapter 7 Research Pathway 
The remainder of chapter seven is structured: 
1) Data collection and data analysis: creation and use of surveys, the development of 
variables and how analysis was performed; 
2) Descriptive statistics for two survey parts (step 1); 
3) An exploratory factor analysis, identifying five factors latent in the 17-question 
sensitivity scale (step 2); 
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4) Analysis of risk sensitivity survey against levels (step 3) and treatment application 
survey against levels (step 4); 
5) An analysis of treatment usage against factors (step 5); 
6) Summary of results. 
7.2 Method: Survey 
Phases 4a (risk sensitivity) and 4b (treatment usage) collected data through survey. Surveys 
are used to gather responses from individuals across distributed locations (across the 
United Kingdom), maximise the potential number of respondents and limit the cost of data 
collection (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Survey methods can provide quantitative data through 
structured questionnaires, and can elicit a range of numerical data representing beliefs, 
opinions, attitudes and general background information on individuals (Hair et al, 2011). 
Electronic (email) surveys require participant self-completion. However the benefit of using 
a survey is the potential to collect large amounts of information without the researcher 
being present and at low cost (Hair et al., 2011). There are known issues with levels of 
completion using this method, and the potential for respondent bias as they become limited 
to computer users. 
Surveying is an accepted and dominant method within the empirical Operations 
Management community (Carter et al., 2008; Gattiker & Parente, 2007), although 
quantitative data is criticised as not rich enough (Barnes, 2001) by the qualitative OM 
community (cf. Meredith, 2009). It provides an opportunity for gathering vast and easily 
manipulated data sets, then available to complex statistical analysis. Barnes (2001) 
proposes that surveys should be kept to the realm of factual based data collection, this 
ignores that surveys are inherently perception of situation by the respondent.  
Benefits and Limitations of Survey Methods 
Surveys allow for distant responses to be made, both geographically and temporally. People 
that may not normally be accessible to the researcher may become available if interest and 
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value can be installed in the respondent (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The time taken to generate 
responses, in researcher hours, is significantly reduced. Tools such as on-line survey sites 
can simplify the tracking and following-up of respondents. The distance and limited 
relationship between researcher and respondent, creates little flexibility to present open 
enquiry, confirm understanding or reach deeper into reasoning. A survey will only yield 
results within the framework provided, and is rare to offer insight beyond these boundaries.  
As a strength, surveys can quickly provide a numeric basis, providing what the logical-
positivist would require for hypothesis testing. For Realists it provides an assessment of the 
extent of a relationship.  
Survey Pilots 
Surveys need to be piloted in advance (Voss et al., 2002) to ensure design does not include 
confusing, ambiguous or tautological statements, that it is easy to navigate and that the 
composition is likely to encourage statistically significant completion rates. Ketokivi and 
Schroeder (2004) identify survey contamination as a risk to validity and reliability. 
Contamination is similar to the concept of respondent bias or interpretation, comprised of 
both “informant bias” and lack of systematic selection of survey response value, for example 
the difference between selecting a ‘4’ and a ‘5’ in a Likert scale (Ketokivi & Schroeder, 2004).  
This understanding influenced the design of the surveys used in Chapter 7. 
 
7.2.1 Design of the Risk Sensitivity Survey (RSS) 
The risk sensitivity analysis administered a survey to extend maximum possible coverage, 
both geographically and across operational shift (in the case of power production). Surveys 
provided the opportunity to gather broad quantitative data in short elapsed time, and 
constrain the questions to a number of pre-defined questions (cf. Hair et al., 2011). The 
survey used Likert scales, to record respondent perception to what extent they are 
influenced by a concept in management of risk. Likert Scales were used to measure attitudes 
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or opinions; it is an accepted method to understand the intensity of the respondent’s 
feelings (Hair et al., 2011). The survey was provided in both electronic and hard copy 
formats56. 
Demographic information was recorded first: gender, case organization, function, role, self-
assessed seniority (S-suite/M-suite) and self-assessed B2B or B2C focus57. 
Fifteen sensitivity questions were presented (see Appendix D): these identified the level of 
influence of a variable on the individual when managing risk58. Risk was presented as a 
generic concept rather than as a recall of specific incident. The questions relate to the 
literature review in chapter 2, and understanding developed through causal mapping (table 
7.1).   
                                                             
56 Although hard copy versions of the survey are provided, only electronic copies were distributed to the 
respondents. 
 
57 Each case potentially contained individuals that could have a B2B or a B2C facing role. Because of this the 
respondent was asked to identify their expected focus of their role. With the lack of B2B sample size, analysis of this 
demographic information was not continued. 
58 The term threat is used in the survey. The terms risk and threat are used interchangeably, this is to infer 
management of pure risk without the need for an extensive explanation. In a non-technical manner the term threat 
is commonly understood, and was tested for its meaning as part of the pilot.  
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Table 7.1 Summary of Sensitivity Tests 
 
These questions conclude the risk sensitivity part of the survey. The second part of the 
survey contains the Treatment Application Survey (TAS), which examined the level of use of 
specified risk treatments.  
Concept 
 
Question 
What is your sensitivity 
toward… 
Basis in research 
Understanding from firm & 
function levels 
Comments and mapping to 
nodes 
Understanding from group-level 
analysis 
Probability  Estimation of event 
probability 
Estimates of impact and 
probability are defined within 
ERM standards. 
A forward-looking measure, it is 
a specific risk measure. 
Impact  Statement of risk 
impact 
A forward-looking measure, it is 
a specific risk measure. 
Financial 
impacts 
A forecast of financial 
impacts 
Financial impacts are used in 
finance sector as the principal 
measure of performance 
A forward-looking measure. 
Potentially a measure of risk, 
but can be used for other 
operational purposes. 
Non-financial 
impacts 
A forecast of non-
financial impacts 
Non-financial measures e.g. 
reputation, safety are seen in 
energy sector 
A forward-looking measure. 
Potentially a measure of risk, 
but can be used for other 
operational purposes. 
A-priori 
data/previous 
financial 
accounts  
Measures of previous 
financial performance 
Traditional performance 
measures of the business 
A lag measure 
Risk 
management 
process  
Adherence to a formal 
risk management 
process 
This is a defined approach to 
rational decision-making in 
controlling risk 
A description of the structured 
decision-making process for 
risk 
Risk 
standards/ 
classification 
tools 
Access to risk registers 
and matrix 
Risk matrices and registers 
are used in the firm-level 
This is part of the risk 
management tools 
Company 
strategy 
Alignment with 
company strategy 
The cases map strategy into 
objectives, although this is not 
done with explicit risk 
strategy 
A reflection of the company’s 
strategy 
Internal 
perception of 
risk 
How the decision is 
perceived internally by 
stakeholders 
Reputation of the individual 
and sub-units of the firm in 
their handling of risk 
The internal perception reflects 
on the control structures within 
the organization 
External 
perception of 
risk 
How the decision is 
perceived externally by 
stakeholders 
Reputation of the company by 
stakeholders, defining the 
environment 
The external perception reflects 
on the environment and the 
perceptions they hold of the 
organization 
Risk 
ownership 
That you are identified 
as the risk owner 
Risk standards suggest risk 
should be owned by an 
individual 
This is a matter of personal 
contingency 
Incentives The impact the 
decision may have on 
your bonus 
Agency theory suggests risk is 
transferred between agent 
and principal 
This is a matter of personal 
contingency 
Reflection on 
risk taker 
How you will be 
perceived 
Managers suggest they are 
personally reflected on in 
their management of risk 
This is a matter of personal 
contingency 
Intuition Your own intuition Intuition versus rational 
decision-making, based on 
application of experience 
This is a reflection of the 
individual’s beliefs and their 
decision making process 
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7.2.2 Design of Treatment Application Survey (TAS) 
Respondents were asked whether they had in their current role used a selection of risk 
treatments, this was answered as yes or no. The list of different treatments being sought was 
developed from section 2.6 (see Appendix D).  
The risk treatments identified for response are: 
1. Insurance: transfer of financial liability (section 2.5.3); 
2. Investing in reducing impact: impact-mitigation (section 2.5.6); 
3. Investing in reducing occurrence: probability-mitigation (section 2.5.6); 
4. Total avoidance: Withdrawal and avoidance (section 2.5.5); 
5. Accepting the risk (section 2.5.2); 
6. Whether the decision can be deferred: a sub-group of avoidance, presented as an 
Option59 (section 2.5.7). 
Having designed the two surveys these were tested before distribution to the single points 
of contact or direct to the respondents. 
7.2.3 Pilot Survey 
A pilot survey was completed with eight respondents; they were not members of the case 
studies. These pilots comprised:  
1) two company owners; 
2) two accountants;  
3) two researchers (two PhD candidates);  
4) two energy industry managers (different companies).  
Their feedback included comment on wording, identification of ambiguity, time taken to 
complete the survey and any recommendations for improvement. Following attention to the 
issues, a revised survey was retested through a second pilot, including three of the initial 
                                                             
59 Isolated as a question following Critical Incident feedback that shows a high consideration for adjusting the 
temporal dimension of risk decisions, and that it was not easily understood as an immediate implementation of 
avoidance strategy. 
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respondents and two new participants (a researcher and an energy industry manager60). Six 
minor amendments were made on using the feedback; survey format, questions and 
wording were fixed. 
7.2.4 Sample Frame 
When combined with the discussion of risk management and risk preferences, discussion of 
risk was seen as politically sensitive and potentially damaging to reputation, access to 
detailed information and accounts were therefore limited. It was not possible to balance 
respondent numbers between management-levels. Inherent in the classification was a 
pyramid of roles/seniority. There were less S-suite managers than M-suite managers. 
Instead there was an inclusion of S-suite managers across all demographic variables61. 
The population of S-suite and M-suite managers62 (GRS & FCORP, UK MU) was estimated 
between 475 and 53563. However some of these were process supervisors, and were 
removed from the survey64.  
The surveys (RSS & TAS) were conducted through an online survey tool65. A link was mailed 
to each nominated participant66 in GRS. In FCORP the link was mailed to the research 
contact assigned to distribute to participants. FCORP approach had several benefits: 1) 
managerial authority and direction to the survey by an internal member of staff yielded a 
higher response rate, 2) FCORP kept the respondent’s email addresses confidential, where 
they wouldn’t have participated otherwise. Limitations were the lack of opportunity to 
                                                             
60 To ensure that prior understanding was not responsible for a perception of improvement 
61 Differentiating gender was possible. There was recognition that certain roles and types of operation were heavily 
skewed towards male employment. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the reasons for this 
distribution, other than to recognise its existence. A report by Feltus (2010) indicated that statistics for women in 
energy are rare and imprecise. Exxon Mobil, had 12% women at executive level, against a target of 20% (Feltus, 
2010). Although Exxon Mobil is an upstream company (gas and oil) and the cases in this thesis were power 
companies, these figures are representative of the gender imbalance.  
62 In FCORP and GRS UK Business Units studied at function-level analysis. 
63 Because of the fluid nature of the organizations, use of secondments (in and out), a precise count of current 
operational managers was not attained. 
64 This identification was completed with the organization liaison points. 
65 Hard copy version made available to EAM, but not used for data collection. Qualtrics was used as the software for 
distribution. 
66 Where direct contact was made, participants were nominated by their organization; in consultation with the 
management team. Emails containing the link include an introduction from their senior management team, 
encouraging participation. 
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analyse non-respondents. This included issues such as gender imbalance or exclusion of 
field based managers (who were not regular computer users). In the service functions, this 
could have selected out sales managers who were less likely to spend administration time in 
the office. Respondents to the survey met the following criteria67, outlined in table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Respondents to Risk Sensitivity Survey 
*The proportion of which are females indicated in brackets 
7.3 Data Analysis 
The data analysis was split into five parts, each analysing a different perspective of risk 
sensitivity or treatment usage. To achieve this, different statistical techniques were used 
depending on the data being analysed. These approaches are outlined below. 
Part 1 (Descriptive Statistics):  
There were 15 variables tested for managerial sensitivity in risk making. The results ranged 
from 0 (no influence) to 5 (extreme influence). The 15 variables were presented in their 
mean and standard deviation68 (these are presented in descending order of sensitivity). 
Part 2 (Exploratory Factor Analysis): 
The 15 variables in the sensitivity survey were analysed to reduce to a lower number of 
“latent variables” (Field, 2013:666), or factors. These factors explain the characteristics of 
managers, and were named in a manner reflective of the phenomenon. Dimension reduction 
can be achieved through exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Factor analysis refers to a range 
                                                             
67 There were 238 usable results in the Risk Sensitivity Survey. All results were permissible, as there was electronic 
validation and enforcement of data integrity of the results before submission 
68 Standard deviation is an estimate of the average variability of a set of data (Field, 2013) 
Firm Split 
FCORP 
Total (female) 
GRS 
Total (female) 
106 (28) 132 (34) 
Function 
Split 
EAM (Asset) FRET (Service) EGEN (Asset) ERS (Service) 
46 (5) 60 (23) 57 (7) 75 (27) 
Management 
Level Split 
S-suite M-suite S-suite M-suite S-suite M-suite S-suite M-suite 
16 (1) 30 (4) 17 (4) 43 (19) 18 (2) 39 (5) 19 (3) 58 (24) 
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of statistical techniques, the two most common are exploratory factor analysis or 
confirmatory factor analysis. In this thesis exploratory factor analysis is used as a means to 
reduce the number of variables into a lesser number of new factors, latent in unstructured 
data:   
“Factor Analysis is based on the fundamental assumption that some underlying 
factors, which are smaller in number than the number of observed variables, are 
responsible for covariation among the observed variables.” (Lewis-Beck, 1994:6). 
The calculation should be completed through using computational means (Field, 2013), and 
for this analysis SPSS was used. This thesis uses the APA format to report statistical results. 
Part 3 (Independent Samples T-Test): 
Independent Samples T-Test (ISTT) provides a comparison of means of two different 
samples. The independent nature of the test infers that the participants in each sample are 
different. In the ISTT performed in Part 3, splitting of samples by gender, function or 
management level was tested. The resulting t-statistic provides a measure of whether these 
compared means are meaningfully different (Field, 2013). If ISTT shows a significance i.e. 
t<0.05 on a two-tailed probability, it indicates that there is not a single homogenous group, 
instead that there is a significant difference in the means indicating separate populations 
that have not occurred by pure chance69. The ISTT is a parametric test based on a normal 
distribution (Field, 2013)70.  
Part 4 (Chi-Squared Tests): 
A Chi-squared test examines patterns of frequencies, and how the results differ from an 
expected pattern of frequencies. The Chi-squared test is a test of the null hypothesis (that 
there wasn’t a significant difference in pattern between expected and observed) (Hair et al., 
2011). In chapter 7 this was used to expose differences in users/non-users of treatments, in 
                                                             
69 An independent sample t-test, indicates a 5% probability of results occurring by pure chance. 
70 If normal distribution is not apparent, shown by a Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance less than 
0.05, the alternate result where equal variances are not assumed is used. 
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firm, function and group level populations. Significance is based on p<0.05 on a two-tailed 
analysis. 
Part 5 (Independent Samples T-Test Comparison of RSS and TAS): 
Part 5 combines the data from RSS and TAS, and the factors derived in part 2. This provided 
an understanding of the relationship between latent risk sensitivities and the propensity 
toward risk treatment use. Part 5 used ISTT to identify the difference between risk 
treatment users and non-users, against each of the risk treatments in the TAS.  
7.4 Results (1): Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics provide an outline of the respondents and their allocation to 
sample frame, descriptive of the mean and standard deviation of each variable and 
percentage of treatment users. The variables included in the survey were developed through 
literature (section 2.6 and summarised in table 7.1); the survey administered is included in 
Appendix D. 
Table 7.3 contains the frequencies and descriptive statistics for the variables (N=238).  
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics, Risk Sensitivity Survey 
 
Variable Mean (s.d.) 
Likert Scale (0: no influence – 5 
extreme influence) 
Sensitivity to statements of impact 4.2 (.9) 
Sensitivity to statements of probability 4.1 (.9) 
Identified as risk owner 4.0 (1.1) 
Personal impact 3.9 (.9) 
Intuition 3.6 (1.1) 
Financial impact 3.6 (1.4) 
Non-financial impact 3.5 (1.1) 
Perception of the individual 3.4 (1.2) 
External perception 3.3 (1.3) 
Risk Management Process 3.2 (1.1) 
Internal perception 3.2 (1.1) 
Risk Classification Tools 3.0 (1.3) 
Company strategy 2.8 (1.2) 
Impact on bonus 2.5 (1.7) 
Previous financial accounts 2.3 (1.4) 
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Zero indicates a total lack of sensitivity to the measure or influence. A five indicates extreme 
(highly sensitive) to the measure. Table 7.4 has been sorted in order from most sensitive 
variable to least. This is a measure of the whole sample. There are individual differences 
between groups; these are evidenced through chi-squared tests (section 7.2.6). There are 
three notable differences between service and asset groups: 
 The sensitivity to an individual’s intuition. Asset managers show a lower sensitivity (3.2 
and 3.3) and wider deviation (1.3) than service managers, who are more sensitive to 
intuition (3.7 and 3.8) with a lower deviation (1.0); 
 Asset managers are more sensitive to statements of financial impact (4.1 and 4.2) than 
service managers (3.5 and 3.7); 
 Asset managers are more sensitive toward statements of probability (4.1 and 4.2) than 
service managers (3.8). 
The overall result indicates that statement of impact and probability demonstrates high 
levels of sensitivity (4.2) to statements and a low standard deviation (.9) of result. This is in 
contrast to the lag measures of previous financial accounts, which demonstrates a low mean 
result (2.3). The effect on an individual’s bonus also has a low level of sensitivity (2.5), 
however the standard deviation (1.7) indicates some level of inconsistency of this result in 
the sample. 
7.5 Results (2): Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Risk sensitivity refers to the way in which people respond to direct and indirect stimuli 
when making risk based decisions. There are a wide variety of stimuli (identified through 
extant literature and prior qualitative analysis, see chapters 4, 5 and 6). In empirical studies, 
there has been no clear consensus on the underlying factor structure of risk sensitivity in 
managers. 
The 238 sensitivity responses were analysed. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to 
uncover latent constructs in the risk sensitivity results.  
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The factorability of 15 variables was analysed, using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy was 0.65, which is above the recommended value of 0.6 (Brace et al., 
2009). Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant (2(208)=105, p<0.001). The diagonal of 
the anti-image covariance matrix showed all 15 variables were over the 0.5 threshold. The 
communalities were all over 0.5 (values under 0.4 were suppressed). 
The initial eigenvalues, indicated that the first factor explained 21% of the variance, the 
second factor explained 15% of the variance, the third factor 11% of the variance, the fourth 
factor explained 9% of the variance and the last factor included, explained 7% of the 
variance. Cumulatively these explained 64% of the total variance. In rotation (Varimax, with 
eigenvalues >1) these five factors were used. The concluding rotated component matrix is 
included below. The varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization provided the best-defined 
factor structure, this concluded after eight rotations71. The results of the EFA are presented 
in Appendix E. 
Five factors were exposed through the rotated solution. The resulting factors appeared to 
offer an explanation of characteristics of the respondents. 
The first factor contained the dimensions of sensitivity toward: alignment to company 
strategy, internal and external perception. In terms of internal and external perception, 
these sensitivities reflect on the organization itself. These two dimensions are joined by 
alignment with company strategy. The common consideration across these points is the 
association to the firm and not the individual. It is therefore a company-focus. 
The second factor contains the dimensions of sensitivity toward the effect on the 
individual’s bonus, how they would be perceived and whether they were identified as the 
risk owner. This is reverse of the company-focus (above) and the point of commonality 
across these dimensions is the individual, this is the individual-focus. 
                                                             
71 Varimax rotation was used, as it is provides a simplified and generally good approach for the interpretation of 
factors (Field, 2013), it is one of three orthogonal rotation methods, the others are quartimax (which is criticized for 
overloading on a single factor) and Equamax (which is criticized for behaving erratically). 
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The third-factor contains the dimensions of sensitivity toward access to the risk 
management process, risk tools and the inverse of intuition. Although it is considered 
whether this is the description of decision-making strategy, being either rational or 
intuitive, inclusion of risk tools makes this a factor describing the standards, tools and 
techniques as part of the risk management process. The inverse of intuition suggests that 
this is a choice between sensitivity to the risk process or the individual’s intuition. To make 
clear the separation from the next factor this is called a tool-focus. 
The fourth factor contains the dimensions of sensitivity toward statements of probability, 
impact and non-financial impact. Probability and impact form the core definition of risk 
(March & Shapira, 1999). Inclusion of non-financial impact is an extension of the traditional 
impact measure. Therefore this factor seems to represent the traditional view of risk as 
impact and probability, where impact includes non-financial consequences; this is the 
traditional-focus. 
The final factor contains dimensions of sensitivity towards previous financial accounts and 
financial impact. These two dimensions are lag and lead measures respectively, but both 
orientated toward the use of financial data. Developing this description in reference to the 
four other factors, the focus is the financial statement sensitivity the financial-focus. 
The five factors are summarised below: 
 Company-focus, company strategy, internal and external perception; 
 Individual-focus, comprising an individual’s bonus and the impact on themselves, how 
they would be perceived and whether they were seen as the risk owner; 
 Tool-focus, availability of the risk management process, and risk tools, and the inverse 
of sensitivity to an individual’s intuition; 
 Traditional-focus, comprising sensitivity to probability, impact and non-financial 
impact measures; 
 Financial-focus, comprising sensitivity to previous financial accounts and sensitivity to 
financial impact. 
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7.6 Results (3): Risk Sensitivity 
The five factors created through the EFA, were used to distinguish whether there were 
different populations within each level of analysis. This was completed through independent 
sample t-tests72, (see section 7.2.6).  
There were three factors that demonstrate significance across various levels of analysis. 
These were financial-focus, traditional-focus and individual-focus. The traditional-focus 
appears both at function and management-level. Firms did not show any significant 
populations appearing through the analysis of factors.  
Function (Asset and service): 
The following independent sample t-tests consider the different conditions of asset or 
service function sensitivity to different conditions: 
Table 7.4 Factors by Function 
* 
Two tailed, equal variances assumed, results are the sum of the individual sensitivity variables in the factor 
There was significance in the scores for asset and service functions financial-focus. This is 
the strongest result from all the different t-tests performed, and indicated that there are two 
distinct populations within the sample. 
This indicated that the asset function had greater sensitivity to financial-focus than service 
functions, and that these form two distinct populations. This indicated that the asset 
function had greater sensitivity to traditional-focus than service functions and that these 
                                                             
72 The observed t-value is 1.8, with degrees of freedom equal to 236. The critical t is approximately 1.96 (on a two-
tailed probability). The observed t < critical t, therefore the samples are the same population.  
 
 Mean (St.Dev) Significance (p) 
Asset (N=103) Service 
(N=135) 
Financial-focus 4.76 (1.60) 3.81 (1.60) 0.001* 
Traditional-focus 10.37 (1.72) 9.52 (1.77) 0.006* 
Company-focus 10.25 (2.28) 9.73 (2.16) 0.19 
Individual-focus 13.85 (3.58) 13.81 (3.24) 0.95 
Tool-focus 6.68 (2.30) 6.81 (3.24) 0.053 
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form two distinct populations. 
Management (S-suite and M-suite): 
The following independent sample t-tests considered the different conditions of S-suite 
sensitivity and M-suite sensitivity to different conditions: 
Table 7.5 Factors by Management Level 
* 
Two-tailed, equal variances not assumed. 
There is a significant difference in sample size between S-suite and M-suite respondents; 
this is an impact of the pyramid of seniority in the case organizations. It was estimated using 
the criteria defined for S-suite managers and the potential population fitting these criteria 
that over 60% of the population was included in the analysis. 
This indicates that S-suite has greater sensitivity to traditional-focus than M-suite and that 
these then form two distinct populations. 
Gender (Male and Female): 
The following independent sample t-tests consider the different conditions of gender 
sensitivity to different conditions: 
  
 Mean (St.Dev) Significance (p) 
S-suite 
(N=70) 
M-suite 
(N=168) 
Traditional-focus 10.17 (1.70) 9.61 (1.83) 0.045* 
Financial-focus 3.88 (1.13) 3.88 (1.34) 0.074 
Company-focus 10.2 (2.42) 9.7 (2.02) 0.207 
Individual-focus 14.16 (3.14) 13.54 (3.54) 0.285 
Tool-focus 6.16 (3.14) 6.54 (3.54) 0.285 
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Table 7.6 Factors by Gender 
* 
Two tailed, equal variances assumed 
This indicates that males will have greater sensitivity to individual-focus than females, and 
that these form two distinct populations. 
The “old bastion of generation businesses” is still heavily biased toward male employees. This 
is changing slowly, and has been the ambition of most companies in this sector to rectify. 
This is an issue of differing importance dependant on national culture influence. Although 
managerial appointments in these businesses are increasingly attracting female employees, 
females are still not occupying the very senior roles. 3% of middle managers were female, 
with no senior managerial appointments for women73. This makes the use of gender as a 
characteristic for development of the sample frame more difficult. Securing access to this 
very small population is seen as a major issue in any further study of gender. 
Summary of RSS Results 
The tests of independent samples identified where there were different populations present 
in the analysis. The most significant of which was the difference between asset and service 
functions. Gender and managerial level had a single significant factor, whilst firms 
demonstrated no differences.  
At the firm-level FCORP (N=106) and GRS (N=132), there were no significant observations. 
The factor traditional-focus demonstrates the greatest population difference. Sensitivity to 
individual-focus and financial-focus also appeared as a differentiator. Table 7.7 indicates the 
                                                             
73 This data does not refer to either of the case organizations, but a comparative generation business unit in a 
similar market. 
 Mean (St.Dev) Significance (p) 
Male (N=176) Female 
(N=62) 
Individual-focus 14.2 (3.12) 12.60 (3.86) 0.02* 
Traditional-focus 10.78 (2.56) 9.38 (3.17) 0.57 
Financial-focus 3.92 (1.28) 3.94 (1.03) 0.977 
Company-focus 8.40 (3.27) 8.16 (3.30) 0.72 
Tool-focus 6.26 (2.18) 6.19 (1.75) 0.86 
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different significant factors. The table identifies the implications of this split at the different 
functions showing the population demonstrating the highest sensitivity to that factor. 
Table 7.7 Summary of Risk Sensitivities at four Frames of Reference 
 
Finding that firms did not differ in risk sensitivity, reinforces the firm-level analysis where 
there was similarity of risk perception between the organizations. 
7.7 Results (4): Risk Treatments 
The following analysis takes the use of risk treatment at the different levels of analysis, to 
test whether there is a significant difference between the samples.  
7.7.1 Treatment Application Survey 
The treatment application survey assessed whether the respondents have used the 
treatment in their organization. This represented either (yes) having used the treatment in 
their role, or (no) not having used the treatment. 
The results are presented as percentages of sample with positive selection of a treatment. 
  
Frame of 
Reference 
Sensitivity toward 
Financial-
focus 
Company-
focus 
Traditional-
focus 
Individual-
focus 
Tool-focus 
Firm 
(FCORP/GRS) 
     
Function (Asset/ 
Service) 
 
Yes 
(Asset high) 
 Yes 
(Asset high) 
  
Management (S-
suite/M-suite) 
  Yes 
(S-suite 
high) 
  
Gender 
(Male/Female) 
   Yes 
(Male high) 
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Table 7.8 Risk Treatments by 3-Levels of Analysis 
 
7.7.2 Risk Treatments by Levels of Analysis 
Using the three levels of analysis, Chi-Squared tests are performed to identify unexpected 
distributions, i.e. a test of the null hypothesis that there isn’t a significant pattern between 
samples. The summary results are provided in table 7.9. It was found that there are no 
significant differences between results at the firm-level. Function and group-level analysis 
demonstrates some unexpected distributions of treatments. 
Table 7.9 Summary of Treatment Usage by Levels of Analysis 
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Firm-Level         
FCORP 105 56% 32% 64% 30% 40% 26% 49% 
GRS 86 49% 43% 69% 36% 37% 35% 40% 
Function-Level         
Asset 103 60% 44% 68% 31% 40% 30% 57% 
Service 88 44% 30% 64% 34% 38% 30% 30% 
Group-Level         
Asset S-suite 33 61% 42% 85% 30% 39% 42% 58% 
Asset M-suite 70 60% 44% 60% 31% 40% 24% 57% 
Service  S-suite 35 46% 23% 74% 26% 34% 40% 31% 
Service  M-suite 53 43% 34% 57% 40% 40% 23% 28% 
 
Users Insurance Outsource Acceptance Avoidance Probability-
Mitigation 
Impact-
Mitigation 
Option 
 
Firm - 
Function Asset high Asset high     Asset 
high 
Group   Asset S-
suite high 
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Function-level: 
The function-level demonstrated difference between asset and service. In treatment usage, 
the asset function demonstrated increased usage of Insurance 2(df=1,N=238)=4.80, P<0.05, 
Outsource 2(df=1,N=238)=4.07, p<0.05 and Option taking 2(df=1,N=238)=14.78, p<0.01, 
over service functions.  
Group level: 
The group level analysis shows increased usage of risk Acceptance in asset S-suite 
(df=3,N=238)=9.62, p<0.05, and increased use of Option taking 2(df=3,N=238)=15.52, 
P<0.01 in both asset M-suite and S-suite (this relates to the function-level analysis). 
Some of these Chi-Squared tests show Pearson Chi-Squared p values of greater than 0.05 
(two tailed). In these cases the null hypothesis is accepted that there are no differences in 
frequencies between samples.  
The data found there were ranges of treatments being used: acceptance was consistently the 
highest used treatment (69% in GRS), and impact mitigation (26% FCORP). Identification of 
treatments use did not differ between firms (FCORP and GRS). There were differences 
identified between functions. Asset functions use insurance, outsource and option taking 
more than service functions. At a group-level, asset S-suite demonstrated a higher usage of 
acceptance than any other group. 
7.8 Results (5): Risk Treatment Usage  
Section 7.6 identified five latent factors, which describe managerial sensitivity; section 7.7 
analyzed the use of different treatments in managing risk. This section combines these 
findings to explain, the relationship between use of a risk treatment (or non-use) and the 
latent sensitivity (the influence). The following results show a significant difference under 
independent sample t-test when applied to the EFA factors (section 7.6)74.  
                                                             
74 Insignificant results are omitted from the results. This is where p>0.05. 
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Table 7.10 Summary of Risk Treatment Usage by Factor 
 
 
7.9 Summary of Individual-Level Results 
The firm-level analysis showed limited differences between FCORP and GRS; indicating the 
differences occurring in managing risk may not be firm dependent. The function-level 
analysis found that differences occurred between service and asset functions (e.g. 
calculative culture and risk system usage). The group-level analysis demonstrated a 
difference between causal maps. However as the discussion outlines (section 6.5), there 
were patterns of agreement and convergence in S-suite, asset managers and service 
managers. 
Chapter 7 tested the different sensitivities and the different uses of treatments. This was a 
quantitative analysis, which in the integrative results, combines the individual-level results 
with the causal maps. 
There was a significant range of sensitivity shown between the 15 statements provided to 
the respondents. This ranged from statements of impact (4.2) through to previous financial 
accounts (2.3). These sensitivities were different across the different groups. It was found to 
be helpful to reduce the number of variables using an EFA. This reduced the variables down 
to five factors, which reflected different traits already seen in the research: Traditional-
Treatment  
(section 7.7) 
Influence  
(section 7.6) 
Users of 
treatment 
(section 7.7.1) 
M(StDev) 
Non-Users of 
treatment 
(section 7.7.1) 
M(StDev) 
Test 
Insurance Financial-focus N=101 
7.23 (1.72) 
N=90 
6.36 (1.62) 
p=0.015 
Acceptance Individual-focus N=126 
13.1 (0.51) 
N=65 
15.1 (0.74) 
p=0.013 
Traditional-focus 12.4 (0.23) 11.0 (0.65) p=0.014 
Avoidance Traditional-focus N=62 
12.7 (1.72) 
N=129 
11.7 (2.07) 
p=0.034 
Option Traditional-focus N=85 
12.6 (1.67) 
N=106 
11.7 (2.12) 
p=0.042 
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focus (based on the established view of risk as probability by impact), Company-focus 
(alignment to strategy and reflection of company perception), Financial-focus (a sensitivity 
to measures and objectives which are framed as financial outcome), Individual-focus (a 
personal reflection of the risk management activity and decisions and how they reflect on 
the individual) and the Tool-focus (application of risk tools, standards and a negative 
relationship with the application of intuition). 
No difference in sensitivity was found between cases (FCORP and GRS), at function-level 
there was a difference between asset and service functions in financial-focus and 
traditional-focus. Between the different groups, no significance was found in the application 
of factors, however only analyzing management level (S-suite and M-suite), there was a 
difference in traditional-focus. S-suite had a higher sensitivity to the traditional-focus factor. 
Finally it was found that between genders, that males have a higher sensitivity to individual-
focus than females75.  
This level of analysis found that an individual’s risk avoidance and option taking were 
sensitive to the traditional-focus (i.e. impact, probability and non-financial impact). 
Individuals using insurance had an increased financial-focus.  
The use of acceptance as a treatment was correlated with two factors: a) the traditional-
focus, b) an individual-focus. Where an increase in sensitivity to the traditional-focus 
identified acceptance as a treatment, a decrease in sensitivity to individual-focus also 
showed an increase in risk acceptance. 
7.10 Integration of Results (4 Levels) 
In Chapter 7’s integrative discussion, primarily focuses upon integration of group-level 
(chapter 6) and individual-level (chapter 7) results; these were levels of analysis focused on 
the structure of decision, following on from firm-level (chapter 4) and function-level 
                                                             
75 It was not possible to provide any further analysis of gender differences at firm, function or group-
level due to the low proportion of females holding managerial posts in these firms. 
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(chapter 5) analysis of the structure of risk management. In turn the discussion considers 
the different groups, their descriptions of influence and their paths to treatment. Table 7.11 
summarizes the combined findings from chapters 6 and 7, and table 7.12 the paths to risk 
treatments. 
Table 7.11 Node and Influence Summary 
 
 Asset S-Suite Asset M-Suite Service S-Suite Service M-Suite 
Map 
Complexity 
(MC) (section 
6.4.2) 
.129 .140 .126 .150 
Map Density 
(MD) (section 
6.4.2) 
1.35 1.33 1.26 1.20 
Significant 
Nodes 
(section 6.4) 
23 26 24 22 
Presented 
Nodes 
(section 6.4) 
20 18 19 15 
Dominant 
Risk 
Treatments 
(section 6.6.3) 
and use 
(section 7.7.1) 
 Acceptance 
85% 
 Outsource 
42% 
 Mitigation 
(probability 
39%, impact 
42%) 
 Acceptance 60% 
 Outsource 44% 
 Mitigation 
(probability 40%, 
impact 24%) 
 Acceptance 
74% 
 Outsource 
23% 
 Mitigation 
(probability 
34%, impact 
40%) 
 Portfolio/ 
Hedging 
 Acceptance 57% 
 Outsource 34% 
 Insurance 43% 
 Mitigation 
(probability 40%, 
impact 23%) 
Dominant 
Risk Types 
(section 6.6.2) 
 Reputation 
 Engineering 
 Safety 
 Environment 
 Reputation 
 Engineering 
 Safety 
 Reputation 
 Financial 
 Planning 
 Reputation 
 Financial 
Central Node 
of Influence 
(NC) (section 
6.4.3) 
 Risk measure 
(.17) 
 Safety (.13) 
 Environment (.13) 
 Control structures 
(.13) 
 Risk measure 
(.15) 
 Belief (.15) 
 Communications ( 
.17) 
Central Node 
of Outcome 
(NC) (section 
6.4.3) 
 Financial risk 
(.13) 
 Communications 
(.17) 
 Control 
structures 
(.11) 
 Structured 
decision-making 
(.33) 
Central Nodes 
(not 
dominant as 
influence or 
outcome) (NC) 
 Belief (.25) 
 Control 
structures 
(.25) 
 Learning (.25)   
Perceptions of 
decision-
making 
(section 6.5.1) 
Rational and 
reasoned 
Reasoned, with a 
satisficing criteria 
rather than optimality 
Rational and 
reasoned 
Intuitive and 
responsive 
Perceptions of 
influence 
(section 6.5) 
Engineering 
discipline and 
experience 
Engineering discipline 
and experience 
Subordinates to 
do the detail, as an 
oversight function 
Individual risk bearing, 
fast paced and using 
experience 
Risk 
Sensitivity 
(section 7.6) 
High financial-focus High traditional-focus, 
high financial-focus 
High traditional-
focus 
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It was seen that reputational risk was the only common risk type formed within the causal 
maps, across all samples. Whereas it was found that acceptance, outsourcing and mitigation 
were consistent risk treatments across all samples. Table 7.12 summarizes the relationships 
between risk types and risk treatments. 
Table 7.12 Paths to Treatment Summary 
 
Table 7.11 and 7.12 summarize the main themes in the group and individual-level analysis. 
The tables demonstrate a consistency in understanding between levels of analysis (group 
and individual). Firstly, that there were pronounced differences between service and asset 
functions. Secondly, that there was an increased consistency between S-suite and M-suite 
managers in asset functions, where there was a more pronounced difference in service 
function management levels. This summary completes the results and analysis in this 
research, which are discussed next in chapter 8. 
  
 Asset S-Suite Asset M-Suite Service S-Suite Service M-Suite 
Direct links to 
treatment (section 
6.4) 
Safety risk to 
avoidance 
Safety risk 
decreases 
acceptance 
Safety risk decreases 
acceptance 
Reputation risk 
decreases transfer 
(outsource) 
 
Prohibitory 
relationships 
(section 6.4) 
Beliefs decrease use 
of lag measures 
Safety risk 
decreases 
acceptance 
Environment 
decreases risk 
transfer (insurance) 
Safety risk decreases 
acceptance 
Environment 
decreases risk 
transfer (insurance) 
Strategy alignment 
decreases reaction 
treatments 
Reputation risk 
decreases 
communication 
Beliefs decrease 
use of lag 
measures 
Reputation risk 
decreases transfer 
(outsource) 
 
Beliefs decrease 
use of insurance 
Beliefs decrease 
use of lag measures 
Environment 
decreases reaction 
treatments 
Inter-risk type 
relationships 
(section 6.4) 
  Planning risk 
leads to financial 
risk 
Speculative risk to 
financial risk 
 
Role of beliefs 
(section 6.4) 
Decreases use of lag 
measures. Increases 
reference to safety 
risk, use of 
avoidance and the 
role of 
communications 
Lead to 
understanding of 
safety risk 
Increases use of 
control structures 
Decreases use of 
lag measures 
Decreases use of 
insurance and 
decreases use of 
lag measures 
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Chapter 8 
8. Discussion 
8.1 Risk in Operations 
Bank’s (2004) classification of risk differentiates between pure risk (the risk of loss) and 
speculative risk (the risk of imprecision, with the potential for gain and loss). This research 
in the energy sector was positioned, as a study of the risk in operations. It was felt on 
starting the research that risk in operations was characteristic of pure risk, because it was 
assumed to be a practice of protection against loss. However at the firm and function-level 
demarcation between pure and speculative risk was blurred. This was most apparent in the 
service functions, whereby hedging and portfolio practices were being used to protect 
against imprecision of outcome, rather than against individual losses, and therefore typical 
of speculative risk practices. Although managers were able to identify where a threat (a 
potential loss event) was being managed, because many of the risks were either systematic 
(Pfohl et al., 2010) or systemic (Kaufman & Scott, 2003), the ability to manage these risks 
didn’t just protect the organization, but provided advantage in the sector. This provided an 
understanding that threats managed successfully offered potential for gain in market 
position, and not just protection from loss. This demonstrated that the theoretical 
distinction between pure and speculative risk management is not precisely replicated in 
practice, confirming Law’s (2009) view that pure and speculative risk cannot be separated. 
In asset functions there was evidence of pure risk practices, in service functions there was 
evidence of pure and speculative risk practices. In asset functions the focus was on the 
protection of assets, whether tangible assets or resources, for example staff, therefore 
speculative practices were not commonplace in asset functions. Because the language 
changed in asset functions to be focused on “protection”, successful management of risks 
was perceived to be a protection of an asset or negatively a loss/damage of an asset. Even in 
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this well-defined environment, risk decisions were not isolated from the ability to gain from 
successful risk management, for example the treatment of an environmental risk that could 
be used for enhancing the reputation of the company.  
At the firm-level the management of risk in operations was a practice covered by definitions 
of both pure and speculative (Banks, 2004) risk practices (section 4.2). It was a reflection of 
discussion of the lowest common denominator in BUs (i.e. speculative practices in the 
service function, as it includes both loss and gain decisions). Both firms demonstrated some 
contention between managing the difference in asset and service risk management 
processes, they found it difficult to reconcile different categories (i.e. engineering or project 
risk) and approaches to risk (section 4.3). Differences between functions included the 
classification of risk, the assessment and valuation approaches and more broadly the 
philosophies toward managing uncertainty.  
A second finding was that across all cases, there was recognition of economic efficiency and 
the inability to fully remove risks. This supported the language of risks being inherent, in 
their untreated form (Bettman, 1973) and in post-treatment a residual risk (cf. Zwikael & 
Sadeh, 2007). It was recognition to a level of uncertainty post-treatment of a risk, and that a 
reduced probability or impact still existed. This meant the risk had on most occasions been 
reduced to a tolerable level (as defined by the Business Unit), where the investment in 
treatment was less than the economic and reputational threat remaining. 
8.1.1 Risk in Operations as a Category of Risk 
Risk in operations, as a separate category of risks was not well defined in literature (section 
2.4), but understood in observed practice. For asset functions, this was a risk associated to 
the loss of production, a safety risk (therefore resulting in production loss) or damage to the 
firm’s reputation (often through environmental hazard); it comprised the majority of the 
function’s activities and therefore risk in operations was the dominant activity (section 5.3). 
In service functions it was more difficult to separate the operation, for example billing, 
meter reading or customer development, from broader market dynamics. This was where 
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the original reference to Operational risk was introduced. Operational risk was analysed and 
deconstructed in the literature review (section 2.3) and found to be a term from the 
financial sector (cf. Power, 2005), its description is similar to a description of an operation 
“people, processes and systems” (Basel Committee, 2006:644). It was found that the 
accompanying processes of valuation and the definition of the term (in relation to Credit and 
Market risk) were incongruent with the energy sector (cf. Mooney et al., 1996), because of 
the multiplicity of risk types (section 4.2.3). The intricacies of market dynamics and the 
operation were brought together in service functions; and because of broader outcomes of 
health, safety, reputational, political and strategic impacts and the inappropriate valuation 
approaches were felt to be fundamentally different from Operational risk (Basel Committee, 
2004). Therefore it was established that risk in operations is not a term of equivalence with 
Operational risk (section 2.3).  
Discussions of supply chain risks were muted within the analysis; in part this is attributed to 
the vertically integrated nature of the companies (section 4.1), and also the relatively short 
supply networks observed. However the learning from the supply chain risk literature aids 
an understanding of practice. In the literature review, it was suggested there were two 
categories of supply chain risks: supply-demand co-ordination risks (Kleindorfer & Saad, 
2005) and disruption risks (Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005; Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007). 
Disruption risk, the “risks arising from disruptions to normal activities” (Kliendorfer & Saad, 
2005:53), was the principle discussion in the case analysis, for example the disruption of 
meter reading agent activities and the impact it had on billing processes. Disruption risk is 
associated to operational failure (Cohen & Kunreuther, 2007), for which the literature 
advocates standardised risk measurement, supply chain information sharing (Hora & 
Klassen, 2013; Ireland & Webb, 2007) and a range of treatment options, which included 
increasing flexibility (Ritchie & Brindley, 2004), redesign (Christopher et al., 2011) and 
redundancy (Grabowski & Roberts, 1999). All of these treatments were observed at the 
function-level (section 5.3.4), and more so in asset functions. Asset functions, as generation 
operations, specifically designed in redundancy in their plants to cope with failure of 
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individual components, even where this provided reduced capacity. However these design 
and investment decisions exposed the importance of analysis and valuation (section 5.3.3) 
informing the treatment decision.  
8.1.2 Risk Analysis and Valuation 
The analysis and valuation processes for risk exposed the impact of individual behaviours, 
suggested by Ellis et al. (2010) and calculative cultures (Power, 2005). The influence of both 
on the risk management process differed between the service and asset functions (section 
5.5). Asset functions were using an increasingly mature risk valuation approach (which was 
not Value at Risk, Basel Committee, 2006). It combined a detailed quantitative and historical 
record of previous failures (as promoted by Dey, 2004; Dey, 2010; Dey, 2012), and 
combined this with expert knowledge, although it was not possible to confirm whether 
these experts were either quicker or more accurate as suggested by Glaser and Chi (1988) 
and Tazelaar and Snijders (2013). Whilst service functions perceived a lack of comparability 
between each risk, the result that each valuation was completed as a discrete transaction 
with limited learning (section 5.3.7) for future assessments being recorded. Therefore the 
different functions demonstrated polar approaches to risk valuation and assessment.  
Understanding of differences in risk categorisation between functions (section 5.5) strongly 
influences an understanding of how, at firm-level, risk in operations can be influenced. It 
indicated that where there was a fundamental difference in adopted philosophy toward risk, 
it caused an increasingly abstract and policy driven connection between the operating units 
and the corporate functions (section 4.2.6). In the cases analysed it resulted in the corporate 
body managing risk as an activity of stakeholder and shareholder communications (section 
4.2.6) and aligning the overall risk portfolio. Individual risks were managed as a portfolio of 
activities within the BUs, and the corporate function intervening only where there was a 
distribution of capital beyond the investment authority of the function (section 4.2.6). It was 
notable that a statement of adopted risk management standard (section 2.2), which included 
the setting of objectives, routines for identification, analysis and approach to treatment (cf. 
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Hopkin, 2004) had limited direct influence on the risk management practices observed in 
Business Units (section 4.3); beyond a requirement for iterative process of treatment and 
control. This is discussed next. 
8.1.3 The Influence of Corporate Function 
In the literature review, only limited differences in the common risk management standards 
were seen to exist (i.e. COSO, AIRMIC and ERM more generically), and in the analysis there 
was limited difference in observed application (sections 4.2.4, 4.3). This put into question: 
what benefit beyond certification does the adherence of a risk management standard 
provide, which is not delivered through risk management approaches developed in practice 
by the company? This challenge was further reinforced by the limited evidence (sections 
4.2.6, 4.3) of cascade and impact at function-level or even in the manager’s decision maps of 
the stated risk management standard (section 6.4.1). This exposed a difference between the 
desired levels of influence from top-down (through the different levels of analysis) and the 
observed and perceived influences in the cases studied.  
Table 8.1, summarises the difference between the desired and observed influences of the 
risk management process. In turn, the design of the risk management process intended to be 
defined in the adoption of a firm-wide risk management standard, for example COSO in 
FCORP (section 4.2.4). The standard was meant to set the strategic process of risk 
management (Federation of European Risk Management Associations, 2013). It was 
apparent that as the risk management process was fulfilled by the BUs, that these cultures 
and operating procedures were dominant in forming the operating model, and that this was 
appropriately aligned to the type of operation (section 5.3.1). In asset functions the 
engineering influence and protection of assets was dominant (section 4.2.5), whereas in 
service functions reconciling the market and the operation (and therefore great awareness 
of exogenous risk) determined the identification, analysis and treatment of risk (section 
4.2.5). 
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Table 8.1 Observed and desired influences at four levels of analysis 
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The identification of risks was a documented phase of the risk cycle (BSI 311000, 2011; 
COSO, 2006). In asset functions, because there was limited competition between generation 
assets and a high number of shared providers (sections 4.1.3, 4.1.5), there was evidence of 
promising practice being shared between organizations (section 5.3.1), where there was not 
a risk of knowledge leakage (cf. Ireland & Webb, 2007). This included sharing of 
documented failure rates and identification of risks. However in the service functions, where 
there were high levels of competition in the homogeneous market there was no sharing of 
risks and treatment practices; as good risk management was described as offering a 
competitive advantage. Therefore the increasing competition in the service sector did not 
encourage sharing of promising practice, unlike in the generation sector. 
8.2 Types of Risk 
The descriptions of different types of risk differed between service and asset functions 
(section 5.3.3), as did the framework for making these distinctions. Different risk standards 
and practices encourage a generalizable classification of risk types (e.g. Operational risk in 
the Basel Accord); risk descriptions were highly localised and reflective of the operating 
level of the managers (section 5.3.3). S-suite managers exhibited descriptions of risk as a 
measure of consequence and M-suite managers of risk as a description of cause. Further, 
translations of risk descriptions were not consistent between firm-level and function-level 
(section 4.2.6), with increasing levels of granularity in the function-level, where the 
conversion between the two were not well understood. This meant that comparison 
between functions (i.e. contrasting risk levels between the retail function and the generation 
function) was inaccurate. What was found was an informal translation of different risk types 
between operations and levels within the firm (section 4.2.6). Because risk descriptions 
were different between operating units the valuation, and the assessment of risk was also 
different (sections 5.3.3, 5.3.4). This was further impacted by the differences in context. It 
was observed that the historical record, the integration of asset and risk registers and the 
role of the risk professional in asset functions provided a suitable quantitative basis for 
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evaluation of a risk (section 5.3.1). However in service functions the complexity of 
influences, the market impact, the competitive barriers between firms, a limited historical 
record and the reliance on the operations manager meant that only a qualitative and 
subjective appreciation of risks were being performed in these operations (section 5.3.1). 
An unexpected characteristic emerged between the two function types; this became 
apparent in using the lens of Calculative Cultures (Power, 2005). It demonstrated a reversal 
of the culture in assessment (section 4.3): in asset functions in the valuation phase appeared 
to be dominated by a quantitative appraisal of risk (typical of calculative idealism) in 
assessment they used the result only as a guide (typical of calculative pragmatism). In 
service functions this was reversed, that risk valuation had limited empirical basis and 
reliant on the subjective assessment of the manager, therefore resulting in a pragmatic 
approach to valuation, which in assessment transferred to almost religious maintenance of 
the initial subjective valuation as if it had been defined through fact (typical of calculative 
idealism). 
8.2.1 Performance System Influence 
Finally, in the selection of a risk treatment, it was observed that there was a lesser effect of 
the performance system in reaching risk treatments than expected in commencing the 
research (section 5.3.8). Risk treatments were justified in reference to organizational beliefs 
(culture) and individual beliefs (often morality) before articulation to stated performance 
measures; and where they were this was felt to be a post-hoc justification (this is discussed 
in greater detail in the next section).  
8.2.2 A Framework for Risk Descriptions 
It has been highlighted in the previous section that different descriptions of risk were 
apparent throughout the analysis. This occurred both between cases (i.e. asset to service) 
and between levels of analysis (i.e. firm to function). This presented a major challenge in the 
comparison between levels of risk, standardised valuation approaches and the potential for 
duplication/ omission. It is felt that the desire for a utopian and standardised single unit of 
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measure was a major influence of the financial sector’s VaR valuation approach, and hence 
reference to Operational risk (Basel Committee, 2006). As discussed later in section 8.6, this 
obsession with finance sector approaches to managing risk is inappropriate in the energy 
sector and further this can be generalised to its inappropriate application in sectors 
displaying a multiplicity of risk types, especially where financial valuation is difficult to 
reconcile to the underlying consequence (i.e. Health and Safety). 
What emerged from the literature review and the case analysis was a relationship between 
different risk types not expressed in theory. The suggested framework is influenced by 
previous research, for example Dey’s (2002; 2004; 2012) Analytic Hierarchy/ Levels of Risk 
and Lewis’ (2003) Cause, Consequence and Control. The framework is a fusion of these two 
ideas; in Dey’s presentation of risk relationships and Lewis’ description of cause and 
consequence. In the analysis it was apparent that at the lowest level of decision-making the 
individual risks were being discussed as a statement of cause (often by M-suite managers), 
for example a failure caused by two-phasing a turbine. In S-suite and function-level this was 
going through a valuation conversion process (section 5.3.3) and being interpreted into a 
consequence of the very same failure. However this was now being expressed as a measure 
of consequence, for example the turbine failure reduced production capacity by 30% and 
equated to £1m/day loss. At the most basic level this was a transfer of the description of risk 
from a single cause into a single consequence. The measure of consequence was defined as a 
financial outcome (£ or $), as this aided investment decisions. However as the analysis 
progressed and increasingly complex risks were observed the relationship between cause 
and consequence also become more elaborate, for example, a failure in the retail billing 
process (as a description of cause) was converted into a risk of reduced income and a 
reputational risk (a single cause had two measures of consequential risks). 
A distinction was made between the description of a risk as a cause and risk as a statement 
of consequence. This distinction serves more than a semantic exercise (cf. Power, 2005); it 
distinguished the level of analysis and the purpose of the description. Table 8.2, provides an 
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approach to causal and consequential definitions of risk, it highlights the purpose of the 
description and how this focuses the organization (or individual). 
Table 8.2 Cause-Consequence Comparison 
 
This distinction can be extended beyond the individual context of energy. It can be applied 
to any industry or organization that seeks to define its types of risks in a structured 
approach. It allows for the relationship between different risk types to be identified, and 
recognition of the conversion and valuation processes. In the energy sector, where there is a 
multiplicity of risk types this was increasingly complex in its relationships, and in the 
analysis showed where an outcome had both financial and safety implications.  
To demonstrate how the risk descriptions can be modelled, the well-documented structure 
of the Basel Committee (2006) is provided in example, figure 8.1. A deconstruction of the 
Basel description exposes the contention in the framework (cf. Crouhy et al., 2001), and why 
Operational risk is a fundamentally different description to Credit or Market risk. 
 Risk as a Cause Risk as a Consequence 
Risk Risk from… Risk of… 
Considerations 
Descriptive of qualitative impact. 
Clear on assumptions of valuation. 
“general categorisation of events that 
initiate failures” (Lewis, 2003:206) 
Ability to compare common sources. 
When aggregated potential to 
duplicate, when isolated ability to 
assign responsibility 
Assumes a probability of event 
occurrence. Requires translation 
method between causes. Challenging 
to see common causes 
Ability to compare different risks, and 
prioritise on a single metric. 
Challenging to assign responsibility. 
Focus 
Focuses on understanding, and 
common causes 
Focuses on prioritisation and 
investment in treatment 
E.g. 
People, processes, systems, law/legal, 
regulation, market, credit 
Financial & safety (H&S). Conversion 
of environmental risk to financial 
because investors need financial 
information (cf. Newton et al., 2005). 
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Figure 8.1 Cause-Consequence in Basel Accord (2004) 
In the Basel Accord (2004), risk valuations are expressed in financial terms; most commonly 
using VaR. Feeding into this overall financial value (for purposes of defining capital 
adequacy) there are three main types of risk: Market, Credit and Operational risk (section 
2.3.1). Market and credit risk are definitions of consequence: risk of economic loss, risk of 
losses on and off-balance sheet positions (Basel Committee, 2006:638). However Operational 
risk is “loss resulting from inadequate or failed processes…” (Basel Accord, 2004:644); this is 
a causal description of risk. The Basel Accord may be criticised in the inconsistency between 
Tier 2 descriptions. Extending the hierarchy further, Operational risk is made up of three 
underlying categories of risk “failed internal processes, people and systems” (Basel 
Committee, 2006:644). Individually these are causal definitions of risk. 
In the following section, the hierarchies of risk are synthesised from the firm-level case 
analysis.  
GRS Risk Hierarchy 
Deconstruction of the GRS risk types, demonstrated the difference between the asset 
functions’ and service functions’ risk hierarchy. In the asset function, BU risk types (3rd tier) 
were mapped to corporate risk types (2nd tier). Whereas the service functions’ risk types 
had increased levels of conversion and many-to-many relationships, see figure 8.2. The GRS 
asset function hierarchy is represented first. 
Financial Risk
(Tier 1 Consequential)
Credit Risk
(Tier 2 Consequential)
Market Risk
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Operational Risk
(Tier 2 Causal)
Systems
(Tier 3 Causal)
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People 
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Figure 8.2 Cause-Consequence in GRS asset 
The three Business Unit risk types (3rd tier) were embedded into the risk analysis software 
(section 5.3.1), therefore reducing complexity in the process and reducing the subjective 
mapping in the reporting process: safety risk (is converted to a financial measure outside of 
the business unit process, at corporate level, but was not used in function-level decision-
making). Environmental risk, mapped to sustainability and environment. Engineering risk 
(already established with a currency value, calculated by predefined production costs and 
profit data) maps to asset risk. 
The service function risks were more complex in their relationship, as shown in figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3 Cause-Consequence in GRS service 
In the service function the different risks were not well defined, beyond forecasting risk and 
customer numbers. Risk types were defined on an ad-hoc basis, responding to emerging 
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issues. Project risk was a consistent point of contention, although understood as an attribute 
of a project, each project commanded different activities, for example: a system change may 
affect customer numbers and operability of the system. But a project to change working 
times incurred a safety risk and an impact on the customer numbers. 
What is seen in this framework is the relationship between a cause of a risk and the path to 
final valuation (top tier). Top tier definitions of risk were a strategic decision reflecting firm-
level stakeholder influences (Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3), for example EAM decided that 
it was inappropriate to turn safety risk into a financial valuation, and therefore left safety 
risk as a separate top tier risk. This was an important statement within the operation, and 
influenced behaviour in the treatment of risks affecting health and safety, in that they would 
not be tolerated regardless of cost to treat. 
8.2.3 Risk Hierarchies 
Developing this hierarchy allows an improved appreciation of the structure and relationship 
of different categories of risk. First the top tier risk types indicate the final unit of 
performance measure in the organization, or the BUs. The different consequential risk types 
operate as a lower level of granularity to identify the risk types within the organization and 
were the dominant unit of measure at the function-level, in the cases analysed this differed 
most between service and asset functions (section 5.5). In asset functions this was 
predominantly: operational/production, safety and environmental risks (section 4.2.3). 
Whereas in service functions the complexity of the environment was exposed, with a 
breadth of risk types: credit, market, systems, projects, reputation and political (sections 
4.2.3, 5.3). Figure 8.4, suggests a generic framework for documenting risk hierarchy in the 
firm. 
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Figure 8.4 Causal-Consequential Classification Reconciliation 
A clear classification of risk types provides the corporate body or supply chain the ability to 
accurately and technically describe and categorise risks, further to structure decision 
support analysis (cf. Dey, 2004). Classification is a method of demarcation, division of tasks 
and basis for resource investment (cf. Dey, 2004). In understanding of the hierarchy of risk 
there are benefits: 1) A clear hierarchy reduces the potential for double counting of risk 
impact; 2) It ensures a precision of the terms being used and 3) It provides a model to 
structure the risk conversion (and hence valuation) process (cf. Dey, 2004; 2010). 
Risk valuation is critical, it provides a comparison for investment in mitigation (section 
6.4.1), cost benefit analysis of outsource and insurance (insurance requires the risk to 
definite and measurable (Vaughan, 1997)) and a means of prioritisation (section 6.4.1). 
Managers focus upon valuation both as a reported measure of risk (measure and targets, 
section 7.3) and as an input into the risk management process for structured decision-
making (value of inherent and residual risk)(section 6.5.1). There needs to be a reflection of 
both the granular and specific descriptions of risk that exist (i.e. at an operational level) and 
an ability to aggregate the risk (at organizational level) for purposes of prioritisation and 
treatment: “In practical terms this involves the risk of things going wrong with the day-to-day 
processing activities of the firm…” (Securities Institute, 2004:4-3). Therefore the causal and 
consequential definitions of risk are summarised as: 
Tier 1 Consequential 
Definition e.g. 
Financial
Tier 2 Consequential Definition 
e.g. Reputation
Tier 2 Consequential 
Definition e.g. Safety
Tier 2 Consequential Definition 
e.g. Environment
Tier 3 Causal Definition
 e.g. Off-Shore Transformers
Difference between 
consequential generation and 
causal generation may lead to 
double counting
Conversion methods need to 
be defined, providing common 
unit of measure
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 A causal definition of risk identifies the source of the risk. It is used to group common 
weaknesses in the operation or environment. It is not used for valuation or contrast 
between other types of risk. It may include measurement for probability of failure; the 
impact of failure may be described qualitatively (e.g. GRS’s risk matrix: section 5.3.6). 
However as a limitation, the specific cause of a loss-event are not always identifiable 
(Power 2005), and then there is a need to view the realisation of risk as a product of the 
system as a whole (Oren 2001), and not just the threat of failure of a component part. 
 A consequential definition of risk identifies the outcome of the risk/s, using a defined 
unit of measure (often financial). It is used for valuation, comparison, and assessment. It 
provides a benchmark for the organization to assess it overall risk structure. However 
as a limitation there is a reduced ability to collect common causes or identify specific 
weaknesses through a consequential measure. 
This classification identifies that both causal and consequential measures of risk must be 
used in tandem to satisfy the different requirements of the risk decision-making process. 
Lack of understanding of the difference between a causal or consequential definition was 
seen to (firm and group-level analysis): 
 Increase the chance of duplication in consequential measures of risk (section 6.5.1); 
 Disassociate the operational managers from their contribution toward the aggregated 
risk of the organization (sections 5.3.2, 6.5.3); 
 Increase silo working in the risk management process (cf. Mikes, 2011 and section 
6.5.3);  
 Defer responsibility for understanding the risk measures to the risk managers only 
(sections 5.3.2, 6.5.2); 
 Make the risk management process bureaucratic (section 6.5.2). 
The next section moves from discussing the structure of the risk management process and 
differences between categorisation to the types of treatment in managing risk in operations. 
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However the two are intrinsically linked, as demonstrated later in the discussion of paths to 
treatment. 
8.3 Treatment Strategies for Risk in Operations 
This research aimed to understand: what are the treatment strategies for managing risk in 
operations, and what influences these selections of treatment? The discussion has 
highlighted the difference between service and asset functions as presenting polar types of 
assessment philosophies, and calculative cultures (section 4.3) toward risk, and further that 
the types of risk being described were in contrast between functions (section 4.3). It 
established that this difference was more than a semantic exercise, as it defined boundaries 
of jurisdiction and provided a categorisation of risk (cf. Power, 2005). The valuation of a risk 
is seen to be an influence on the selection of a treatment (sections 6.6, 6.6.3), however as the 
argument developed the categorisation of the risk was influential. Chapter 7, the individual-
level exposed the use of treatments, and a sample of the extent of use (section 7.6). Again 
differences were exposed between asset and service functions; however there was also an 
observed effect of management level. 
The firm, function and group-levels of analysis identified a range of risk treatments 
(sometimes referred to as risk strategies by participants) that had been used (section 7.6.2); 
the individual-level then tested for the quantity of use of these treatments (section 7.6.1). 
Hopkin offered the “4Ts of risk treatment: Tolerate, treat, transfer and terminate” 
(2012:224), and although practice did demonstrate use of all these treatments being used 
(section 7.6), the model was found to be overly simplistic.  
Managers did accept risks (section 7.6.1), but they were also shown to ignore risks (which 
was different to being ignorant of the risk, see section 2.6.1). Hopkin’s (2012) description of 
tolerate, did not differentiate between these two mind-sets; whereas Gan et al. (2009) 
suggested this is the difference between defensive strategies and controlling strategies. In 
accepting risk, there was seen to be a conscious decision balancing alternative costs of 
treatment against both the probability and impact (section 7.4) of the identified risk. In 
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ignoring a risk, this reasoned decision-making did not occur, nor was there evidence of an 
intuitive decision (cf. Kahneman, 2003) to accept the risk. Acceptance of risk was seen as a 
risk taking decision (section 6.6.1), however in the causal mapping analysis avoidance of 
risk was seen not as a separate treatment option, but as a prohibitory action not to accept a 
risk (section 6.4.1).  
The treatment of risk, which in Hopkin’s (2012) language is a sub-category of affirmative 
action on an identified risk, included both impact and probability reduction (mitigation). 
This category of treatments was consistent with observed practice (section 6.7.3). However 
managers demonstrated little appreciation for the difference in mitigating the probability of 
an event, by providing resilience, for example in designing flexibility or procuring multiple 
sourcing partners (cf. Ritchie & Brindley, 2004; Spekman & Davies, 2004); or the mitigation 
of impact, by providing redundancy, for example the provision of contingency (cf. Davies & 
Walters, 1998) or limitation of affect (cf. Faisal et al., 2006). Within this category of 
mitigation there was evidence of portfolio treatments (section 6.4.1), for example the 
practice of hedging, the inversely correlated holding of two outcomes, therefore minimising 
impact or portfolio management (uncorrelated holdings) which through their probability 
reduces the overall risk position (cf. Oren, 2001). 
Transferring of risk (Hopkin, 2012) was a popular risk treatment in the analysis (section 
7.6.1: asset managers 60% and service managers 44%), however it was found that 
structural conditions could prevent their application. Transfer of a risk through outsourcing 
(cf. Teng et al., 1995) was perceived as a strategic decision (sections 6.5, 6.5.2), requiring 
collective and senior authorisation, and transfer (of financial impact) through insurance (cf. 
Crockford, 1980) were only enabled through organizational framework agreements (section 
6.6). It was widely acknowledge that transfer of risk, in either form, had no or limited 
influence on the probability of a failure (section 6.6), and only served to reduce the impact 
to the client organization. This was consistent with Crockford (1980) that transfer is not a 
suitable replacement for other risk management strategies. 
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Finally, terminate (Hopkin, 2012), is the total withdrawal from an environment presenting a 
risk, this was expressed as avoidance by managers in the study (section 6.4.2). They felt this 
was the most difficult and costly treatment available to them, and many felt this was 
perceived negatively. Hopkin’s description does not however recognise the role of option 
taking in risk management. Option taking is the deferral of decision (Dixit & Pindyke, 1994), 
where it is possible to delay entry into the path of the risk.  
From the literature, logical deduction and the accounts of managers it was possible to 
deconstruct the different treatments, using the original ontology of risk, which defines risk 
as a product of (subjective) probability and impact (cf. Dey, 2004; Dey, 2012; de Finetti, 
1970; Knight, 1921). Further the accounts of managers identified the perceptions of 
permanence of decision to a specific treatment, for example the acceptance of a risk was 
seen as a decision that could be altered immediately after if presented with new criteria. 
Second there was a perception of the relative cost of applying a treatment (reflecting on the 
cost before a risk may be realised), for example the cost of deploying fail-safe technology for 
reducing probability of failure was perceived as moderate cost, whereas purchasing 
contingency was seen as a costly decision, because of procurement of assets/resources. This 
is presented in table 8.3. 
Table 8.3 Risk in Operations Treatments 
 
Treatment 
Risk Axis Managed Perceptions of Treatments 
Impact  Probability  
Permanence Cost before 
realisation 
Accept - - Low Low 
Avoid -  High High 
Hedging  - Low Moderate 
Mitigate-Impact  - Moderate High 
Mitigate-
Probability 
-  Moderate Moderate 
Portfolio 
approach 
 - Low Low 
Transfer 
(Insurance) 
 - Low Moderate 
Transfer 
(Outsource) 
  High High 
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When presented in practitioner terms, managers could differentiate between probability 
and impact mitigation, and further toleration and transfer treatments (7.8), and answers 
provided a separation in the perception of cost. This had meant in some cases that 
successive probability-mitigation strategies had been employed (as individual cost is low 
and reflected procedural changes within their authority), where a more expensive impact-
mitigation strategy would have been more effective, but required capital expenditure, 
outside of their authority (M-suite).  
Before the paths to different treatments are discussed, the relative usage of each can be 
identified. Managers had identified their use of treatments, in their performance of their 
role. Figures 8.5a to 8.5d represent the usage of treatments by group (Chapter 6). The 
treatment levels were taken from section 7.6, and positioned against perceived cost and 
perceived permanence (section 6.5.2) of treatment decision. These results indicate for each 
treatment the percentage of the sample that used the treatment in their role. 
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Figure 8.5 Paths to Treatment 
There were differences and commonalities exposed in combining understanding of the 
group’s mental models and the treatment usage results. First, acceptance was used more 
regularly by S-suite managers, than M-suite managers (section 7.6.2). Second the barrier of 
S-suite authority perceived by M-suite managers (section 6.5.2) clearly reduced the 
application of impact mitigation treatment in M-suite (Asset M-suite, 24%, asset S-suite, 
42%, service M-suite, 23% and service S-suite, 40%). This was logical as the access to capital 
and resources to deploy impact mitigation strategies was under the assessment of the senior 
managers. Excluding this rule it could be seen that as cost and permanence increases in the 
treatments, the levels of use decrease. This again is a logical deduction, and further 
supported by the finding of structured decision-making being a path to selecting the more 
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costly treatments (section 6.4.1). These paths to treatment were seen to be influenced by 
more than a pure economic decision however, and it was one that was mediated by all four 
levels of analysis completed in this research (discussed next). Leading to an understanding 
to how managers make and are influenced in reaching a treatment, the different levels of 
analysis are discussed in turn. 
8.4 Four Levels of Analysis 
Four levels of analysis were completed in this research. Each contributed to the 
understanding of the different influences on the risk management process and how the 
performance of the risk management process is understood. The distinguishing features of 
each level are discussed in turn: 
The Firm-Level 
The firm-level recognised the limitations and challenges it faced in managing risk across a 
distributed and operationally diverse organization (section 4.3). The finding was that the 
firm-level (the corporate functions) focus upon defining the risk standards (section 4.2.4), 
the risk contribution of its BUs (section 4.2.7) and defining the final valuations and 
categories of risk (section 4.2.6). The firm-level was focused upon communications to the 
stakeholders (section 4.2.1) as well as providing guidance (for alignment with stakeholder 
demands) to the functional units.  
The Function-Level 
At the function-level, there was increasing awareness that the BUs were the largest 
operational structure in the firm. Therefore they commanded great power in the 
relationship with the central corporate functions. There was an awareness of local context 
(national or regional). Risk systems, or systems incorporating risk processes were held in 
the BUs (section 5.3.1, therefore as the system drove the process, identities including 
descriptions of risk were strong at this level (section 5.3.3). This was about aligning risk 
process to the operations, whilst contributing to the corporate identity. 
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The Group-Level 
Managerial groups and separation between S-suite and M-suite demonstrated a difference 
in levels of authority (section 6.5.2). There was indication that S-suite had an increased 
breadth of understanding of the environment (section 6.6.7), and demonstrated this 
complexity in their decision process. There were different categories of decisions exposed in 
the causal mapping analysis (section 6.5.5), and this was consistent across the different 
samples. 
The Individual-Level 
Individuals reflected on their own relationship with risk. Understanding that they were 
officers of the firm (seen in the financial-focus and company-focus factors, section 7.5), but 
also individuals that have individual responsibility and their management of risk reflected 
on them personally (seen in the individual-focus factor, section 7.5).  
8.4.1 Relationship between Levels of Analysis 
These four levels showed a development of perspective from firm-level to individual-level; 
this was systematic combining, cycling between matching and redirection (cf. Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002). The firm-level, was about the organization and structures (section 4.3), with 
an objective to be objective and standardised (section 4.2.4). The function-level was equally 
about the organisations and structures, but increasingly aware of the operational, regional 
context (section 6.5.4) and environment (cf. Looney et al., 2008; Villena et al., 2009). The 
function-level demonstrated a need for the risk management process to be aligned to system 
capability and the nature of its processes (section 5.3.1). Moving to group-level (the 
difference between management levels) there was increased evidence of the personal 
influence, both in terms of organizational authority (section 6.5.2), experience of the 
individual, their increased breadth of understanding (demonstrated by the increasing 
complexity of causal maps), but also the responsibility they held to both their subordinates 
and the company. The individual-level demonstrated that subjective influences and personal 
contingencies influenced the individual decision-making process (section 7.5); and the unit 
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of analysis had developed to the individual decisions rather than the collective perspective 
of risk in the firm. This evolution of the research and the influences from the different levels 
is summarised in figure 8.6.    
 
Figure 8.6 Changing Perspectives 
The organization’s risk types and treatments (firm-level direction, mediated and 
contextualised by function-level) were the organization’s influences on the decision-maker. 
This required an understanding of the mechanism for transferring this vision, targets and 
measures to the managers. It was found that direct and prescriptive uses of performance 
systems (either performance management systems or performance measurement systems) 
were nearly absent from the management of risk (section 5.5). Instead it was found that the 
influence was indirect (by interpreting other measures, section 6.4.1) and open (no direct 
target). However there was evidence of the different components of the performance system 
being influential in the decision-making process (section 6.4.1). There was a clear statement 
that risk decisions were made in consideration of the stated strategy (section 7.4), however 
Frame of Reference
F
o
cu
s 
o
f 
R
es
ea
rc
h
organization individual
structures
decisions
The risk management process 
is objective, defined by 
standards, classifications and 
valuation routines.
The risk management process is 
contingent on its environment, a 
product of the operation, defined 
by its systems and local 
descriptions.
The risk management 
decision process is a product 
of experience, authority and 
responsibility.
Risk management is a complex 
interaction of beliefs and 
organizational influence. Risk 
decisions are a product of the 
individual within the context of an 
organization.
Path of research
318 
 
evidence of articulation and transfer of strategic ambition into objectives, measures and 
targets (cf. Bourne et al., 2000) or any process of risk strategy mapping (cf. Kaplan & Norton, 
2000) were absent (section 6.4.1). Further there was no evidence that risk measurement 
was feeding back into either the control structures or strategy nodes (sections 6.4.1; 7.10), 
as encouraged by Bourne et al. (2000); this was a significant limitation in the process; 
meaning there was limited mediation of the firm-level or functional-level strategies being 
developed (sections 4.2.4; 5.3.8). 
The measurement function was broken down in the analysis, to include lag and lead 
measures (cf. Evans, 2004) and further risk measures, but not as key risk measures (cf. 
Proctor et al., 2009). The relationship between each measurement node showed some 
consistency in understanding between the samples. Lag measures had influence on the 
communication of risk (section 6.4.1), whereas lead measures were seen as a causal 
influence on the development of risk measures (section 6.4), this is entirely consistent with 
risk as being a latent phenomenon, but was also difficult for the organization to reconcile 
with the reporting against target.  
The communication function of the performance system was seen as highly influential in the 
development of beliefs in the organization (section 7.10), and the link in causal maps was 
established across three of four groups (section 6.6). In interview respondents were keen to 
highlight how the message of “safety first” had been implemented into the belief set through 
a systematic communication drive and challenging targets over many years (section 6.5.5). 
These different influences and roles of the performance system become evident in the 
integration of understanding from the four levels of analysis; however they are the 
mechanism rather than an explicit force (section 7.10). Figure 8.7, identifies these key 
relationships. 
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Figure 8.7 Levels of Analysis Inter-Relations 
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The firm-level was driven by the ability to secure capital through the markets and maintain 
stakeholder support (section 4.2.2), especially dominant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997), 
the influence resulted in a financial measure of risk being applied, as a single and 
understandable measure of risk (section 4.2.2). However, there was disconnection in the 
measures of risk being cascaded into the function-level (section 5.3.3); this disconnect was 
influenced by regional understanding and functional association, the functions 
demonstrated different perspectives of risk (section 5.3.9). Asset functions perceived risk as 
the potential for investment and service functions perceived risk treatment as cost (section 
5.3.3). 
The managerial groups, made up of a collection of individual managers, demonstrated 
difference in authority (management level) and awareness (strategic versus operational 
focus, section 6.5.2). Multiple forces influenced the individuals, including interpretation of 
the performance system (indirectly to risk), their personal contingencies and access to 
experience and/or data (section 6.4). The role of the individual in decision-making was 
mediated by the risk systems and policies (section 6.5.3), but at different levels based on 
their functional alignment.  
The findings and their implications at the function and firm-levels were discussed in the 
analysis of risk types, risk classifications and risk processes. It was shown that the path to 
treatment selection resided within the individual managers. The group and the individual 
are discussed next to understand the route to treatment selection. 
8.5 Individual Decision Influences 
The research showed there were five main factors influencing the individual’s risk decision-
making (section 7.5). The traditional-focus was recognition of risk as a product of 
probability and impact; this is consistent with Dey (2004), de Finetti (1970) and Knight 
(1921). Participants from asset functions were shown to be more sensitive to this influence 
than service functions (section 7.5). This was explained through the system driven reasoned 
decision-making, therefore removing known biases (cf. Kahneman, 2003) and it leveraged 
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the significant data sets and historical analysis maintained within the asset functions 
(section 5.3.1). This process was embedded in unavoidable requirements and design of the 
risk register, which was embedded in the asset register. Second there was a financial-focus 
(section 7.5), this was the sensitivity toward measures of financial outcome and previous 
financial accounts, and asset functions demonstrated higher sensitivity toward these 
measures. This reflected the ability of asset functions to make detailed and accurate 
financial valuations of both latent risk and cost of treatment. These two findings indicated 
the accuracy of information used for creating the assessment of risk was reflected in the 
manger’s sensitivity toward the measure.  Therefore in stable and more predictable 
environments the measures of risk as impact, probability and specifically financial impact 
became clear considerations by the individual manager. However there was an indication 
that in volatile environments (section 6.5.4), with perceived imprecision of data, this effect 
was reduced. 
There were three other factors identified in describing the sensitivity of the individual 
manager: company-focus (the sensitivity toward being aligned to company strategy and the 
perceptions of operation), individual-focus (the sensitivity toward implications on the 
decision-maker) and tool-focus (the sensitivity toward the application of tools in forming 
assessment and valuation of risk). Of these three factors, none showed a distinction between 
the levels of analysis used in this research (section 7.9). It was observed that males, more 
than females, were sensitive to implications on the individual (section 7.6). It inferred that 
females are more altruistic than males in making risk decisions.  
8.5.1 Levers of Control 
Simon’s Levers of Control (1995), was identified as a framework explaining the theoretical 
impact of performance systems on the management of risk (section 2.8.7); or more 
specifically decisions in managing risk. Simons (1995) identified four different levers: belief 
systems (the core values of the firm), boundary systems (boundaries of decision), diagnostic 
systems (ability to predict and analyse performance) and interactive systems (real-time 
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management of uncertainties). This was reflected on in the analysis of the causal maps 
(section 6.5.5). 
The causal maps exposed three different paths to treatment selection: 
- The direct link between a type of risk and a treatment (or prohibition of a treatment). 
These links to treatment had no mediating node (section 7.10), indicating no reference 
to the performance system or individual stimuli. It was most common to see this direct 
link expressed as a direction of prohibition, for example safety risk did not directly 
require mitigation but the ability to accept the risk was removed. This is significant 
because it both infers an order of decision, that the prohibition occurs first before 
moving to a second level of decision, but most importantly it made the classification of 
risk significant (section 7.10). This is consistent with Hsee and Hastie (2006) that rules 
dominate over experience, organizational rules therefore fundamentally influence the 
selection of treatment. 
- Treatment paths are influenced by beliefs. In the context of this analysis there were 
beliefs of the individual (section 6.5.1). Similar to direct links to treatments, belief 
mediated paths appeared as prohibitory influences on treatment selection. In the 
accounts of managers the alignment of individual and organizational beliefs was 
important to maintain consistency; this was maintained by a bidirectional influence 
between individual and organization (section 6.5.5). There was evidence of individual 
beliefs impacting the control structures, demonstrating influence on the organization. 
- Paths to treatment influenced through the structures of the performance system. These 
included communications (cf. Lowrie & Cobbold, 2004), measures (three types: lag, lead 
and risk) (cf. Neely et al., 2002), alignment (cf. Kaplan & Norton, 2008) and learning (cf. 
Bititci et al., 1997). The relationships from risk to treatment followed a complex route 
of considerations, and these paths to selection treatment were not consistent between 
samples (section 6.6.6); however some commonalities in map segments were identified 
(see section 6.6). It was seen that S-suite managers held more complex mental maps 
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than their equivalent M-suite (section 6.4.3), showing a greater understanding of the 
relationships between the different nodes (influences). These are the performance 
managed paths to risk treatment. The inclusion of the structured risk decision making 
node (section 6.5.1), was evidence of reasoned decision-making in the process, this was 
inseparable from the performance system components being applied. 
These three different paths to risk treatment seen in the analysis have a similarity to the 
understanding in the Levers of Control (Simons, 1995); this was exposed in the analysis of 
decision order (section 6.5.5). These findings extend the understanding of how these levers 
appear in practice. An order of influence can be deduced between these different levers 
(section 6.5.5); however there is also a contention exposed with the existing model, this is 
discussed in the next section. 
8.5.2 Contrast with Levers of Control (Simons, 1995) 
The direct links to treatment occur first in the decision-makers selection of treatment, this 
prohibition (not to take a certain treatment). This equated to Simons’ Boundary Systems: 
“boundary systems are stated in negative terms or as minimum standards” (1995:84). This 
reduces the number of options available to the decision-maker. They were characterised 
responses of “we…”, e.g. “we do not hurt people, safety risks are not accepted” or “we have to 
invest in mitigating the impact to the environment”. These reflect on culture and 
organizational mantras. 
Second, belief mediated treatment selection is characteristic of Simons’ Belief Systems 
(1995). Although Simons’ definition is focused on organizational beliefs, what was stated in 
this research was the belief of the individual, which both reflected on and influenced the 
beliefs held by the organization (section 6.5.5). The recommendation for extension is that 
there are two groups of belief held: the individual and the organization (although 
organizational beliefs appeared to be established through rules), and that the system 
reconciles these collectively. Where it is critical, an organizational belief, by its significance 
becomes established as a boundary condition (section 6.5.5). This is achieved through the 
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role of communications, and hence indirectly the performance system. Beliefs in contrast 
were characterised as statements discussed as “I…”. These have been formulated through 
experience, and what would be considered critical incidents. There was strong evidence of 
storytelling and urban myths to validate these beliefs, even where they knew the stories not 
to be accurate. They were formed through statements of morality and personal philosophy 
of management. They were not always easily articulated as to their reasoning, and in many 
accounts the belief had been formed without conscious attention (section 6.5.5). 
The performance managed path to treatment selection was unable to separate between the 
diagnostic and interactive systems (Simons, 1995). This is a consistent challenge to Simons’ 
Levers of Control (Ferreira & Otley, 1999), that these two systems are not always possible to 
separate in implementation. It appears that the difference between diagnostic and 
interactive is the difference between lag/reactive and lead/proactive systems, although this 
difference was not established in this research. 
In developing this understanding it is possible to present the Levers of Control in a revised 
framework, which offers an order of influence and an understanding of the relationship 
between levers. This is presented in figure 8.8. 
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This model is incomplete without understanding the feedback loop (section 6.5.5), and the 
medium/long-term influence the performance system had on both beliefs and direct 
treatment choices. There is clear evidence that beliefs were influenced through learning and 
communication from the performance system (section 6.4). Company anecdotes and myths 
permeated from interpretation of the performance systems (section 6.5). This learning was 
a synthesis of multiple measures, not just those that had either financial or safety statement. 
Managers were seen to be effective in their integration of cause and effect of their actions 
and how this had a bearing of risk taking in the organization. These were expressed as part 
of their belief. 
The influence of the performance system was further seen in the statement of direct 
treatment links (section 7.10). So although the performance system did not explicitly outline 
the type of risk and the action that must or must not be taken, managers were clear in their 
articulation on a limited number of accounts as to how they knew their actions and 
decisions were in-line with the organization’s values. In this way the performance system 
was influencing the perception of risks in the organization. These organizational visions had 
become combined with individual beliefs. In this way managers had reconciled their 
understanding of the issue. 
Therefore as the individual gains in experience, their beliefs develop and this reflects on 
their future actions (section 5.3.9). This was consistent with the understanding that experts 
may have different mental models (Tazelaar & Snijders, 2013). Risk is therefore determined 
on both an individual and firm level, consistent with Nocco and Stulz (2006). 
The behaviours and accounts observed also have explanation in the psychology literature. 
Reflections on previous incidents (especially safety incidents) influenced the individual’s 
framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and weighting (Wedell & Senter, 1997; Wiseman & 
Gomez-Meija, 1998), beliefs were established through recall of previous events and used as 
frame of reference in completing a risk assessment. Further the introduction of multiple 
categories of risk for manager’s consideration increased the number of attributes 
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considered. It was found that some managers were being presented large volumes of 
operational information, with no explicit risk management guidance (in absence of a 
prescriptive performance system). It is known that increased number of attributes increases 
cognitive load (Payne et al., 1988), but under time pressure this load forces coping strategies 
to be applied (Pennington & Tuttle, 2007). Combined with time pressure, which was evident 
in service functions (chapter 6), this drove a subsistence existence in risk management, i.e. 
dealing only with close proximity and high impact risks (section 6.5.1). The inference is that 
increased number of attributes and increased weighting increases the accuracy and validity 
of results (Peterson & Beach, 1967), however this research could not make judgement of 
accuracy of decision (cf. Glaser & Chi, 1988) or speed of decision (Tazelaar & Snijders, 2013) 
as it dealt with risk as a latent force, and did not reflect on the control mechanisms post-
treatment. 
8.6 Sponsor Statement 
This research was conducted in the context of the question posed by GRS’ Chief Finance 
Officer: 
 “I want to understand the mechanisms available to me to change our risk 
management process, whether we can operate like financial institutions in our 
assessment of risk, or whether we are fundamentally different. I wish to be able to 
desensitise certain aspects of our organisation and turn-on others.”   
In structuring this question and to reflect a sector specific desire to emulate the finance 
sector, there was a more specific question: 
 “Should we adopt the classification defined by the Basel Accord as a suitable standard 
for our risk management policy?” 
In conclusion this research is able to respond to these questions: 
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8.6.1 Influencing Risk Taking 
The performance management system is only one influence on the selection of a risk 
treatment; however it is a reference point that is accessed toward the end of the decision-
making process when assessing risk. The boundary conditions are set by the organization 
through systematic communication and development of organizational beliefs, these 
influences will have primacy over the decision. Where structured decision-making is applied 
this is a complex relationship between the role of the individual, their authority levels and 
the context they exist within (i.e. Asset or service affiliation in this research), where the 
function’s systems, valuation methods and the experience of staff in the process will become 
the dominating factor. Alignment between the firm and function-levels is inherently 
challenging in an environment that exhibits both a multiplicity of risks and diverse 
operational requirements. Therefore the culture of risk decisions is likely to be defined 
within the local operating unit, rather than the culture of the firm. 
The next section covers the specific question of adoption of Basel frameworks (and 
Operational risk and VaR) in the energy sector. 
8.6.2 Operational Risk in the Energy Sector 
It appears that the Basel Accord definitions should not be used as a framework for the 
energy sector. There are clear contradictions exposed in the definitions of Market, Credit 
and Operational risk as seen in the Basel Committee (2006). The ability for the finance 
sector to approach risk valuation as a matter of financial impact is not a simplification or 
luxury that the energy sector exhibits. The finance literature and commentary from the 
finance sector demonstrate concern (Power, 2005) in the appropriateness and ability for 
techniques, such as VaR to be used effectively in calculating the exposure in the sub-
category of Operational risk, regardless of transfer into a new sector. 
The cause-consequence model provides an explanation to the challenges in the Basel 
definition. In finance, market and credit risk (consequential definitions) have a financial 
measure implicit in their classification, both in the terms to calculate it and express it. 
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Operational risk (causal definition), is not naturally expressed as a financial measure, it 
requires a conversion. In finance there is a single measure of risk (£/$). However this 
measure of risk is used for one purpose – the calculation of capital adequacy, it is not seen as 
a measure appropriate for managing the risk treatment decisions. 
8.6.3 Finance Sector Envy 
The energy sector’s envy of financial risk management practices can be traced to a reflection 
on valuation techniques and the standardised approach to recording and analysis. Energy 
has a multiplicity of risk types, specifically at a tier one and tier two consequential levels e.g. 
reputation, safety and environmental. These measures of risk are material to its 
stakeholders and observed by its shareholders (as seen in the firm-level analysis). The 
purpose behind energy sector risk valuation is not driven by capital adequacy requirements. 
Therefore the benefit seen in the Basel definition is not directly transferable to the energy 
sector. Instead it increases complexity and has a potential to exclude proven and valuable 
approaches seen in asset functions. 
There is a subtlety. Asset functions have developed a standardised approach in recording 
and analysis, and the valuation is objective whilst recognising the multiplicity of risk types; 
this could be lost. Service functions, more representative of the financial sector can borrow 
from the understanding in finance and specifically Basel if required. But this must be 
integrated into the wider energy risk management system. If seeking a common approach 
across asset and service functions, the lowest common denominator must be preserved. 
This is of particular concern as a halo effect from asset into service has been observed (e.g. 
safety risk, hold the handrail in call centres). It would seem inappropriate for the service 
functions to become isolated from the wider corporate culture of risk management in firm. 
8.6.4 Summary 
In addition to these considerations, this research shows that an understanding of how to 
influence risk management in operations is complex. Through the four levels of analysis 
findings provided a richer and more granular appreciation of the structures and behaviours 
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affecting the process. There were three theories which exposed this complexity. Firstly the 
understanding of calculative culture (Power, 2005). There was reversal in culture between 
assessment and treatment. This further exposed the fundamental difference between asset 
and service functions, which at firm-level were being managed as a homogenous group of 
operations. 
Mikes’ ERM ideal types (2009; 2011), which explained the holistic structure of risk 
management in the firm, was used to assess the current and future desires in the firm. The 
two firms differed in their ERM ideal types. However, it exposed the evolutionary nature of 
risk management practices; and that the firms recognised benefits from different ERM types. 
Finally, using the Levers of Control (Simons, 1994; 1995), demonstrated that the 
performance system manifested itself through the physical embodiment of a performance 
measurement system, where non-risk measures (i.e. ROCE or project contingency) were 
being interpreted when making treatment decisions. But also, that the performance system 
influenced the beliefs of the individual and the firm. Critically, and understanding that the 
performance measurement system is a secondary point of reference, where beliefs have not 
pre-determined the decision. So, the impact of the performance management system is 
better understood as a medium or long-term influence on establishing individual and 
organizational beliefs.  
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Chapter 9 
9. Conclusion 
The motivation for this research was born of a question from practice: the ability to 
influence risk management in an energy firm. Academically this research bridges a number 
of domains. These are: risk management, performance management and behavioural 
science. 
In its undertaking, this research has created new knowledge in understanding that the 
management of risk in operations is a multi-level phenomenon, in that each level studied 
(i.e. industry, firm, function, group and individual) has a distinct impact on this phenomenon 
of managing risk in operations.  
The firm-level focuses on aggregation, reporting and communication of risk to stakeholders, 
which manifests as efforts to create holistic risk management frameworks and further 
adoption of formal risk management standards (e.g. COSO); which in isolation has limited 
evidenced impact on the function-level. The function-level represents the control structures 
(i.e. oversight meetings and risk reports) and defines the systems for managing a portfolio of 
risks. The firm-level’s influence on function is a product of the unidirectional reporting 
requirements, less so the imposition of explicit targets or measures in managing risk; hence 
it demonstrates an awkward relationship between risk management and the performance 
management system.  
The design and use of the risk systems (prevalent in the function-level) influences 
organizational learning and calculative culture (i.e. pragmatist or idealist); it is this influence 
that transmits into the group-level. Group-level differences are pronounced in the perceived 
availability of risk treatments, that levels of authority are fundamental in the selection of 
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treatment, where collective decision-making is influential in implementing strategic risk 
treatments (i.e. outsource). 
 At the group-level the influence of the performance management system is limited, which is 
unexpected when considering that the performance system is a tool for adjusting 
behaviours and communicating actions between levels of management. The individual 
(manager) operates within this context of firm, function and level of authority; however 
individual beliefs have a material influence on both assessment and where appropriate 
treatment selection. These beliefs are influenced over the long-term through interpretation 
of the performance targets and measures.  
Specifically this thesis has demonstrated that the formal structures within the firm and 
function are inherently mediated by the role of the individual, that although the 
organization can define risk frameworks and policies (often supported through formal 
systems), the process of analysis and treatment selection are a product of managerial 
behaviours and beliefs, and that the performance system must be understood how it can 
affect these beliefs and behaviours.  This is the first research of its kind to study vertically 
through the company the effect of these influences, and expose this complexity. 
The current point of maturity of risk management in operations demonstrates that 
performance measures and targets are not explicit of risk measures, and that managers 
must subjectively develop the link between the two. It is the implicit association of risk 
management and performance management that validates the need to understand their 
relationship, although this relationship has inherent contention in application. Risk 
management is therefore not a sub-theme of performance management, rather two 
independent disciplines that need integration in understanding and application. 
This research was conducted in the context of two energy companies; however there is an 
implication on organizations which operate in environments with distributed structures and 
multiple types of risk, that they might be expected to exhibit similar characteristics. This 
new knowledge has implications on both theory and practice. 
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The extant literature provided an understanding to the definition and ontology of risk (e.g. 
de Finetti, 1971; Knight, 1921) and further into the practice of risk management, which 
included risk management standards (i.e. ERM, COSO 2004) and risk practices (including 
assessment, valuation and categorisation). The lack of understanding of how structures and 
control systems in managing risk was identified by Mikes (2009). This was reviewed 
through an understanding that the performance system exists as mechanism between the 
firm (principle) and the manager (agent) (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). Both the performance 
management and measurement literature were reviewed, and the closely related 
management accounting literature. This highlighted the different components of the 
performance system (e.g. as a measurement function, cf. Otley, 1999). The decomposition of 
the performance system enabled an implementation independent analysis (i.e. not only 
Balanced Scorecard implementation) to be conducted. The Levers of Control (Simons, 1994; 
1995) complementing the understanding of control system use in the management of risk. 
The final body of work reviewed was decisions under uncertainty (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 
1981; Payne et al., 1988; Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998), this provided explanation to the 
behaviour of individuals in making decisions. 
There was no single theory which explained the phenomenon of managing risk in 
operations, therefore the aim was to extend theory, rather than test it. It was apparent that 
different influences on the risk management process appeared at different levels of the 
organization (e.g. firm, function, group and individual), this informed the need to conduct a 
multi-level study. This formed the research questions: 
1. RSQ1: What are the treatment strategies for risk in operations? and 
2. RSQ2: What influences the selection of treatment strategy? 
As the understanding of risk management influences developed at each level of the study it 
was appropriate to conduct the research as a process of systematic combining, i.e. the 
continued matching of theory and data to develop a revised understanding. This led to the 
adoption of an abductive approach.  
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Four levels of analysis were completed. The firm and function-levels were analysed through 
the exploratory case study method, triangulating data from managerial accounts, reports 
and meetings. As the research developed from the structures (firm and function) to a study 
of managerial behaviours and thought processes, the group-level extended the case study 
approach, and presented the findings as causal maps. Causal maps provided the opportunity 
to express direction and relation between the different concepts in manager’s metal models. 
Qualitative and quantitative measures were used to analyse the causal maps, thereby 
providing an empirical contrast between models. The final level of analysis, and the most 
granular frame of reference was the individual. This phase of the research turned to survey 
data and statistical description and analysis.  
By combining the findings across all four levels of analysis it provided a rich understanding 
of the influences, rationales and outcomes of the risk management process. The findings 
have created new insight, extended existing understanding and confirmed previous 
research; these are outlined in the next section. 
9.1 Findings 
There were findings at each level of analysis. Further, questions at each level of analysis 
were exposed, that lead into the next level. However by integrating the findings across the 
different levels a more complete understanding of the influences on managing risk in 
operations can be reached.  
At the firm-level it was found that the abstracted and aggregated nature of the risk data 
provided limited opportunity for the central governance functions to interact with the 
functional units. The aim of the corporate functions was to standardise, report and control 
risk taking and risk investment within the business units. Standardisation was evidenced 
through the adoption of risk management standards (i.e. COSO, 2004), however these did 
not permeate into the business units. 
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At the function-level there were pronounced differences between service and asset 
functions. Structurally, the business units defined the risk management process, through the 
application of risk management systems, and the cultures exhibited in risk assessment and 
valuation. The development of the risk management process in the business units was 
context specific; this was evidenced through the descriptions (types) of risks, the propensity 
toward specific risk treatments and the decision-processes observed. A complexity was 
exposed in the lack of understanding of the different risk classifications and the relationship 
between them. Chapter 8 presented two related frameworks to mitigate these issues: the 
Cause-Consequence classification and the Risk Hierarchy. 
At the group-level there were differences exposed between senior managers (S-suite) and 
middle managers (M-suite) in their mental models. Further there were differences between 
managers in asset and service functions, hence confirming the differences found at the 
function level. It was found that the role of individual beliefs had a significant influence on 
the decision process, and therefore limiting the influence of the performance system. It was 
seen that different risk treatments were used to manage risk in operations, and that access 
to these treatments were bounded by levels of authority and the requirement for collective 
consensus. 
To focus the research, it was defined that the selection of risk treatment provided an 
indication to the influence on the risk management process (it was the observable outcome 
of the decision, without inferring a positive or negative result). The risk management 
process comprised several sub-processes (i.e. identification, assessment, analysis/valuation, 
treatment and control), each leading to a discrete decision of treatment selection (although 
this could result in no action being taken). 
The use of treatments and the types of sensitivity in individuals was tested in the individual-
level analysis. This exposed five latent influences on the manager, and that three of these 
demonstrated significant differences between managerial samples. Significantly it was 
found that the levers of control (Simons, 1994; 1995) demonstrated an order of influence on 
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the risk management decision process. The findings supported three of the four Control 
Levers directly. Boundary Systems prohibited specific risk treatments, before referring to 
Belief Systems. Where Belief Systems were not informing the decision, the individual refers to 
the performance system. There was a feedback loop from performance system through to 
beliefs and to directives (boundary systems). 
 In combining the findings from the four levels of analysis it was evidenced that the asset 
functions showed a precise and standardised risk management process, from the 
implementation of system through to activity of prioritisation. The standardised approach in 
asset functions appeared idealist, as attention was to quantitative valuation. However 
managerial selection of treatment and presentation of risks was pragmatist; where the 
valuation was only a guide. The reverse was found in service functions. With less data, 
unstructured processes and risks being treated as single issues, the analysis of risks 
appeared pragmatist in character. In selecting treatment and debating investment, the 
language used and decision-making reflected idealist beliefs. This was a result of the 
different perceptions of risk types between functions and difference in communities of 
employees. The asset functions exhibited professionalised and static resources, service 
functions with semi-skilled and mobile employees. 
The extension of risk processes from finance to energy would face many challenges. The 
variety of risk types and the range of potential treatments in energy would require revision 
of the Basel Accord risk categories. The objective of the Basel Accord is to determine capital 
adequacy, under three classifications of risk: market, credit and Operational risk. This was 
not the stated objective of the risk management process in energy. So although learning 
from the discipline of valuation and understanding risk appetite seemed appropriate, the 
benefits of application were limited. The energy sector looked to manage risk for protection 
of assets and increasingly for operational and capital efficiency. So although Operational risk 
is similar to risk in operations, it is not a term of equivalence. They have different uses and 
meanings. 
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For the practitioner, a singular thermostatic lever to turn-on or desensitise different parts of 
the organization in performance managing risk did not exist. Instead an understanding of 
how the integrated performance system, across levels, influenced risk management was 
required. Boundary conditions can be established through organizational culture. This 
reflected the performance system literature that encourages constant revision of strategy, 
using measures as a challenge to this process (i.e. Bourne, et al., 2000). Personal beliefs, 
established through experience as well as through long-term influence of the performance 
system were harder to predict, so although traits of influence existed within groups and 
individuals there was only limited convergence of perceptions between functions and 
managerial levels.  
The role of the performance system must therefore be seen beyond the diagnostic function 
and not as a panacea for structuring risk decisions. Managers reflected their objectives in 
this contract between principle (firm) and agent (employee). However this reference point 
required a subjective interpretation of an objective measure and target, which was not 
explicitly risk based. The understanding of risk objectives was interpreted through primary 
measures, so the manager handled risk in different ways.  
Therefore the risk management process is influenced by a complex relationship between, 
embedded visions, personal beliefs and interpretation of the performance system.  
9.2 Contributions to Theory 
This research has made several contributions to the understanding of managing risk in 
operations, the contributions, basis in findings and their justification are summarised in 
table 9.1. It identifies where contributions: create (i.e. is original development beyond that 
of the existing literature), extend (i.e. develop existing theory) or confirm (i.e. further 
evidence existing understanding). 
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ro
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b
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 p
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ro
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 m
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at
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 o
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 o
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 o
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 b
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ra
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 s
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 o
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at
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 o
f 
co
n
tr
o
l/
p
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 o
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R
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b
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at
io
n
s,
 t
h
es
e 
in
cl
u
d
ed
 a
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
, 
av
o
id
an
ce
, t
ra
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 t
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 m
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at
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 d
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is
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.g
. H
o
p
ki
n
, 2
0
1
2
; P
au
w
el
s 
&
 M
at
th
ys
se
n
s,
 2
0
0
2
; T
en
g 
et
 a
l.,
 1
9
9
5
).
 T
h
is
 r
e
se
ar
ch
 h
as
 
fo
u
n
d
 t
h
at
 a
 v
ar
ie
ty
 o
f 
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
 a
re
 b
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 c
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 c
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 c
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 m
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 r
is
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l t
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 b
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 c
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
o
n
e 
ty
p
e,
 b
u
t 
al
so
 
ta
rg
et
in
g 
a 
m
o
ve
 t
o
 a
n
 a
lt
er
n
at
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 d
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 m
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l t
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 c
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 p
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at
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 t
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 c
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 d
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h
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p
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is
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 m
an
ag
e
m
en
t 
o
f 
n
o
th
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re
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is
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at
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ra
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n
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n
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n
d
 
p
u
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o
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 c
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at
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n
g 
Su
p
er
vi
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o
n
. 
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This research has shown that risk is a complex phenomenon, influenced by structures in the 
firm (therefore a multi-level phenomenon) and with roots in the behavioural science 
literature. Through researching two polar operations, their management communities, and 
the selection of a sector that exhibits a multiplicity of risk types, there are opportunities for 
generalising beyond the energy sector or the finance sector (which has been the focus of 
attention in extant risk management literature). The next section takes the contributions to 
theory and applies this understanding to practice. 
9.3 Contributions to Practice 
The idea behind this research was developed from a question in industry: how to 
performance manage risk. It is shown that a number of different influences must be brought 
to bear to encourage this change. There is not a single thermostatic control that can be 
applied to change the management of risk. Instead the medium and long-term influence of 
the performance system must be used to steer new beliefs and responses. Table 9.2 
demonstrates how the contributions to theory may also be used to develop promising 
practice. 
Recommendations for practice and the resulting contribution are simple. This is 
dissemination of promising practice, rather than a radical change in process. For the energy 
industry it has been suggested that adoption of a financial standard for risk definition and 
valuation is not appropriate. However asset functions demonstrated a mature risk process, a 
balance of quantitative idealism, but argued using pragmatism.  
The four levels of analysis are used to explain the difference between desired attributes and 
influences of the risk management process and the observed activities. The findings show an 
almost contradictory relationship between the two. The structures expected to have 
influence are responded to with a different and more subjective force. The 
recommendations for practice are derived from the contributions to theory, these are 
summarised in table 9.2.  
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Table 9.2 Contributions to practice 
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R
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 m
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ra
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at
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p
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 t
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re
s 
o
f 
ri
sk
. 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
: 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 r
is
k 
an
d
 
ri
sk
 in
 o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
as
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
te
rm
s 
 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 r
is
k 
(B
as
el
 C
o
m
m
it
te
e,
 2
0
0
6
) 
an
d
 r
is
k 
in
 o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
te
rm
s 
o
f 
eq
u
iv
al
en
ce
; t
h
ey
 h
av
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
m
ea
n
in
gs
, r
at
io
n
al
es
 a
n
d
 
o
b
je
ct
iv
es
 in
 t
h
ei
r 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
. H
o
w
e
ve
r 
it
 w
as
 f
o
u
n
d
 t
h
at
 O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 r
is
k 
in
 t
h
e 
en
er
gy
 s
e
ct
o
r 
is
 u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 t
o
 m
ea
n
 t
h
e 
m
an
ag
em
e
n
t 
o
f 
ri
sk
 
ar
is
in
g 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
.  
D
es
ir
e 
to
 e
m
u
la
te
 f
in
an
ci
al
 d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s 
o
f 
ri
sk
 (
i.e
. O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 r
is
k)
 a
re
 n
o
t 
ad
vi
se
d
 f
o
r 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
ex
p
o
su
re
 t
o
 a
 m
u
lt
ip
lic
it
y 
o
f 
ri
sk
 t
yp
es
. 
R
is
k 
in
 o
p
er
at
io
n
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 a
s 
a 
d
is
ti
n
ct
 d
is
ci
p
lin
e,
 w
h
ic
h
 
en
co
u
ra
ge
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n
 f
ro
m
 lo
ss
 e
ve
n
ts
; a
n
d
 t
h
at
 t
h
es
e 
lo
ss
 e
ve
n
ts
 m
ay
 
h
av
e 
im
p
ac
t 
o
th
er
 t
h
an
 f
in
an
ci
al
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s.
 
St
an
d
ar
d
s:
 
R
is
k 
st
an
d
ar
d
 
p
er
m
ea
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 E
R
M
 
ty
p
es
 
 
Th
e 
u
se
 o
f 
ri
sk
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
s 
(i
.e
. C
O
SO
) 
at
 f
ir
m
-l
e
ve
l d
id
 n
o
t 
p
e
rm
ea
te
 in
to
 
th
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 u
n
it
s.
 T
h
is
 in
d
ic
at
es
 li
m
it
ed
 o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 in
fl
u
en
ce
 o
n
 t
h
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
o
f 
ri
sk
 w
h
en
 a
d
o
p
ti
n
g 
a 
ri
sk
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 (
se
ct
io
n
 5
.5
).
 E
R
M
 
id
ea
l t
yp
es
 (
M
ik
es
, 2
0
1
1
) 
w
er
e 
sh
o
w
n
 t
o
 b
e 
fl
u
id
, t
h
at
 t
h
e 
ca
se
s 
ex
h
ib
it
ed
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
o
n
e 
ty
p
e,
 b
u
t 
al
so
 t
ar
ge
ti
n
g 
a 
m
o
ve
 t
o
 a
n
 a
lt
er
n
at
iv
e 
ri
sk
 t
yp
e 
(i
.e
. H
o
lis
ti
c 
ri
sk
 m
an
ag
em
en
t)
. T
h
is
 d
em
o
n
st
ra
te
d
 t
h
at
 n
o
 
sp
ec
if
ic
 E
R
M
 r
is
k 
ty
p
e 
is
 id
ea
l o
r 
p
er
ce
iv
ed
 t
o
 b
e 
o
p
ti
m
al
. (
se
ct
io
n
 4
.3
) 
R
is
k 
st
an
d
ar
d
s 
(i
.e
. E
R
M
) 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 a
s 
a 
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
 a
n
d
 
sy
st
e
m
at
ic
 m
et
h
o
d
 o
f 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ri
sk
. I
t 
p
ro
vi
d
e
s 
a 
fr
am
ew
o
rk
. H
o
w
ev
er
 a
s 
se
en
, e
ff
o
rt
s 
to
 im
p
le
m
en
t 
th
is
 t
h
ro
u
gh
o
u
t 
th
e 
fi
rm
, a
re
 li
ke
ly
 t
o
 b
e 
ch
al
le
n
ge
d
 b
y 
lo
ca
l o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
. W
h
er
e 
th
e 
cu
lt
u
re
 o
f 
ri
sk
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d
 t
h
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
s 
(i
.e
. r
is
k 
sy
st
e
m
s)
 a
re
 li
ke
ly
 t
o
 b
e 
d
o
m
in
an
t 
o
ve
r 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
. T
h
er
ef
o
re
 b
ey
o
n
d
 t
h
e 
re
q
u
ir
em
en
t 
fo
r 
ce
rt
if
ic
at
io
n
, t
h
e 
re
la
ti
ve
 b
en
ef
it
 o
f 
o
p
er
at
io
n
al
 c
h
an
ge
, w
h
er
e 
p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
re
 a
lr
ea
d
y 
m
at
u
re
 
w
ill
 b
e 
m
in
im
al
. 
M
u
lt
ip
le
 
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s:
 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
in
 A
ss
et
 
an
d
 S
er
vi
ce
 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 a
n
d
  S
-
Su
it
e 
an
d
 M
-S
u
it
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
 
A
ss
et
 m
an
ag
er
s 
h
ad
 a
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
 m
o
d
el
 t
o
 m
an
ag
e 
ri
sk
, t
h
an
 
Se
rv
ic
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 6
.6
).
 S
er
vi
ce
 m
an
ag
er
s 
fo
cu
se
d
 o
n
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
ri
sk
, a
n
d
 h
ad
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
e
en
 b
el
ie
fs
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
u
se
 o
f 
la
g 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 6
.6
.8
).
 A
ss
e
t 
m
an
ag
er
s 
fo
cu
se
d
 o
n
 s
af
et
y 
ri
sk
, a
n
d
 u
se
d
 
ri
sk
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 in
fo
rm
 le
ar
n
in
g 
an
d
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 d
ec
is
io
n
-m
ak
in
g 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 
6
.6
.9
).
 S
-S
u
it
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
h
ad
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s 
to
 m
an
ag
e 
ri
sk
 
th
an
 M
-S
u
it
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
(i
.e
. E
n
gi
n
ee
ri
n
g 
m
an
ag
er
).
 M
-S
u
it
e
 m
an
ag
er
s 
d
em
o
n
st
ra
te
d
 n
o
 c
o
n
si
st
en
cy
 a
cr
o
ss
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s,
 w
h
er
ea
s 
S-
Su
it
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
(a
cr
o
ss
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s)
 d
e
m
o
n
st
ra
te
d
 c
o
n
si
st
en
cy
 in
 u
se
 o
f 
ri
sk
 m
ea
su
re
s,
 a
n
d
 
an
 in
cr
ea
se
d
 a
w
ar
en
e
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
 (
se
ct
io
n
 6
.6
.7
) 
M
an
ag
er
s 
in
 m
u
lt
i-
d
is
ci
p
lin
e 
co
m
p
an
ie
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
a 
si
n
gl
e 
h
o
m
o
ge
n
o
u
s 
gr
o
u
p
. T
h
ei
r 
al
le
gi
an
ce
 t
o
 s
p
e
ci
fi
c 
d
is
ci
p
lin
e
s 
(i
.e
. g
en
er
at
io
n
 o
r 
re
ta
il)
 w
ill
 
m
an
if
e
st
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s.
 F
u
rt
h
er
 t
h
er
e 
is
 a
 c
le
ar
 in
d
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
at
 
se
n
io
r 
m
an
ag
er
s 
w
ill
 d
e
ve
lo
p
 m
o
re
 c
o
m
p
le
x 
an
d
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 m
en
ta
l m
o
d
el
s 
o
f 
th
ei
r 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t.
  T
h
er
e
fo
re
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
th
er
m
o
st
at
ic
 c
o
n
tr
o
l t
h
ro
u
gh
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
is
 u
n
lik
el
y 
to
 b
e 
fo
u
n
d
, i
n
st
ea
d
 t
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
b
et
w
e
en
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s 
m
u
st
 b
e 
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 w
h
en
 d
e
si
gn
in
g 
ri
sk
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
s.
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C
o
n
ce
p
t 
an
d
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 
Fi
n
d
in
gs
 
C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 t
o
 p
ra
ct
ic
e
 
Th
e 
In
d
iv
id
u
al
: 
La
te
n
t 
in
fl
u
en
ce
s 
o
n
 
ri
sk
 m
an
ag
er
s 
 
Th
er
e 
w
er
e 
fi
ve
 la
te
n
t 
in
fl
u
en
ce
s 
o
n
 t
h
e 
ri
sk
 d
ec
is
io
n
 f
o
u
n
d
: f
in
an
ci
al
-
fo
cu
s,
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
-f
o
cu
s,
 c
o
m
p
an
y-
fo
cu
s,
 t
o
o
l-
fo
cu
s 
an
d
 t
ra
d
it
io
n
al
-f
o
cu
s 
(s
e
ct
io
n
 7
.2
).
 It
 w
as
 s
h
o
w
n
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
u
se
 o
f 
in
su
ra
n
ce
 w
as
 in
fl
u
en
ce
d
 b
y 
a 
fi
n
an
ci
al
-f
o
cu
s,
 t
h
e 
ac
ce
p
ta
n
ce
 o
f 
ri
sk
 in
fl
u
en
ce
d
 b
y 
a 
lo
w
er
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
-
fo
cu
s 
an
d
 h
ig
h
er
 t
ra
d
it
io
n
al
-f
o
cu
s,
 r
is
k 
av
o
id
an
ce
 a
n
d
 d
ef
e
rm
en
t 
b
y 
h
ig
h
er
 t
ra
d
it
io
n
al
-f
o
cu
s 
(s
ec
ti
o
n
 7
.8
).
 It
 w
as
 s
ee
n
 t
h
at
 A
ss
et
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
s 
h
ad
 
h
ig
h
er
 f
in
an
ci
al
 a
n
d
 t
ra
d
it
io
n
al
-f
o
cu
s,
 a
n
d
 S
-S
u
it
e 
h
ad
 h
ig
h
e
r 
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
 
fo
cu
s,
 w
h
ils
t 
fe
m
al
es
 h
ad
 lo
w
er
 in
d
iv
id
u
al
-f
o
cu
s 
(s
e
ct
io
n
 7
.6
) 
M
an
ag
er
s 
ar
e 
sh
o
w
n
 t
o
 h
av
e 
a 
ra
n
ge
 o
f 
in
fl
u
en
ce
s 
im
p
ac
ti
n
g 
th
ei
r 
ri
sk
 
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
 F
u
rt
h
er
, d
if
fe
re
n
t 
co
m
m
u
n
it
ie
s 
o
f 
m
an
ag
er
 e
xh
ib
it
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
tl
y 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
se
n
si
ti
vi
ti
e
s,
 a
n
d
 t
h
at
 t
h
es
e 
se
n
si
ti
vi
ti
es
 r
el
at
e 
to
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
b
ia
se
s 
fo
r 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
se
le
ct
io
n
. T
h
is
 m
ed
ia
te
s 
th
e 
im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
 
u
se
. T
h
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 in
 p
er
so
n
al
 r
is
k 
b
ea
ri
n
g 
b
et
w
ee
n
 m
al
e 
an
d
 f
em
al
e 
m
an
ag
er
s 
w
as
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
in
 t
h
at
 f
em
al
es
 d
e
m
o
n
st
ra
te
d
 g
re
at
er
 a
lt
ru
is
m
 in
 
th
ei
r 
d
ec
is
io
n
s.
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
sy
st
e
m
s:
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
an
ag
ed
 d
ec
is
io
n
s 
m
ed
ia
te
d
 b
y 
d
ec
is
io
n
-m
ak
er
 a
n
d
 
d
ec
is
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
 
R
is
k 
d
ec
is
io
n
s 
w
er
e 
d
o
m
in
at
e
d
 b
y 
su
b
je
ct
iv
e 
in
fl
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
th
e 
m
an
ag
er
 
(b
o
th
 in
 v
al
u
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t)
, t
h
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 s
ys
te
m
 w
as
 a
 lo
w
er
 
o
rd
er
 in
fl
u
en
ce
 (
i.e
. l
at
er
 in
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
).
 R
at
h
er
 it
 is
 s
u
gg
es
te
d
 
th
at
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
-m
ak
er
 is
 m
e
d
ia
te
d
 b
y 
th
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 s
ys
te
m
 (
se
ct
io
n
 
6
.7
).
 T
h
e 
ad
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
d
ec
is
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
w
as
 s
h
o
w
n
 t
o
 b
e 
re
fl
ec
ti
ve
 o
f 
th
e 
co
n
te
xt
 (
o
f 
th
e 
o
p
er
at
io
n
),
 t
h
is
 in
cl
u
d
ed
 t
h
e
 t
im
e 
p
re
ss
u
re
 o
f 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
u
se
 o
f 
ri
sk
 v
al
u
at
io
n
 s
ys
te
m
s 
th
at
 
re
d
u
ce
d
 t
h
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
(c
o
gn
it
iv
e 
lo
ad
) 
o
n
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
-
m
ak
er
 (
se
ct
io
n
 8
.5
.2
) 
Th
e 
en
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
a 
m
an
ag
er
 o
p
er
at
ed
 w
it
h
in
 h
ad
 a
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 o
n
 
th
ei
r 
d
ec
is
io
n
 s
tr
at
eg
y.
 In
 f
as
t 
p
ac
ed
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
ts
, i
n
tu
it
iv
e
 ju
d
ge
m
en
t 
w
as
 b
ei
n
g 
u
se
d
, w
h
er
ea
s 
in
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
ts
 t
h
at
 w
er
e 
le
ss
 v
o
la
ti
le
 in
cr
ea
se
d
 
re
as
o
n
ed
 d
ec
is
io
n
-m
ak
in
g 
w
as
 b
ei
n
g 
p
er
fo
rm
ed
. I
t 
w
as
 s
h
o
w
n
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
ap
p
lic
at
io
n
 o
f 
em
b
ed
d
ed
 r
is
k 
sy
st
e
m
s 
(l
ev
er
ag
in
g 
th
e 
h
is
to
ri
ca
l r
ec
o
rd
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
),
 a
ls
o
 s
er
ve
d
 t
o
 e
n
co
u
ra
ge
 m
o
re
 r
ea
so
n
ed
 d
e
ci
si
o
n
-m
ak
in
g.
 
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
an
ag
in
g 
ri
sk
: 
O
rd
er
 o
f 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 in
 
Le
ve
rs
 o
f 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
n
 o
rd
er
 o
f 
in
fl
u
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
Le
ve
rs
 o
f 
C
o
n
tr
o
l (
Si
m
o
n
s,
 1
9
9
5
).
 
Th
is
 b
eg
in
s 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
B
o
u
n
d
ar
y 
sy
st
e
m
, t
h
en
 t
h
e 
B
el
ie
f 
sy
st
e
m
 a
n
d
 t
h
en
 
th
e 
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e/
 D
ia
gn
o
st
ic
 s
ys
te
m
 (
se
ct
io
n
 8
.5
.2
) 
Th
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
ea
su
re
m
e
n
t 
sy
st
em
 is
 c
o
n
su
lt
ed
 la
te
r 
in
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
 
p
ro
ce
ss
, w
h
er
e 
in
d
iv
id
u
al
 b
el
ie
fs
 a
n
d
 b
o
u
n
d
ar
ie
s 
h
ad
 n
o
t 
p
re
-d
e
fi
n
ed
 t
h
e 
d
ec
is
io
n
. T
h
er
e
fo
re
 t
h
e 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sy
st
em
 m
u
st
 b
e 
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 in
 it
s 
m
ed
iu
m
 a
n
d
 lo
n
g-
te
rm
 c
ap
ac
it
y 
to
 in
fl
u
en
ce
 t
h
es
e 
b
el
ie
fs
 
an
d
 e
st
ab
lis
h
 t
h
e 
b
o
u
n
d
ar
ie
s 
o
f 
o
p
er
at
io
n
. 
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This research makes distinct contributions to the understanding of managing risk in 
operations, showing that it is a granular, complex and multi-level phenomenon. 
9.4 Limitations and Extensions 
Limitations to this research are a product of the design of the study and the limitations of 
the existing literature. The sector analysed was the European Energy Industry, it was a 
sector with a multiplicity of risks and complex in the breadth of operational tasks. This was 
a deliberate choice to extend understanding beyond the finance sector. The findings are 
therefore specific to the energy sector. Further, the organizations selected were large 
multinational firms, which through geographic and cultural differences within the firm 
present unique challenges (i.e. remote oversight from central governance functions). 
Analysis of medium size organizations would be expected to limit the issues in 
communication seen in this study. Extension into both comparable and contrasting sectors, 
and inclusion of small or medium firms would provide evidence of the effects (i.e. reversal of 
calculative culture) seen in this research. These findings also suggest applicability into 
sectors where a multiplicity of risks exist e.g. Mining or large conglomerates. It is a study, 
existing in parallel to the discipline of financial risk management and shows how the 
complexity of different risk types requires an evolution from the financial perspectives of 
risk management. 
The function-level analysis, selected two polar operations (as suggested by Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007): retail (service) and generation (asset). The differences were pronounced 
between these samples (see chapters 5 and 6). However the service-asset dichotomy is a 
simplification of the environment, as operations exhibiting characteristics of both function 
types existed within the energy sector (e.g. distribution, which operate call centres and asset 
management). The pronounced differences should be tested using a breadth of operations 
types. 
The group-level analysis split the sample by senior (S-suite) and middle (M-suite) managers, 
this was modified from the sample in Bremser and Chung’s work (2006). This research 
344 
 
excluded the supervisor grades and further operating grades within the organization. 
Therefore a limitation of this research is the omission of these different roles in the 
organization, and their inclusion in further studies would enable greater understanding of 
the pyramid of decisions (i.e. decreasing volume but increasing significance) occurring, and 
the implications this has. It offered opportunity for vertical extension, further separating the 
different grades and functions of managers. The research excluded supervisors and non-
managerial employees. However it was seen in the analysis that some risk decisions are 
completed at all levels of the organization. It was found that authority levels constrain 
potential risk treatments available to the individuals; there is opportunity to see how 
individuals that have no authority to treat risk cope with risks being identified. This is 
beyond the domain of this knowledge, but may identify how ownership of risks feeds from 
the non-managerial employees into the risk management system. 
The individual-analysis provided the greatest scope for extension. It is both a move toward 
positivistic methods and different disciplines. The analysis in this research was constrained 
to provide an indication of the levels of sensitivity, rather than an exhaustive test of all 
influences on risk perceptions. The development of understanding communication protocols 
exists outside of this researches domain, but may expose what the response is to different 
presentations of the performance system (i.e. Balanced Scorecards, or Enterprise Risk 
Scorecards). 
The final limitation identified is the time of the study, both that it was an analysis at a 
specific point in time (data were collected for all four levels over a six month period), and 
that this occurred at a period of great evolution and change in the sector (i.e. rationalisation 
across national boundaries for both firms). The potential to analyse the evolution of risk 
management practices over a temporal study would aid an understanding specifically to the 
change in ERM practices (section 4.3).   
Through the extensions to this research, greater understanding of the phenomena of 
managing risk in operations can be attained.  
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11. Appendix 
Appendix A: Firm-Level interview protocol 
Interview Note: The interviews are semi-structured; participants should feel free to take the 
discussion of the risk management process, their decisions and the structures affecting them 
in an approach suitable to their understanding and role. Prompts identified in the protocol 
can be presented either as direct questions, or as guidance to the interviewer. 
 
A: The approach and meaning behind different descriptions and classifications of risk 
o What does risk mean to your organization? 
o What terminology is used to describe risk? 
B: The risk management process 
1. Can you describe the risk management process in your firm? 
2. How are decisions made? 
C: Communication of risk 
o Who are the stakeholders in your risk process? 
o How do you communicate risk measures and objectives to them? 
D: The roles and standards are used to manage risk, what is performed by the corporate 
functions? 
o What informs the approach adopted to manage risk? 
o What roles are there in the organization to manage risk? 
E: The performance management of risk  
o What are the performance measures for risk? 
o What is the role of the central governance function/ corporate centre? 
F: What risk measures are used? 
3. Are there any specific risk measures used? 
4. How do you use these to inform managerial or operational decision-making? 
G: What are the systems used? 
o What is the strategy to manage risks? 
o Is there a company statement of risk management? 
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Appendix B: Function-level Interview Protocol 
Interview Note: The interviews are semi-structured; participants should feel free to take the 
discussion of the risk management process, their decisions and the structures affecting them 
in an approach suitable to their understanding and role. Prompts identified in the protocol 
can be presented either as direct questions, or as guidance to the interviewer. 
 
A: The approach and meaning behind different descriptions and classifications of risk 
o What does risk mean to your organization? 
o What does risk mean to your Business Unit? 
o What terminology is used to describe risk? 
B: The risk management process 
1. Can you describe the risk management process in your operation? 
2. How are decisions made? 
C: Communication of risk 
o What is the relationship with the corporate oversight functions? 
o Who are the stakeholders in your risk process? 
o How do you communicate risk measures and objectives to them? 
o How do they communicate risk targets or objectives to the operation? 
D: The roles and standards are used to manage risk, what is performed by the operation? 
o What informs the approach adopted to manage risk? 
o What roles are there in the organization to manage risk? 
E: The performance management of risk  
o How do you communicate performance measures to your staff? 
o What is the role of the central governance function/ corporate centre? 
F: What risk measures are used? 
3. Are there any specific risk measures used? 
4. How do you use these to inform managerial or operational decision-making? 
G: What are the systems used? 
o What is the strategy to manage risks? 
o Is there a company statement of risk management? 
o What function controls the risk management process? 
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Appendix C: Group-Level Interview Protocol 
Interview Note: The interviews are semi-structured; participants should feel free to take the 
discussion of the risk management process, their decisions and the structures affecting them 
in an approach suitable to their understanding and role.  
 
 Please describe the risk management process 
 What types of risk occur in your operation?  
 What types of treatments do you use to manage risk? (**where treatments are identified 
the prompt table may be used to elicit detailed responses from the participant – see Nodal 
Considerations to Strategy) 
 How do you select which treatment to apply? 
 What organizational influences exist, how do these affect your decision? (**where 
performance system components are identified the prompt table may be used to elicit 
detailed responses from the participant – see Performance Management Application) 
 Other there any other influences on your decision-making, what are they and how do they 
effect the risk management process? 
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Table 11.2 Group-level Interview Prompts  
 
  
Question Part
What criteria would exist for you to accept a risk? Option Strategic direction Accept
What criteria would exist for you to seek total 
avoidance of a risk? Option Strategic direction Avoid
What criteria would exist for you to insure a risk? Option Strategic direction Insure
What criteria would exist for you to make investment in 
reducing the probability of a risk occurring? Option Strategic direction Mitigate (p)
What criteria would exist for you to make investment in 
reducing the impact of a risk, when it occurs? Option Strategic direction Mitigate (I)
What would encourage you to defer (for a period) in 
taking action in response to a threat? Option Strategic direction Defer/ option
What role does the company strategy or stated 
objectives have on your decision processes when 
managing risk? Option Strategic direction
Strategy & 
Objectives
How does the considerations regarding organisational 
learning contribute to your risk management decision 
processes? Option Strategic direction
Learning & 
Analysis
How does structured analysis contribute to your risk 
management decision process? Option Strategic direction
Learning & 
Analysis
What decisions regarding access and use of measures do 
you go through, when managing a risk? Option Strategic direction Measurement
What decisions regarding communication do you go 
through in managing risk? Option Strategic direction
Communication 
& Stakeholders
What considerations arise relating to the various 
organisational stakeholders, when managing a threat? Option Strategic direction
Communication 
& Stakeholders
How does the existence (or not) of a risk management 
process affect your decisions when faced with managing 
risk? Option Strategic direction
Ownership & 
Scope
How do you think, you as an individual influence the 
risk management process? Option Strategic direction
Control & 
Implementation
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that acceptance of risk fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Accept
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that total avoidance of risk fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Avoid
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that insurance of risk fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Insure
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that mitigating the chance of occurrence of risk fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Mitigate (p)
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that mitigating the impact of occurrence of risk fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Mitigate (I)
What strategic or operational benefits do you consider 
that deferring decision or investment in managing a 
threat fulfils? Strategic direction Goal Defer/ option
Association to Goals
Performance Management Application
Nodal Considerations to Strategy
Contribution (a-b)
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Appendix D: Risk Sensitivity Survey and Treatment Application 
Survey 
 
Information about you: 
 What is your name? [freetext] 
 Are you: male/female/prefer not to say 
 What is your job title? [freetext] 
 What company/ division do you work in? [freetext] 
 Are you considered: a CxO/ Director/ Middle manager/ Junior manager/ Other 
 What is the nature of your business? [freetext] 
Risk Sensitivity Survey: 
To what extent do the following influence your assessment and treatment of risks in your 
current role? Score results as: 0 (not at all influential), 1 (slightly influential), 2 (somewhat 
influential), 3 (influential), 4 (very influential), 5 (extremely influential). 
a. Your own intuition  
b. Estimation of event probability 
c. Statement of risk impact 
d. A statement of financial impact 
e. A statement of non-financial impact 
f. Measures of previous financial performance 
g. Adherence to a stated risk management process 
h. Knowledge of the risk register, or risk matrix 
i. Company strategy 
j. How the decision is perceived internally to the organization 
k. How the decision is perceived externally by stakeholders 
l. That you are identified as the risk owner 
m. The impact the decision may have on your bonus 
n. How you will be perceived 
 
Treatment Application Survey: 
In your current role have you used, or using any of the following risk treatments? Results 
answer yes or no. 
a. Insurance 
b. Mitigating the impact 
c. Mitigating the probability 
d. Avoidance or withdrawal  
e. Outsource 
f. Deferment of the decision  
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Appendix E: Exploratory Factor Analysis Results 
Table 11.1 EFA Rotated Component Matrix 
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Reliance on using intuition   -.594   
Financial impact assessment      .794 
Non-financial impact assessment    .589  
Estimated probability of an event    .812  
Previous financial accounts     .715 
Alignment to company strategy .545    .417 
Future perception of individual  .586    
Impact on the individual’s bonus  .809   .436 
Impact on external stakeholder perception .826     
Impact on internal stakeholder perception .676     
Identified as risk owner  .629    
Impact assessment (generic)    .699  
Use of risk standard   .781   
Risk management process .446  .694   
That the individual will be personally 
impacted 
 .555    
 
Values under 0.4 are suppressed 
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Appendix F: Causal Mapping- A Worked Example 
To demonstrate the method, an extract from a test interview and practice mapping exercise 
is provided below. It does not show data entry into the database, but highlights different 
stages in coding being applied. An example extract for worked analysis is provided: 
“First and foremost it means making sure no-one gets hurt so there’s a very 
operational safety risk thing that’s always in all of our minds. Even though I wasn’t 
in the team where the fatality happened, I saw it from the outside and that’s what 
formed my strong views about health and safety. From these experiences we have 
developed a safety culture. This established culture means that, if you feel unsafe, 
you stop. If anyone around you looks like they’re going to do something stupid, you 
stop them there’s no sort of production over safety kind of mentality at all.” (Test 
Interview) 
Step one: Highlight different causal or equivalence terms. As outlined by Narayanan (2005), 
the words: but, if, then, so, because are standard identifications76; however shown in this 
extract the spoken word does not follow an amenable grammatical construction. The 
underscored and bold text indicates a causal term. 
“First and foremost the established culture means making sure no-one gets hurt so 
there’s a very operational safety risk thing that’s always in all of our minds. Even 
though I wasn’t in the team where the fatality happened, I saw it from the outside 
and that’s what formed my strong views about health and safety. From this we 
have developed a safety culture. This established culture means that, if you feel 
unsafe, you stop. If anyone around you looks like they’re going to do something 
stupid, you stop them there’s no kind of ‘you should have carried on working’.” 
Step two: Break down into different statements, keeping the full description as close as 
possible ensuring the underlying meaning is not lost or misinterpreted during secondary 
coding. This is where the use of a relational database becomes most valuable. This extract 
results in the following five causal relationships: 
o Established culture      SO        Operational safety risk awareness 
o Awareness of safety incident    FORMED  Strong views on H&S 
o Strong views on H&S     HAVE        Developed a safety culture 
o Established culture     MEANS     Stop action on feelings of safety 
o Stop actions on feelings of safety THEN        No requirement to carry on working 
 
 
                                                             
76 When undertaking a confirmation through use of a hard copy transcript, it was found to be useful 
to use the search and replace function in the word processor and highlight these words in the text as 
guidance. 
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Using standard notation when writing them in text form, this appears as: 
1. Established culture    -> Operational safety risk awareness 
2. Awareness of safety incident   ->     Strong views on H&S 
3. Strong views on H&S    -> Developed a safety culture 
4. Established culture   -> Stop action on feelings of safety 
5. Stop actions on feelings of safety -> No requirement to carry on working 
 
Step three: The causal map can present this relationship (nodes and arcs): 
 
Figure 11.1 Raw Causal Map (Worked example) 
Step four: Aggregation of concepts, this might happen as a single pass or take several 
iterations. In reality two iterations were required, before moving to the confirmatory 
activity. The confirmatory activity returned a number of results that needed review, and a 
tighter definition for the different aggregated nodes.  
The first iteration of this extract would have faced the following aggregation of terms: 
 Culture (aggregated node): Established culture, Developed safety culture; 
 Safety awareness (aggregated node): Operational safety risk awareness, Awareness of 
safety incident; 
 Stop for Safety (aggregated node): Stop actions on feelings of safety, No requirement to 
carry on working; 
The representation of these nodes and arcs are expressed as a causal map in figure 10.2. 
Established Culture
Awareness of safety incident
Stop action on feeling of 
safety
Operational safety risk 
awareness
No requirement to carry on 
working
Strong views on H&S
Developed safety culture
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Figure 11.2 Individual Map, Pre-aggregation (Worked example) 
Following the process of reduction (Scavarda et al., 2006) these nodes are condensed. In this 
limited example there is no basis for reduction, so is not expressed. Figure 10.4 shows how 
the different nodal roles can be used to highlight the sources and the goals. In this case the 
source appears to be the statement of safety risk (identified as a risk type). The goal is 
stopping for safety, a goal or treatment. This would be a treatment of avoidance. 
 
Figure 11.3 Consolidate Causal Map (Worked example) 
To complete the representation of the causal map, it is appropriate to move the sources to 
the left hand side of the map and goals to the right hand side of the map. This provides an 
understanding of flow, with beginning and end. 
 
Culture
Stop4Safety
Safety Awareness
Strong View on H&S
RISK TYPE
RISK TREATMENT
CULTURE & 
ALIGNMENT
Stop4Safety
Safety Awareness & 
LEARNING
‘BEHAVIOUR & 
BELIEFS’
Safety Risk
The concept of ‘Safety Risk’ is 
inferred at this point of the analysis, 
and the arc to the learning node is 
also inferred.
